

Military Review

November 1987



The Soviets . . . see pages 2-51



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From the Editor

Despite the focus of national attention on the Persian Gulf and Central America, the Soviet Union remains the most dangerous threat to the national security of the United States. Although not the only threat, nor the most likely one, facing US security interests, the Soviet Union alone possesses the military might to threaten our national survival. For this reason, our armed forces must prepare for a conventional war against Soviet forces and their Warsaw Pact allies. Failure to do so could be disastrous should war come.

Recognizing the need for Army officers to better understand their most potent adversary, the editorial staff chose Soviet operations as the theme for this issue of *Military Review*. Featured are articles on Soviet operational techniques, doctrine and leadership.

Colonel Thomas E. White Jr. investigates the importance of time and tempo to the Soviet concept of operational and tactical maneuver and proposes countermeasures for disrupting the cohesion of Soviet offensive operations. Lieutenant Colonel Richard N. Armstrong, however, suggests in his article on Soviet military leadership, that fighting Russian forces will not be an easy task because of the war-fighting skills they acquired during World War II. Forged and tempered in the crucible of war on the Eastern Front, Soviet leadership mastered the art and science of armored warfare and perfected the operational techniques of large scale, combined arms maneuver.

Major James F. Holcomb explores the use of Soviet airborne forces in theater operations. He argues that the airborne will be employed to foster confusion among defenders and to enhance the probability of success of the larger operational maneuver group (OMG). William and Harriet Scott continue the analysis of the Soviet concept of forward detachments started by Colonel (P) John R. Landry and Lieutenant Colonel Garrett R. Fonda in the June 1987 issue of *Military Review*. Finally, Natalie Gross looks into *Red Star's* assessment of junior leadership in the Soviet army. Even, during this time of *glasnost*, revelations in the Soviet press of military incompetency are surprising.

In closing, a few words are in order concerning some minor changes in our format. A Department of Defense initiative to reduce the services' periodicals printing budget has resulted in the elimination of most Army periodicals and the development of a new publication medium, the professional bulletin. Consequently, effective this issue, *Military Review* becomes a professional bulletin. This means we will no longer call ourselves, "The Professional Journal of the US Army"; instead we are PB 100-87. Under these new publishing guidelines, we are prohibited from using certain state of the art printing techniques, as well as photographs of contributing authors, and restricted from publishing certain items in our "MR News" and "Bulletin Board" sections. These mandatory changes, however, will not detract from our commitment to excellence as a forum for the exchange of ideas on matters pertaining to doctrine, training, combat developments and professional education.

PWC

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BULLETIN BOARD

1 Military History Writing Contest

The Chief of Military History recently announced the 1987 military history writing contest, open to all students who attended an officer advanced course or the Sergeants Major Academy during the current calendar year. The contest is seeking unpublished manuscripts between 2,000 and 4,000 words that deal with the historical aspects of one of the following themes: relationship of the Army to the US Constitution; the NCO; leadership; battle; war and technology; logistics; and doctrine. Five winners will be selected to receive the \$500, \$400, \$300, \$200 and \$100 prizes. Send submissions, postmarked not later than midnight 31 December 1987, to: Center for Military History, ATTN: History Writing Contest, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200. Call Billy Arthur at AUTOVON 285-1278 for more information.

2 Terrorism Counteraction Videotapes

Four videotapes dealing with terrorism counteraction were distributed recently to major commands, selected Reserve commands, National Guard states and districts, and schools within TRADOC. The four, titled **Regional Travel Briefing**, Europe (TVT 20-670), Far East (TVT 20-671), Middle East (TVT 20-672) and Latin America (TVT 20-673), are designed to assist commanders in presenting overseas travel briefings and in conducting terrorism counteraction training. Additional details are available by calling AUTOVON 552-2131/3240.

3 AirLand Battle Future

TRADOC is currently preparing a concept statement that will develop different approaches for warfighting in the year 2003. The AirLand Battle Future concept will eventually represent the cornerstones of TRADOC's architecture for the future Army, describe Army operations on the future battlefield and provide guidance for a disciplined evolution from

current AirLand Battle doctrine. An interim version of the concept statement is planned for completion during January 1988. This statement will be staffed worldwide, with comments and recommended changes incorporated into a pamphlet on future warfighting expected to be published in late summer 1988.

4 Theater-Level Command and Control

Earlier this year, Headquarters, Department of the Army, designated TRADOC as combat developer for theater/tactical command and control (C²) systems. In support of this decision, the Combined Arms Combat Development Activity (CACDA) at Fort Leavenworth recently activated a theater systems integration branch that will be the key agency for joint/combined and theater-level C² combat development actions in the Combined Arms Center (CAC). To contact this new agency, write HQ, USACACDA, ATTN: ATZL-CAC-AI, Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-5300, or call AUTOVON 552-4283 or commercial (913) 684-4283.


5 Integrating the Force

Quotas have been announced for attendance at two force integration courses early next year—the force development officer course (2G50A) and the corps/division force integration course (2G-F01/500-F13). Class 2-88 in force development has 48 quotas and runs from 14 February to 4 March 1988, whereas class 2-88 for corps/division integration has 60 quotas and runs from 10–16 July 1988. Both courses will be taught at Fort Leavenworth. Quotas can be obtained at local installations or activities through the schools office, Directorate of Plans, Training and Mobilization (DPTM). Officers interested in attending either course on a TDY en route basis or in conjunction with a permanent change of station should obtain quotas through their respective branch manager at the US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). Additional information can be obtained by calling AUTOVON 552-2040 (force development) or 552-3212 (corps/division force integration).

OPERATION

TORCH

The Fight for French North Africa



3d Infantry Division troops coming ashore north of Fedala, French Morocco, 11 November 1942

On 8 November 1942, US and British forces commenced amphibious landings in French North Africa. Although it was hoped that French forces would not resist, there was sporadic opposition with considerable fighting at Oran and two destroyers lost at Algiers. A ceasefire between the Allies and the French took effect on 10 November.

The Germans rushed reinforcements into Tunisia to protect Rommel's rear. British and US troops conducted seaborne and airborne landings to push into Tunisia and contact with German patrols was made on 18 November. Heavy fighting developed until the Germans withdrew on 26 November to a series of strong-

points in the hilly Tunisian terrain. The African campaign would continue until 12 May 1943, when more than 250,000 German and Italian troops surrendered.

The Tunisia fighting confirmed basic combat principles taught in US Army training manuals, but it also emphasized some aspects of the principles and revealed certain deficiencies in the application of others. One significant lesson was that it "required actual combat and casualties to make the average American soldier sufficiently wary and determined. Even then, the soldiers not only had to know what to do and how to do it but also to be under the unremitting control of officers who knew their business."



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Articles to Watch for:

Removing Square Pegs from Round Holes; Low-Intensity Conflict in Army Doctrine

Colonel Richard M. Swain, US Army



Whence Values Come

Major Mark P. Hertling, US Army



The Third Reich's Third Front


Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Ramsey, US Army Reserve

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STAMPING OUT THE RED

By JAMES H. HARRIS



This article discusses a principle that applies from the tactical level to the strategic level of war: beating the other guy to the punch. By describing the goal of "outstrip[ing] our opponent's planning and execution time," the author reapplies the wisdom of history that the first aim in conflict is to defeat the enemy's strategy. Our own doctrine allows us to use the Soviets' commitment to maintaining the tempo of the attack against them. The article correctly notes that in some situations more could be gained through the delay of forces rather than their partial attrition. For instance, employing assets to prevent Soviet engineers from putting in a bridge may yield bigger dividends than hitting the combat unit that would have used the bridge.

The author realizes the role that technology plays in our ability to shorten our own decision-action cycle, to find the enemy and to bring combat power to bear. As such, one major contribution of this article is the highlighting of the continued need of the force to develop not just better systems, but ones that translate innovative technological advances into strategy-defeating capabilities on the battlefield.

General Glenn K. Otis
Commander in Chief
US Army Europe

MILITARY theorists in the United States and Soviet Union routinely emphasize the importance of "timeliness" in the conduct of mobile warfare. This is to obtain the rapid achievement of tactical, as well as operational, success on the nuclear and conventional battlefield. The many and varied Soviet examinations of the imperative demands of time assume new urgency in view of the theoretical and technological implications of the reintroduction of the operational level of war into US military art.

The US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine emphasizes operational and tactical maneuver throughout the entire expanse of the battle area. Together with the inherent characteristics of contemporary mobile warfare, this emphasis imposes stricter time standards on the planning and execution of combined arms operations for both sides.

The need to assert and maintain the offensive in all its dimensions against the enemy is thus a common feature in both US and Soviet doctrine. The US Army continually exhorts battle commanders to seize the initiative and "take the battle to the enemy." This

Recurring statements by senior Soviet military officers stressing the need to supply their forces with advanced technology reflect new concerns about the rapid technological advances of NATO. A major factor in these concerns is the Soviet acknowledgment that victory in battle will depend on . . . functions related to the factor of time.

concept rests on tested judgment that such action will force the enemy to constantly react to our actions, thereby throwing him off balance and, in the process, upsetting his fire and maneuver planning.

Both armies, of late, are placing increased reliance on the proposed capacity of new technologies to accomplish this condition of the offensive. However, technology, no matter how available it may be, will not realize its full potential unless its varied features are joined with a full understanding of the enemy's military doctrine, its underlying



Soviet Military Review

Tempo, as it is employed by the Soviets, is a concept not totally grasped in the West. Perhaps the manner and extent to which the concept dominates Soviet military art are not fully comprehended. . . . A major benefit derived from an understanding of the Soviet theory of tempo and its implementation would be the ability of commanders to employ both forces and fires in more effective economy-of-force roles.

military theory and its battlefield execution. The importance of timeliness in Soviet maneuver and the range of possible actions to disrupt it illustrate this proposition.

Recurring statements by senior Soviet military officers stressing the need to supply their forces with advanced technology reflect new concerns about the rapid techno-

logical advances of NATO. A major factor in these concerns is the Soviet acknowledgment that victory in battle will depend on reliable command and control (C²), accurate and rapid dissemination of intelligence, swift concentration of combat power, and other functions related to the factor of time.¹

The application of technology to improve the speed with which these functions are performed will dominate future Soviet military programs. In the West, extraordinary technological developments and the application of these technologies to military systems can provide US forces with improved weapon system lethality, C² automation and reconnaissance capabilities to deal with Warsaw Pact forces in any conflict.

At the same time, however, the US Army must avoid overemphasizing high technology as the key to success in combat for accomplishing the entire scope of battle tasks faster than our opponent. There is an important distinction between speedy execution of critical functions in accordance with specific battlefield situations and employing speed indiscriminately to do virtually everything quicker than our opponent. We must realize that combat success lies as much with slowing or extending the time frames in which the enemy conducts critical tactical and operational maneuver as it does with increasing the speed of our own decision-making process.

The time available to plan and execute combat operations has been reduced to a matter of hours from the longer time frames required in the past. Accordingly, we will frequently confront the challenge on the battlefield to plan and execute with a velocity necessary to "act within" the corresponding time cycle of our opponent. This capability to outstrip our opponent's planning and execution time would enable battlefield commanders to obtain intelligence, project opportunities for future operations, take preemptive action more rapidly than the en-

emy and, as a result, achieve victory. Yet, this challenge is perhaps more easily met in theory and in the laboratory than in the reality of high-intensity combat. Conceivably, the time is approaching when technological advances supporting decision making will outstrip the ability of forces to physically execute the decision within the desired hypothetical standards of time.

Although the overall effort by the military to capitalize on emerging technologies must continue, more attention must be accorded to a broader study of the Soviet theory of combined arms operations and its implementation. Particular stress should be placed on examining combat units in the context of the functions they perform in establishing and maintaining the speed and tempo of Soviet offensive operations. The decisive impact of the timely employment of these units on the development and sustainment of the offensive must be fully understood. This understanding will equip US battle commanders and staffs with a basis upon which to undertake measures to deny the enemy the effective and timely use of his forces to perform assigned missions.

The study of the concept of tempo deserves particular emphasis. The Soviet army has extensively investigated the theory and application of tempo in view of the critical influence it exerts on the outcome of offensive maneuver warfare. Tempo, as it is employed by the Soviets, is a concept not totally grasped in the West. Perhaps the manner and extent to which the concept dominates Soviet military art are not fully comprehended.

One Western scholar of Soviet military art perhaps has come closest to the mark when he describes Soviet tempo as "flexibility and agility of action which can develop opportunities and accrue advantage upon advantage."² A major benefit derived from an understanding of the Soviet theory of tempo and its implementation would be the

ability of commanders to employ both forces and fires in more effective economy-of-force roles.

In addition, specific capabilities that are critical for achieving and maintaining time-

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liness and high tempo should receive more targeting consideration. This may supplant the reliance on selective targeting of forces possessing higher intrinsic combat power values. In fact, it may be as important to delay or slow the introduction of specific Soviet forces in certain situations as to destroy them. For example, delaying the arrival of enemy engineer bridging units by the remote mining of their routes to river crossing sites may have far greater impact on the operation than the destruction of a second-echelon motorized rifle or tank battalion moving forward to exploit from the bridgehead.

Soviet operational maneuver and the mobile concepts developed out of an analysis of World War II and various postwar experiences provide an effective backdrop for understanding Soviet military theory. This theory establishes the relationship of speed, space and time as well as force structure and systems critical to the successful application of these factors in modern mobile warfare. Analysis of the manner of force echeloning, depths of penetration, rates of advance and the optimal configurations of forward detachments and standard ar-

mored/motorized rifle formations have characterized modern Soviet operational maneuver studies.

Mobile concepts pay considerable attention to the factors of time and space. They involve careful tailoring of forces and the de-

Soviet army officers often recite the significant aspects of tactical and operational maneuver that support the objective of keeping unwarranted delays affecting tempo, swiftness and continuity of the attack to a minimum or eliminating them altogether. These points also assume an equal importance for US Army theorists developing tempo-denial operational concepts.

velopment of mass and concentration through the time-phased use of forces in a variety of configurations.³

Soviet army officers often recite the significant aspects of tactical and operational maneuver that support the objective of keeping unwarranted delays affecting tempo, swiftness and continuity of the attack to a minimum or eliminating them altogether. These points also assume an equal importance for US Army theorists developing tempo-denial operational concepts. The Soviets require combat leaders to:

- Correctly organize for combat in accordance with the expected battle situation.
- Rapidly develop and communicate mission orders.
- Provide close and uninterrupted troop control.
- Effect timely concentration of effort along the main axis of advance, with particular emphasis on correct use of air defense, artillery and engineer units supporting the attack.

- Effectively employ reconnaissance assets.

- Properly commit second-echelon units.
- Correctly employ forward detachments in the depths of the opponent's defenses.⁴


To a large degree, these measures provide a blueprint for success in modern offensive operations. The imperative to perform them correctly is particularly compelling for Warsaw Pact armies that will seek rapid concentration of overwhelming force to achieve multiple breakthroughs of NATO antitank defenses.

Penetrations into the tactical depths of NATO defenses must be expanded to permit the introduction of operational maneuver groups to quickly seize territory and specific objectives critical to continuation of the offensive. At all times, the Soviets will try to avoid decisive engagement before operational objectives are achieved. They will bypass difficult terrain and urban sprawl and avoid other situations that would slow their offensive tempo.

The actions of NATO forces to inhibit Soviet offensive tempo and timeliness should be focused on enemy forces in proximity to the close fight. It is here that time is most important, and the outcome of subsequent battles will largely be decided. NATO must place emphasis on disrupting Soviet artillery formations to reduce their ability to achieve established norms for maneuver rates and duration of fire.

Artillery support has been aptly described as "the true powerhouse" of the Soviet offensive. Its capabilities enable it to provide support to forces throughout the entire depth of the battle area to create conditions for maneuver forces to gain and sustain the initiative. Significantly, the Soviets appear to regard artillery as the primary means for suppressing antitank defenses and for allowing the breakthrough of defensive zones.

According to Soviet sources, fire capabili-



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ties (air and artillery) in the offensive are based on four distinct periods of fire.

- Fire support of the advancing troops.
- Fire preparation of the attack.
- Fire support of the attack
- Fire accompaniment of the attacking troops in the depth of the defenses.⁶

To provide this fire, the artillery battalion, as the basic artillery formation, may be attached to a first-echelon maneuver battalion or a battalion assigned as a forward detachment or advanced guard. This close association of artillery with individual maneuver elements provides the Soviet commander with the ability to rapidly concentrate his firepower to execute several missions.

The artillery can be employed to create gaps in the front of enemy formations, to enable rapid penetrations of enemy forward defenses or to seize the initiative against opposing forces in a movement to contact prior to a meeting engagement. Artillery support of forward detachments would be used to repel counterattacks, as well as to destroy or neutralize point targets that may jeopardize both the advance of the main body forces and the outcome of the entire battle.

When targeting Soviet artillery, NATO forces should concentrate on disrupting three qualities that Soviet artillery must retain to accomplish its mission. These qualities are mobility, survivability and continuous coordination with supporting units.

Mobility of artillery as it advances with its supporting motorized rifle and tank forces is an essential feature of successful fire support. Reduction of the artillery units' ability to keep pace with supported forces degrades their ability to provide rapid effective fires in support of the fire plan and slows the tempo of the entire force at critical phases of the operation. It also increases the vulnerability of maneuver units, which are forced to slow down to await the completion of artillery strikes against targets affecting the pace of forward momentum. Countermobility missions in appropriate situations should take this into account and emphasize slowing Soviet artillery rates of advance. Air- and artillery-delivered scatterable mines are particularly effective means to isolate the artillery and slow its ability to keep pace with supported units.

The emphasis on inhibiting the effectiveness of artillery support does not preclude the goal of destroying the artillery when the situation demands it. In essence, the de-

situation. Hence, the objective should be to react more quickly than the enemy and to neutralize or destroy his artillery before he disables yours and before maneuver forces collide.

Once contact occurs between forces, accurate counterbattery and other fires should be concentrated against the artillery supporting Soviet forces at specific points in the meeting engagement battle. Knowledge of Soviet theory governing these objectives would provide a decisive advantage to US Army commanders and staff.

Soviet military sources assert that the most important tasks of artillery coordination with supported units throughout the attack are to eliminate the break in time between the end of artillery preparation and the beginning of the tank and infantry attack, and to combine artillery fire and movement of forces into a single effort. This process can be degraded by the selective employment of combat electronic warfare and destructive fires against enemy communications networks and facilities crucial to artillery fire support and C².

NATO commanders at all levels must make similar efforts to degrade other methods the enemy uses to maintain the speed and tempo of operations. Soviet engineer elements play a decisive role in maneuver units' achievement of high rates of advance in the offensive. Mobility missions supporting the rapid deployment of forward troops in the crossing of obstacles, such as rivers, minefields and contaminated zones, must be executed crisply and rapidly. The Soviet challenge is to employ engineer units mobile enough to keep pace with fast-moving maneuver elements and to ensure completion of engineer mobility tasks in support of the high-tempo operation.

The experience of the Soviet army during World War II, in particular during the Vistula-Oder operations in 1945, taught the Soviets that engineer troops must be attached

When targeting Soviet artillery, NATO forces should concentrate on disrupting three qualities that Soviet artillery must retain to accomplish its mission. These qualities are mobility, survivability and continuous coordination with supporting units.

struction of artillery would be the preferred option. US commanders, however, should also weigh the relative importance of artillery to the Soviets with regard to its impact on timeliness. Artillery should be the first priority for destruction at the initiation of a meeting engagement during which each side is attempting to preempt the other in deploying and using its artillery. Rapid execution is the critical factor for success in this



The contribution of engineer units to fulfilling the imperatives of time in Soviet operations is striking. This is reflected in such mobility missions as bridging and obstacle clearing; in countermobility operations . . . ; and in protection missions designed to prolong the survivability of critical artillery formations.

well forward with first-echelon forces, particularly along the main axis of advance. During offensive operations by large tank forces well into the operational depths of the German defenses, the main task of engineer troops was to provide prompt bridging and other forms of support for the crossing of the numerous water obstacles encountered. To accomplish this, engineer units were deployed well forward and mobile reserves of bridging elements were positioned to provide necessary support.⁷

The contribution of engineer units to fulfilling the imperatives of time in Soviet operations is striking. This is reflected in such mobility missions as bridging and obstacle clearing; in countermobility operations such as those in support of forward detachments attempting to avoid decisive engagement in the forward area; and in protection missions designed to prolong the survivability of critical artillery formations. Accordingly, we should develop and employ mea-

asures that prevent timely accomplishment of the engineer mission in these situations. The delay or destruction of engineer resources is important and must be factored into the allocation of fire and maneuver assets against targets having the greatest impact on the enemy's performance of tactical and operational missions.

Accurate and timely reconnaissance is also a dominant concern to the Soviets. The Soviet commander must have correct information to determine the area where he should concentrate his forces for the main effort and to perform a wide range of combat tasks in the offensive. Mobile forces attempting to follow the route of least enemy resistance into the operational depths must rely on thorough reconnaissance to avoid situations that will slow them down and reduce the overall tempo of operations. The Soviets often stress the need for well-organized reconnaissance to protect forces from the effects of NATO's precision-guided mu-



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nitions (PGMs).⁶ Hence, the Soviets plan to devote more attention at all combat echelons to the location of PGMs and presumably the exact destination of the incoming ordinance from those systems. Such measures would provide them a longer period in which to take evasive action and thus lead to greater force survivability.

Soviet reconnaissance means in various situations should also receive more consideration by US commanders in light of the direct bearing these means have on the speed of Soviet maneuver. Measures, such as the use of tactical camouflage, cover and deception to deny opposing commanders the cor-

rect picture of force compositions, locations and intentions, should be a constant feature of our operational plans. Similar emphasis must be placed on targeting the important components of Soviet tactical and operational reconnaissance forces.

The potent antiarmor capabilities possessed by attack helicopters have created new requirements for the Soviets to equip maneuver forces with anti-air means. This has underscored the importance, to the Soviets, of air defense for the maintenance of high offensive tempo in the presence of this threat. Destruction of Soviet air defense assets through the use of joint air-attack

teams and improved ground-based fires will enable commanders to employ airborne antiarmor assets in a more effective economy-of-force role.

One important objective of this economy-of-force role would be to delay the commitment of second-echelon units in the immediate vicinity of the close battle. A second objective would be to prevent battalion- and regiment-size forward detachments and advance guards, operating ahead of the main elements of the first-echelon divisions, from achieving tactical penetrations as precursors to the exploitation by follow-on tactical and operational-level main forces.

The impact of the total Soviet combat and combat-support force structure on operational and tactical maneuver and the concept of time and tempo on the integrated battlefield must be thoroughly examined within the armies of NATO. We must then use the results of this work to develop coordinated actions to deprive our adversary of the effective use of his artillery, engineer, air defense, C², reconnaissance and other capabilities that permit the rapid, timely and

Soviet reconnaissance means . . . should also receive more consideration by US commanders in light of the direct bearing these means have on the speed of Soviet maneuver. Measures, such as the use of tactical camouflage, cover and deception to deny opposing commanders the correct picture of force compositions, locations and intentions, should be a constant feature of our operational plans.

continuous offensive maneuver.

We cannot fully match the quantity of Warsaw Pact forces that will confront NATO in a general conflict in Central Europe. Instead, to ensure success, the US Army must combine the technological advantage it possesses and the new doctrine for maneuver it is implementing with clear understanding and thought-provoking analysis of the imperative demands of time in Soviet tactical and operational art. \square

NOTES

1 I Vorobyev, "Time in Warfare," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star), 9 Oct 85, as translated in AFPR 200-1, Soviet Press Selected Translations, Directorate of Soviet Affairs, AFIS (Jan-Feb 85), 12.

2 J. Erickson, "Soviet Combined Arms: Theory and Practice," College Stations Papers 1 Soviet Combined Arms Past and Present, Center for Strategic Technology, College Station, TX (1981), 33.

3 More detailed analysis of Soviet operational maneuver and mobile concepts are presented by D. M. Glantz, *Deep Attack: The Soviet Conduct of Operational Maneuver* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1987). Pages 102-103 provided concepts used in this instance.

4 D. Dragunsky, "The Imperative Demands of Time," *Military Herald* No 12, Military Publishing House, Moscow, USSR, Dec 83, as translated in

AFPR 200-1, Soviet Press Selected Translations, Directorate of Soviet Affairs, AFIS (Jan-Feb 85), 227-29.

5 Erickson, 36.

6 "Ognevoye Porazheniye" (Fire Destruction), *Voennoy Entsiklopedicheskoy Sloyar* (Military Encyclopedia Dictionary), Voenizdat, 1st ed., Moscow, USSR, 507.

7 For a brief summary of engineering operations in this instance see Ye. Kolbomov, "Characteristic Features of Engineering Support for Troops of the Fronts During the Vistula-Oder Operation," *Military History Journal* No 1, Jan 85, as translated by FBIS in JPRS-UMA-85-033, 20 May 1985, 37-43.

8 Vorobyev is but one example of the discussions ongoing on this subject.

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SOVIET Tank Commanders



U.S. military professionals appear to know little about Soviet army leaders during World War II. Through these short introductions to three prominent Soviet operational-level commanders, we may in a small way "humanize" the faceless personalities within the Soviet army leadership and gain a wider appreciation for the accomplishments of the victors on the "other side" of the Eastern Front.

