



PREPARING FOR THE PAST

Chaplain (COL)

Cecil B. Currey, US Army Reserve

The reasons for the failure of American efforts in Vietnam have been debated in many forums and have produced many explanations. Few have found that the root cause of our failure rests with the Army's senior leadership. This author takes to task directly our military leaders for prosecuting the war without ever understanding its political nature.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.—Editor

IN THE early years of America's struggle in Vietnam, an important man spoke out against a trend he saw developing there. Edward G. Lansdale, the original "ugly American," was this nation's greatest expert on unconventional and guerrilla warfare. An intelligence agent, he had successfully master-minded Ramon Magsaysay's campaign against Hukbalahap guerrillas in the Philippines and had then been reassigned to Vietnam. He wrote these prophetic words: "The harsh fact . . . is that, despite the use of overwhelming amounts of men, money and materiel, despite the quantity of well-meant American advice and despite the impressive statistics of casualties inflicted on the Vietcong, the Communist subversive insurgents . . . still retain the initiative to act at their will in the very areas of Vietnam where Vietnamese and American efforts have been most concentrated." What he observed in 1964 would become increasingly true as the years passed.

The reason for the failure of American efforts in Vietnam is clear. The military managers of that era did not understand the kind of war facing them. They believed conventional approaches to combat, so successful in all theaters of operations during World War II and in which they were trained and prepared, could easily subdue an ill-equipped and ill-trained guerrilla force in Vietnam. General George Decker, Army chief of staff from 1960-1962, calmly observed that "any good soldier can handle guerrillas." His successor, General Earle G. Wheeler, top soldier of the Army from 1962-1964, announced that "the essence of the problem in Vietnam is military." General Maxwell D. Taylor was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from 1961-1964. In the years just ahead he would increasingly occupy an ever more important political role as an elder military statesman in American dealings with Vietnam. He spoke out even more clearly of his distaste for any special approach to this new form of conflict. Counterinsurgency, he believed, "is just a

form of small war, a guerrilla operation in which we have a long record against the Indians. Any well-trained organization can shift the tempo to that which might be required in this kind of situation."

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Army Chairman of the JCS from 1960-1961, resisted pressures from the new Kennedy adminis-

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tration to consider new approaches in Vietnam. The young president, Lemnitzer said, was "oversold" on guerrilla warfare. Taylor agreed. "All this cloud of dust that's coming out of the White House really isn't necessary."² "Business as usual" was the watchword of the day as military managers plotted tactics in Southeast Asia with an "Alice in Pentagonland" approach.

Except for James Gavin's early quiet urging that American troops be restricted to coastal enclaves in Vietnam, no American general publicly protested any military policy or decried the bankrupt tactics used there. Nor did any American general resign in protest, no matter how much he might later have claimed to disagree with standing operating procedures. No full generals, no lieutenant generals, no major generals, no brigadier generals.³ They all seemed to agree with the approach called for by General William Westmoreland. At the Waldorf in New York City in April 1967, Westmoreland described



US Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker (right) and MACV Commander General Paul D. Harkins inspect members of the Civil Defense Guard at Hao Cain, Vietnam, 15 June 1962. The tripod used by the Vietnamese militiaman is constructed from a single piece of bamboo.

The military managers of that era did not understand the kind of war facing them. They believed conventional approaches to combat, so successful in all theaters of operations during World War II and in which they were trained and prepared, could easily subdue an ill-equipped and ill-trained guerrilla force in Vietnam.

America's military policy in Vietnam: "In effect we are fighting a war of attrition. The only alternative is a war of annihilation."⁴ No fellow general took him to task. It was Dave R. Palmer, then a lieutenant colonel (and now a lieutenant general), who spoke out, criticizing Westmoreland for his limited imagination: "... attrition is not a strategy. It is irrefutable proof of the absence of any strategy. A commander who resorts to attrition admits his failure to conceive of an alternative. He turns from warfare as an art and accepts it on the most nonprofessional terms imagin-

ble. He uses blood instead of brains. . . . [T]he United States was strategically bankrupt in Vietnam."⁵ Certainly no Army leader has ever taken upon himself, nor has the government of the nation ever attempted to ascertain, any responsibility for the military debacle in Vietnam.