TO MOST Americans, the fighting on the Eastern Front during World War II is known only in general terms. There is little understanding of the major operations and key operational-level personalities on the Soviet side. This *terra incognita* exists primarily because no Americans fought on this front. Thus, it is mostly through the translated memoirs of German generals and histories built upon their recollections that we have any perception of the course of fighting in the Soviet Union.¹

The names and actions of numerous German commanders such as Guderian, von Mellenthin and von Manstein are familiar. It is through their experiences and interpretations that we judge the fighting on the Eastern Front. However, in these German writings, the Red Army unit commanders, and particularly Soviet tank force commanders, largely remain nameless.

While in some Western accounts a few Soviet high-level leaders are named, the operational-level commanders remain faceless personalities within a monolithic Red Army war machine presumed led by unthinking automatons pushed forward by pistol-carrying commissars.² Consequently, the Eastern Front has been narrowly developed by a small number of participants.

A clear, accurate portrayal of Red Army commanders, either as personalities or as combat leaders, is not available. Yet, many of these unknown and faceless commanders at the operational level fought from 1941 to 1945, while many of the Germans who wrote memoirs of fighting on the Eastern Front did not fight the entire war there. Interestingly, there are very few German memoirs dealing with the latter years, when Red Army offensive operations, spearheaded by tank forces, advanced hundreds of kilometers (km), pocketing tens of thousands of German defenders.

The Soviets, on the other hand, have published a vast number of memoirs, unit histo-

ries and accounts of operations from their Great Patriotic War. Yet, their accounts have been read and studied by few in the West. During the war, Stalin and other members of the Soviet High Command referred to fronts, armies, tank and mechanized corps by the names of their commanders, such as Katukov's or Rybalko's tank army.³ Immediately after the war, Stalin's role as the architect for Red Army victories dominated Soviet writings.

Since Nikita Khrushchev's denigration of the "cult of the individual," the attribution of individual accomplishments in Soviet society, as well as in the army, have been

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shared in the context of the common effort. The results of this selfless portrayal is a shallow picture of the individual at the expense of personality development and individual credit for major victories and accomplishments. So, even within Soviet military writings, the task is to pierce socialist realism in biographical sketches. This can be done by combining the glimpses of personality with unit battlefield accomplishments to determine the measure of commanders.

During the 1930s, the Red Army took a very progressive attitude towards the use of new technologies, such as airplanes and tanks, for the modernization and mechanization of its forces. They built several large mechanized corps. However, by the eve of World War II, following confusing experi-

ences in the Spanish Civil War, the purging of top military leadership, the occupation of eastern Poland and disastrous fighting with Finland, the Soviets dismantled these corps. Only in late December 1940, based on General Georgi K. Zhukov's experiences at Khalkin Gol and observations of the German successes in the west, did the Soviets reverse their regressive trend and begin rebuilding the mechanized corps. This reorganization was caught in mid-stride by the German invasion on 22 June 1941.

Katukov

During the initial period of the war, June 1941 to early 1942, the large tank and mechanized units were pared down to brigades, regiments and battalions for easier command and control and because of the limited


number of available tanks. One of the first tank force commanders to reach prominence during this trying early period with the new tank units was Colonel Mikhail Efimovich Katukov.

The German invasion found Katukov in a Kiev hospital, recuperating from an operation two weeks previously. Disregarding his recovery, he rejoined the staff of his 20th Tank Division in General K. K. Rokossovskiy's 9th Mechanized Corps (MC). Fighting defensive battles in the Ukraine, Katukov showed courageous and innovative leadership in organizing his tank division for combat actions against numerically superior German forces. It was from these early battles that he gained insight and understanding of German armored operations and methods that would serve him well in later fighting.

This tall, slender commander had a good nature behind a long, stern face with alert eyes. While outwardly calm and restrained, he could joke and laugh to encourage others. After surviving the desperate defensive summer battles of 1941, the Soviet command recalled him to the interior to organize, train and equip a new T-34 tank brigade.

But urgent needs at the front forced a hasty deployment of his unit. Because of a shortage of T-34s, his brigade was only half-filled with the requisite number of them and a handful of heavy KV tanks. The remainder of his unit received the BT-7 light tank, affectionately called "Betushka," and disparagingly referred to as a "sparrow shooter." His crews had little training, but he concentrated on defensive armored fighting.

Katukov's 4th Tank Brigade (TB) arrived at the front on 4 October 1941, off-loading in the small town of Mtsensk to begin stanching the flow of German forces into an operational breach in the Bryansk Front. The brigade immediately drove south to Orel to meet the onrushing German panzers. In a



Destroyed equipment belonging to the Soviet 44th Division near Soumvasaint, Finland, January 1940.

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series of defensive tank battles along the major highway and necessary line of communication for a German advance between Orel and Tula, his brigade faced the famed Panzer Group Guderian, as it attempted to dash for Moscow on the southern approaches.

With a patchwork of reinforcements, consisting of paratroopers, frontier guards and Katyusha rocket launchers, Katukov's tank brigade squared off against the 4th Panzer Division. Operating his command post out of two staff tanks, Katukov threw a sheepskin over his shoulders and listened to his staff reports. At night, he would walk to different points in his defense carrying a light machinegun on his back and Mauser pistol in his belt.

In midnight meetings in the brigade command post after a day's hard fighting, Captain Anatolii A. Raptopullo, the brigade's light tank battalion commander, experienced Katukov's manner with young officers. "We knew Katukov did not throw words to the wind." Katukov would later call these young officers his "professors of tank warfare."

Katukov was direct in his assignment of positions and how he wanted subordinates to conduct the tactical battles. In his memoirs, he wrote, "By October forty-one I had sufficiently learned the ways of the German attack." He understood the general use and sequence of motorcycle reconnaissance, tanks, antitank guns and infantry. He had even noted the Germans' repeated use of green and blue rocket flares to mark their locations for their artillery and aviation.

While the Germans were stunned by the quality of the T-34s' performance, Katukov enhanced the value of their limited numbers and his light tanks' effectiveness with his knowledge of German tactics. He conducted an active defense using multiple ambush positions on successive lines, along with camouflage and deception, to fight the




Mikhail
Elimovich
Katukov

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panzer group to a temporary standstill before Mtsensk.

After a week's fighting, backed to a river and faced with encirclement, Katukov led his brigade to escape over a partially destroyed railroad bridge the night of 11 October. During the crossing, Germans with mortars and machineguns began firing on the withdrawing brigade. Katukov's presence restored order and calm from growing confusion. He saved all of his unit's fighting vehicles and weapons.

Slowing Guderian's advance to 30 km over seven days allowed the formation of an



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army to fill the gap in the Soviet lines and reinforce the defenses at Tula. This significantly contributed to Guderian's inability to reach Moscow on the southern approach. While never acknowledging, by name, the Soviet commander who fought his panzer group, Guderian's impressions of the battle and T-34s "... were descriptions of the quality and, above all, of the new tactical handling of the Russian tanks were very worrying (emphasis added). The damage," he continued, "suffered by the Russians was considerably less than that to our own tanks."⁶ Guderian's encounter with Katukov evoked his first doubts about the German army's ability to capture Moscow before winter, if at all. He had met one of the rising stars in the new and growing Red Army tank force.

Katukov's talents were soon needed elsewhere on the front. His tank brigade immediately road marched some 300 km north to help stop the German assault on the northern approaches to Moscow. As a result of the successful tank battles before Mtsensk, the

4th TB became the first tank unit to be redesignated a "Guards" unit—1st Guards Tank Brigade (GTB). Katukov was promoted to Major General of Tank Forces and awarded The Order of Lenin.

In early 1942, Katukov assumed command of the 1st Tank Corps (TC) and then of the 3d MC. His command progression typified the successful Red Army tank force commander. During the war, most (though not all) successful Soviet commanders followed an experience pattern as a tank brigade commander in the war's first period, then as a tank corps commander during the middle and final periods. A few rose to command one of the six tank armies existing by the end of the war.

By January, Katukov was designated commander of the 1st Tank Army (TA) and assigned to the Voronezh Front for the anticipated major battle at Kursk. The front commander, General N. F. Vatutin, gave the 1st TA (with two corps) the mission to form a second defensive line. By 6 July 1943, after the German attack on the southern face of the Kursk salient had commenced, the 1st TA prepared an attack in the direction of the German penetration. It participated in the counterattack that contributed to the great tank battles centered around Prokhorovka on 12 July and resulted in driving the Germans back to their original positions.

In early August, after a short two-week respite, the Red Army mounted a massive counteroffensive, known as the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, from the southern face of the Kursk salient. The 1st TA and 5th Guards Tank Army (GTA) comprised the main attack for the Voronezh Front. Attacking towards Bogodukhov, Katukov's tank army occupied that city by 7 August and, on the morning of 12 August, resumed the offensive. The Red Army drove Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's army group back to the Dnieper River.

By 1944, Red Army tank armies achieved

workable force structures and refined combat methods. Tank commanders rose to the demands of armored warfare in terms of agility, initiative, depth and synchronization, as we currently define the tenets of Air-Land Battle.

The 1st TA, as part of the 1st Ukrainian Front, in March 1944, fought to develop that front's offensive objectives in the direction of southern Poland and the Carpathian mountains. Always seeking to find innovative methods of combat and to win victories with fewer forces, Katukov created a forward detachment from his reserve 64th GTB, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel I. N. Boiko. The forward detachment's mission was to capture Chernovtsy, an important administrative center for the Ukraine.

In seven hours, the detachment drove nearly 80 km, forcing the Dniestr River. Concentrating its forces, it conducted a surprise night attack, seizing the Moshi railroad station north of Chernovtsy. After capturing Chernovtsy, the 1st TA relentlessly continued the attack. Because of this operation, the Soviet Supreme High Command redesignated the 1st TA as the 1st GTA on 25 April 1944.

In the summer of 1944, the 1st GTA, still with the 1st Ukrainian Front, began a major offensive by slashing into the rear of German Army Group Northern Ukraine. In continuous combat for some 450 km, forcing a series of large rivers, liberating towns and villages in the northern Ukraine and southern Poland, and finally seizing a very important bridgehead across the Vistula River, Katukov was awarded the Soviet Union's highest decoration, Hero of the Soviet Union. Proud of his awards (he twice received this one), he often wore his tunic full of awards, particularly for photographers.

In several operations from 1943 to 1945, Katukov continuously displayed personal courage and skill in successful combat actions with his tank army. For his mind

and quick wit, his soldiers nicknamed him, "General Sly." His 1st GTA played a significant role in the Berlin operation and was selected as an occupation unit in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG)—testimony to the unit's honor in destroying and capturing the "lair of the beast Fascism." Katukov had been on the battlefield from the first to the last days of the war on the Eastern Front.

Rotmistrov

The development of Red Army tank forces and commanders moved in parallel. In the March 1942 battles around Moscow, the Red Army could not accomplish deep attacks and surround large German groupings. Without large tank formations in the front and army organizations, the Soviet General Staff concluded that the task of developing a tactical success into an operational success could not be fully achieved. Consequently, in the middle period of the war, from April 1942 to the end of the year, the small tank units of the early period were supplemented by the formation of larger tank and mechanized corps and tank armies.

Another Red Army tank-force commander who achieved success and recognition very early was Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov. With a thin build of medium height, a bushy mustache and dark round-rimmed glasses, he looked like a professor who had wandered off campus. Despite his appearance, he fought aggressively and was respected as a tactical and operational commander. Rotmistrov, with the reputation of an intellectual on tank warfare, played a significant role in the early organization of large tank formations.

In December 1940, Rotmistrov was named deputy commander, 5th Tank Division (TD), 3d MC, in the Baltic Military District. By May 1941, he was chief of staff for the corps. After the early defensive battles and fighting from encirclements, his en-



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ergetic, dynamic form of command earned him designation as brigade commander for one of the newly formed T-34 units.

Rotmistrov's 8th TB, assigned to the Northwest Front under the command of General P. A. Kurochkin, conducted a seven-day battle in the Demyansk sector. With 61 tanks—22 T-34s, 7 heavy KVs and 32 T-40 light tanks—he fought aggressively and effectively. He drew the notice of the supreme high commander, Stalin, who closely watched the crucial fight against the German pincers closing on Moscow.

By December 1941, while fighting around Klin in the 30th Army, Rotmistrov assumed command of the army's mobile group, consisting of the 8th and 21st TBs, 145th Separate Tank Battalion, 2d Motorized Rifle and 46th Motorcycle Regiments. Conducting a desperately needed counterattack to stem the German advance, his group made heavy contact along its penetration from Klin to Vysokovsk. Despite the German resistance, his unit advanced steadily, unbalancing the German advance on the northern approaches to Moscow. As a result of this action, the

8th TB was redesignated the 3d GTB, and Rotmistrov received The Order of Lenin.

In the spring of 1942, the Soviet High Command activated 12 tank corps and two tank armies. In April, Rotmistrov formed the 7th TC, which, in July, became part of the 5th TA. He commanded this corps in the battles around Voronezh, Stalingrad and Rostov. In these battles, Rotmistrov began to cultivate his method of operations for armored forces. Using a high degree of agility and powerful, direct, active maneuver, he would strike a devastating blow against the enemy. "Powerful strikes to upset the enemy, and then, utilizing in full measure the agility of the unit, broke up their main forces, encircled them, and destroyed them in detail—such was the favorite tactical conduct in battle of Rotmistrov," wrote one of his early commanders, General P. A. Kurochkin.⁸ The skillful combination of fire, maneuver and shock marked his fighting style.

"The success of Rotmistrov's corps resulted from his always carefully studying the enemy," observed Kurochkin, "weigh-

ing their strengths and weaknesses, he knew how to find the point for striking the main effort¹⁰—a seemingly necessary ability that operational-level commanders must possess. Rotmistrov also possessed uncanny ability to quickly assess a situation and devise a creative approach for decisions.

Rotmistrov's ways differed greatly in variety and uniqueness of methods. This, at times, put him at odds with senior commanders—especially when he believed that he had a much better idea. While a mark of many great military leaders and a predicament common in all armies, this attitude became a serious problem in later operations. In its struggle for survival, however, even the Soviet system tolerated such an eccentric nature.

Rotmistrov's exploits on the battlefield continually attracted attention from the highest levels. Gaining the reputation as an authoritative theorist and practioner in the combat application of tank forces, he took an active part in creating a more homogenous force structure for tank armies after serious problems were revealed in operations around Stalingrad.

In February 1943, he assumed command of the 5th GTA. His first major test came at Kursk. Assigned to the Voronezh Front, his tank army initially waited as the reserve against the advancing German panzer forces. At the culminating point for the German operation, his tankers swung into action. The 5th GTA, as the Soviet armor elite, faced the German's elite 2d SS Panzer Corps.

On the morning of 12 July 1943, Rotmistrov, with a group of staff officers, occupied an observation post (OP) near the front. From there, he had radio communications with his tank corps and with the army staff. He also had couriers and additional radios for backup communications. The OP, located on a small height southwest of Prokhurovka, provided a fine view of the im-



Pavel
Alekseevich
Rotmistrov

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pending battle area. Rotmistrov had anticipated the place and time for combat with the advancing German armor formations—he essentially conducted an operational-level ambush, resulting in the largest tank battle in history to that date. Germans and Soviets committed some 1,500 tanks and self-propelled assault guns to this battle in the southern half of the Kursk salient.

With the code words "Steel, steel, steel," Rotmistrov's units hit the advancing Ger-

man armor units hard with a rush of tanks closing the distance to compensate for the German tanks' superior firing ranges. The Soviet tanks closed before German turrets could traverse to engage them. Rotmistrov would recall in his memoirs, "I was surprised how close from one another gathered ours and enemy tanks. Meeting halfway moved two huge tank avalanches."¹⁰ After a day-long, swirling tank engagement in which attack plane pilots could not distinguish friend from foe, the Germans withdrew.

After successfully blunting the German armor thrust and restoring the defensive lines, Soviet forces quickly refitted and launched a major counteroffensive. Rotmistrov's 5th GTA attacked beside Katukov's 1st TA in a relentless advance, pushing the

Germans back to the Dnieper River by autumn.

During the advance to the Dnieper River, Rotmistrov's tank army pursued the Germans with 66 tanks—12 percent of its original strength. Corps staff officers were at 30 to 35 percent strength; communication means were reduced by 75 percent; and about 85 percent of company and battalion commanders were out of action.¹¹

Rotmistrov filled shortages in tanks and personnel in one brigade from each of the three corps, reinforced them with artillery, and then united them in one combined-arms detachment. To lead the detachment, he appointed the commander and staff of the 5th GMC. The operations and intelligence staff sections from the tank corps reinforced the army staff officers. Also from the tank corps, staff detachments with two very powerful and three medium radio stations were set up.

These measures allowed Rotmistrov to successfully continue the offensive with a strong unit forward and two phantom corps for deception, while simultaneously stopping parts of the army for restoration.¹² This brilliant risk and improvisation belies the conventional notion that Soviet advances came as a result of a massive superiority in personnel and equipment rather than with true military prowess.

In February 1944, high appraisal for the talents of Rotmistrov in the Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy operation, which resulted in the encirclement and destruction of some 73,000 Germans, won him appointment as Marshal of the Armored Forces.

In preparation for the Belorussian operation in June 1944, Stalin permitted his *Stavka* representative, Marshal A. M. Vasilevskiy, to make a last-minute transfer of Rotmistrov's tank army from the reserve to the 3d Belorussian Front. "Rotmistrov was not exactly enthusiastic about the *Stavka* decision," recalled Vasilevskiy in his mem-

T-34/76 tanks



With the code words "Steel, steel, steel," Rotmistrov's units hit the advancing German armor units hard with a rush of tanks closing the distance to compensate for the [German's] superior firing ranges. The Soviet tanks closed before German turrets could traverse to engage them.

oors, "both the transfer of his army and the change in direction of its introduction into the breakthrough."¹³ Rotmistrov objected that his tankers had too little time to prepare routes and assault positions in the new direction. But, he was primarily concerned that the German operational reserve was unlocated. His tank army's advance would attract the reserves' attention.

The 5th GTA, which had always distinguished itself in battle, performed disappointingly in the initial phase of the operation. In the advance, Rotmistrov's army began losing too many tanks. On 28 June, Stalin wrote in a directive to Vasilevskiy and the 3d Belorussian Front commander, "The High Command demands swift and decisive actions from the 5th GTA as called for by the situation at the front."¹⁴

Chernyakovskiy, the 3d Belorussian Front's 38-year-old commander (the youngest in the Red Army and much younger than Rotmistrov) challenged the tank forces' hero's high losses. Rotmistrov claimed that he was using the same tactics that had brought him earlier success. Chernyakovskiy replied that Rotmistrov was no longer on the steppes but in hill and swamp country.¹⁵ Chernyakovskiy appointed a special commission to investigate. Based on the results of the investigation, the commission required Rotmistrov to immediately revise his tactics of armored combat in defiladed and semi-defiladed terrain.

In August 1944, after another clash with the front commander over his commitment of tanks to the city fighting around Vilnius, Rotmistrov relinquished his command to be appointed deputy commander of Soviet Armored and Mechanized Forces. None of the 5th GTA's successive commanders achieved the intensity or success of Rotmistrov's operations. Whether the incident was a momentary personality conflict or Rotmistrov had truly lost his touch has never been acknowledged or developed in Soviet writings.

[Rotmistrov continued] the offensive with a strong unit forward and two phantom corps for deception, while simultaneously stopping parts of the army for restoration. This brilliant risk and improvisation belies the conventional notion that Soviet advances came as a result of a massive superiority in personnel and equipment rather than with true military prowess.

Regrettably, Rotmistrov died before completing this portion of his memoirs.¹⁶ He did, however, survive to become the major writer for Soviet armor doctrine in the postwar years until his death in the early 1980s.

Rybalko

Pavel Semenovich Rybalko did not follow the typical wartime career pattern to tank army commander. Yet, while he did not serve as a brigade or corps commander, he commanded a tank army longer than anyone else. Like many commanders, he did have a cavalry background. He commanded a separate cavalry squadron when attached to the Soviet embassy in the Mongolian capital of Ulan Bator and served in the famous 1st Cavalry Army.

The war found Rybalko teaching in a Soviet military academy. In May 1942, after repeated written requests for assignment to the front, he was transferred from the school staff to become deputy commander of the 5th TA. By the end of September 1942, he took command of the 3d TA.

Short, squat and with an old-fashioned shaven head (common among officers before the war), Rybalko was a very competent, self-confident and strong-willed commander. A hard-looking man, with many scars on his head and a long saber-like cut down his right cheek, he conveyed a no-



Pavel
Semenovich
Rybalko

nonsense manner.¹⁷ However, in friendly chats, he could be witty and resourceful and very positive in his attitude.

He could rally those who surrounded him and those he commanded. Yet, his methods did not include concessions or pats on the back. General-Colonel David Dragunskiy alluded to this in his memoirs after commanding a tank brigade under Rybalko. Dragunskiy had just returned after recovering from serious wounds. He was already a Hero of the Soviet Union when Rybalko introduced him to the commander of the front artillery: "This is the commander of our 55th Tank Brigade. He has been in the hospital. But is back in time. He feared he would not make it to Berlin. Now, if he enters Berlin first, he'll get a second Gold Star, and if he doesn't, we'll take his first from him."¹⁸

Rybalko was very exacting and drove his men hard. Although tough and dedicated, he was at the same time judicious in his con-

siderations. He was personally quite fearless and always located himself well forward in the dangerous sectors. His exposure to danger was not reckless, but was employed effectively, galvanizing subordinate commanders and men by moving forward to give them orders and directions.

Marshal I. S. Konev, Rybalko's front commander for the last year of the war, wrote, "We had many good tank commanders, but without deprecating their services, I wish to say just the same that in my personal view Rybalko most thoroughly understood the nature and capabilities of large tank formations. He loved, valued and knew his equipment well although he was not a tankerman from his youth. He knew what could be gotten out of his equipment, what it was capable of and what not and always remembered this when he gave missions to his troops."¹⁹

For skillful leadership of his tank army in January 1943, fighting near Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh, he received the Order of Suvorov, 1st Degree. Zhukov and Vasilevskiy, *Stavka* representatives, in a telegram to Stalin and the *Stavka* reported, "On Rybalko personally we might say the following: he is an experienced general and his appraisal of the situation is accurate."²⁰

In the middle of February 1943, 3d TA received the mission to attack towards Poltava. This operation would reveal that Rybalko's rise was not without flaw. He, too, learned lessons forged in difficult battles. In a situation in which the Red Army command had underestimated the strength and capabilities of the German forces and overestimated their own successes, Rybalko's tank army received an impossible mission.

On 19 February, the German 2d SS and 48th Panzer Corps went on the offensive against the Southwestern Front. On 28 February, 3d TA, subordinated to this front, went on the defense with 30 operable tanks. Not knowing the German intentions and unable to shift to the offense by the morning

of 2 March, Rybalko's tank army was attacked by the 4th Panzer Army.

German units of Operational Group Kampf and SS Adolf Hitler attacked from the vicinity of Krasnograd and, by evening, surrounded the 3d TA. Rybalko ordered a breakout to the northeast. Between 5 and 10 March, elements of the 3d TA broke out of the encirclement, leaving their vehicles and artillery because of a lack of ammunition and fuel.

The army's costly losses and combat ineffectiveness forced its placement into the front reserves and later into the High Command's reserve. Inexperience flawed the Soviet's operational-level assessment, but the Red Army and Rybalko were learning.

On 26 April 1943, the 3d TA was redesignated the 57th Army, and Rybalko was without a command. On 1 May, he approached General Federenko, commander of the Red Army tank and mechanized forces, and the chief of the general staff with a proposal to reestablish the 3d TA as an operational formation. On 14 May, the *Stavka* High Command issued a directive for the formation of the 3d GTA. Rybalko was given a second chance.

With each operation and with each fight, Rybalko's art in leading tank forces grew. He learned quickly (just as the rest of the Red Army had to) in a very demanding school of survival. This mastery would culminate for Rybalko in the final years of the war.

By the summer of 1943, the tank armies, including the 3d GTA, became purely tank formations. Thanks to Rotmistrov's recommendations on force structure, they no longer had rifle divisions that caused awkward coordination of maneuver and movement. Pure tank armies gained the capability to operate independently in the operational depth, apart from the rifle armies.

Shortcomings became evident in breakthroughs of prepared, in-depth German

defenses—the tank army did not have sufficient reinforcements, primarily in heavy artillery, a problem that was never fully resolved. This organic firepower deficiency was not compensated for even by artillery support from the rifle armies. As a result, tank armies suffered high casualties when assisting in the breakthrough of a defense.

The greater majority of breakthrough operations required assistance from the tank armies. Controversy in the post-war years consistently identified Rybalko's front commander, Konev, with the too early commitment of tank forces in the breakthrough, a method supported on occasion by Rybalko.