Neither then nor since has any official military spokesman or any Army school publicly admitted that its training program, its strategy or its tactics in Vietnam were in error. No leader has publicly suggested that the Army fought the wrong war in the wrong way, thus

making the results there a foregone conclusion. Colonel David Hackworth, the most decorated soldier of the Vietnam era, who finally resigned his commission in protest, bitterly commented that "We had all the assets to win this war. . . . No doubt we could have won if we'd had commanders who know how to use these assets."⁶

It is not that leaders then were not offered alternatives. Time and again they were warned of the consequences of their obstinacy. One of this century's most insightful theoreticians of guerrilla warfare, Robert Taber, wrote his book, *The War of the Flea*, in 1965, just at the time President Lyndon B. Johnson was beginning to send massive numbers of American troops to Vietnam. The Army purchased large quantities of this book for internal pinpoint distribution, yet its leaders paid scant heed to Taber's warnings. Guerrilla warfare, Taber said, is "the single sure method by which an unarmed population can overcome mechanized armies, or, failing to overcome them, can stalemate them and make them irrelevant."⁷ He insisted that there "is only one means of defeating an insurgent people who will not surrender, and that is extermination. There is only one way to control a territory that harbors resistance, and that is to turn it into a desert. Where these means cannot, for whatever reason, be used, the war is lost."⁸

Sir Robert Thompson agreed. This British expert on counter guerrilla warfare in Malaya wrote that "where a guerrilla force enjoys support from the people, whether willing or forced, it can never be defeated by military means, however much it is harassed and attacked, shelled, mortared, and bombed by superior forces of infantry and artillery, air and sea power."⁹ At a later time, Thompson observed that "while there have been plenty of younger Americans, both military and civilian, who have had a good understanding of the war, they have made no impression at all on the system."¹⁰ Some of those younger voices belonged to men such as Jeffrey Race,

Lieutenant Colonels William Corson and Carl Bernard, and Major Jean Sauvageot.

Race went to Vietnam initially as an Army officer in the mid-1960s. Assigned as an adviser to a district chief in Phuoc Tuy Prov-

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ince, he saw clearly that there was a "generally poor American preparation for dealing with Southeast Asia." Even worse, few were capable of any "understanding of revolutionary social movement," and the Army seemed not to care.¹¹ William Corson was a Marine officer, for a time in charge of that force's Combined Action Platoons program in the I Corps sector of Vietnam. After his hasty retirement, he lamented that the American military effort "was not and is not war, it is genocide."¹²

Bernard was a Province Senior Adviser before reassignment as a student to the Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. In 1969 he noted with bitterness that "ominous and far reaching is the cavalier disregard of . . . US commanders for the dictates of the 'pacification' program, in their headlong rush to 'kill VC [Vietcong]'—still touted as the objective. . . . The tools of the Vietcong are primarily non-military [while those of the United States] overwhelmingly are military. . . . This basic failure has insured that the enemy becomes stronger each year, despite heroic lists of KIA [killed in



Vietcong guerrillas circa 1966

Frederickson

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action], weapons captured, VC eliminated, and kill ratios. The US continues to concentrate the bulk of . . . resources and military might on controlling the terrain and looking for massed enemy formations. The VC continues to concentrate its talents on controlling the people. Each succeeds."¹³

Sauvageot served repeated tours in Vietnam. For a time he was a member of Lansdale's country team there. He became one of the Army's top experts on that beleaguered country. Some years ago, he told me that "there is, I think, some kind of correlation between the inordinate use of firepower . . . and the loss of legitimacy for the government that we were supporting. . . . When you kill a lot of the wrong people, noncombatants, as a foreigner in that country, you are handing the Communist enemy for free a lot of propaganda." He wrote dozens of reports that went through channels to higher headquarters in which he spoke plainly of the failures of

American military tactics. "It is unrealistic and, therefore, analytically unfeasible, to look at anything in Vietnam from strictly a military point of view. . . . Everything we did [had] a political impact and the war was basically political."¹⁴

These comments, and literally hundreds like them which could be added, have been quoted not because their warnings were unique, but because they bespoke the constant sentiments of many mid-level officers who recognized the inadequacies of America's military tactics and strategy in Vietnam. No one heeded their clarion call. Insisting on its own rectitude, the Army resented such individuals and condemned critics of whatever background, suggesting that they spoke from lack of information or experience, or for personal gain. Thousands of critics were muted and dozens forced into retirement. Yet what happened in Vietnam was clear. After his retirement, Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard




199th Light Infantry Brigade soldiers guard a group of suspects at Long Trung.