By 1944, Rybalko's use of the 3d GTA had established a solid reputation and many commanders looked forward to working an operation with his forces. He developed the

Rybalko was very exacting and drove his men hard. Although tough and dedicated, he was at the same time judicious in his considerations. He was personally quite fearless and always located himself well forward in the dangerous sectors. His exposure to danger was not reckless, but was employed effectively, galvanizing subordinate commanders and men by moving forward to give them orders and directions.

intuitive ability to sense the flow of an operation and to distinguish the really decisive moments from the apparently decisive ones. He knew exactly when and where he should be, which remains an uncommon but important quality for operational-level commanders on the modern battlefield.

This was particularly true in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation in July 1944, when Rybalko skillfully reacted to changing situations and executed new decisions. With the

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launching of the offensive, and despite a planned introduction of his tank army into the battle on the second day, he did not wait for a faltering first-echelon attack to clear the path. He recommended to the front commander an early commitment of his tank army into a gap four to six kilometers wide, that became known as the "Koltov corridor."

Anxious to execute the general mission, Rybalko saw an opportunity for a new plan of action, despite a bogged-down advance complicated by counterattacking panzer divisions. After a series of encounter battles and the splitting of the tank army in the operational depth, his forces assisted in encircling nearly eight German divisions at Brody and in capturing Lvov. It then moved towards the Sandomierz bridgehead across the Vistula River.

Perhaps the most impressive operations conducted by Rybalko, demonstrating his depth and agility as an operational-level commander, were the actions of his tank army in Polish Silesia. In January 1945, during the Vistula-Oder operation, the 1st Ukrainian Front, still commanded by Konev, decided the quickest way to liberate the Silesian industrial region and save it from destruction could be accomplished by striking to the rear of the German Silesian grouping.

At 2240 on 23 January, the 3d GTA was

assigned an unexpected, and very complicated, task to turn the entire tank army 90 degrees. On that day, 7th GTC, the lead element of 3d GTA, reached the Oder River south of Oppeln. The army's turn to a new axis required that reconnaissance be reorganized and that troop units and rear services be regrouped. To fulfill the order, Rybalko moved his units 80 km and its forward detachments about 100 km by midday on 24 January.

Rybalko decided to place his trailing corps, 9th MC, in the first echelon and moved the 6th GTC, which had been attacking, into a second-echelon role. At 0310, 24 January, his troops were assigned their missions and, by dawn, they had shifted their offensive onto the new axis.

By evening 24 January, they had forced the Klodnitsa River, and by the evening of the 27th, the 7th GTC was in Rybnik, 9th MC in Nikolai and 6th GTC in between. These efforts quickly led to a situation that threatened the Germans in the Silesian industrial region with encirclement. Since Soviet experience showed that a battle would destroy the industrial works and mines, and it was important to secure the region intact, the Soviet High Command ordered the ring around the Germans not be closed.

Accordingly, on the night of 27-28 January, the front commander assigned 3d GTA a limited mission to complete the destruction of isolated German groupings in the areas of Rybnik and Nikolai, to destroy the enemy as they were escaping from the encirclement, and to attack in the direction of Raciborz and reach the Oder. Rybalko's army reached Raciborz on 29-30 January. Beginning to withdraw units for reequipping and new combat missions, 3d GTA allowed Germans to hastily retreat through the corridor left for them. "Rybalko was a man on whom I completely relied," Konev emphasized in his postwar memoirs.²¹

Preparations began for the final assault

on Berlin. Crossing the Neisse River, Rybalko's path was significantly to the south of Berlin in the direction of the city of Brandenburg. "From the first day of the operation all our actions could be characterized in one word—aggressiveness," wrote Rybalko in a postwar recollection.²² At 0310, 18 April, when the 3d GTA was 2 km from the Spree River and driving on Brandenburg, "I received a directive from the front commander to force the Spree and to develop an aggressive attack in the general direction of . . . Barut, Tel'tov and the southern edge of Berlin. . . . How this order inspired us!"²³ Rybalko's tank army attacked Berlin, not from the east but from the south, and advanced to the center of the city.

Tank army commanders, like Rybalko and other Red Army commanders, followed a long, hard path to a victorious end. Many impressive factors, such as adapting force structures, adopting lessons learned and conducting imaginative warfare at the operational level, were all extensions of a very capable and effective military leadership. This leadership, on the other side of the Eastern Front, mastered modern armored warfare. These Soviet leaders put their tanks in Berlin—an ironic response to Guderian's 1937 writing, *Achtung! Panzers!* It was a leadership foolishly held in contempt by invading Germans, and it is a leadership still unrecognized in US postwar writings and studies. Δ

NOTES

1 The most notable and readily accessible memoirs have been Ench von Manstein, *Lost Victories*, (Novato: CA Presidio Press, 1982); F. W. von Mellenthin, *Panzer Battles*, (New York: Bantam, 5th ed., 1980); Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, (London: Futura, 1974). Major contributors to a German characterization of Red Army forces have been in the Department of the Army Pamphlets 20—200 series, which are historical studies of German experiences on the Eastern Front based on writings paid for by the US Army as a form of subsistence for German officers in the immediate postwar period.

2 See Alan Clark, *Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45*, (New York: Quill, 1985); Earl F. Ziemke, *Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East*, (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1984); Alexander Werth, *Russia at War 1941-45*, (New York: Dutton & Co., 1964); and B. H. Liddell Hart, *The German Generals Talk*, (New York: Quill, 1979). Major works from a Soviet perspective, but not developing individual commanders are John Erickson's *The Soviet High Command*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962); *Road to Stalingrad*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1975); and *Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin's War with Germany*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983); and Malcolm Macmillan, *Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces*, (New York: Macmillan, 1967).

3 S. M. Shermenko, *Generalnyi shtab v gody voiny (The General Staff in the War Years)*, vol. 1, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1981) 178.

4 A. Rafailovich, *V atake "Indisat chetvorki" (In the Attack: Thirty-four)*, (Saratov: Privolzhskoe PU, 1973), 42.

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7 I. Gusevskiy, "Dvazhdy geroy sovetskogo soyuza marshal bronnitankovykh voisk M. E. Katukov" ("Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of Armored Tank Forces M. E. Katukov"), *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Military Historical Journal)*, (hereafter *Vizh*, no. 9, (1980) 93.

8 P. Kuroshkin, *Glavnyi marshal bronnitankovykh voisk P. A. Rotmistrov* ("Main Marshal of Armored Tank Forces, P. A. Rotmistrov"), *Vizh* no. 6, (1981) 90-91.

9 Ibid., 91.

10 P. A. Rotmistrov, *Stal'naya gvardiya (Steel Guard)*, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984) 186.

11 A. Radzhevskiy, "Podderzhanie i vosstanovlenie boesposobnosti tankovykh armii v nashubotnykh operatsiyakh" (Maintenance, Repair and Recovery Support for Tank Armies in Offensive Operations), *Vizh*, no. 3, (1976) 19.

12 Ibid.

13 A. M. Vasilevskiy, *Delo vshei zhizni (A Lifelong Cause)*, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), 412.

14 Ibid.

15 A. Sharupov, "General Chernyakhovskiy," *Prograni* (1980) 367.

16 Rotmistrov's memoirs end with the Kirovograd Operation in 1943.

17. Author's interview with Malcolm Macmillan, Esq., CMG, MA, who, assigned as a British military observer to the Soviet army during World War II, once saw Rybalko.

18 D. A. Dragunskiy, *Gody v brone (Years in Armor)*, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), 271.

19 I. S. Kanev, *Sorok pyat' (Forty five)*, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966) 44-45.

20 Vasilevskiy, 270.

21 Koniev, 46.

22 P. Rybalko, *Udar s yuga* ("Strike from the South"), *Shturm Berlina (Storming Berlin)*, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1948) 186.

23 Ibid., 187.

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The Historical Development of Soviet Forward Detachments

William F. Scott
and Harriet Fast Scott

According to these authors, the June 1987 Military Review article, "Countering Soviet Forward Detachments," by Colonel (P) John R. Landry and Lieutenant Colonel Garrett R. Fonda, was an important first step in explaining the concept of forward detachments. To design measures to combat these important formations, a clear understanding of the purposes for which they were formed, placed within the historical context of their development, is necessary. This article traces the evolution of forward detachments in Soviet military theory, their employment in World War II and their role in contemporary conventional and nuclear high-intensity operations.



IN HIS book, *Crusade in Europe*, Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote that in March 1945, the main problem facing Allied forces was crossing the Rhine River. The US III Corps reached the river at Remagen on 7 March. To their astonishment, they found the Ludendorff Bridge over the Rhine still standing. Its destruction had been planned, but the American troops had advanced so fast that the detachment of German troops responsible for detonation of the charges under the bridge was thrown into confusion. Should they destroy the bridge and trap their own troops on the west side of the river or let it stand?

The US 9th Armored Division led the advance toward the bridge. "Without hesitation a gallant detachment of Brigadier General William M. Hoge's Combat Command 'B' rushed the bridge and preserved it against complete destruction." The news was relayed to General Omar N. Bradley. How much force would be pushed over that bridge? He immediately got in touch with Eisenhower, who later recalled: "I could scarcely believe my ears. We had frequently discussed such a development as a remote possibility." "How much have you got in that vicinity that you can throw across the river?" Ike said to Bradley.¹ Five divisions were sent over the bridge right away.

Taking the bridge at Remagen intact was a crucial event that shortened the war. Its capture has since been celebrated in print and on the movie screen. It is instructive to study how Soviet military historians report this same event. Colonel V. M. Kulish, a distinguished Soviet military historian, in his book, *The Second Front*, wrote:

"The 3rd Corps, having moved 25 to 30 km (kilometers) in three days, on 5 March reached the Rhine south of Bonn. Moving ahead of the corps, the 9th Armored Division turned toward Remagen and with their *forward detachment* seized a railroad bridge which the enemy had not managed to blow

up. On learning of this, Eisenhower ordered Bradley to widen the bridgehead and immediately send not less than five divisions over to the bridgehead."²

The use of the term, "forward detachment," (*peredovoy otryad*, or PO, in Russian) may come as a surprise to American readers. To explain the actions of Hoge's Combat

The use of the term, "forward detachment," [at Remagen] may come as a surprise to American readers. To explain the actions of Hoge's Combat Command "B" to his Soviet readers, Kulish used a military term immediately comprehensible to them: forward detachment.

Command "B" to his Soviet readers, Kulish used a military term immediately comprehensible to them: forward detachment. The Soviets have studied the forward detachment for many years and are quite familiar with the concept. What is a forward detachment and from where did the idea spring?

Official Soviet sources define a forward detachment as:

"... a reinforced tank (motorized rifle, naval infantry) subunit (unit), detached for independent performance of a mission during the course of a battle (operation); an element of the combat order. In the offensive, a forward detachment is designated for rapid penetration into the depth of enemy defenses, seizure of his important objectives (lines), pursuit of the enemy, forcing water barriers from the march and performing other tasks; in defense—for actions in the security zone. Forward detachments might also be sent out on the march in anticipation of a meeting engagement. In the Great Patriotic War, forward detachments were sent out from rifle divisions (sometimes from

At least one Soviet theorist, when discussing maneuverability, stated that "in the course of the offensive troop actions of the Eastern front in 1919 to liberate the Urals, forward detachments were used to ensure continuous operations . . ."

regiments) of the first echelon made up of a rifle battalion reinforced with tanks, artillery and engineers. Tank and mechanized corps detached reinforced brigades for forward detachments. Forward detachments fulfilled missions both in the direct proximity of the main forces, and also while separated from them by 15–50 km, sometimes in cooperation with a tactical air landing.”

It is difficult to determine the exact time the concept of forward detachments was developed in Soviet military art. A number of authors point to the 1930s—the role of forward detachments in cavalry formations was in field manuals in that period. But at least one Soviet theorist, when discussing maneuverability, stated that “in the course of the offensive troop actions of the Eastern front in 1919 to liberate the Urals, forward detachments were used to ensure continuous operations at night and during the day, for reaching the enemy’s rear and disrupting its lines of communications.”

A forward detachment at this time might have included “three-five rifle companies, several machine guns and one or two artillery pieces; on the most important directions they also employed reinforced cavalry units as forward detachments.” Such forward detachments “made it possible to maintain a high rate of advance and ensure the continuous pursuit of the enemy.”

The term came back into use in the 1930s as the Soviet high command developed the

idea of deep battle and deep operations. World War I had defenses so strong that neither side could make much headway in the attack. Troops, if attacked, merely retreated some distance and set up new defenses. Thus, the initial tactical success failed to develop into an operational success, which could have led to strategic results. This failure led to a stalemate, the trench warfare that characterized most of World War I.

Some method was needed to quickly overcome these defenses and destroy the enemy grouping to achieve strategic success. In the post-World War I period, Soviet military strategists determined that to do this, deeply echeloned masses of coordinated infantry, tanks and artillery, supported by aviation, were needed. This method of combat action got the name “deep operation.” Today, operational maneuver groups (OMGs) may be used in the modern version of this concept.

The idea’s embryo can be seen in the latter part of the 1920s in the works of M. N. Tukhachevskiy, N. Ye. Varfolomeyev and Ye. A. Shilovskiy, *Army Operations*; A. K. Kolenkovskiy, *On Offensive Operations of an Army as Part of a Front*; and V. K. Triandafillov, *The Character of Operations of Modern Armies*. Their ideas were reflected in the 1929 Field Service Regulations (PU–29).⁶

In early 1931, just before his death in an airplane accident, Triandafillov, head of the Operations Department of the staff of the Red Army, delivered a speech outlining the features of the deep operation, using the new means of fighting that were just beginning to be developed: armor, artillery and aviation. A. I. Yegorov, the chief of staff, saw to it that Triandafillov’s ideas were widely discussed by the higher command personnel. After several meetings, the staff issued “Provisional Instructions on the Organization of Deep Battle,” which became official in February 1933.



BT-7-2 tanks and
Komintern artillery
tractors circa 1935.

The Provisional Field Service Regulations of 1936 (PU-36) indicated that forward detachments were designated and used for forestalling the enemy on favorable lines and seizing important regions and objectives deep inside his area. Their actions were proposed only when the sides were approaching and at the beginning of a clash.

In March 1935, "Instructions for Deep Battle" was approved by the Commissariat of Defense. These instructions were subsequently tested in maneuvers and troop exercises by military leaders such as I. P. Uborevich, I. E. Yakir, I. F. Fed'ko, P. Ye. Dybenko, B. M. Shaposhnikov, K. A. Meretskov and others. After this, the new Field Service Regulations of 1936 were issued.⁸

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The deep operation had several stages:

- The breakthrough of the tactical defenses by combined efforts of infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation.

- The development of tactical success into operational success by introducing masses of tanks, motorized infantry and mechanized cavalry into the gap, with the support of long-range aviation and the landing of airborne troops, for destruction of reserves and elimination of the enemy's operational defense.

- The development of operational success until the group chosen as the object of the operation is destroyed, and a favorable position for a new operation is seized.¹⁰

To develop the deep operation from the first stage into the second stage, mobile troops (tanks, motorized infantry and mechanized cavalry) had to be introduced, and air drops made into the enemy's operational depths. Air superiority over the region was essential.¹¹

Many of the leading theoreticians who developed the concept of deep battle perished

in Stalin's purges: Yakir, Fed'ko, Dybenko, Tukhachevskiy, Yegorov, Uborevich, R. P. Eideman, and many others. However, the 1936 Field Regulations (PU-36) remained as a guide to young officers.

The use of forward detachments thus preceded World War II. An early mention of forward detachment can be found in *Instructions on Tactics of the Cavalry* issued in 1934. The general instructions indicate that in the offensive, a cavalry regiment might be designated for developing the main strike by the second echelon.¹² This reflects the concept of deep battle.

However, at that stage, "the task of the forward detachment—security of the main forces, [for example] their protection and performance of reconnaissance in their interests,"¹³ did not entirely indicate the role of the forward detachment as it later developed. Before battle, one of the main tasks of the cavalry forward detachment was reconnaissance. On the march and in a meeting

On meeting the enemy, the forward detachment commander was to deploy his troops on the most favorable line available and go over to the defensive in case the enemy had superior forces. If, subsequently, he found the relationship of forces in his favor, the commander was to swiftly attack and repulse the enemy and then continue his mission.


engagement, the forward detachment of horsemen was to move out to a line, designated by the division commander, where its task would be either to move ahead or to stay in the spot, depending on its mission. If it were to precede the main force, it jumped ahead from cover to cover along the general march route, being careful to stay ahead

the mandated distance.

On meeting the enemy, the forward detachment commander was to deploy his troops on the most favorable line available and go over to the defensive in case the enemy had superior forces. If, subsequently, he found the relationship of forces in his favor, the commander was to swiftly attack and repulse the enemy and then continue his mission. If the enemy was superior in force, the forward detachment commander was to remain on the defensive, with the intent of going over to a mobile defense at the first opportunity.¹⁴ There were also instructions for actions of the forward detachment of cavalry in the attack, in defense and in retreat.

Forward detachments were used extensively in World War II. Since they operated independently in performing their mission, apparently the most capable officers available were selected to command them. Among the officers, then junior, who were noted as having commanded forward detachments in that war were A. Kh. Babadzhanian, later Chief Marshal of Armored Forces and Commander of Armored Forces; I. I. Gusakovskiy, General of the Army; D. A. Dragunskiy, General Colonel of Tanks and head of *Vystrel* Higher Officers' Courses for many years; O. A. Losik, Marshal of Armored Forces and Commandant of the Malinovskiy Tank Academy; I. I. Yakubovskiy, subsequently Marshal of the Soviet Union, Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact and 1st Deputy Minister of Defense.

In the first period of the war, in the winter campaign of 1941–42, Soviet troops finally brought the German advance to a halt and even attacked in some areas. Lacking reserves, German troops began hastily to withdraw their troops. The attacking Soviet divisions needed special mobile subunits to impede the enemy's withdrawal. At first they were called by different names—mobile detachments, mobil forward de-



Soviet T-34 with early
L/30.5 76mm gun knock-
out in a Russian village, circa

Soviet historians admit that early in the war forward detachments were not always used correctly. Often badly led, their maneuvers on the battlefield frequently were poorly executed, resulting in terrible losses. It was not until 1942 that Stavka of the Supreme High Command issued a directive that reorganized the breakthrough along the lines of the earlier concept of deep battle.

tachments, forward detachments. But they all performed a single task. As the Directive of the Western Front No. 0103 (13 December 1941) noted:

"Pursuit will be conducted rapidly, without losing contact with the enemy, with wide use of strong mobile forward detachments for seizure of road junctions, defiles and disorganization of the enemy's marching and combat order."¹⁵

Soviet historians admit that early in the war forward detachments were not always used correctly. Often badly led, their maneuvers on the battlefield frequently were poorly executed, resulting in terrible losses. It was not until 1942 that *Stavka* of the Supreme High Command issued a directive that reorganized the breakthrough along the lines of the earlier concept of deep battle. New equipment arriving at the front made it possible to create stronger forward detachments. This made new missions possible:

- Seizing lines (objectives) in the next

zone and holding them until the main forces arrived.

- Reaching the rear areas of individual enemy groups and, together with the division's main forces, annihilating them.
- Reaching the route of the enemy's withdrawal and seizing the defense line prepared by him.
- Seizing (river) crossings and other important objectives in the depths of the enemy's defenses.¹⁶

Before August 1943, tank corps sent out forward detachments consisting of reinforced companies or battalions, but later tank or mechanized brigades were used. They could be formed at the beginning of an operation or during it. Usually, they were formed ahead of time so that the commander could work out all the details of action with his men before the battle. Reinforcement units were assigned in time to take part in the planning, using models of the terrain or maps. Frequently, there was no time for detailed rehearsal. The accompanying figure

Forward Detachment Preparation Time In Offensive Operations

Operation	Forward Detachment	Time to Prepare
Stalingrad Counterattack	Composite detachment	3-4 hrs
Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy	25th & 233 Tank Brigades	2-3 hrs
Zhitomir-Berdichev	1st Guards Tank Brigade	13-14 hrs
Shyauliyay	8th & 9th Gds Mech Brigades	3.5 hrs
Vistula-Oder	44th & 52d Gds Tank Brigades	None

shows the time available for such preparation in selected operations.¹⁷

The distance of the forward detachment from the parent unit increased during the war. In 1942, the forward detachment operated up to 25 km ahead of the main force, and later, 50 km and even 90 km or more.

High tempos were achieved because the forward detachments avoided battle whenever possible. The units also had to be replaced frequently by fresh units. For example, the forward detachments of the 7th Guards Tank Corps of the 3d Guards Tank Army in the Vistula-Oder operation were relieved five times from 14 to 24 January

5th Guards Tank Corps in the Yassy-Kishinev operation was the 22d Guards Tank Brigade. It was reinforced with a regiment of self-propelled artillery, an artillery battery, engineer and mortar companies. During the night of 26-27 August 1944, in pursuing the enemy, it destroyed his rear guard and prevented him from taking up a defense on the approaches to the city.¹⁸

General Major I. N. Vorob'yev today appears as one of the most authoritative of the Soviet military spokesmen. In 1965, Vorob'yev, then a colonel, writing in the General Staff's theoretical journal *Military Thought*, listed the major missions forward detachments were to perform. Among them were seizing and holding important objectives and securing information on the formation and strength of enemy forces; the ensuring of a more rapid and complete exploitation of nuclear strikes delivered by the advancing forces; the destruction of the enemy's nuclear systems and air defense groups. He then described the role of "large forward detachments," which differed significantly from that of the forward detachments used in World War II:

"Large forward detachments possessing their own nuclear weapons may be used not only to capture and hold objectives but also to destroy individual, small advancing enemy reserve groupings, and to destroy his large control points and communications centers. This may be accomplished independently or in coordination with air-

The major missions forward detachments were. . . seizing and holding important objectives and securing information on the formation and strength of enemy forces; the ensuring of a more rapid and complete exploitation of nuclear strikes delivered by the advancing forces; the destruction of the enemy's nuclear systems and air defense groups.

1945. The forward detachments of the 1st Mechanized Corps of the 2d Guards Tank Army were changed six times from 18 to 30 January 1945.¹⁹

Forward detachments frequently operated at night. The forward detachment of the

borne forces and with support from nuclear weapons and aviation of a higher command." (emphasis in original)²⁰

Vorob'yev then suggested that such large forward detachments be called "operational forward detachments." It is speculated here that such detachments were the predecessors to what, today in the West, are known as OMGs. He noted that "at the same time the role of tactical [forward] detachments has not been decreased." (emphasis added)²¹

In the same article, Vorob'yev mentioned "so-called raiding operations" as follows:

"Basically these operations consist of assigning to each detachment not just one but several objectives, located at various depths. . . . Such raids may be especially effective when performed by large detachments."²²

In 1976, General Colonel V. A. Merimskiy, then deputy chief of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of Soviet Ground Forces, concluded a series of articles that had appeared in the *Military Herald* debating the use of the armored personnel carrier, *Boevaya Mashina Pekhoty* (BMP), in battle. The BMP was eminently suited, he concluded, for actions deep in the enemy's rear as part of a forward or bypassing detachment.

One article in the *Military Herald* series had proposed "raiding tactics" for subunits of BMPs. Merimskiy noted:

"Comparing the actions of a subunit of BMPs in the exercises Lt Colonel Molozev described with the actions of forward detachments, it is easy to see their complete identity. In actual fact, a forward detachment as part of a reinforced battalion will rush into the depths of the defenses, bypassing strong points and pockets of resistance. . . . Consequently, it is hardly advisable to introduce such a term as 'raiding tactics' especially for platoons, companies and battalions, but rather talk about actions of sub-



T-55A tanks and BMP-1 armored personnel carriers

Primary emphasis is given to methods that will ensure "continuous and rapid advance by our troops to a great depth." . . . work continues on "the coordinated employment of airborne forces, forward detachments and the rapid exploitation of success, the combating of enemy reconnaissance and attack weapons."

units in BMPs in forward, bypassing and special detachments."²³ In other words, the actions of small forward detachments are the same as "raiding tactics."

Soviet strategists in the mid-1980s, like General Colonel M. A. Gareyev, continue to stress "the preparation and conduct of offensive operations." Primary emphasis is given to methods that will ensure "continuous and rapid advance by our troops to a great depth." Work continues on "the coordinated employment of airborne forces, forward detachments and the rapid exploitation of success, the combating of enemy reconnaissance and attack weapons and so on."²⁴

What is the role of the forward detachment today? Soviet theoreticians like Colonel F. D. Sverdlov, for many years professor of tactics at Frunze Military Academy, in 1986 wrote an entire book on the subject. He described how such detachments will be sent out to penetrate deep into enemy de-



The US Army concept of AirLand Battle, according to Sverdlov, makes it possible to predict the combat actions of the probable enemy and to plan and prepare to conduct battle accordingly. AirLand Battle must be countered by tactics of decisive, highly maneuverable actions. The necessary combat tasks must be performed actively, continuously and with surprise.

fenses and to support a high rate of advance for the main troops.²⁵

Today's combat actions will take place over a wide area. Troops will be able to use gaps in the enemy's front lines for flank attacks and envelopment, reaching the rear area defenses and carrying out surprise attacks. Sverdlov pointed out that the battle plan, particularly the order of nuclear and artillery fire destruction of the enemy, will determine the time and area from which forward detachments will be sent. Holes in the enemy's defenses created by nuclear strikes will create favorable conditions for swift action by forward detachments.²⁶ In pursuing a retreating enemy, forward detachments will forestall the enemy in reaching a designated area, creating favorable conditions for his encirclement and destruction by the main forces.²⁷

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Sverdlov points out that forward detachments will be an important element of the combat order during offensive and defensive operations. They can successfully perform their mission in any kind of battle or action by the enemy. Their personnel will be specially trained for the task. The use of nuclear weapons and other new means of destruction does not decrease but increases the possibilities for using forward detachments under today's circumstances.²⁸

In offensive battle, the actions of forward detachments will depend on the enemy's defenses. Commanders must know the strong and weak aspects of the enemy's defenses to take advantage of the slightest miscalculation both when using nuclear weapons and when using only conventional weapons. The enemy will be expected to defend his rear areas against possible penetration by forward detachments or tactical airborne landings.²⁹

The enemy will build his defenses on the terrain exactly where the forward detachments will want to operate. The forward detachments must be constantly on the alert so they will not be caught in an ambush. If nuclear weapons are used, the enemy will occupy his strong points only at the last minute, a circumstance forward detachments will use to their advantage. The commander must know the enemy's order of battle, his forces, the terrain and the time available. Enemy covering forces will try to impede the movement and actions of troops, including forward detachments.

In defensive battle, forward detachments will operate in the security zone, which

means they will be the first ones to encounter an attacking enemy. Their task will be to give their main forces time to organize their defenses, using new tactical methods of defensive actions. Forward detachments will be called on to slow down the enemy attack in the security zone, to keep him from seizing the initiative and to limit his freedom to maneuver by creating obstacles and other impediments. In some cases, forward detachments will be able to stall the offensive by vigorous defense and by leading the ene-

my astray as to the main force defenses.

Forward detachments can be used in the offensive, in meeting engagements, in defense, in pursuit and in retreat. These missions applied when forward detachments rode out on horseback, with horse-drawn artillery pieces and ammunition wagons. Today the weapon systems have changed, but the basic concept remains. The presence of nuclear weapons has not altered military fundamentals and the missions of these highly mobile and powerful formations.²⁴

NOTES

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4 M. A. Gareyev, M. V. Frunze-Voyennyy Teoreti (M. V. Frunze-Military Theoretician) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985) 208.

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6 *Ibid.*, 12.

7 *Ibid.*, 13.

8 *Ibid.*, 15.

9 Colonel N. Kiriyev and Colonel N. Dobenko, "From the Experience of Combat Use of Forward Detachments of Tank (Mechanized) Corps," *Voenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal (Military Historical Journal)*, no. 9 (1982) 20.

10 *Ibid.*, 15.

11 *Ibid.*, 16.

12 *Ukazaniya po Takhke Chastey i Podrazdeleniy Konnitsy RKKA (Instructions on Tactics of Cavalry Units and Subunits of the RKKA)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1934), 52.

13 *Ibid.*, 152.

14 *Ibid.*, 154.

15 F. D. Sverdlov, *Peredovoye Otryady v Boyu (Forward Detachments in Battle)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986), 9. Sverdlov included a typical order on

use of forward detachments. The commander of the 49th Army ordered, "The 194th rifle division, attacking in the direction of Gosteshevo, Novaya Slobodka, bypassing Vysokinski from the south, by the end of 19 December, with the main forces, will take N. Konovo, Karpovo, and with forward detachments, occupy Novaya Slobodka. The 30th rifle Brigade by the end of 19 December, with its main forces, will take the line Alukhovo, Durovo, Poznikovo, and, with forward detachments, reach the line Filippovka, Nedel'noye, Kudino."

16 *Ibid.*, 12.

17 Kiriyev and Dobenko, 24.

18 *Ibid.*, 26.

19 *Ibid.*

20 I. N. Vorob'yev, "Forward Detachments in Offensive Operations and Battles," *Voenyaya Mysl (Military Thought)* (April 1965) (From *Selected Readings from Military Thought 1963-73*, vol. 5, part 1 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), 99.

21 *Ibid.*, 100.

22 *Ibid.*, 103.

23 V. Mensky, "The BMP in Battle," *Voyennyy Vestnik (Military Herald)* (March 1976) 21.

24 Gareyev, 244.

25 Sverdlov, 66.

26 *Ibid.*, 67.

27 *Ibid.*, 68.

28 *Ibid.*, 77.

29 *Ibid.*, 66.

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Soviet Airborne Forces and the Central Region

Major James F. Holcomb, US Army

Since World War II, the Soviet Union has continued to expand and modernize its military forces to unprecedented levels. Soviet airborne forces are part of that expansion and are a major factor that must be considered by the NATO allies in the event of hostilities. This article examines the capabilities and limitations of Soviet airborne forces in support of a theater offensive and examines current Soviet views on employment of their airborne forces.



IN RECENT years, some Western military analysts have presented the view that Soviet planning for theater war is predicated on achieving theater objectives solely through conventional operations (albeit with a substantial nuclear backup).¹ Use of massive amounts of airpower and conventional surface-to-surface missiles in lieu of nuclear strikes will allow the Soviets to break into NATO's operational rear area with force-tailored, highly mobile formations called operational maneuver groups (OMGs).²

The OMGs would be division or army/corps size at army and front level respectively. Once in NATO's rear area, they would conduct raiding actions to disrupt command, control, and communications (C³) and logistical functions, capture key facilities, such as airfields, and destroy nuclear weapons facilities and launchers. The goal of this operational concept is to present NATO military and political leaders with a *fait accompli* by the third or fourth day of the war. The destruction of nuclear delivery means and the intermixing of Soviet and NATO units in the rear area would preclude a NATO nuclear response to the offensive.

All of these writers posit the massive Soviet employment of airborne and air assault formations to support the advance of combined arms forces and, in particular, the OMGs as they penetrate beyond tactical (50 kilometers [km]) defenses into the operational depths. Since the air-defense environment in Europe is the densest of anywhere in the world, this would seem to pose some problem to Soviet leaders tasked with employment of these forces in support of such an offensive.³

The Soviets resumed analysis of the conventional "option" in the 1960s. In their writings, they continued to assign a key role to airborne forces in support of a conventional theater offensive. The airborne dimension is seen as a means of attacking the ene-

my's defense throughout its depth, a key Soviet concept, especially in a conventional context. As the discussion matured, the role of airborne forces changed from that of merely exploiting nuclear strikes to that of acting as an essential element of the theater offensive itself. Current writings, notably those by airborne force (*Vozdushno-Desantnye Voiska* [VDV]) personalities, continue analysis of the Soviet historical experience and assign an essential role to airborne forces and operations in support of such an offensive.⁴

Employment Limitations


The employment of airborne forces in a theater war is dependent upon the capabilities and limitations of the means required for such employment.

VTA Assets

The principal and most obvious limitation to employment of airborne forces is the number of Military Transport Aviation (*Voenno-Transportnaia Aviatsia* [VTA]) aircraft available to transport the force. VTA currently has over 1,200 aircraft. Of these, the ones most applicable to operational-level airborne operations are the AN-12 Cub, the IL-76 Candid and the AN-22 Cock.⁵ Of these, the IL-76 is the most important. It is being produced at the rate of 30 per year, while AN-12 and AN-22 production has stopped.⁶

The AN-22 would more likely be employed as a cargo hauler rather than as a lift aircraft for airborne operations. Although a demonstration drop was conducted from a single AN-22 during the *Dvina* exercise in 1970, apparently that is the exception rather than the rule (as are similar operations with the US C-5A Galaxy).⁷

Aeroflot aircraft are not considered in the total number of available aircraft because of the particular crew skills required for air



It is estimated that it would take 55 to 65 IL-76 aircraft to drop a Soviet airborne regiment equipped with airborne armored vehicles (BMDs). This would equate to more than 200 AN-12 sorties. Obviously, this would be a sizable percentage of the total AN-12 and IL-76 assets now available.

drop or assault landing operations. One must assume that aircraft used for airborne assault operations in a theater-level conflict would come from trained VTA assets. The number of aircraft needed to deploy elements of a Soviet airborne unit would depend on the size and tailoring of the force, the logistical requirement of the force and the amount of time the force would expect to operate. In short, it is mission dependent.

It is estimated that it would take 55 to 65 IL-76 aircraft to drop a Soviet airborne regiment equipped with airborne armored vehicles (BMDs).⁶ This would equate to more than 200 AN-12 sorties. Obviously, this would be a sizable percentage of the total AN-12 and IL-76 assets now available. Also, the AN-12 suffers from a distinct range limitation when compared to the IL-76. Depending on the units' deployment location, the IL-76 assets could be even more valuable.

Operational Competition

Another important factor to consider in airborne force employment is the competing operational requirements for those same assets. This competition can take various forms. For example, to obtain the surprise necessary for success of OMGs (by striking prior to complete NATO deployment), some Western analysts propose that the Soviets will launch an offensive from a "standing start." This would entail attacking with the forward deployed units in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) and in the Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia.

Once the offensive is launched, rapid Soviet reinforcement is available only from Poland (two tank divisions) and from the western military districts in the Soviet Union (33 additional divisions, mostly category II and III).⁷ Depending on the situation, the Soviet Supreme High Command may decide that rapid reinforcement of the Western

Theater is essential. It is likely that VTA assets would be used if such a need was urgent enough (or NATO air forces succeed in significantly disrupting rail traffic). This could conceivably limit the availability of VTA assets for airborne employment in the Central Region.

Soviet military and political goals could function as a second competing factor. In the context of a short-war philosophy, the Soviets may decide to employ their available airborne forces for strategic or operational-strategic missions rather than merely operational missions in support of the theater offensive. The 1986 edition of the *Voenno-Enciklopedicheskii Slovar'* (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary) defines an operational-strategic *desant* assault as one that is intended to "... seize large administrative-political centers and industrial regions of the enemy and disorganize the enemy government. . . ." They can also be employed to "... open a new front of military action and sometimes to cause the withdrawal of particular governments from a war. . . ." ¹⁰ Any such employment would draw VTA assets away from employment in support of the theater offensive in the Central Region. ¹¹

Combat Aviation Support

In the Soviet perception, successful airborne force employment is contingent on total air superiority. ¹² Security for the operation would entail three separate functions for Soviet combat aircraft and air defense systems:

- Security in the marshaling area.
- Security en route to the objective.
- Ground support of the inserted force. ¹³

Aviation support of the airborne operation is an essential element of the airborne operation itself. The quantitative balance of combat aircraft in the Central Region lies clearly in the Soviet's favor (3,775 Warsaw Pact vs. 2,368 NATO). ¹⁴ In the event of an offensive in the Central Region, however,

many of those aircraft would be required to perform a variety of missions formerly assigned to nuclear weapons. These would include striking command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) facilities, nuclear delivery means, airfields, and air defense sites, as well as fighting the air superiority battle. This multiplicity of mis-

Depending on the situation, the Soviet Supreme High Command may decide that rapid reinforcement of the Western Theater is essential. It is likely that VTA assets would be used if such a need was urgent enough (or NATO air forces succeed in significantly disrupting rail traffic).

sions would seem to constrain combat aviation support of airborne operations.

In Soviet thinking, however, "total" air superiority can be qualified since "... through massive employment and diligent utilization of aviation it is possible to gain air superiority on several operational or strategic directions, even under such conditions as when the enemy has overall air superiority." ¹⁵ The preemptive nature of present conventional air operations would provide the necessary conditions to establish and maintain sufficient local air superiority to accomplish airborne operations. In addition, a growing number of multi-mission aircraft affords some flexibility in allocation of assets to airborne missions. Overall, this factor seems to be the least constraining one in the employment of airborne forces in the Central Region.

Assault Force Availability

The availability of VDV forces for potential employment in the Central Region is the fourth limiting factor for consideration.

AIRBORNE FORCE DEPLOYMENT

Military District	Location	Division	Orientation
Leningrad	Pskov	76th Gd	NW TVD
Baltic	Kaunas	7th Gd	W TVD
Belorussian	Vitebsk	103d Gd (a)	W TVD
Odessa	Kishenev	98th Gd	SW TVD
Moscow	Tula	106th Gd	Cen. Reserve
Turkestan	Fergana	105th Gd <small>In Afghanistan</small>	S TVD
Transcaucasus	Kirovabad	104th Gd <small>1 Regt in Afghanistan</small>	S TVD
Baltic	Jonava	44th Gd	Tng Div <small>(3 5,000 pers)</small>

At first glance, it appears that the Soviets have an ample number of airborne troops to employ. These forces, some 50,000, are organized into eight divisions. Their deployment and possible orientations are shown in the accompanying figure.¹⁶


The geographical orientation of the divisions must not be taken too literally. VDV forces are a reserve of the Supreme High Command and could be committed to TVDs (theater of military operations) and *fronts* as needed. For example, the 76th Guards Division (GD) was employed during the *Dvina* exercise in the Belorussian Military District. A more recent example is that one regiment each of the 103d GD of the Belorussian Military District and the 104th GD of the Turkistan Military District are presently reinforcing the 105th GD operating with the 40th Army in Afghanistan.

There are 3 2/3 division equivalents available for employment in the Western TVD. The 44th GD at Jonava is generally regarded as a training division and should be discounted for immediate combat availability. In addition, the 106th GD would probably be retained by the Supreme High Command as

a reserve. That leaves 1 2/3 division equivalents to consider for operational employment in the Western TVD. This approximates Soviet statements that one or two airborne divisions would support a TVD for a strategic offensive.¹⁷

It is interesting to consider the ranges involved in employing these two divisions in the Central Region. Without forward basing, the 7th GD at Kaunas lies approximately 1,000 km from potential objectives in northern Germany. This is well within the 5,000-km range of the IL-76 and would allow the transport aircraft to recover in the Soviet Union following the operation. However, if lifted by AN-12s, the aircraft would have to recover in eastern Europe for refueling prior to being used for subsequent lifts for other missions. The 103d GD in Vitebsk would require IL-76s to lift them the 1,400 km to potential objectives in southern Germany. With the number of available VTA aircraft, it is apparent that Soviet planners face significant time and space problems.

The Soviets are aware of these problems. In 1980, during the exercise *Brotherhood in Arms*, conducted in the German Democratic



Each airborne regiment
should maintain and transport
its own set of military medical
systems in its military regiment.

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Republic, the Soviets airdropped an airborne regiment on the western side of the Elbe River.¹⁸ What made this operation significant is that this regiment was transported from a military district in the western Soviet Union by IL-76s. This reflects the Soviet interest in solving the "time-space" problem of employing airborne forces directly from their bases in the Soviet Union into the Central Region.

It appears then, that upwards of two divisions would be available to support a theater offensive in the Central Region. It is also clear that, without forward basing, substantial obstacles would have to be overcome to ensure timely employment of those forces.

Possible Solutions

The Soviets recognize the limitations of airborne operations and analyze their historical experience to help find solutions.

Drawing on Soviet perceptions, some conclusions can be reached concerning the present characteristics of Soviet airborne operations and what such operations might look like in the Central Region.

Surprise

Since the death of Stalin, surprise has re-emerged as an important principle of war in Soviet military theory. In the context of a strategic offensive it is an essential element to achieve victory while preventing the use of NATO's nuclear assets. The Soviets have taken steps to ensure that the mobilization functions required to transition from peace to war are as simple and short as possible.

In the event of hostilities, the Soviets must seize the initiative very early, that is, prior to complete NATO deployment, to create the conditions for introduction of OMGs.¹⁹ Likewise, subordinate operations will also have to rely, to a great extent, on achieving surprise to guarantee success.



22



The success of the strategic offensive depends almost totally on the achievement of air superiority.

The employment of OMGs without such superiority would be counterproductive and could result in the failure of the entire offensive. This point also encourages the integration of airborne operations into the air operation from the outset.

The Soviets recognize this: "It is clear that the operations of airborne troops . . . will produce the greatest success only when they are used suddenly."²⁰

To achieve a measure of surprise, various

techniques can be used. The airborne operations must be launched in a sudden strike using only one aircraft pass. This stands in Soviet literature as a major lesson of World War II. Another way is to drop simultaneously in several areas. This has the effect of confusing the enemy and shortening the amount of time the force is vulnerable en route to the objective area.²¹

Another possibility is to conduct the operation under cover of darkness or bad weather. Soviet writings indicate that their aircraft have navigational equipment, similar to the US AWAD (All-Weather Aerial Delivery) system, that would allow such operations.²² Such technology allows airborne operations to be conducted without having to visually identify flight checkpoints or even the drop zone itself. During the *Berezina* exercise in 1978, for example, US military observers witnessed the drop of a Soviet airborne regiment from IL-76s during a snow storm.²³

Deception measures also play a key role in achieving surprise. These could include moving troops and VTA assets forward under the guise of an exercise, marshaling at dispersed airfields at night, or even integrating airborne elements into the semiannual troop rotation to GSFG for forward basing.

The Air and Anti-Air Operation

To provide greater security for the operation, the Soviets can integrate the airborne operation into the larger air operation. In a conventional offensive, the air operation will replace nuclear strikes at the outset of the offensive. The objective is to destroy NATO nuclear-capable aircraft on the ground, to strike C³I and nuclear resources, and to secure an air corridor into NATO's depths.²⁴ The anti-air operation is conducted to gain and maintain air superiority.

Identifications of the air corridors and the means to establish and secure them would

Virtually, all Western analysts agree that in the event of a strategic offensive, special operations forces [spetznaz] would play a key role. They would conduct sabotage, assassination and raids to aid in disrupting NATO's rear area. Another important role for such forces would be to assist the airborne operation.

take place at the TVD level.²⁵ This would simplify integration of the airborne assault landings (also being planned at the TVD level) into the overall operation. In addition to air strikes, artillery and conventionally armed missiles would also be used to establish the corridors.

Once the corridors are established, they could be used by both combat and transport aircraft simultaneously. In fact, multi-mission capable aircraft could secure the transport aircraft en route and then strike selected targets in the landing areas. Additionally, even when total surprise is not achieved, NATO aircraft would more likely be involved in the air superiority battle than in trying to specifically interdict the airborne echelons.

The success of the strategic offensive depends almost totally on the achievement of

air superiority. The employment of OMGs without such superiority would be counter-productive and could result in the failure of the entire offensive. This point also encourages the integration of airborne operations into the air operation from the outset.

The Air Assault Unit

The creation of front-level air assault brigades and army air assault battalions²⁶ is a partial solution to the problem of force availability. It also minimizes potential command and control problems by giving the front and army commanders an organic airborne capability to employ in direct support of the OMGs. In addition, within GSFG there are five assault helicopter regiments (one per army) and two front helicopter regiments (one assault and one transport) to move these units.

The appearance of air assault units is a manifestation of a conscious decision to "divide the labor" required of airborne forces into operational and operational-tactical

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missions. The air assault units would fill the need for a force operating in direct support of a division- or army-size OMG at the operational (army and front) level. They would be employed by the front commander to ensure rapid movement of the OMG into the enemy's operational depth. Since most of the air assault brigades' objectives would lie within range of forward-deployed, rotary-wing aircraft, the force would be able to use low-level or terrain-following flight techniques, which would significantly enhance the survivability of the force.

Additionally, the air assault force has the capacity of being "reloaded" after linkup with the forward detachment of the OMG. Logistics support for the helicopters could be included in the overall OMG logistics package allowing repeated use of air assault units in direct support.²⁷ On the other hand, airborne forces using fixed-wing transport would have to be withdrawn to secure airfields for further employment.

Force Survivability


In the last decade, the Soviets have tended to concentrate on smaller-size airborne operations. At the most, they have been reg-

imental in size. More often, however, they involve employment of a battalion reinforced with ASU-85 assault guns, artillery or antiaircraft systems or all of these. In fact, the last division-size operation was conducted during the *Yug* exercise in 1971.

By 1980, the move toward reduced scale operations was complete.²⁸ Battalion- and regimental-size operations conducted simultaneously at operational depths are intended to confuse the enemy as to the location of the main effort. Smaller operations over a larger area also lessen the vulnerability inherent to large fleets of transport aircraft penetrating enemy airspace. A division-size airborne assault would encompass an area, 80 by 100 km, that would have in it some 10 to 12 drop zones and 4 to 6 landing zones.²⁹ This would correspond to one drop or landing zone for each battalion.

Virtually, all Western analysts agree that in the event of a strategic offensive, special operations forces (*voiska spetsial'nogo naznacheniia* or *spetznaz*) would play a key role. They would conduct sabotage, assassination and raids to aid in disrupting NATO's rear area. Another important role for such forces would be to assist the airborne operation. Many of the *spetznaz* elements would already be in country prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Use of *spetznaz* for "terminal guidance" on drop zones would also allow the smaller drops described.³⁰ By securing drop zones prior to the operation, they would also preclude the need for the airborne force to commit an "assault detachment" to perform the same operation. This, in turn, enhances the security and surprise of the operation.

The equipping of all VDV regiments with the BMD also encourages smaller drops and enhances surprise. In the Soviet view, the introduction of the BMD radically changed the nature of airborne operations. The BMD allows airborne battalions to drop away from their objectives, increasing security



BMD airborne combat vehicle following airdrop. Note that the suspension has yet to be lowered.

Once on the ground and assembled, the airborne force will use "raiding" tactics to accomplish their missions. The BMD provides the force with a measure of security through maneuver. The force can strike their immediate mission objective. . . . The subsequent mission can be designated or merely be a "target of opportunity" within the battalion (regimental) zone.

and survivability. If a major objective is to be attacked (for example, an airfield), the battalions can drop separately and assemble as a regiment some distance away or even attack simultaneously from different directions. The BMD provides substantial antitank defense, maneuverability and some armor protection. It addresses precisely those weaknesses the Soviets perceived in their historical experience.³¹

The transport aircraft themselves would be organized into echelons to enhance security. Each echelon would consist of approximately 20 aircraft.³² These aircraft would be enough to carry an airborne battalion. These echelons would be separated by three to four minutes in trail and by a minimum of 25 km in width.³³ Command and control elements would be cross-loaded to ensure redundancy in case of aircraft loss.

In the area of the drop itself, the aircraft would cross the drop zone in a "V of Vs" formation and drop the heavy equipment first. There would be only one pass. The BMD

crews may jump with their vehicles to speed up recovery and assembly. The troop-carrying aircraft would drop, using both doors and the ramp.³⁴ This ensures a quick exit of the aircraft and a tighter dispersion pattern on the ground. The combination of all these features is designed to ensure the greatest security, speed and surprise.

Once on the ground and assembled, the airborne force will use "raiding" tactics to accomplish their missions.³⁵ The BMD provides the force with a measure of security through maneuver. The force can strike their immediate mission objective and then move on to a subsequent mission.

The subsequent mission can be designated or merely be a "target of opportunity" within the battalion (regimental) zone. During exercises, raiding actions have covered as much as 60 to 80 km in a single night.³⁶ The BMD has a cruising range of 320 km and could operate at similar ranges for two to three days.³⁷ Such tactics increase the disruptive potential and the security of the air-

borne force by making it more difficult to "find, fix and destroy."

Economy of VTA Assets

The timing of the operation can be an effective way to economize aircraft. If the airborne operations go in as an integral part of

Assuming that the air corridors have been effectively established, TVD, front and army VTA assets consisting of AN-26s and helicopters can be used as necessary for resupply or "housekeeping" missions. This, again, would free up the critical long-range VTA assets for other missions.

the air operation itself, those VTA assets can recover early enough in the offensive to be used for other missions.

Assuming that the air corridors have been effectively established, TVD, front and army VTA assets consisting of AN-26s and helicopters can be used as necessary for resupply or "housekeeping" missions. This, again, would free up the critical long-range VTA assets for other missions.

Another way for VTA assets to be conserved is by targeting airfields or large landing areas for airborne assaults. This is considered an important mission for airborne forces and is practiced regularly.³⁸ In addition, both the AN-12 and IL-76 have a short takeoff and landing capability and can operate from unimproved airstrips.³⁹ This would facilitate use of bare-base, air-landing sites in the assault. Since fewer aircraft are required for air-landing operations than for parachute assault operations, some economy of assets could result. Following the initial parachute assault by a portion of the force, the remainder of the force and its equipment could be air landed. This,

also, aids assembly and organization of the force for its combat mission.

Finally, although Aeroflot aircraft should not be considered for use in the airborne assault, they can fulfill many of the other demands on VTA aircraft. About 200 AN-12s and IL-76s are on duty with Aeroflot.⁴⁰ They could be used to move material and personnel from the western Soviet Union forward into eastern Europe. This again would release VTA aircraft and crews for combat missions.

If a combination of these measures, along with some forward positioning, is used, it is possible that enough VTA aircraft could be made available to support a two-division airborne operation in support of the theater offensive.

Since the 1930s, airborne forces have occupied a key role in Soviet military theory. The continuing evolution of Soviet operational art reflects the theories of the '30s and the experiences of the Great Patriotic War. It is not surprising that the Soviets still consider airborne operations an essential element of the larger theater operation. Continuing technological development of airlift and airborne-specific equipment reflects the key interest Soviet leaders have in these forces and their application. Their writings indicate an appreciation of the threat to and limitations of such a force on the battlefield.