So today they talk about how to use helicopters, how to use armor, how communications are employed, how to resupply in the jungle . . . Unfortunately, none of these things have any relevance in a real low-intensity situation. . . . What the Army doesn't understand even yet is that it lost the war at a level it doesn't even see."

may have said it best. "We invented a form of war which only we could fight and which was irrelevant to long-term political objectives. . . . Our heritage to our ally was a form of warfare he could not sustain."¹⁵

Because it never seemed able to achieve its strategic objectives in Vietnam, the military was not particularly keen on emphasizing the nature of guerrilla warfare even in the midst of that conflict. After the fall of Saigon, it quickly relegated the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare to a minor role. When I attended the Command and General Staff College in 1975, little official attention was focused on the nature of revolutionary warfare. Few hours in the curriculum were devoted to it, despite the fact that Jean Sauvageot was by then a member of the faculty there. There was little time given him during the school day, and he had to offer sessions in the afternoon and evening on a voluntary attendance basis.

Two years later, 40 hours of the 10-month course were devoted to the study of low-intensity conflicts (LICs). By 1980 only eight hours of instruction were still offered, although currently the school requires 33 hours and offers five elective courses in that subject. In other military schools, the subject was completely dropped from courses of instruction. Notwithstanding the recent surge of activity exemplified by the creation of the Special Operations Command (Joint) at MacDill Air Force Base, the JFK Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, the Center for Low-Intensity Conflict (Joint) at Langley Air Force Base and several force structure changes, it appears that "the US Army still does not regard guerrilla warfare, insurgency and counterinsurgency as being unique and is unwilling to devote substantial resources to preparing for our most likely form of involvement."¹⁶ It remains to be seen, if this increased attention to LIC/counterinsurgency will amount to any sig-



Houses set afire during a strike by F-100 Supersabres northeast of Can Tho, August 1965.

"There is, I think, some kind of correlation between the inordinate use of firepower . . . and the loss of legitimacy for the government that we were supporting. . . . When you kill a lot of the wrong people, noncombatants, as a foreigner in that country, you are handing the Communist enemy for free a lot of propaganda."

nificant improvements in actual capability.

A concomitant problem has been caused by a lack of experienced teachers at such military schools. Those who once had some expertise in counterinsurgency activities and who taught its theory and practice to others have now gone on to other assignments or into retirement. "So today they talk about how to use helicopters, how to use armor, how communications are employed, how to resupply in the jungle Unfortunately, none of these things have any relevance in a real low-intensity situation. They fought a mid-intensity war and called it a low intensity one. So, of course, when they speak of lessons learned, then that's where the . . . lessons learned came from. What the Army doesn't understand even yet is that it lost

the war at a level it doesn't even see. . . . The worst problem is that it will only be another couple of years before anybody with real insight into what went wrong in Vietnam will be out of business."¹⁷

Despite the unwillingness of the Army to focus carefully on any form of combat other than the conventional combined arms tactics it will use in Europe to parry any thrust westward by Warsaw Pact powers, its inability to address unconventional threats is recognized at the highest levels. In the winter of 1984-85, General Wallace H. Nutting, former commander of US forces in Latin America and the US Readiness Command, testified before Congress about the military's capability to engage unconventional enemies. "As a nation," he said, "we seem not to well understand this form of conflict, nor are we well organized to cope with it." The general mis-spoke. The nation is more aware than is its military leadership. At least he recognized that "this is the central strategic issue facing the United States today."¹⁸

A former administrator at the Army War College, now retired, spoke correctly when he once admitted that "the Army has been ducking its responsibilities. . . . I think that because of Vietnam, our longest and most traumatic war, and one we can truly say we lost, we've got to look inside—not for scapegoats, not for witch hunts, but in an objective, responsible way, without biases."¹⁹


Regnant voices within the Army today, however, seem to echo neither this retired colonel's hope that we might learn something from the Vietnam debacle, nor Nutting's concern that the military must learn how to cope with indigenous insurgencies. A more strident voice has been heard throughout the land. A popular national Sunday supplement magazine cried out in 1983 that "In US military circles, Col. Harry [G.] Summers Jr. is regarded as the man of the hour. . . . [He] is the author of *On Strategy*, a book that explains why we lost the war in Vietnam.