The Soviets also show a willingness and ability to examine problems and develop the equipment and theory necessary to overcome them. Moreover, in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, employment of airborne forces will be an integral part of the theater offensive. The appearance of mechanized airborne forces in the NATO rear on Day 1 of such an offensive will not be decisive in itself. However, the confusion and damage these forces would generate could contribute significantly to the success of the greater overall threat: the division- and army-size OMGs committed as part of the theater offensive. ^{MR}

NOTES

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- 2 The Soviets use the historical term "mobile group" to describe these formations.
- 3 For the purpose of this paper the term "Central Region" is used as a subset of the Soviet Western Theater of Strategic Military Action (*teat voenno-voennoy deystviya*, hereafter referred to as TVD).
- 4 V. Samurukov, "Combat Operations Involving Conventional Means of Destruction," *Selected Readings from Military Thought*, 1963-1973, part I, Joseph Douglass ed. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), 184. M. M. Kiran, "Armieska Nastupatel'naya Operatsiya" ("Army Offensive Operations"), *Sovetskaya Voenная Entsiklopediya* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), T. 1, 243. F. Gavronskii, "Razvitiye Operativnogo Iskusstva" ("The Development of Operational Art"), *voenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal* (ViZh) (Military Historical Journal), no. 12, (1983), 29. D. Sukhorukov, "Vozdushnye Desanti vo Frontovkh Nastupatel'nykh Operatsiyakh Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voiny" ("Airborne Assaults in Frontal Offensive Operations in the Great Patriotic War"), ViZh, no. 12, (1985), 21.
- 5 The AN-12 can carry 60 paratroopers or two BMDs with a range of 1,400 km at maximum payload. The IL-76 can carry 125 paratroopers or three BMDs with a range of 4,600 km at maximum payload. The AN-22 can carry 175 paratroopers or four BMDs and has a range of 4,200 km. Estimate of current VTA holdings are 270 AN-12s, 270 IL-76s and 55 AN-22s. Data from John Taylor, ed., *Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1982-1983* (London: Jane's, 1982), US Dept. of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1986* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986), D. Isby, ed., *Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army* (London: Jane's, 1981), and *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985).
- 6 *Soviet Military Power 1983* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), 46.
- 7 R. Oden and F. Stenert, "The Soviet Airborne Troops," *Review of Soviet Ground Forces* (March 1980), 9.
- 8 John Hines, "An Airborne Battalion Conducts a Night Raid in the Enemy Rear," *Review of Soviet Ground Forces* (October 1981), 4-15.
- 9 William Mako, *U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1983), 127-28.
- 10 S. F. Akhromeyev, ed., *Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986), 229.
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- 13 A. G. Fedorov, *Aviatsiya i Bitva Pod Moskvoy (Aviation in the Battle for Moscow)* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1975), 290.
- 14 John Collins, *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985* (London: Pergamon-Brassley's, 1985), 269.
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- 17 M. Cherednichenko, *Razvitiye Teorii Strategicheskoy Nastupatel'noy Operatsii v 1945-1953 gg.* ("The Development of the Theory of the Strategic Offensive Operation, 1945-1953"), ViZh, no. 8 (1976), 42.

- 18 F. Stenert, "Exercise Brotherhood in Arms-1980," *Review of Soviet Ground Forces* (June 1981), 12.
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- 20 Samurukov, "Combat Operations Involving Conventional Means of Destruction," 184.
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- 29 I. I. Andriukhov, *Vozdushno-Desantnaya Vostoka NATO (Airborne Forces of NATO)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970), 164.
- 30 Ibid., 167. V. Suvorov, *Spektrazh: The Soviet Union's Special Forces*, IDR no. 9 (1983), 1, 215.
- 31 N. Lyashchenko, "General Arm. V. F. Margelov," ViZh, no. 12 (1978).
- 32 Pavlenko, *Razvitiye Teorii Vozdushno-Desantnykh Voysk v Poslevoennyy Period* ("The Development of Tactics of the Airborne Forces in the Post War Period"), 28-29.
- 33 Andriukhov, *Vozdushno-Desantnaya Vostoka NATO* 194.
- 34 Lisov, *Desantniki*, 247.
- 35 A. Golubkov, *Sokraschshaya Sroki Podgotovki Desanta k Boyu* ("Shortening the Preparation Time of the Assault into Battle"), *Voennyy Vestnik* (Military Herald), no. 11 (1978), 40.
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- 37 Hines, "An Airborne Battalion Conducts a Night Raid in the Enemy Rear," 16.
- 38 Isby, ed., *Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army*, 295.
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Weaknesses in Soviet Junior Leadership

Natalie Gross

There are few in the West who can read Russian and even fewer who have the time or inclination to research happenings within the Soviet Union. Even then, rarely has information on internal problems been made available in Soviet domestic news media. This situation has somewhat improved recently. This article relates what some Soviet media are saying about the young men in their armed forces.

DURING the past year or so, the Soviet Union has allowed a *glasnost* (openness) campaign in some of its news media. One of the developments of this movement is that the Soviet military press has released statements containing unusually frank criticism of the Soviet professional soldier.

In June 1986, recruitment specialists admitted that a number of Soviet cadets select an officer's profession as if by chance.¹ Polls taken in military schools in the city of Leningrad show that a preference to live in a big city or close to home constitutes, for many cadets, a primary reason to enroll. Other significant reasons include expectations of higher education and considerable financial benefits. In a similar vein, a noncommissioned officer (NCO) complained to the Soviet military newspaper, *Red Star* (*Krasnaya zvezda*), that too many young Soviet people enter schools for military warrant officers

primarily to gain the social and material benefits.² Many applicants are said to be lured to the schools by the promises of an easy and comfortable life made to them by military commissariat (draft board) officials.

The military authorities perceive a direct relationship between drop-out rates in some military schools and the dominant role of nonprofessional factors in a cadet's decision to pursue a military career. General Morozov, commander of the Frunze Artillery School, recalled that one of the school's drop-outs, a former vocational school graduate, had enrolled to move to a town with better cultural life.³

An instructor at the warrant officer school in Odessa told *Red Star* about a young man who had enlisted to receive an apartment. Once his housing problem was solved, the cadet left the military school.⁴ Instructors from the Commanders' Artillery

School in Central Russia, who expelled six cadets during their first six months of study, believe that recruitment from the ranks of the former conscripts suffers from similar problems—a shortage of motivated, profession-oriented candidates. "High percentages of cadets who came to school merely by accident are recorded among former soldiers and sergeants. They don't have a desire to learn or to become officers."⁵

Military officials also complain about inadequate academic qualifications of applicants, especially their deficient knowledge of mathematics and physics. Again according to Morozov, only about 20 to 30 percent of the students with good and excellent school grades are reported to show sufficient knowledge of the subjects during the entrance examinations. The problem seems to be even more serious in warrant officer schools. In one such school operated by the Navy, one-third of the applicants was sent home after an initial review of their documents. Many of the students who were admitted were expelled during the first weeks of study.⁶

In the summer of 1986, *Red Star* conducted a discussion of academic problems at officer-level military schools. An instructor at the signals school in Ryazan voiced his concern about the barely passing grades of one-third of the school's students.⁷ He admitted that many students, despite commendable efforts, do not have the ability to master technical subjects. On the other hand, a number of the students have a serious motivation problem and are not willing to make an effort to learn the military profession.

Serious academic problems in Soviet military engineering schools are of special concern to the Soviet military leadership. According to Colonel Malyakin, professor at the Kiev Military Radio Engineering School of the Air Defense Forces, the military profession is anything but a calling for the ma-

jority of the students. This fact accounts for poor learning habits and low grades.⁸ In the opinion of Soviet military experts, degree-granting military engineering schools presently train graduates whose qualifications do not exceed those of technicians.

According to the assessments made by military officials, poor academic achievements and the lack of motivation to learn the military profession while still at school interfere with the performance of field duties by young officers during service.⁹ A number of junior officers serving in air defense units were reported to have failed their qualifying professional examinations. Other undisciplined and undedicated officers are said to have failed to perform routine assignments in their units. A young officer from a tank unit was reportedly at a loss during an exercise in which communication with his commander was cut off. In addition, a young military engineer, a radar specialist, failed to make a fairly simple repair of electronic equipment and nearly caused an accident.



Soviet Military Review



Soviet Military Review

According to the assessments made by military officials, poor academic achievements and the lack of motivation to learn the military profession while still at school interfere with the performance of field duties by young officers during service.

The Soviet military press also dwells at length on discipline and morale problems of future military personnel. One military school was reported to have reluctantly expelled a cadet who had stolen personal belongings from a roommate. The cadet had also earned 14 reprimands.¹⁰

The training and education of so-called hard-to-raise adolescents is apparently a larger problem in warrant officer schools. Judging from media reports, NCO schools are often viewed by commanders as institutions for reforming soldiers with disciplinary problems or criminal records. Drinking and discipline violations during leisure hours are said to be common in warrant officer schools. One school was reported to have accepted, for admission, a thief who had stolen government property during conscript service. Another school admitted a criminal who had been convicted a number

of times and who, at the time of enrollment, was a fugitive from justice.¹¹

Some unit commanders, wishing to rid themselves of a problem conscript, often recommend him to a warrant officer school. This is done in the hope that, upon completion of the course, the "problem" will be reassigned to another unit. Recruitment of these unsuitable candidates, with disciplinary problems or even criminal records, reflects a serious shortage of warrant officers in the Soviet army to staff important NCO positions requiring technical skills.

As can be seen here, the Soviet military authorities perceive serious problems in the availability of career NCOs, as well as the technical skills, training and moral character of young NCOs and officers. To alleviate the problem, the Soviets have proposed major changes in the recruitment process and a fundamental restructuring of the entire military education system.

- There are new reforms in the civilian schools. These are designed to divert vast numbers of school children to modernized technical programs at vocational schools. In the future, this is expected to supply a pool of qualified applicants to military schools, especially those for warrant officers.

- It has been proposed that a thorough screening of every prospective candidate for officer and warrant officer school be conducted. This screening would begin with middle school records and continue through the completion of initial military service.

- It has been suggested that military engineering schools offer two curricula to accommodate different student abilities—a three-year, nondegree program for military technicians and a competitive follow-on program leading to a degree in military engineering. Additionally, incentives and privileges have been contemplated for hard-working successful students.

- It has been recommended that former active duty soldiers and workers with expe-

rience receive preferential treatment in admissions to military schools.

The Soviet authorities have further upgraded the status and privileges of warrant officers to attract more suitable, technically competent candidates to enlist for longer periods.¹² Warrant officers working as technicians in electronics can expect to receive a pay increase in the near future.

The Navy has started building dormitories for career NCOs, and unit commanders are being asked to provide them housing by the end of their first enlistment period. The military press has argued for establishing a new position in unit personnel sections for an officer in charge of career NCOs. All proposals suggest major improvements in curricula, technical equipment and the quality of instruction and instructors at military schools for NCOs and officers.

However, changes in recruitment patterns are closely related to more complex processes of social change in youth culture, values and attitudes towards the military profession. The trends that have become prominent among Soviet youth and in Soviet society at large in the 1980s—prestige and social status aspirations, a drive for an easy and pleasant life, and acquisition of consumer goods—may be slow and painful

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to reverse. Much, of course, will depend on the success or failure of Mikhail Gorbachev's economic policies and the attitudes of the younger generation towards the regime's core values.

In the meantime, it appears major improvements in training methodologies and increased training time are required for these young people. These measures are needed to bring the young cadre component of the Soviet army in line with sophisticated Soviet military theory, operational war planning and the complex technological requirements of a modern battlefield. ¹²

NOTES

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2. *Krasnaya zvezda*, 15 November 1986

3. *Ibid.*, 13 November 1986

4. *Ibid.*, 14 October 1986

5. *Ibid.*, 1 June 1986

6. *Ibid.*, 14 October 1986

7. *Ibid.*, 6 July 1986

8. *Ibid.*, 12 April 1986

9. *Ibid.*, 15 October 1985, 20 May, 15 and 29 August 1986

10. *Ibid.*, 5 November 1986

11. *Ibid.*, 11 February and 14 October 1986

12. *Ibid.*, 16 December 1986




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Division Intelligence

Left in AirLand Battle's Dust?

Colonel Leonard G. Nowak, US Army

Commanders must have information about their enemy before appropriate battlefield decisions can be made. Military Intelligence is charged with obtaining this information. Is the current structure and equipment of our intelligence units what it should be? This article attempts to review where we are now, how we got there and how we might efficiently get divisional intelligence units back on track to support the US Army of tomorrow.



WITH the advent of Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) organizations, Military Intelligence (MI) appeared to be coming of age in the US Army. Starting from nearly zero in terms of force structure, hardware and data processing, MI has been fighting hard over the past 15 years to take its rightful place on the modern battlefield. And a degree of success has been achieved as combat arms commanders clamored for and received their own organic intelligence assets.

Yet, the designers and proponents of CEWI failed to anticipate our doctrinal evolution. Viewed in light of our emergent AirLand Battle doctrine, much of our expenditure of energy and heavy investment in force structure and systems development has led to hollow victories. MI—most specifically the divisions' CEWI organizations—continues to follow a path that diverges from the AirLand Battle effort.

Struggling out of the Vietnam era, the Army began refocusing its prime attention on the heavy forces with missions in NATO. Within NATO, the most intense focus reached down through AFCENT (Allied Forces, Central Europe) to the CENTAG (Central Army Group, Central Europe) battlefield. There, given the state of our then-current capabilities, we wisely opted for a defensive doctrine. Almost simultaneously, pressures from some of our NATO allies added another stricture, causing us to forsake the long-established stratagem of a mobile defense in depth, with nuclear combat power in reserve, for the more politically acceptable policy of forward defense (*die Vorverteidigung*).

Under these internal and external restrictions, we developed what were essentially "tactics of desperation," attempting to capitalize, in a local tactical sense, on our presumed superiority in mobility and flexibility. This was our active defense period.

Enter CEWI, an idea in search of tangible

reality. MI sought to calculate optimum mixes of equipment and personnel for the projected battlefield. With little practical experience to fall back on, we turned to the analytical community's gaming and analysis experts to solve our problems through

If our current doctrine were position defense, CEWI organizations would be admirably outfitted to support the force. But, translated into the scope, scale and fluidity of the AirLand Battle environment, we remain structured only to support local tactical engagements along a nonporous FEBA.

the use of models. These models used relative FEBA (forward edge of the battle area) movement as a measure of a system's contribution to the battle. Yet, because of the limits of this process, some possibilities remained unexplored.

A crucial shortfall was the lack of any serious attempt to quantify the effect of synchronized deep operations against an uncoiling enemy force—this fell into the "too hard" category for the modelers. Our possibilities were limited not by technology itself but by the limits of our models.

The products of this highly disciplined (perhaps overdisciplined), academically oriented process are the ground-bound collectors and jammers we employ today—systems optimized to operate in relatively static, linear battlefield environments. If our current doctrine were position defense, CEWI organizations would be admirably outfitted to support the force. But, translated into the scope, scale and fluidity of the AirLand Battle environment, we remain structured only to support local tactical engagements along a nonporous FEBA.



**OG-181/VRC PIRANAH
mounted on an M151.**

A relative abundance of ground-bound intelligence systems have been fielded. These systems are lethargically mobile, at best, and each demands precision placement and requires excessive setup and teardown times.

We cannot fully or even adequately support the more encompassing operations and lightning campaigns foreseen by today's military strategists. Perhaps most painfully, an excellent AirLand Battle support system, SOTAS (standoff target acquisition system), actually made it to the field as a prototype. But lacking Armywide support, SOTAS was regarded as a frivolous toy, costing too much for its potential return.

SOTAS never received the full developmental hardening it deserved.

CEWI organizations are not alone, of course, in longing to hold on to the last doctrinal vestiges of position defense. An Armywide bias toward neat, easily supportable linear battlefields remains alive and sulking in the operational shadow, apparently as hard to eradicate as heresy in the Middle Ages. "FLOT (forward line of own troops) battle" advocates maintained a strangle hold on IEW (intelligence and electronics warfare) systems design and procurement as late as 1985. Then, the Army's Deep Attack Task Force, after more than a year of intensive study, produced compelling evidence that validated the winning potential of comprehensive, synchronized attacks against enemy forces in depth. Fortunately, this study dealt with our total battlefield organization and had high-level support, so it could not be conveniently swept under the rug by the "old guard."

In the meantime, however, a relative abundance of ground-bound intelligence systems have been fielded. These systems are lethargically mobile, at best, and each demands precision placement and requires excessive setup and teardown times. Only one division-level system, QUICKFIX (emitter locator heliborne system), can currently rise to the rigorous demands of AirLand Battle offensive operations. Yet this system was very nearly killed before it reached a production go-ahead, narrowly avoiding the fate of its companion system, SOTAS.


Only the direct intervention of the commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), in 1984 saved QUICKFIX, as linear battlefield-oriented critics moved in for the kill. Had SOTAS also survived and been encouraged to evolve into a sufficiently robust system, there would have been far less need for this article.

Today, the basic truth is that CEWI, as currently equipped and configured, is an amateur in a race with world-class athletes, such as our new M1 Abrams and M2/M3 Bradley family of fighting vehicles, and long-range shooters, epitomized by the MLRS (multiple launch rocket system). The introduction of the Apache attack helicopter places even greater stress on CEWI organizations. Yet, divisional CEWI units are equipped with systems conceived in the 1960s, designed in the 1970s, produced and product-improved in the 1980s. These are the systems we expect to meet the battlefield challenges of the 1990s. We are in a poor posture now, and we do not have a very good base established to propel ourselves into the age of Army 21.

In working toward a solution to our problems, we need to consider some specific deficiencies common in currently fielded systems. Addressing mobility and survivability first, even the most conservative CEWI veterans will admit that shoehorning systems such as TRAIL BLAZER, TACJAM and TEAMPAC into the old M548 tracked cargo carrier (redesignated the M1015) has produced uniformly unacceptable results. Maneuvering, or just plain moving, these systems across hilly or broken terrain, for instance, is a challenge of major proportions for these underpowered, grotesquely unbalanced and overloaded systems. Attempting to rapidly position them in the correct geometric arrangement, permitting line of sight to the enemy, to each other and to centrally located processing and control stations, assumes the quality of a pipe dream in a fast-moving battlefield environment.

Certainly, well-honed crew drills reduce setup and teardown times. But it is unrealistic and grossly unfair to expect human operator effort—sweat and blood—to overcome well-known and correctable technical shortcomings.

Battlefield mobility problems can even



Survivability also includes our ability to keep our systems operating under combat conditions and integrated into our total effort. Given these facts, the poor mean-time-between-failure rate of the M1015 tracked carrier adds a grim negative factor to the survivability equation.

increase when wheeled vehicles are used to mount our systems. Cross-country movement is out of the question for a 1 1/4-ton truck or a militarized commercial 4 X 4 station wagon loaded far beyond its rated capacity. IEW teams have to look for improved trails to get from position to position. Hopefully, someone will have picked up all the shrapnel and debris left behind by recent

engagements so that our CEWI vehicles can displace on one set of tires.

Before we move on to other considerations, it is important to state the obvious one more time: survivability on the battlefield is not simply a function of enemy acqui-

If the contentions of AirLand Battle doctrine are correct and we find ourselves on a fluid battlefield, mounting dynamic offensive actions where courses of action on both sides continue to evolve . . . , our current CEWI assets will contribute more to traffic control problems in the rear than to the outcome of battles far to the front.

sition and engagement. Survivability also includes our ability to keep our systems operating under combat conditions and integrated into our total effort. Given these facts, the poor mean-time-between-failure rate of the M1015 tracked carrier adds a grim negative factor to the survivability equation.

We can summarize here, by remarking that MI, and the Army as a whole, recognized the need for CEWI-type organizations and hurried to equip divisions with the equipment necessary to give commanders a critical edge. The fielded systems, despite some growing pains, do provide most of the collection and jamming capability necessary for static, linear defensive battles, where geometries are relatively predictable, line of sight easily discernable and where the enemy irreversibly commits himself to a single course of action.

But, if the contentions of AirLand Battle doctrine are correct and we find ourselves on a fluid battlefield, mounting dynamic offensive actions where courses of action on both sides continue to evolve, our currently field-

ed division-level systems will simply eat the dust of our highly mobile combat forces. The sinews will tear, and key components of the CEWI force will disconnect. Our current CEWI assets will contribute more to traffic control problems in the rear than to the outcome of battles far to the front.

Where do we go from here? Forward! But there are a few pertinent ground rules necessary to keep our efforts on a positive track.

Rule one: Don't throw everything away and start over. Marginally capable systems are better than none, and we may be involved in a shooting war before totally new hardware packages (with their increasingly complex and troubled software) emerge from their developmental beauty sleep.

Rule two: Make changes incrementally wherever it is feasible by building upon systems in the field (while recognizing that some dramatic modifications may be necessary, such as platforms). This is also necessary to operate within reasonable budgetary constraints. Besides, even if sufficient dollars were available, rapid change would be nearly impossible if only because of the many groups with a vested interest in the status quo. Remember we were well into World War II before our Army's last horse cavalry units gave way to the tank, despite the compelling evidence of more than two decades of war, experimentation, theorizing and exercises that pointed to armored warfare as the trend of the future.

Melding our knowledge of shortfalls on current and future battlefields, with the cautionary notes on how to manage the development process, let us examine a series of steps that will complement and improve our ground-based IEW systems within our divisions.


Step one is to procure and field an RPV (remotely piloted vehicle) at division level now to support mobile operations with near-real-time imagery that reveals what is happening beyond the next hill mass. Finding

the enemy by sensing the brilliant flash of a kinetic energy round penetrating the turret of our lead M1 tank is certainly not an acceptable method. Yet, that may become a routine event if our leading brigades are not supported with a day/night capable RPV, and if our division-level IEW operators are denied the RPV capability to rapidly verify and exploit data collected from ground-based radar and SIGINT (signal intelligence) systems.

Step two is to remount selected IEW systems on a carrier that has the toughness, agility, speed and endurance to get to decisive positions on time. While a variety of carriers exist, the M1RS or Bradley chassis appears to be the most desirable option. Life-cycle cost analysis certainly favors these mounts as we factor in maintainability, repair parts commonality, crew and maintenance training and, above all, current and projected battlefield operating requirements. We have learned the hard way that temporizing, as we did in the past when we selected the M548 tracked carrier, simply mortgages our future.

Step three is to upgrade existing systems with Very-High-Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC) technology and with precision ground-navigation devices to break the strangle hold of goometric and multiple-line-of-sight requirements that choke the vitality from our currently available systems. Cutting setup and teardown times, while making each system mission capable in a stand-alone mode, promises an increase in efficiency to the point where we can even selectively streamline the force structure.

Step four demands that we integrate sensor packages on the same carrier. Advances in compact SIGINT sensors, for example, will allow us to intercept and locate COMINT (communications intelligence) and ELINT (electronic intelligence) signals simultaneously from the same platform—




Aquila RPV tests, 1978.

Finding the enemy by sensing the brilliant flash of a kinetic energy round penetrating the turret of our lead M1 tank is certainly not an acceptable method. Yet, that may become a routine event if our leading brigades are not supported with a day/night capable RPV, and if our division-level IEW operators are denied the RPV capability to rapidly verify and exploit data collected from ground-based radar and SIGINT systems.

even displaying results on the same monitor, either discretely or in an overlay effect.

Frequently, we find the ELINT system, TEAMPAC, and the COMINT system, TRAIL BLAZER, vying for the same advantageous piece of high ground. Even a casual observer, knowing that both systems collect enemy signals in a line-of-sight mode, would wonder why two nearly identical tracked-vehicle-mounted systems with different antennae are sitting on the same hill,



AN/ALQ-151 QUICKFIX
mounted on an EH-60A
Black Hawk.

Given the dramatically increased time and space dimensions of the AirLand battlefield, however, airborne collectors have clearly become the way of the future. And, while we are reinforcing our QUICKFIX effort and enhancing its interoperability with ground-based systems, we should also incorporate an ELINT sensor aboard the aircraft (miniaturizing to meet space and weight limits), thus yielding a SIGINT "power package" to support deep operations.

when it is technologically practical for one total system to more efficiently do the work of both. Further, as we continue to study this possibility, we should bear in mind that technology is readily available to integrate a variety of imagery systems with SIGINT platforms, allowing for extremely innovative and powerful combinations.

Step five calls for an additional platoon of three more QUICKFIX systems in each division and for the integration of QUICKFIX with our ground-based systems. This would make it possible to capitalize on aerial line of sight to enemy targets; to digitally link ground systems electronically separated by terrain or distance; and to relay collected

data to the division-level processing centers positioned in depth. A few readers may recall that initial studies supported six QUICKFIX platforms for each division, but analysis using linear defense models supported only three aircraft per division.

Given the dramatically increased time and space dimensions of the AirLand battlefield, however, airborne collectors have clearly become the way of the future. And, while we are reinforcing our QUICKFIX effort and enhancing its interoperability with ground-based systems, we should also incorporate an ELINT sensor aboard the aircraft (miniaturizing to meet space and weight limits), thus yielding a SIGINT "power

package" to support deep operations.