Copies have been sent to every member of Congress, and in the upper echelons of the Pentagon, it is considered 'must reading.'²⁰

Summers' view is one of the more curious, and dangerous, expressions of opinion that have appeared in print to explain what happened to America's fortunes in Vietnam: His slim volume was first produced by the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College and then later issued by Presidio Press. A selection by the Military Book Club, the book was the subject of a *New York Times* wire service article by Drew Middleton and has been reviewed favorably in Army publications such as *Military Review* and *Armor* magazine. The latter publication proclaimed that Summers' book "could be the most important analytical military literature produced by a member of our Armed Forces since Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote his great treatise on seapower, almost a century ago."

It is little wonder that some within the military might praise this effort. Writing as the complete Army apologist, Summers has resurrected the old and discredited view that the military failed in Southeast Asia because of a lack of will on the home front. Central to his thesis is his view that the real enemy in Vietnam was not the turbulent political situation in Saigon nor even the dedicated Vietcong warriors of the South. He quotes approvingly General George H. Decker's argument that "any good soldier can handle guerrillas." That view caused President John F. Kennedy to sack Decker as Army chief of staff, but Summers remains an unflinching disciple of that antiquated position. He believes that Vietnamese guerrillas never did achieve any decisive results on their own.

He also stressed the long discredited idea that the war in Vietnam was caused by aggression from the North. Entranced by this chimeric, Summers asserts that America should have focused its attention not on the guerrilla war in the South, but rather on North Vietnam which was the real enemy. He affirms



South Vietnamese
heliborne troops.

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his dislike for the 'useless' efforts expended during the American era on such programs as pacification, nationbuilding, internal security, rural construction, stability operations, neutralization operations, revolutionary development, 'winning the hearts and minds of the people'; all loosely falling under the umbrella called Internal Defense and Development. Thus counterinsurgency, in Summers' view, consumed both time and energy better used in direct assaults against North Vietnam.

In the face of all the evidence, Summers maintains that, ultimately, Vietnam was only another example of conventional warfare and should have been fought in conventional ways. He is not even aware that on this one single point he has managed to be right: It was fought conventionally as the Army labored to 'find, fix and finish' the enemy as if

it were facing Soviet hordes bursting through Europe's Fulda Gap or the Hof Corridor. This military spokesman notes with approval that

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the Army swept away counterinsurgency doctrines as a result of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War despite their continued relevance in the Orient. He sighs with relief at the recollection that the Army War College de-emphasized counterinsurgency instruction. Such a posture makes clear that he understands neither conventional nor revolutionary warfare.

Nor is Summers bashful about explaining what should have been done in Vietnam during the 1960s. A strategic offensive against the North, he believes, was clearly in order. American troops should have been thrown into battle north of the demarcation zone and the 17th Parallel. The waste of lives would have been great. Widening of the war would have been inevitable. The erstwhile author cum strategist seems unshaken by the ramifications of such actions. That these things did not happen was a result, he avers, of flabby political wills by civilians at home.

The best assessment of these hopelessly flawed ideas was set forth by Lieutenant General DeWitt C. Smith Jr., a former commander at the War College and now retired. In

his introduction to the first edition of Summers' work, Smith described *On Strategy* as "one man's critical analysis" which became "somewhat controversial even before its publication." Its contents, the general wrote, "can be contested," for the book "by no means represents the ultimate judgment, nor is it without flaws. But it exists. . . ."