Step six calls for the enhancement of the divisions' ground surveillance radar (GSR) capability. Experience at the National Training Center has forced the maturation of GSRs from an infrequently used and poorly employed security device to a highly effective tactical surveillance and target acquisition system. Yet, as long as our GSRs remain mounted in M113 armored personnel carriers or wheeled vehicles and lack position-locating devices, these critical systems are hampered in fast-moving fluid environments.

Additionally, lack of responsive and reliable communications frequently impairs the battlefield utility of the GSRs. So as we move to enhance our COMINT and ELINT collection capabilities and our jammers, we must not neglect to integrate an improved GSR capability into our revamped organizations. Another useful step would be to integrate passive optical sensors with GSRs on the same platform, both enhancing our target acquisition effort and improving survivability in difficult and extreme battlefield situations.

Following the steps outlined above guarantees two advantages for our divisions as they engage in mobile operations:

- An improved airborne collection capability, integrating RPVs and QUICKFIX with our most mobile and survivable ground-based systems. This means that we will be able to maintain the pace set by our fast-moving combat forces as they thrust to exploit weaknesses on the AirLand battlefield.

As we move to enhance our COMINT and ELINT collection capabilities and our jammers, we must not neglect to integrate an improved GSR capability into our revamped organizations. Another useful step would be to integrate passive optical sensors with GSRs on the same platform, both enhancing our target acquisition effort and improving survivability in difficult and extreme battlefield situations.

- An integration of sensors on a single carrier, reducing the total number of deployed systems and generating an opportunity for selective but meaningful force structure savings—something we must not ignore in today's Army of finite end strength and continuing fiscal constraints.

We can do more with less. By moving now to apply low-risk, in-hand technology, we not only can regain our IEW initiative on the AirLand battlefield, but, by careful husbandry of current and future assets, we may be able to better equip our reserve components and solve pre-positioning problems. Attainment of these long-sought-after goals is truly within our grasp, if we generate a comprehensive and bold management plan now. We need to spur IEW systems forward out of the dust cloud left behind by our highly mobile combat systems. Failure to act aggressively now will only further disrupt the integrity and synergy of the AirLand Battle team. ^{MR}

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Civil Affairs

a Rebirth or Stillborn?

Major David A. Decker, US Army

Since the Vietnam War era, the US Army has been criticized for placing too much emphasis on conventional war in Europe and ignoring potential "small wars" in other regions of the world. This situation appears to have changed in the past few years, but, according to this article, there is still a long way to go.

IT SEEMS, these days, that one has to be shot at to realize the United States is at war in Latin America. No, there has been no formal declaration of war, and it is doubtful there will be because of the insidious nature of the conflict. Several hundred years of desperation, despair and deprivation in traditional "have not" societies have enabled the Soviet Union, through use of its surrogates in Cuba and Nicaragua, to engage us indirectly and, thus far, successfully.

Through the use of modern communications techniques and trained propagandists/agitators, our adversaries are "educating" historically isolated peoples in terms of the hopelessness of their social, economic and political status. This new politicized phenomenon struck a nerve in our national consciousness with the advent of insurgency in El Salvador in the early 1980s.

A new emphasis on what is now termed "low-intensity conflict (LIC)" started in 1982 and surprised many in the US Army school system. In the decade following the end of the Vietnam War, any mention of LIC in US military circles appeared, at best, to draw a blank stare. This critical omission of LIC consciousness is documented by Douglas S. Blaufarb, who examines both US military and civilian agency inattention to LIC in an incisive account of the period.¹

The notion seemed to be that if we just "spit it out," insurgency, or the threat of it, would go away. Andrew F. Krepinevich further contributes to our understanding of the military confusion and uncertainty of Vietnam that produced a rapid return to conventional conflict scenarios recalling victories in earlier wars.²



While our military immersed itself in conventional wisdom, civil affairs (CA), a portion of the Army catering almost exclusively to reservists, retained, as an integral portion of its instruction, the insurgency/LIC milieu. To the more than casual observer, this comes as no surprise. The CA approach to warfare across the conflict spectrum focuses on civilian elements of the population. The CA mission is to plan, advise, conduct and supervise those contacts between the people (and their leaders) and the military commander.

CA doctrinal experts in the 1970s continued to be preoccupied with indigenous populations to the extent that understanding them offered the best chance of mission success.³ This necessity to understand, particularly from cultural and linguistic viewpoints, fits in rather nicely with the principal tenets of insurgency/LIC. Most important in this regard are the notions that the people are the key to success and that military actions must be measured in terms of their impact on the local populace.

While the overwhelming majority of our military forces abandoned LIC scenarios, CA, as a matter of practicality and professionalism, continued to study the population-dominated insurgency discipline. As a result, some institutional memory pertaining to lessons learned from Vietnam and other similar scenarios remained.

It is this institutional memory, however minuscule, that is conceptually so critical for our approach to situations such as El Salvador. By itself, the memory that exists to write viable doctrine and to instruct such will never be sufficient to prepare US forces for the myriad challenges of insurgency today and tomorrow. Our nemesis has been a failure to understand the degree of individual expertise, especially from a CA viewpoint, that is required to deal with the crucial popular aspects of an insurgency.

It is important, at this juncture, to return momentarily to the central theme of CA, that of understanding those with whom we deal. In terms of the specific internal conflict situations where personal attitudes and motivations are involved, this understanding is absolutely essential if effective advice and training in military and nonmilitary technology is to be transmitted. This understanding should provide viable channels through which the United States can communicate with fraternal parties.

The ability to communicate is a function of linguistics and, more importantly, of cultural awareness. This cultural base enables the foreigner to live and work in an alien environment. CA theorists are continuing to study this approach and

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The ability to communicate is a function of linguistics and, more importantly, of cultural awareness. This cultural base enables the foreigner to live and work in an alien environment. CA theorists are continuing to study this approach and are developing military concepts and doctrine designed to provide our Army with the tools necessary to make a positive difference in LIC.


are developing military concepts and doctrine designed to provide our Army with the tools necessary to make a positive difference in LIC. Developed in consonance with how today's Army functions, these concepts provide the basis for the transitions necessary if we are to have a chance in the LIC environment.

Three primary obstacles must be overcome before individual specialists in LIC, especially insurgency, can be developed. First, as Krepinevich states, the conventional Army must change its unwillingness to conceptualize warfare other than in traditional fire and maneuver terms. The battles currently being waged in the Third World involve people, ideas, ideals, hopes, frustrations, deprivation and expectations.

Success in such environments is measured in the long-term ability of a government to maintain internal stability and cohesion. To achieve this status, a (hopefully) democratic government must convince the people that it is the better choice. (In a sense, the battle for Grenada is only now being waged.) If this is to happen, the military and its advisers must measure their every action against the long-term goals. If not done, battles may be won at the expense of the war. This notion is what the often-quoted North Vietnamese officer meant when he referred to the winning of military battles as being irrelevant. It is imperative that these long-term measuring devices be ingrained in our leadership and in the individual players involved in helping others to help themselves in insurgent scenarios.

Second, the process of selecting, educating and using specialists takes time. No one understands the value of time in protracted terms better than our insurgent antagonists, who consider this aspect to be their strongest ally when challenging governments being assisted by the United States. Understanding individual cultures and societies (together with their respective militaries and governments) to the extent that viable advice and assistance can be proffered requires rigid selection procedures.

Often, years of study in the country are necessary if an individual is to be able to perceive societal actions and problems from other than a Western perspective. This understanding must then be used in conjunction with host countries requesting our assistance to conduct the analyses needed for a realistic threat assessment, together with the development of a national plan designed to halt an insurgency or prevent one from occurring. American society and, indeed, our military usually demand results "yesterday." If others we assist are to prevail, this mentality must be overcome.



Third, our Army's personnel management system must become flexible enough to meet the challenges of LIC. The constant shuffling of officers between primary and alternate specialties certainly does reflect the generalist theories of officer development so popular today, but this process fails to develop communicators who can empathize with the problems of individual Third World nations and their militaries.

It is not that we do not possess the individual potential to meet the threat. Rather, we lack the sophistication necessary for realizing that there is no substitute for specialization and the developmental processes required to produce it. Accepting this, dare we believe that we are optimally assisting friendly governments faced with insurgent problems?

When helping allies who are experiencing or anticipating insurgency is in the US national interest, several important decisions must be made:

- LIC must be considered as important as high-intensity conflict. Appropriate military concepts, doctrine and organizational structures must be developed to accommodate LIC-type warfare.
- An active CA branch agency, staffed by individuals who understand the primacy of the people in LIC, must be established.
- The idea that generalists can accomplish the LIC mission must be dropped in favor of selecting, educating and employing for the long-term, individual-country specialists. These

The military and its advisers must measure their every action against the long-term goals. If not done, battles may be won at the expense of the war. This notion is what the often-quoted North Vietnamese officer meant when he referred to the winning of military battles as being irrelevant.

At the heart of these arguments is the notion that the US Army can be a positive factor in precluding insurgent warfare through assistance to other militaries. This requires that both we and they never lose sight of the primacy of the people and conduct ourselves in such a manner so as to retain local support.

individuals can provide us a basis for understanding what we are doing and whom we are attempting to assist.

- This process must be perceived and couched in protracted terms and, from the viewpoint that it is part of a larger effort (to include our civilian agencies), designed to produce long-term stability in individual nations.

At the heart of these arguments is the notion that the US Army can be a positive factor in precluding insurgent warfare through assistance to other militaries. This requires that both we and they never lose sight of the primacy of the people and conduct ourselves in such a manner so as to retain local support. The culmination of such efforts is a representative government acting in consonance with its society for social, economic and political ends that are beneficial for all.

In effect, elements of the US Army, traditionally viewed as "swords," become "plowshares." This does not mean that preparedness for traditional forms of battle has to be sacrificed, rather that there exists a recognition of the true nature of the current battles in less-developed nations.

The disease responsible for the current wave of insurgent warfare must be arrested. CA concepts allowing for a comprehensive approach to and prosecution of insurgent battles are needed and available. They await adoption and application which, hopefully, will usher in a new era of sophistication. Then, perhaps, our nation and others will be afforded a chance at success against insurgency, a heretofore barren and debilitating milieu. ^M_R

NOTES


1 Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance 1950 to Present* (New York: The Free Press, 1977)

2 CPT Andrew F. Krepinovich, "The United States Army and Vietnam: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Army Concept of War," unpublished (April 1983). This article offers a great deal relative to internal military processes and thinking during the Vietnam era.

3 Special Text 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations* (February 1978), Chapter 7, "CA Support of Unconventional Warfare," and Chapter 8, "CA Support of Internal Defense and Development," are especially recommended. (Special texts were used when doctrine was in the process of being formulated, reflecting current military thought at the time. It is now known as Field Manual 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 17 December 1985.)

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The Republic of Korea Army The **LIGHT** Infantry **DIVISION**



Major James D. Maret, US Army

When trying to develop something new, it is usually a good idea to examine what others have done with similar concepts—especially when they have been successful. This article describes the organization of the Republic of Korea Army infantry division and discusses the three primary types of operations it has developed. The article also discusses why differences in tactics and missions will continue to exist between ROKA and US infantry divisions.

Too little has been said in praise of the South Korean Army which has performed so magnificently in helping turn this war from the defensive to the offensive. . . .

LTG Walton H. Walker, 25 September 1950¹

WHILE the US Army is deploying its own light infantry divisions, it would perhaps be useful to examine the force structure and tactics of what one knowledgeable observer has called "some of the finest light infantry soldiers" in the world²—the Republic of Korea Army (RO-

KA) infantry.³ The Koreans have developed a set of tactics and operations that maximizes the combat effectiveness of a lightly equipped division operating in their indigenous terrain.

This article intentionally focuses on the Korean perspective.⁴ While US and Korean tactical doctrines are quite similar, the differences between organic unit capabilities and Korea's unique geography will necessarily dictate that the Korean infantry division be employed and fight in a somewhat different fashion than its US ally.

FORCE STRUCTURE

Two characteristics distinguish the RO-KA infantry division. It is "heavy" in the number of combat soldiers—the typical RO-KA infantry division has 14,716⁶ soldiers of which more than 10,000 serve in its organic infantry regiments and battalions.⁶ It is "light" in terms of equipment, transportation and communications assets. The organization of the division is depicted in figure 1.


The ROKA infantry division has four battalions per regiment (brigades exist in armor units), three infantry and one artillery regiment per division, and has a reasonable facsimile of combat support and combat

service support units when compared to its US counterpart. The fourth battalion in each regiment enables three battalions to be placed forward and leaves one for reserve or rear-area protection missions within the division area.⁷

At first glance, differences between RO-KA and US infantry divisions are not readily apparent. The imperatives for slightly different tactics, however, arise from three areas:

- Compared to its US counterpart, the ROKA infantry division has significantly fewer antitank assets.
- Its transportation assets are limited and at a premium in any scenario.

ROKA Infantry Division



SOURCE: (ROKA) FM 101-10-1, Figure 2-6 (TDE 7-101) p. 11

Figure 1

• Extensive communication equipment for command and control (C²) does not exist.

If hostilities began on the Korean peninsula, ROKA would initially be at a considerable disadvantage in terms of North Korea's armor and artillery superiority. Among other factors, one of the reasons the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) was able to capture Seoul in five days during the Korean War was an almost complete lack of an antiarmor capability in the South.⁸ The 2.36-inch bazooka could not penetrate North Korean armor; World War II vintage antitank rounds for armor and artillery often malfunctioned and could not stop the T-34 tank; and not a single antitank mine was in South Korea in mid-1950.⁹ While progress in these areas has been made, the ROKA infantry division's antiarmor capabilities are still dwarfed by those of a US division.

Today, the principal antitank weapons for the ROKA infantry division remain the 106mm and 90mm recoilless rifle. Each infantry regiment has six 106mm recoilless rifles in its combat support company, along with 12 4.2-inch mortars. The combat support companies in each of the four infantry battalions have four 90mm recoilless rifles, along with nine 81mm mortars. Each infantry division also has a battalion of 39 M47/M48 tanks assigned. The normal corps augmentation to a division is one TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) section with six missile launchers (see fig. 2).

Transportation assets are at a premium in the ROKA infantry division. Total division truck assets include 31 5-ton and 375 2 1/2-ton trucks (178 of these belong to the artillery regiment). Each infantry regiment has 30 2 1/2-ton trucks, and each infantry battalion has six.¹⁰ While the Korean logistical system "pushes" supplies and equipment to its forward combat units, in most scenarios the ROKA infantry can be expect-

Division Anti-Tank Capability Infantry Battalions and Regiments

	ROKA	US
TOW	6*	54
106mm RR	18	243 (Dragons)
90mm	48	0

*Augmentation from Corps

SOURCE: Army Weapons Data Card, Combined Arms & Staff College, January 1982, p. F626. Figures based on a 3 infantry brigade slice.

Figure 2

ed to walk to its objective, carrying most of its organic equipment. Korea's limited road network and mountainous terrain further impedes the movement of forward combat troops by vehicle.¹¹

Somewhat ironically, the ROKA infantry division may be in a much better position to operate in an electronic warfare environment than its US counterpart. Since the infantry division lacks significant radio and teletype assets, it relies on much more secure and less vulnerable means of communications—field telephones, messengers or face-to-face meetings. However, what is gained in terms of security and reliability is, at least, partially offset by a lack of operational flexibility.¹²

"Although South Korea tactics originated from and developed in parallel with US military doctrine, there are significant differences. . . . Korea has neither abundant war materials nor enough space to fight while trading space for time. The loss of weapons and equipment is often regarded as more intolerable than the loss of manpower."¹³

The ramifications of such modest antitank, transportation and communications capabilities in the ROKA infantry division necessarily define part of its tactics. Its ability to engage in free wheeling, deep opera-

tions in daylight is limited. When compared to its US counterpart, the ROKA infantry division cannot shift its forces as quickly, rapidly change and coordinate its plans, or expose its limited resources to the North's significant artillery and armor advantage.

The Korean War indicates that any conflict on the Korean peninsula probably would involve several battles running across a series of mountains and ridges. Armor and mechanized operations would be necessarily confined by the situation and immediate geography. The majority of the land battles would be with light infantry operating at night and in the mountains. Modest penetrations by foot are possible. These types of operations are extensively practiced and planned for by the ROKA infantry division.

TACTICS

In light of the constraints and Korea's unique geography, ROKA has developed tactics that are necessary reflections of its own capabilities and requirements. According to one author, the Koreans "are as independent at thinking as they are at fighting."¹⁴ ROKA places special emphasis on three types of tactical operations: night operations, mountain operations and infiltration. Though these are certainly not foreign to US infantry, the missions take on added importance in Korea.

Night Operations

"Our experience in night combat up to now shows that we can operate only four or five hours in the dark . . . if the battle continues until dawn, we are likely to suffer losses. From midnight on, engage the enemy in close combat by approaching to within 100 to 150 meters of him. . . . This is the most valuable battle experience we have gained. . . ."

Recognizing that it would face an inva-

Night Attack Objectives

Continuation of Day Attack

Achieve Surprise and Physical Security

Acquire Key Terrain

Exploit Combat Results

Compensate for Artillery and Armor Inferiority

SOURCE: (ROKA) FM 61 100 Para 190 p 6-75

Figure 3

sion from the North with an armor, artillery and airpower inferiority, ROKA's tactics and commensurate training for the infantry division stress night operations to reduce North Korea's advantages. The objectives and advantages of night operations are in figure 3.

Night operations are viewed not only as a means of reducing the North's advantages, but also as a means of exploiting the strength of the ROKA infantry division—its well-disciplined, sizable manpower assets. Night operations can be used to deceive the enemy, reduce the effectiveness of his direct and indirect fires, and exacerbate C² problems.

One of the inherent strengths of a light infantry division is its ability to operate at night, especially in Korea's rugged terrain. The fact that the NKPA may also attempt to exploit this strength has not been lost on ROKA. Great emphasis is placed on both offensive and defensive night operations.

During the first three months of the Korean War, the NKPA achieved remarkable successes following a fairly standard set of plans and tactics. The NKPA closely pursued US and ROK (Republic of Korea)

forces, attempted single or double envelopments to the flanks and infiltrated a blocking force to the rear (at night) to cut off retreating troops. It was not until the allies formed a consolidated, integrated defensive line and gained experience in all-around defensive operations that these tactics began to fail.¹⁶

Mountain Operations

"Those who wage war in mountains should never pass through the defiles without first making themselves masters of the heights."¹⁷

Another type of operation emphasized in the ROKA infantry division is mountain operations.¹⁸ The definition of mountains in Korea includes elevations greater than 500 meters. These comprise 75 percent of the terrain on the Korean peninsula.¹⁹

ROKA envisions that mountain operations will normally be conducted by smaller units in coordination with other major operations, such as penetrations, envelopments or deliberate attacks on surrounding areas. Coordination and control will be difficult, special training will be required²⁰ and the effective use of indirect fire support may be crucial.²¹

Several of the key characteristics of mountain operations are shown in figure 4. The most important consideration in Korean thinking is the appropriate use of the terrain and concealment.

Special training for mountain operations includes the use of ski and snow shoes, visible (hand, flag or mirror) communications and the use of pack animals.²² Strong emphasis is also placed on mountain-climbing techniques, medical training and evacuation procedures, special engineering techniques, aerial resupply, and, above all, physical conditioning.²³

While mountain operations are often difficult small-unit operations, surprise and, therefore, success is achievable if sufficient

Mountain Operations

Appropriate Use of Terrain Is Crucial

Weather Plays a Major Role

Small Unit, Independent Operations

Military Value of Roads
Significantly Increased

Special Training and Equipment Required

SOURCE: ROKA FM 61 102, Para 193, p. 6-81

Figure 4

cover and concealment exist. The use of appropriate terrain, detailed planning and logistical support, and the use of periods of limited visibility are also crucial to the success of such operations.²⁴

ROKA's tactical planning consistently focuses on the dominant hill mass in a given area. Key terrain consists of the highest mountain in a given area at the expense of other terrain features such as roads, bridges, built-up areas or level terrain through which mechanized operations can be conducted.²⁵ This perception can be attributed to a healthy respect for experiences during the Korean War, a close-hand appreciation of Korea's unique geography and the constraints that geography would impose on armored and mechanized operations.

Infiltration

Recognizing that the terrain in Korea often prohibits penetrations by armor and mechanized forces, ROKA has emphasized the use of infiltration operations to get behind the enemy and support the main deliberate attack. The reconnaissance battalion of the ROKA infantry division and the special forces brigades organic to the ROKA

Infiltration

Basic Considerations

Detailed planning and
extensive coordination required

Objective is to
prevent enemy reserve deployment,
secure key terrain, disrupt C³,
support the main attack

Easy avenues of approach are avoided

Maximum use is made of limited visibility
— forest, rain, snow, fog and steep terrain

Command and control is difficult, but crucial

SOURCE: (ROKA) FM 61-100, Para 185, p. 6-69

Figure 5

corps are especially suited to this task.²⁶

Infiltrations of battalion-size units are difficult in any scenario, but Korea's mountainous terrain makes such operations a little more feasible during periods of limited visibility—fog, rain, snow or darkness. Some of the basic considerations for infiltration operations are shown in figure 5.

Infiltration operations are conducted by the ROKA infantry division at battalion level and below. Their principal objectives are to support the main attack, acquire information and deceive the enemy. Such operations will be directed against weakly defended key terrain and command and logistics centers in the enemy's rear. There is some evidence that the NKPA still favors envelopment, supported by limited penetrations during periods of limited visibility, as a favorite tactical form of maneuver.²⁷

DIFFERENCES

This brief review of current Korean thinking on night, mountain and penetration operations has revealed many close

parallels to US doctrinal thinking. So what are the differences?

Three factors can be identified that define tactical planning in the ROKA. First, the "lightness" of its infantry divisions (in terms of equipment and antitank assets) requires that it march to the battle, conduct penetrations and envelopments on foot during periods of limited visibility, and rely on a more detailed, methodical, coordinated and prearranged planning and execution sequence.

It is not a highly flexible, maneuverable division. It is a division characterized by its large number of highly disciplined, well-conditioned soldiers who will tenaciously defend the 40-odd kilometers between Seoul and the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Second, Korea's rugged terrain prohibits extensive mechanized operations and large concentrations of troops and equipment. Armored or mechanized operations by either North or South Korea will be constrained and, at times, armor will be relegated to a mission of supporting infantry by fire.

Third, Korean tactical thinking draws heavily upon experiences during the Korean War. While a good amount of instruction at its service schools covers US and Allied actions in Europe and the Pacific during World War II, the Arab-Israeli 1973 War²⁸ and other modern conflicts, direct parallels between current tactical planning and ROKA's experience in the Korean War have been highlighted here. The emphasis placed on night, mountain and infiltration operations is a direct reflection of these experiences.

There has been no attempt here to evaluate, criticize or compare Korean tactical thinking with that of the US Army. That task is left to the reader. As Lieutenant Colonel Gertmann Sude of the Federal Republic of Germany said: "A military professional should study not just his own doctrine but the doctrine of his allies. This can truly enhance the chance of success on the battle-

field."²⁹

The challenge for any commander involved in US—ROK combined operations is

to recognize and then exploit the inherent strengths of each of the respective allied forces' capabilities and tactics. ²⁴

NOTES

1. Roy E. Appleman *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960), 599.

2. Comment made by Chief of Staff BG John C. Bahnsen Jr., Combined Field Army (CFA), Uijongbu, Republic of Korea (ROK), May 1985, during a command briefing to US Embassy personnel. The CFA, headquartered at Camp Red Cloud near Uijongbu, is the only combined US-allied field army in the world. It is composed of two corps and nine divisions, including the US 2d Infantry Division. "Welcome to Combined Field Army (ROK/US) and Camp Red Cloud," Public Affairs Office, CFA, undated, 3.

In his review of this article, Bahnsen described the soldier in the Republic of Korea in the following manner: "They are tough, uncompromising soldiers who are trained hard and love their country and their freedom."

3. The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) does not list a "light" infantry division in its force structure. This article uses the term light infantry division to generally address all ROKA infantry divisions.

4. The high level of generalization and lack of data in some areas has been mandated by the Republic of Korea's legitimate concern for operational security. Though some of the data and analyses presented do not reflect the most recent structural and operational changes, unless otherwise noted, such changes do not impact significantly on the central discussion.

See David C. Isby, "Weapons and Tactics of the Republic of Korea Army" *Jane's Defense Review*, vol. 3, no. 1 (1982). Isby's article is one of the few English language treatments of the ROKA's tactics and capabilities available anywhere. Two other excellent, yet secondary, sources are the annual *US Army Greenbook* and annual congressional hearings on military posture. In Korea, the ROKA Command and Staff College publishes its own *Military Review* on a monthly basis and supplements this publication with a series of *Military Science Data* journals on an as-requested basis.

5. Field Manual (FM) 101-10-1 (ROKA, 12 December 1985), 132. Also see Isby, 57.

6. *Ibid.*, 132. During the Korean War, as of 30 September 1950, 119,559 ground service support troops were required to support 125, 126 US, 101,573 Korean, and 3,073 Philippine and British combat troops, resulting in a tooth-to-tail ratio of 2 to 1. Appleman, (derived from Table 4), 606.

7. Col. Rhee Taek-Hyung, *Combined Operations of ROK-US Combined Forces Command: Overview from a Korean Perspective* (Fort McNair, VA: National Defense University Press, 23 June 1984), 27-28.

8. For an account of the first US ground action against North Korean armor, see Russell A. Gugeler *Combat Actions in Korea* (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1954), 3-18. *Ibid.*, 6.

9. Appleman, 72. Though the allied forces were without mines during the early period of the war, the North Koreans achieved significant successes using mines. From July to September of 1950, US forces lost 136 tanks to all causes—70 percent of these were because of enemy mines. In contrast, during the same period North Korea lost 154 tanks—102 to air action, 39 to direct tank fire and 13 to rocket launchers. *Ibid.*, 602.

10. (ROKA) FM 101-10-1, 482. Mobilization planning in the ROKA involves the extensive use of commercial 1,000 kg trucks, especially for the Mobilized Reserve Divisions (HRD) and Homebased Reserve Divisions (HRD).

11. One of the major concerns for the defense of Seoul is the lack of lateral road networks between Seoul and the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Mountain ranges in Korea run north-south and severely restrain east-west movement. The same condition exists between the DMZ and Pyongyang.

12. Isby, 55. Isby attributes this same lack of flexibility to the need for detailed planning on the part of the ROKA. The ROKA he states "stresses at all levels of command rote memorization of school solutions . . . innovation,

analysis and independent thinking are subordinated to repetition and memorization. This leads to a considerable degree of inflexibility."

Paradoxically, junior officers and subordinate units are frequently exposed to short notice, major changes in plans. At a personal and professional level their tolerance and ability to respond to such changes are much higher than one would expect from Isby's comments.

13. Taek-Hyung, 26.

14. Isby, 55.

15. Appleman, 438. MG Pang's comments were taken from *Research Supplement: Interrogation Reports*, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Issue 100 (NK 6th Division), 41-42.

16. Appleman, 392-93.

17. *Ibid.*, 717.

18. Since the forward deployed ROKA infantry divisions conduct their own basic and unit training, it is somewhat difficult to generalize about the amount of "mountain" training each soldier receives. While the quantity and quality varies, several specific divisions in the Third Republic of Korea Army area are well-known for their ability to conduct such operations.

19. Mountains are defined by ROKA FM 61—100, para. 191, 6-81.

20. *Ibid.*, para. 193, 6-81.

21. For a vivid account of one small unit mountain operation during the Korean War (that of HJ 520 on Heartbreak Ridge), see Gugeler, 223-29.

22. One of the more interesting facets of the Korean War was the use of civilian labor, even near the forward edge of battle area. In May of 1951, 700 civilians, over a 7-day period, carried 237,000 sandbags, 385 rolls of barbed wire, 6,000 steel pickets and 39 55-gallon kerosene barrels to the 23 bunkers on top of Bunker Hill. As a result, this "strong point" defensive area was able to withstand 7 days of repeated Chinese attacks before being forced to withdraw. Gugeler, 178, 188-89. For a Marine's evaluation of these local laborers, see Martin Russ, *The Last Parallel* (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1957), 165-167.

23. During the first US counteroffensive of the Korean War (Task Force Kean, 7-15 August 1950), there were more US Army and Marine casualties from heat injury than from battle injuries. Southern Korea's 105 degree summers, combined with the 60 degree slopes of some of its mountains, devastated many of the newly arriving troops. During the 5th Marine regimental attack on Fox Hill near Masan on 7 August 1950, the 2d Battalion experienced 30 heat prostration cases and only 5 combat injuries. In comparison, while the ROKA experienced higher combat losses during August 1950, it had far fewer nonbattle casualties. Appleman, 269, 272, and 391.

24. ROKA FM 61—100, para. 193, 6-81.

25. This observation is consistently supported throughout the ROKA Command College's offensive and defensive operations instructional blocks.

26. Each ROKA infantry division has one organic reconnaissance battalion, each corps has one special forces regiment of four battalions. These units tend to be tactically employed under the division/corps commander's personal direction.

27. Taek-Hyung, 18. Also in (Korean) North Korean Research: *Advanced Materials* (Chinhae, ROK: ROKA Command and Staff College, 1978).

28. The ROKA holds a particular fascination for the successes of the Israelis. Though small and numerically inferior to their foes, the Koreans tend to attribute Israeli successes to training, qualitative superiority in weapons, and most of all, to its resolve and spirit.

29. Lieutenant Colonel Gertmann Suds, Federal Republic of Germany Army, "Clausewitz in US and German Doctrine," *Military Review* (June 1986), 47.

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Who Ever Heard of Ranald Mackenzie?



**Lieutenant Colonel Charles Crawford,
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History is studied for various reasons: an academic grade, a search for lessons applicable today or just for fun. Whatever the incentive, the discovery and study of an obscure figure or event can be personally and professionally rewarding. This article examines an obscure figure who, perhaps, should not be so because his contributions to his country and its defense rank with the best.

WESTUDY the lives of military leaders to learn leadership. We see how others persevered in a variety of adverse situations. Normally, we study a leader famous for wartime accomplishments: Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley and MacArthur are familiar names about which most military professionals know at least a bit.

In general, the farther back in history one goes, the fewer familiar names. Some wars generated few remembered leaders. To see this for yourself, list the wars of the United States and beside each one, write down as many military leaders of that war as you can. How many do you have for the Mexican

War? How many for the War of 1812? Did you even think to list the Indian Wars?

There are few familiar names among those who prosecuted the war against the Plains Indians, although it was the longest sustained conflict the United States has had. In the last 20 years, characterizations of that conflict have often been negative, emphasizing the brutal and genocidal aspects.¹ No matter what the political and societal implications of the Indian Wars, they involved some of the most difficult operations ever mounted by US forces. Further, the burden of command was largely at the company and regiment level, where most

military people spend the bulk of their careers.

Yet, the first (often the only) name most of us think of in connection with the Indian Wars is that of a man whose record shows a mix of achievement, bombast, self-aggrandizement and disobedience. His name stands out among many other Indian fighters principally because he capped his career with a disaster.

Is George A. Custer worth studying? Probably so, since we can learn from others' mistakes as well as their successes. But, I fear that Custer's actions carry ambivalent messages for military professionals, most notably his penchant for publicity and self-promotion. Most of us would probably say that Custer went too far in his efforts to garner the attention of his superiors, the press and the public. Yet, he is the one we remember. Who ever heard of George Crook, John Gibbon, Benjamin Grierson or Ranald Mackenzie?

After the Civil War, the Army had a lot of talented young officers, but not nearly enough commands for them. Many of these men had held the temporary rank of general through the peculiarities of the brevet system and the dual volunteer/regular structure in effect during the war. Some got frustrated and sought better careers elsewhere, and some persevered within the Army. Emory Upton became an analyst of military policy. Wesley Merritt and Nelson Miles became prominent Indian fighters; however, if they are remembered, it is probably for their later activities relating to the Spanish-American War and the years immediately thereafter.

Interestingly, three men made the footnotes in many military history books by finishing the Civil War as generals, pursuing nonmilitary careers for 33 years and serving again as generals in the Spanish-American War. Two of those three—Fitzhugh Lee and Joe Wheeler—had been Confederate

generals—and the other—James Wilson—enhanced his reputation by writing one of the better memoirs of war experiences, *Under the Old Flag*.²

In many ways, Ranald Mackenzie is worth more of our attention than any of the others mentioned.

In a war full of young generals, Mackenzie was one of the youngest. Born in 1840, he graduated from West Point in 1862 and

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ranked first in his class. He was the only military academy graduate from his class (or any subsequent class) to become a general during the Civil War.³ This is more remarkable when you consider that he was still a captain in the summer of 1864, two years after his graduation and less than a year before the war's end.

In his basic branch of engineers, Mackenzie performed well, gained (through merit) the notice of his superiors and seemed to have a penchant for getting wounded. But it was in infantry and cavalry that young officers of promise were rising rapidly in rank. As the Federal Army swelled with new regiments in the summer of 1864, more opportunities arose for officers to assume the rank of colonel of volunteers to lead these regiments. Mackenzie got the 2d Connecticut Heavy Artillery (serving, as did many other artillery regiments, as infantry). He soon rose to command a brigade in the Shenandoah Valley Campaign in the fall of 1864 and, after returning to the Petersburg front,

led a cavalry division as a brevet major general in the closing days of the war.

After the war, Mackenzie, along with many other officers, reverted to a lesser rank in the Regular Army. He spent two years as a captain of engineers until the Ar-

The biographers who mention Mackenzie characterize him as high-strung, irascible from wounds (which caused frequent pain) and exposure, exacting and a strict disciplinarian. Yet he was undoubtedly intelligent, courageous and effective.

my reorganization of 1867. Significantly, he was made a colonel despite his age. Other "fast burners" who had preceded him to the rank of general during the war held lesser rank. Specifically, Custer was made a lieutenant colonel.

As a colonel of first an infantry and then a cavalry regiment, Mackenzie was one of the premier troop leaders. His 4th Cavalry Regiment became a fire brigade, being dispatched all over the frontier to subdue tribes after other units had failed. Ironically, he was dispatched to the northern plains after Custer's disaster and defeated the Northern Cheyennes who had helped wipe out Custer's command. He was considered favorably by Philip H. Sheridan, his division commander; William T. Sherman, the commanding general of the Army; and Ulysses S. Grant, the president.⁴

In the early 1880s, death and age took its toll on the relatively older Civil War generals who had remained in the Army, and a brigadier's position was found for Mackenzie. (There were only six brigadier billets in the Army.)⁵ Not long after being promoted, Mackenzie showed signs of irrational behavior and was retired for medical reasons

in 1884. Twenty years of hard campaigning, seven wounds, and a bad accident in which he was thrown from a wagon and landed on his head had combined to break him physically and mentally. He lived his last five years in relative seclusion, dying at the age of 48 in 1889.

In his memoirs, Grant wrote of Mackenzie's status at the close of the Civil War: "I regarded Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the army. Graduating at West Point, as he did, during the second year of the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its close. This he did upon his own merit and without influence."⁶

Grant wrote these words in 1885, after Mackenzie had retired and within days of his own death, so the perception may have been affected by emotionalism. Yet Grant's memoirs are remarkably honest (they've been called the best ever written by an American military leader⁷). He chose to mention few of his many subordinates, and he reserved for Mackenzie the honor of being the last man mentioned.

With this sort of record, how is it that Mackenzie remains such an obscure figure? There are probably several reasons. His career ended on a fizzle, rather than a triumphant or disastrous bang. He was unable to take steps to widen his reputation after his retirement, even had he been prone to do so. He had an aversion to publicity. He never married, so there was no wife to extol his accomplishments while he was alive or after his death. (Custer's wife was particularly good at that.) Nor were there any children to carry on his line.

Was there something about Mackenzie personally that, despite his military accomplishments, made him reprehensible? It doesn't seem so, though he evidently was not a warm person. Had psychology reached the state it has today, Mackenzie might have been described as a "type A" personali-

ty. The biographers who mention Mackenzie characterize him as high-strung, irascible from wounds (which caused frequent pain) and exposure, exacting and a strict disciplinarian.⁸ Yet he was undoubtedly intelligent, courageous and effective. One author who writes that Mackenzie "had acquired a reputation as an unbending martinet who would brook no slackness" (the word "martinet" has a particularly negative connotation), also states he "can be justly described as a military leader of almost Napoleonic genius."⁹ Somewhat in contrast, one of his subordinates wrote:

"He was fretful, irritable, oftentimes irascible and pretty hard to serve with. This was due largely to his failing to take care of himself and his wounds received during the Civil War. He kept late hours, ate but little and slept less than anybody in the regiment. But he was not a martinet and was always just to all the officers and men. . . . The wound through his lung was always a most serious drawback to his physical comfort and action on campaigns and it probably, with his other wounds, added to his irritability at times. He could not ride more than 25 to 30 miles without being in great pain and yet he rode more than 160 miles in 32 hours when we crossed the Rio Grande in 1873, without, so far as I can recall, a single murmur or sign of exhaustion. . . . Mackenzie hung on like a bulldog until the Indians begged him to let go. He had more brains than Custer, better judgement, and he carefully planned his attacks. . . ."¹⁰

The historians' data base on Mackenzie is relatively small. He wrote very little correspondence outside of that necessary for official duties, and even in that area, his superiors wished that he would have written more.¹¹ As mentioned, he disliked publicity. The principal sources for data on Mackenzie's personality (as opposed to official data, such as Army records) are two memoirs written by his subordinates.¹²



Ranald S. Mackenzie

In a war full of young generals, Mackenzie was one of the youngest. Born in 1840, he graduated from West Point in 1862 and ranked first in his class. . . . This is more remarkable when you consider that he was still a captain in the summer of 1864, two years after his graduation and less than a year before the war's end.

While it is perhaps unfair to summarize their thoughts in so brief a space, both were aware that Mackenzie could be a difficult person. Nevertheless, they relate that he gained the respect and, to a degree, the affection of his subordinate officers and troops by manifesting concern for their well-being and leading them well.

So, there seems no reason to doubt that

Mackenzie is "One of America's most remarkable soldiers . . . a forgotten hero."¹² But what are we to learn from this forgotten hero of a century ago, operating in a service and a time so different from ours? Though the analogies cannot be carried very far, I believe Mackenzie manifested leadership

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traits we would all do well to emulate. Personally, I would like to be as brave as he was, but the sort of jobs most of us have do not present the opportunity to demonstrate physical courage. I would like to be as smart as he was, but outside of continuing my professional reading and education, there is not a lot I can do. So, I propose to concentrate on those aspects of Mackenzie's leadership that one can consciously work on; his thoroughness, his confidence and his avoidance of self-promotion.

Thoroughness and Confidence

Mackenzie was thorough in his planning and preparation. Supply or, more generally, logistics was a hit-or-miss proposition in the Army of the 1870s and 80s.¹³ Mackenzie was careful to coordinate with his quartermaster before going into the field. Another facet of his preparation was the gathering of intelligence. In contrast to some of his contemporaries who were anxious to react to every perceived crisis and see their names on the front pages as "in the field," Mackenzie sent out scouts and spies and sought to find out significant data.

Lastly, he trained his troops hard before each campaign.¹⁴ This was particularly difficult given the quality of personnel he commanded both in the Civil War and on the plains. Often illiterate, sometimes unable to speak English, occasionally fleeing arrest, prone to overcome their privation by getting drunk and abusing local townsfolk each payday, the troops presented a challenge that we do not face today. They resented Mackenzie's training regimen to the extent that on at least one occasion during the Civil War, they contemplated killing him in battle as soon as the opportunity arose. As it happened, Mackenzie's bravery and competence in the field overcame the resentment born on the garrison drilling grounds.¹⁵

Another attribute Mackenzie displayed was confidence. Certainly, his thoroughness in preparation contributed to this. In one action, Mackenzie's men found themselves under fire in a canyon, and some began to wonder aloud if they were ever going to get out. According to a witness, the exact words uttered by one despairing trooper were, "How will we ever get out of here?" Mackenzie heard this and answered sternly, "I brought you in; I will take you out."¹⁶

In perhaps his most recognized action (given his overall lack of recognition), Mackenzie raided an Indian village in Mexico.¹⁷ Worthy of a lot more words than used

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here, the Remolino raid was not only militarily daring, it had great potential to end Mackenzie's career, whether he was successful or not. To explain briefly, the Texas frontier in 1873 was plagued by marauding Indians who used Mexico as a sanctuary. Mackenzie's division commander, Sheridan, in the presence of the secretary of war, told Mackenzie to take whatever action was necessary to end the threat. Discerning that Sheridan was referring to a cross-border raid, Mackenzie asked for specific authorization, to which Sheridan replied:

"Damn the orders! Damn the authority! You are to go ahead on your own plan of action, and your authority and backing shall be General Grant and myself. With us behind you in whatever you do to clean up this situation, you can rest assured of the fullest support. You must assume the risk. We will assume the final responsibility should any result."¹⁹

Mackenzie was in good standing with Sheridan, Sherman and Grant, but a cross-border raid would be logistically difficult, tactically dangerous and politically risky. Mackenzie pulled it off with considerable success, yet even with success came a political uproar. (Imagine what would have happened if he had failed.)

The significant feature is that Mackenzie knew there was significant risk, yet he was confident. Seldom is the decision on whether to take responsibility so starkly presented, but Mackenzie evidently had little or no hesitation. Note, too, that he could have attempted to end the depredations without crossing the border and, given enough time, he might have been successful. But he was confident that he had gotten as much guidance as he was going to get and was also confident that the cross-border raid was the most effective course.

One other incident from the Remolino raid is relevant here. Gathered around a campfire after returning to the US side of

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In contrast to some of his contemporaries who were anxious to react to every perceived crisis. . . . Mackenzie sent out scouts and spies and sought to find out significant data.

the border, Mackenzie's officers reflected on what had just occurred. One said that if he had known the operation was not specifically sanctioned by higher authority, he would have refused to cross the Rio Grande. Mackenzie quietly replied that he would have shot anyone who refused to follow him across the river. If the incident is related accurately, it is interesting that Mackenzie used the word "follow" instead of a statement such as "I would have shot anyone who refused orders."²⁰ The choice of words reflects Mackenzie's confidence that he was going to cross, regardless of who followed. That is confidence!

Avoidance of Self-Promotion

Most intriguing is Mackenzie's aversion to publicity, which may be part of a larger tendency to minimize communication altogether. Today, we put a high premium on a leader's ability to communicate, so it is important to specify Mackenzie's approach in this area. Though he did not say much, what he did say to subordinates was effective. He communicated by getting out front. This accounts in part for the seven wounds.

For the Remolino raid, he did not inform his officers of the objective, and this was

common for him. His written communication was equally terse. Despite enjoiners to send written reports from the field, he sent very few. Given the state of communications

Since Mackenzie was increasingly used as a fireman, he moved frequently. The pattern was to do the job, write the report and get on with the next job. This is in marked contrast to Custer and Miles, who promoted their exploits with the pen. Further, they went to the trouble of having friendly newspaper correspondents accompany them on expeditions.

technology, infrequent reports were understandable, but Mackenzie often sent none at all until his mission was completed. In one instance, Indian survivors of one of Mackenzie's attacks drifted back to the reservation, and it was from them that the first news of the operation was obtained by the Army command. As one author has written, "It was his 'style' as a soldier, when given an assignment, to perform it in a magnificent manner, but in return he expected his commanders to trust his capacity and his judgments, without his being required to waste time on impeding progress reports."²¹

This probably lights up most of our eyes as an ideal way for things to be. It is important to remember the independent nature of operations against the Plains Indians in the 1870s. We are unlikely to be put in similar situations where such lack of communication is justified. Mackenzie's after-action reports were also terse. He has been characterized as writing brief accounts of recently completed operations, then getting on to the next assignment without further ado.²²


Since Mackenzie was increasingly used as a fireman, he moved frequently. The pat-

tern was to do the job, write the report and get on with the next job. This is in marked contrast to Custer and Miles, who promoted their exploits with the pen. Further, they went to the trouble of having friendly newspaper correspondents accompany them on expeditions to ensure that there was not only publicity, but that it was favorable. Mackenzie is described as having a "temperamental aversion to publicity."²³ It was not that Mackenzie could not write, he just did not like publicity.

But what lessons are we to learn from Mackenzie, a man of a time far different from ours in both military and technological ways? How do we relate to his courage, intelligence, thoroughness, confidence and reticence, given that his situation and opportunities were so vastly different from our own? As I became interested in the man, I looked for leadership lessons and found that the applicability was questionable.

It took me a while to find an underlying theme that I could grasp and identify with. I latched upon the premise that Mackenzie was driven. He seems to have felt there was always more to do—another mission always loomed. Was this drive an adjunct to ambition? Certainly, ambition must have been a factor, but it does not seem to have been ambition in the sense that Custer, Miles and many of us pursue it. Mackenzie was not driven by a desire for square filling or making himself look good.

Of course, Mackenzie had a luxury few of us have known—he was a major general at 25, and through combat performance (as opposed to flamboyance), he was known by the most important men in the Army (Sheridan, Sherman and Grant). To turn that argument around, I believe Mackenzie could have taken his foot off the accelerator a bit and still done quite well. A man missing part of a lung and a couple of fingers (the Indians called him "Bad Hand")²⁴ could have justifiably avoided some of the exertions he



Most intriguing is Mackenzie's aversion to publicity, which may be part of a larger tendency to minimize communication altogether. Today, we put a high premium on a leader's ability to communicate, so it is important to specify Mackenzie's approach in this area. Though he did not say much, what he did say to subordinates was effective. He communicated by getting out front. This accounts in part for the seven wounds.

undertook. He did not need to impress anyone, except perhaps himself.

Should we be as driven as Mackenzie? Could not he have been as good a soldier if he had been less intense? These are unanswerable questions. Certainly, we do not want to end up like him, physically and mentally broken and forgotten. It has been suggested that Mackenzie could not face the prospect of having no challenge.²⁵

The wounds, accidental injuries and exposure took a toll, but Mackenzie became irrational and was sent to an asylum only after he became engaged to a woman he had loved for many years, decided to retire (at age 44),

and bought a ranch as a retirement home. Maybe the idea of being content and unpressured is what finally unhinged him.

In this era of management, we are taught in civilian schools and during professional military education courses that the good managers know how to delegate authority, parcel out tasks so that they do not have to do everything themselves, and realize the limits of situations so they know not to waste resources trying to accomplish the impossible. More typically, the lesson is phrased, "Don't waste resources (time, money, material or people) on something that does not meet the threshold of the cur-

rent cost-benefit analysis." I doubt that Mackenzie would have fit very well into such a system, but I believe he would have broken out of whatever pattern he was supposed to conform to and been successful anyway.²⁵

My contention is that the United States would be better served if its military people had more of a sense of being driven. This does not mean hyperactivity to no effect. Appearing busy or putting in long hours for the sake of appearances is not the key. The key is to care, to abhor the "close enough for government work" mentality. The very essence of leadership is caring—about the mission, the people and one's principles.

Caring can result in a heavy physical and mental cost, but those who care, who hunger

for doing a job well, do not have to end up like Mackenzie. Still, Mackenzie did not go unrewarded. His talents and accomplishments were appreciated by his superiors and his contemporaries. His lack of public recognition or lasting admiration is lamentable to me but it probably was not lamentable to him, since such things are not what leadership is all about.

The next time you are faced with a difficult decision, take an extra minute or so to think about what some leader you admire would have done. There are many leaders you might consider, but I think it would be hard to find one better than Ranald Mackenzie, the intense Indian fighter who lies forgotten in the shadows of many lesser men. \mathcal{M}

NOTES

1 Perhaps the best known book exemplifying this trend is Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970). Two movies illustrating this view are "Little Big Man" and "Soldier Blue."

2 Two well-researched accounts of the post Civil War Army are Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The U.S. Army and the Indian 1865-1891* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977) and Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984) 265-292.

3 Ezra J. Warner, *Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964). Other brief biographic sketches of Mackenzie are in Dumas Malone, ed., *Dictionary of American Biography* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961), vol. 6 pt. 2, 95-96 and Mark M. Boatner III, *The Civil War Dictionary* (New York: David McKay, 1959), 499-500. A fuller treatment of Mackenzie's career is Edward S. Wallace, "Border Warrior," *American Heritage* (June 1958), 221.

4 Utley, 34, 346, 367n, and James L. Haley, *The Buffalo War: The History of the Red River Indian Uprising of 1874* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), 207.

5 Utley, 41n.

6 U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant* (New York: Da Capo, 1962), 583.

7 Boatner, 353.

8 Utley, 209.

9 Clarence C. Clendenen, *Blood on the Border* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1969) 64.

10 Wallace, 103.

11 Haley, 182, 251; Malone, 96.

12 Robert G. Carter, *On the Border with Mackenzie* (Washington, DC: Eynon Printing Company, Inc., 1935); Eugene B. Beaumont, "Over the Border with Mackenzie," *United Service Magazine*, vol. 12 (1895), 281-288; Major W. A. Thompson, "Scouting with Mackenzie," *Journal of the United States Cavalry Association*, vol. 10 (December 1897).

13 Boatner, 500.

14 Utley, 73-77.

15 Clendenen, 66, 68, 70.

16 Wallace, 23, 25.

17 Haley, 180.

18 Accounts of the Remolino raid are in Clendenen, 64, 70; Wallace, 25, 101-102; Utley, 346-349. Almost all treatments of the raid draw heavily on Carter's account.

19 A passage as juicy as this is quoted fairly frequently. Based on Carter's recollection of what Mackenzie told him, none of the principals left an account; it can be found in Wallace, 25, and Clendenen, 66.

20 Clendenen, 70.

21 Haley, 182.

22 Malone, 96.

23 Ibid.

24 Wallace, 22.

25 Ibid., 105.

26 While not exposed to modern management theory, Mackenzie, none the less, was known as a conservative of forces who did not press an advantage at too great a sacrifice beyond the point of assured victory. Malone, 96.