Smith continued his observation: "I have said that this book is not perfect or all-inclusive and others will share that view. . . . It is very much one man's opinion. . . . Some may feel that it puts too much blame on political and social shortcomings, and not enough on the substantial faults which the war revealed within the armed forces themselves. Still others may find it unsubstantial, or unappreciative in dealing with counterinsurgency and the tactical war. And my own special concern is that it seems not to stress enough the enormous force, depth, and consequence of the moral judgment which many good Americans made against the war itself even when they were sensitive to the decency, valor and commitment of most who fought in Vietnam."²¹

Smith's disclaimers to the contrary, the Army today seems to have adopted Summers' views as the perfect explanation for what went wrong in Vietnam. The danger is that having done so, having determined that the problems there were caused only by an insufficient application of traditional combat power, the Army is released from any necessity for further contemplation of its mistakes. It paid too much attention to internal defense and development. It knows this because it has been told so by an 'expert.' It will not have to recognize that counterinsurgency will remain for the foreseeable future as "the central strategic issue facing the United States today."²² It can prepare for the future by returning to those halcyon days of the past when it did so well against the Germans and Japanese by intensive applications of combat power.

Did the Army pay too much attention to



[Lansdale] observed that all too many of those in the military believe that they "can go in someplace and shoot up everything and everyone . . . expect someone like me to show up on the scene and go over it with a magic wand and cause everyone to smile and say, 'We love you Americans,' and then come up and kiss us on the cheek. Human nature isn't like that."

internal defense and development in Vietnam? A look at the documents is revealing. Every senior officer leaving Vietnam was to file a report detailing his actions and attitudes for the period of time covering his service there. A review of reports in the archives at Fort Leavenworth (including debriefings of four corps, 10 divisional and two brigade commanders) shows that such men placed almost exclusive emphasis upon *conventional* aspects of the Vietnam War. Generally no more than one short paragraph in an otherwise lengthy report was devoted to nationbuilding. (The report of Lieutenant General Melvin Zais, for a time commanding general of XXIV Corps, was an exception.)

Four paragraphs out of a 31-page report, written by Major General Frederick C. Weyand, commanding general of II Field Force Vietnam from 1 July 1967 to 1 August 1968, emphasized pacification efforts.²³ Brigadier General Carleton Preer Jr., deputy senior adviser for III Corps, dedicated only seven lines of a 107-page report to civic action for the period 1 May to 30 November 1969. Three of those seven lines dealt with the laundry contract for the unit widows' association.²⁴ Brigadier General D. P. McAuliffe mentioned neither pacification nor any related subject.²⁵

Too much emphasis upon counterinsurgency? Perhaps the best example of a military commander's lack of appreciation for the sub-

ject comes from the debriefing report of Major General Salve H. Matheson, commanding general of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne (Airmobile) Division.

"On 10 June 1967 the brigade began the evacuation of people and livestock from Song Ve Valley. There were approximately 8,465 people and 1,149 animals. The people were told that they could take what they could carry. . . . ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam] was to have driven the livestock; however, they considered the job degrading and began to shoot the cattle so [the Vietnamese] had to be replaced by Americans. . . . On leaving the village, crops were burned to prevent enemy use and to discour-

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age the return of the villagers. The Song Ve Valley was the largest civil affairs project ever undertaken by the 1st Brigade. *It was an overwhelming success and a model for future operations.*²⁶

Matheson was typical of many, an example of those who persuade themselves that they can function in any situation and environment without adaptation. Convinced that they are right, they think only of applying their own earlier experiences to new situations. They inevitably prepare for the past. Such attitudes show up regularly in the pages of the Senior Officer Debriefing Reports. Consequently, the Army learned very little,

as the years passed, about either Vietnam or wars of national liberation.

The Army's view of its military mission has been unfocused in recent years. It thoroughly misunderstood appropriate ways to fight limited wars or wars of national liberation within the Third World during the Vietnam era. Past mistakes have remained unacknowledged. The old refrain that the Army failed in Vietnam because of political softness at home has come to be an enduring theme song within the higher ranks of the military. The fact is that the military disaster in Vietnam grew out of ineptitude at the top. Stated simply, the Army made too many mistakes. At some point, for reasons then believed to be good, America's Army will once again be sent into battle. It will be unfortunate if it has closed its eyes to the lessons of Vietnam and again faces a debacle. If those same errors are not to be repeated, their sources must be identified, understood and corrected. Instead of preparing for the past over and over again, the Army must learn from it and finally begin to prepare for the future.

Just as Edward Lansdale's words opened this essay, so also is it fitting that they close it. Reminiscing about his own career, Lansdale mused not long ago that the military has seldom "caught on to the importance of the human relationship." Consequently, it has been ineffective in much that it has tried to do. "That is practically all my work was in the Philippines and Vietnam—trying to help the people there solve their own problems. . . . which is, I think, the ideal way to help." Nor do citizens of beleaguered areas want to be inundated with foreign experts. "I would send in one guy as an adviser," Lansdale recalled, while the military "would send in hundreds."²⁷

He wistfully observed that all too many of those in the military believe that they "can go in someplace and shoot up everything and everyone and then some pacification expert can show up, do something that you can't quite see, and everything suddenly becomes peace-

ful as people there give up all their old ways. They go in and kill these people, civilians, in a village and expect someone like me to show up on the scene and go over it with a magic wand and cause everyone to smile and say, 'We love you Americans,' and then come up and kiss us on the cheek. Human nature isn't like that."¹⁸

The elder statesman of counterinsurgency continued. "When we go into a foreign country using just military power, we can never win unless we kill everything in sight. I hope that at some point we would start understanding that these rebellions are essentially political movements aimed toward political goals and they use the military only to help them

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towards their goals. Our own efforts [usually] turn people against us."¹⁹ They will continue to do so as long as our military continues to prepare for the past. ☞

NOTES

- 1 MG Edward Geary Lansdale, "Viet Nam: Do We Understand Revolution?" *Foreign Affairs* (October 1964) 76.
- 2 These quotes are drawn from the excellent article by COL John D. Waghestein, "Post-Vietnam Counterinsurgency Doctrine," *Military Review* (May 1985) 45-46.
- 3 Cincinnatus [Cecil B. Currey], *Self-Destruction: The Disintegration and Decay of the United States Army During the Vietnam Era* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1981), 60-61.
- 4 Norman Hannah, "Vietnam: Now We Know," *National Review* (11 June 1976) 613.
- 5 Dave R. Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective* (Novato, CA: Prosidio Press, 1978), 117.
- 6 Haynes Johnson and George C. Wilson, *Army in Anguish: A Washington Post National Report* (New York: Pocket Books, 1972), 76.
- 7 Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare, Theory and Practice* (New York: Citadel Press, 1965), 132.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 11.
- 9 Quoted in Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 430. *Italics added*.
- 10 Robert Thompson, *No Exit From Vietnam* (New York: David McKay, 1969), 129-30.
- 11 Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972), *passim*.
- 12 William Cronson, *The Betrayal* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1966), *passim*.
- 13 LTC Carl Bernard, *The War in Vietnam: Observations and Reflections of a Province Senior Adviser* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The US Army Command and General Staff College [Student Paper], 1969), *passim*.
- 14 Interview with LTC Jean Sauvageot, Washington, DC, Summer 1979.

- 15 BG Douglas Kinnard, *The War Managers* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1977), 44.
- 16 Waghestein, 45-46.
- 17 Quoted in Cincinnatus, 128.
- 18 Richard Halloran, "Army begins training study of warfare in Central America," *New York Times* wire service story as quoted in the *Tampa Tribune-Times*, 5 May 1985, 20A.
- 19 Cincinnatus, 154 (Subject interview).
- 20 *Parade Magazine*, 14 August 1983.
- 21 Harry G. Summers Jr., *On Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, The Army War College, 1981), see introduction by LTJ DeWitt Smith Jr.
- 22 Halloran.
- 23 Some of these Senior Officer Debriefing Reports are available in the classified section of the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Others may be consulted at the Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, DC. Still additional reports are currently "lost" in the unmanageable mass of uncatalogued Vietnam materials stacked in boxes at the Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland. See LTJ Fred C. Woyand, *CS, II Field Force Vietnam*, July 1968 to August 1969.
- 24 BG Carleton Preer Jr., deputy senior adviser (DSA), III Corps and III CTZ, May to November 1969, CMH.
- 25 BG D. P. McAuliffe, DSA, MFR, December 1969 to November 1970, CMH.
- 26 BG S. A. Matheson, CG, 1st Bde, 101st Airborne (Airmobile) Div, 2 March 1968 CARL. *Italics added*.
- 27 Edward G. Lansdale interview with the author, McLean, Virginia, 19 December 1984.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 17 December 1984.
- 29 Edward G. Lansdale address to students and faculty, Library, University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida, 28 November 1984.

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