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MR SUMMARIES

Misleading Parallels: Nicaragua and Vietnam

By Morton A. Kaplan
The World & I, April 1987

In an effort to foster a "hands-off" policy in Nicaragua, people are drawing parallels between that country and Vietnam, according to Morton A. Kaplan, editor-publisher of *The World & I*.

Among these parallels are ones that suggest our involvement in Nicaragua will "necessarily escalate in the absence of congressional curbs, that the domino effect has been proven wrong, and that we can come to terms with Nicaragua as we did with China," writes Kaplan.

The author, however, argues that these parallels are incorrect and in this editorial suggests others that he believes are more relevant.

In the first place, Kaplan says much of Southeast Asia was expected to come under communist control if North Vietnam won the war there, but "this has not been the case." This parallel should also not be applied to Nicaragua. He writes a more appropriate parallel would be that of Cuba. He says that after the initial failure of Cuba's revolutionary operations abroad, "it was assumed that Cuba had ceased being a revolutionary power." Then Cuban involvement was discovered in Grenada, El Salvador and Nicaragua.

"Now we are told that Nicaragua has ceased its revolutionary activity in Central America," the author says. But he expects the country will intensify its activities at the next favorable opportunity. He suggests this would be particularly true "if we have normalized relations and the Contras have been beaten."

Kaplan likewise disputes the claim that US support for the Contras will escalate into direct US troop involvement unless Congress restrains the president. "There is no good reason to believe this," he writes. "Only if we allow the Contras to be defeated is there a risk that we may decide in favor of American troop involvement."

His solution to the Nicaraguan problem is to offer the Sandinista regime "an alternative to an enhanced Contra operation." Such an option would include major reductions in Nicaragua's military forces, the absence of foreign troops and

advisors, an amnesty for all Contras and a democratic constitution.

If the Sandinistas do not accept such a plan, Kaplan supports forming a government that excludes the Sandinistas. "In the meantime," he writes, "the president should consider declaring a state of hostility between the United States and Nicaragua." He claims this declaration would marshal public and congressional support for the cause. He adds that the president should also consider blockading Nicaragua.

Kaplan argues there is "much better legal justification" for blockading Nicaragua than there was for blockading Cuba during the missile crisis. The Sandinista regime was established with "massive external support"; it pledged a democratic regime and broke that pledge; it used "extrahemisphere forces" to undermine the government in El Salvador; and it continues to provide a haven for rebels fighting in El Salvador.

The author challenges the "acumen in foreign policy" of the members of Congress suggesting these parallels and says "the Soviet Union likely expects to win in Nicaragua in the halls of Congress." The president should make foreign policy, not the Congress, he writes. "Whatever the defects of the executive in the conduct of foreign policy, the committee decisions and the lack of accountability of Congress make the executive look brilliant by comparison." —ELH

States' Rights—Central America and the Governors

By Brigadier General Edward J. Philbin
National Guard, April 1987

The refusal of the governor of Maine to deploy 48 Maine National Guardsmen to Honduras for a joint training exercise last year and the subsequent cries of states' rights have created a "negative impression" of the US National Guard force that has grown "like a downhill snowball," according to Brigadier General Edward J. Philbin, deputy commanding general-air of the District of Columbia National Guard.

"Although the governor's refusal had no opera-

tional impact on the exercise or mission accomplishment," says Philbin, this incident "became the source of serious doubts in many minds that the National Guard . . . would be available for mobilization in the event of a major conflict."

As a result, several solutions were proposed in Congress. The one ultimately enacted—called the *Montgomery Amendment*—clarified the relationship between the federal government and the governors under the terms of the Militia Clause of the Constitution.

That clause gives states the authority to train the National Guard but also stipulates that the training be conducted under standards set by Congress. With the *Montgomery Amendment*, Philbin says Congress "for the first time" has stated that "the location, type, purpose and schedule of overseas training of the Guard is a matter of uniform training standards beyond the authority of a governor to change."

The author notes that many governors opposed passage of the *Montgomery Amendment* and says this is "understandable," but also warns them that "in their pique," they should not overlook the fact that control of the National Guard has been divided between the federal and state governments for more than 30 years by provisions of the *Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952*.

Philbin says there has been a fundamental change in the organization of our nation's forces during this time. He writes: "... the National Guard now is not simply a reserve of individuals and units that provide stand-by military capacity for the national defense, but are essential, integrated elements of the front-line defense capability of the United States. As a consequence, Na-

tional Guard units are required by statute to meet the same training and performance standards as active Army and Air Force units."

The system works, according to Philbin, because the governors "have proved willing" to deal with the Department of Defense to ensure smooth command transition for Guard units from the states to the federal government. He calls the refusal of one or more governors to allow their units to participate in training in Central America "a new political element . . . injected into that stable and successful working relationship."

He adds that "the interjection of political considerations into purely military affairs was and is a matter of deep regret and serious concern to Guardsmen throughout the nation."

In defense of the governors, however, Philbin indicates that widespread resistance to participation in this training did not really occur. He says "it has never taken place in the 34 years in which the *Armed Forces Reserve Act* has been operative, and there is no evidence that it will take place in the future."

But the author concedes that the credibility of Guard units as full partners in the *Total Force* "was put at risk by state authorities, who sought to obtain short-term political advantage and public visibility by refusing to allow their respective National Guard units to train overseas."

He hopes congressional action in light of this refusal will not be interpreted by governors as a reduction in their authority. Rather, he concludes, Congress "merely defined the limits of a consent authority that Congress in 1952 . . . bestowed upon them"—ELH

M⁺INSIGHTS

A Legacy of Vigilance

Morning begins along the banks of a slowly flowing river; a shallow mist drifts over the water. Silently nearby, a soldier gazes through the river fog. We know him not, nor the border where he stands vigil. No blaring band, no plaque of bronze will mark his duty; yet he walks the boundaries guarding liberty.

Nearby, Neptune's wave encompasses the prow of a man-of-war, whose turbine engines churn a deep wake, marking its course for free-

dom. The waves rise, bathing the bowman in a wash of brine, ice-chapping his face and hands. But inside him burns a flame lit by our forefathers and passed to each who stands a watch: never flickering, never dimming before the hours of fatigue—never extinguished by the cold that builds amid the night air, frost that forms on brow and beard.

And like the Vulcan of steel plying the surface above, there lingers in the realm of silence below

a shadow of steel, prowling on a peace patrol. Her captain commands, and she slips away, leaving a swirl in a growing sea swell, diving deep to await her call.

Above, on high, a silver lance slices through the clouds, chasing those that would obscure the flame.

Each stands ready to die that we may live with freedom. For them it suffices that peace is preserved; it is enough to dream of whispers from those gone before, those white stone soldiers standing forever at attention on a sunlit knoll. Listen, as we enter that area of hallowed ground—listen, as the men who knew Belleau Wood, the Ardennes and Verdun tell us of challenges past.

"Over there" . . . These men knew Saint Lô, Arno, and Bastogne!

"And there, they stood watch at Iwo, Tarawa and Guadalcanal." Marbled heroes from Inchon, from Long Binh, Hue and A Shau lie beside those who consecrated Manassas, Gettysburg and Appomattox. Silently they rest, comrades all. Their anguish has slipped away: they mark that price paid to honor the newborn in a land blessed by God. Freedom's honor was won by men whose

physical forms are now melted into a soil nurtured by tears wept when they did not return.

A youth stands near the mark of his kin he never knew. He asks of those long silent, "Who stands the watch?"

From the army of white stone soldiers, a response, "We have completed our watch, we rest. Others take our place; others keep the flame."

"And I, when?"

"That has no answer until you see tomorrow."

"Then I will stand the next watch so those yet to be born can see the sun strike the mountains and taste the clear waters of the great river. Vigilance and peace shall be my legacy too." He turns; a breeze engulfs him, whispering its thanks. Tomorrow, two soldiers exchange the watch. Uniforms crisp, weapons at the ready, no bend in their stature, a signal to those across time's way, they stand ready to defend the harvest of two hundred years. Their legacy is ours—to be preserved in silence, that war's crescendo may not rage.

LTC Kenneth J. Strafer, USA

Associate Director of Mobilization Planning, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), Washington, DC

MR LETTERS

Castles in Space

It is evident that the debate inside the Army over a proper role in space continues. In your article, "The Army in Space: New High Ground or Hot-Air Balloon?" (*Military Review*, December 1986) B. Bruce-Briggs asserts that "the Army will require a small cadre of officers knowledgeable about what can be done in space." In addressing who is best suited to head up this cadre, Bruce-Briggs suggests that the "18th-century equivalent of the spacemen was the engineers—the technical leading edge and the most bookish of the officers, but a small group and not the core nor the archetype of the officer corps." I think that was a put down. Army engineers can and should play an important role in space.

The Army has been both literally and figuratively a pioneer, with engineers often major players. In exploration, Army engineers coordinated and carried out the surveys that resulted in the

first accurate overall map of the Trans-Mississippi West. In the 1950s, engineers were still involved in explorations and surveys, producing topographical maps of the moon for NASA. Today, the Corps of Engineers' topographic laboratories at Fort Belvoir serve a variety of defense customers with some of the most technologically advanced work done by the corps.

The Army's engineers have also been a force for technological change, in both the civil and military areas. For example, Colonel Stephen H. Long's pre-Civil War wooden bridge frame was the first to be based on mathematical calculations. More recently, Corps of Engineers and ordnance experts joined with civilian engineers to produce the World War II tank dozer, which has evolved into the combat engineer vehicle. The Army's engineers also provided the management and administrative expertise that made the

Manhattan Project a reality and built the complex facilities for producing the atomic weapons that ushered in a new era of warfare. The immensely complicated space defense work (formerly "Safeguard" and "Ballistic Missile Defense," now "Strategic Defense Initiative") has been done in huge measure by the US Army.

With its history and tradition of leadership, exploration and technological innovation, the Army, and its engineers, should be a full partner in the development and utilization of space, this new frontier that will be so vital to our national defense and the Army's land warfare mission in the 21st century. The need is clear for space engineers to assist in the design and construction of large space structures. Sensors will be mounted on these platforms for Army use in navigation, positioning and communication. The Army's strategic defense command will need reflectors for its ground-based lasers if they prove effective.

Further in the future, the challenge might likely be for facilities to support colonies on the moon and mars. Army engineers also can assist in determining future land warfare requirements that can be met by satellites and other facilities located in space and developing technology to meet these requirements.

The Army cannot depend on the other services or the space command to apply an "Army conscience" to space efforts. The Army must be a full partner in the US Space Command because of its growing awareness of what space activity means to it as an organization.

The Army must continue to keep an eye on and a hand in space despite Bruce-Briggs's assertion that "the future of the Army is not in space, but in the mud." Perhaps tomorrow's crucial battle will once more be fought in the mud, but with space technology the Army that fights it will increase its combat effectiveness and better assure victory. Looking to the 21st century, space is not an option for the Army, it is a necessity. Army engineers envision extending into space the overall purpose of our corps—quality, responsive engineering services to the nation in peace and war—even though the ultimate mission of the Army will continue to be on terra firma.

LtG E. R. Heiberg III, Chief of Engineers, Washington, DC

Don't Mix Mission and Intent

As a current CGSC student, I read the August 1987 issue of *Military Review* (Command and

Control topics) with great interest. Major Edward J. Filiberti's article, "Command, Control and the Commander's Intent," particularly attracted my attention. By far, his article is the most logical, concise and easily understood explanation of this frequently elusive concept I have seen yet. I completely agree with his contention that a principal goal of the commander's intent is to establish criteria for measuring success in combat operations. This aspect of commandship is often overlooked and contributes to subordinate-leader hesitation and indecision at critical junctures of battle.

While I applaud Filiberti's effort, I must take issue with his suggestion that paragraph 2, Mission, be divided into "Intent" and "Essential Tasks" subparagraphs. To do so defeats the purpose of defining the mission. The mission is, after all, the immediate *near-term* "measure of success" most often derived from the higher commander's directives. It is the task at hand, the "close-in target," if you will, that is expressed in narrow, definitive terms. The commander's intent provides a broader framework within which the mission is to be accomplished. I feel that expressing the commander's intent as part of the mission paragraph would unduly narrow the scope of the commander's overall aim for the outcome of the operation.

We must keep the terms "commander's intent" and "mission" in perspective. Both are distinct and necessary as Filiberti has so aptly shown. His recommendation would only serve to weaken both concepts.

MAJ Guy C. Swan III, USA,
USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

On Insurgency and Revolution

The following comments refer to the article, "A Threat-Oriented Strategy for Conflict Control" (*Military Review*, July 1987). Lately, there appears to be a fixation among military academics/leaders with Clausewitz. An important point to remember is that Clausewitz lived during a time when wars were "localized." But the 20th century will be known as the century of war, disintegration of colonialism, age of nuclear weapons and formation of vast military alliance systems (NATO/Warsaw Pact). My point is that decolonization and bipolarization have spawned what we drearily call the "Third World" nations or developing/emerging countries.

These newly emerging nations *cause*—due to their weak social, educational and industrial fabric—the conditions for revolution and insurgency the authors' article describes. Their four anti-insurgency postulates are sound, but I am afraid the problem will be in the area of acceptance and implementation by US government agencies outside the Department of Defense.

Another area of insurgency that I feel needed to be addressed is the insurgency or internal revolution fueled by religious doctrine (Sunni versus Shiite, Islam versus Christianity, Hindu versus Moslem, and so forth). I think in light of recent and likely events in the Persian Gulf and other areas of the world, this religious aspect of insurgency needs more attention.

Michael S. Evancevich, *US Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona*

The Business of War

Lieutenant Colonel John M. Vann's article, "The Forgotten Forces," in the August 1987 issue was not only profound and most illuminating, but it also stimulated me to offer a few observations on the state of affairs in our military.

The doctrine, "America's business is business," first announced by President Calvin Coolidge was complemented later by Secretary of Defense "Engine" Charlie Wilson: "What is good for General Motors, is good for the country." The theme has been amplified in recent years by the glorification of business ethics as the real secret of America's greatness. We have now arrived at the doctrine of "privatization," reflected in the belief that war can be contracted out to foreign governments and to civilians here and abroad.

The Navy does not need mine sweepers because the allies and friends will do it. Europeans will provide logistics personnel from the civilian sector guaranteed to withstand the horrors of war to themselves and their families by their devotion and reverence to a signed contract with us. Intelligence collection and operations can be safely contracted out in the Middle East and elsewhere to other governments and private groups because the contractor's policies and interests are always the same as ours.

The idolization of business methods and motives as the only management technique is also reflected in "profit" as the true criterion, where the effectiveness of each service, branch, department or agency is measured by the amount of

funds it can accumulate to its respective account from the defense budget, and how it is then distributed to the shareholders' satisfaction. This satisfaction of some shareholders is clearly more important than others, depending on a complicated formula of politics, personalities and perceptions of what looks good and is marketable for further profits. It appears that combat commanders and soldiers have yet to learn that war is really a business. Perhaps all military academies should be converted to business schools.

LTC Juri Raus, *AUS, Retired, Burke, Virginia*

Helicopters and the Next War

Mr. Paul Katz's article in the June issue of *Military Review*, "The Additional Principle of War," reads well until his unproven conclusion that the helicopter has no place on the front line of the next war. His argument is unconvincing and does not take into account the helicopter's third dimension, nor its extraordinary maneuverability. The helicopter uses the folds of terrain because it has the mobility differential to do so. It does not count on armor to survive; it counts on stealth and hide positions.

The author's use of helicopters as "precision point artillery" is one of the greatest wastes I can think of with this highly mobile weapon system. Fire support channels for direct fire action would take the helicopters out of the maneuver force, a mistake that was proven time and again in Vietnam combat actions with aerial rocket artillery.

Low-observable technology, high-dash speeds and early-warning sensors give the helicopter hummingbird-like agility. There are missiles beyond the *HOT* and *TOW* missiles, such as *HELLFIRE*, which are effective at ranges beyond five kilometers. Helicopter tactics also call for side, rear and top attack of armored vehicles as first priority.

To conclude that a lack of armor will limit helicopter employment strikes me as naive in thinking of future battlefields. Helicopters should not "heavy up" with armored protection at the expense of agility and higher speeds. My prediction is that we will have a helicopter-like weapon system on the 21st century battlefield with triple the speed of current helicopters. They will be equipped with a generation of over-the-hill sensors that will make armor unnecessary.

BG John C. "Doc" Bahnsen, *USA, Retired, Yorktown, Virginia*

SINGGARS DELIVERED

The first delivery to the US Army of the new single channel ground and airborne radio system known as SINGGARS was made recently. The test units, delivered by ITT Aerospace Optical Division of Fort Wayne, Indiana, will be used to verify the radio's functioning with integrated communications security components prior to an Army decision regarding full-scale production.

SINGGARS is a single-channel, jam-resistant, very high-frequency radio for multi-service tactical communications. Developers will produce nearly 300,000 radios under the fielding plan in manpack, vehicular and airborne versions.

Delivery of the initial group of radios was delayed because the Army was told SINGGARS broke down every 200 to 300 hours as opposed to the 1,250 hours required in the contract. Recent efforts by the contractor to improve reliability of the radio have demonstrated that SINGGARS now performs an average of 1,951 hours.

Some 250 test sets have been delivered for Army use. A total delivery of 44,100 radios is planned between January 1988 and May 1992.—*Defense News*, ©1987

JAMMED IN A WING PYLON

Production has begun on the high-performance, compact radar jammer labeled the AN/ALQ-162, which is the first jammer small enough to fit inside the wing pylon of an aircraft thus preserving existing space in the aircraft, improving access to the system and allowing full carrying of external stores.

The AN/ALQ-162, to be produced at the Northrop Corporation's Defense Systems Division in Rolling Meadows, Illinois, is being manufactured for the US Army, the US Navy, and the military forces of Canada, Denmark and Spain. The jammer is planned for use in a wider variety of aircraft than any other jammer.



AARDVARK SALES INCREASE

The Aardvark Mk3 joint services flail unit (JSFU), a mine-clearing system used to clear explosive devices from airfield runways, hardstands and perimeter tracks, is entering full-scale production to meet orders placed by the US Army, the US Air Force and the forces of countries in the Middle East and Africa.

US Air Force testing of its two Aardvark systems concluded this past summer, while the US Army system is undergoing further evaluation with the flail unit installed on oth-

er pieces of equipment. Sweden has purchased one of the British-built Aardvark units for service with United Nations forces in Lebanon and another for tests elsewhere.

The firm of George Sellar and Sons builds the flails for the system and also assembles and tests the unit. Glover Webb, also of the United Kingdom, fabricates the complete prime mover including an armored cab that can be fitted with a 7.62mm machinegun turret.—*Jane's Defense Weekly*, ©1987

DOWN GOES MIFASS

The US Marine Corps has begun searching for an alternative computerized fire control system after cancelling its Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support system, or MIFASS, (*MR*, March 1987, 89) after 15 years and an expenditure of \$120 million.

The Marine Corps recently set up a special office at Quantico, Virginia, to assess other battlefield fire control systems that might replace MIFASS. MIFASS was designed to provide automated coordination of targeting and weapons fire with infantry, aviation and artillery combat operations centers. The system was supposed

to distribute battlefield information such as boundaries, friendly unit locations and air defense data.

The Marine Corps is reportedly interested in assessing the US Army's advanced field artillery tactical data system. This system uses advanced graphic display terminals that show various depictions of the battlefield.

MIFASS allegedly fell victim to a string of unreasonable testing requirements and a demand for battery power that made the system very heavy and bulky. In the end, the portable system became too heavy to carry.—*Defense News*, ©1987



HAVE PALADIN, WILL ENTER

Competition to produce a weapons system for the US Army's forward area air defense, line-of-sight (heavy) or FAAD-LOS-H program, has drawn two derivatives of the *Roland* air defense system from a joint US-French-West German consortium of manufacturers.

Called *Paladin*, the systems will incorporate elements of the *Roland* currently in service in the United States, France, West Germany and seven other nations. The manufacturing consortium, called the Western Alliance Air Defense, is made up of Hughes Aircraft Company, MBB of West Germany and SNI Aerospatiale of France.

Two basic versions of *Paladin* have been entered—the A² or anti-air weapon system and the A³ or anti-air Abrams weapon system.

Aerospatiale and MBB will furnish the *Roland* module and either the *Roland* II or III missiles for the *Paladin* A² which is being configured to meet "initial" FAAD-LOS-H requirements. Hughes will supply track and surveillance radar, plus support equipment, spares and training. The A² unit will be mounted on the M993 multiple-launch rocket system tracked carrier, to be supplied by the FMC Corporation of the United States.



The *Paladin* A³ version will use the Hughes track radar and integrated electro-optical fire control system. The European firms will supply the *Paladin* cupolas containing the launcher hardware and the *Roland* III missiles. The A³ will mount a

25mm, M242 automatic cannon in an armored anti-air turret. The entire unit will be mounted on the standard M1 tank chassis.


Plans call for 50 to 70 percent of *Paladin*'s contents to be built in the United States.

MICROLASER INTRODUCED

Amoco Laser Company, a subsidiary of Amoco Corporation, has introduced a family of miniaturized laser products that grew from its microlaser technology and that promises improved laser applications for the military, according to developers.

The microlasers, described as vastly smaller, more efficient, superior in performance and much cheaper to mass produce than current lasers, will reportedly improve applications in optical instrumentation, telecommunications, optical sensing and scanning, laser printing, optical memory, target designation and range finding.

Although the microlasers have not as yet been applied to military systems, developers consider them a



critical future component in improved telecommunications systems requiring high-precision analysis of fiber-optic transmission equipment. Developers also envision using them in collision-avoidance

systems for aircraft and in producing more accurate weapons systems through improved target designators, range finders and laser guidance mechanisms.

MR BOOK REVIEWS

IN THE COMBAT ZONE: An Oral History of American Women in Vietnam, 1966-1975 by Kathryn Marshall
270 pages Little, Brown & Co., Boston, MA. 1987.
\$17.95.

Kathryn Marshall's interest in Vietnam developed when she "felt America was being shaped by Vietnam." In 1985, she realized that women who had gone to Vietnam were organizing to locate other women who had been there; they were talking earnestly about their experiences. She sought out these women to develop an oral history through interview. These women shared their experiences, feelings, thoughts and beliefs.

Marshall did an excellent job of finding both the military and the civilian women who served in Vietnam. The military nurses, secretaries, Red Cross SRAO (Supplemental Recreational Activity Overseas) workers, American Friends Service Committee members and journalists. The book is a good cross section. However, Marshall acknowledges that few black women were willing to participate in the interview process, three said "No" immediately. Someone else needs to gather their experiences.

These women describe their conceptions of Vietnam before arrival in the country. Their in-country experiences varied from boring to outrageous; most of them reference the oppressive heat and human suffering. They describe their coping mechanisms and their fears. The theme present in their stories is pain and destruction that did not recognize boundaries set by man and resulted in destruction of humans and country-side.

Their return to "the world" was marked by gross disappointment—discrimination, sexism and disinterest by families and society in the self-actualization achieved by these women. Some have continued to achieve; others were destroyed by the experience.

The honesty in these interviews is both refreshing and frightening. This is a book for everyone who wonders about how the experience of Vietnam affected peers, friends or family. Marshall has the skill to make the reader feel the experiences of these women; it is compelling and powerful.

MAJ Gale S. Pollock, RN, USA, Fort Hood, Texas

THE ARMED FORCES IN CONTEMPORARY ASIAN SOCIETIES edited by Edward A. Olsen and Stephen Jurka Jr. 368 pages Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1986.
\$39.50.

A compendium of papers presented at a US Naval Postgraduate School conference on military roles in Asia, this is an important book for Asian scholars, military historians and professional military officers. Ranging in coverage from Pakistan to North Korea, the work examines most armed forces in Asia. The editors have fashioned an uncommonly succinct and informative overview of the disparate roles and capabilities of the region's armed forces. The focus of examination is the role of the military within each country's contemporary society. It does not attempt to discuss international political affairs, instead it explores closely the domestic implications of each nation's military system. It is probably the first book to use this theme in so inclusive an examination of Asian armed forces.

The professional strengths and competence of the individual authors are what make the book particularly important. Douglas Pike writes on the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN), for example. Each chapter was written by a person well-known for his or her expertise on the country concerned. The editors then tied the work together with a good introduction that examines such common themes as use of power in the region and the variety in national concepts of authoritarianism. In the closing chapter Sheldon Simon correctly points out that the role of armed forces in the region is so variegated that the analyst must be sensitive to the unique features of the region when attempting to maintain a view on regional tensions, politics or use of military force. He also examines regional perceptions of the major external powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—and the role of regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in promoting regional stability and security.

This book is an important contribution to scholarship on Asian armed forces and is highly recommended for any professional military officer seeking to broaden his understanding of this important region of the world. Regional scholars should have this well-written and easy-to-digest

book in their reference library. Casual and serious students alike will find it valuable.

COL John B. Haseman, USA

HER MAJESTY'S SECRET SERVICE: The Making of the British Intelligence Community by Christopher Andrew 619 pages Viking, New York 1986 \$25 00.

With the exception of the relatively young US Central Intelligence Agency, British Intelligence has received more publicity than the comparable services of any other nation. This publicity has ranged from the extremely favorable disclosures about *ULTRA* signals intelligence during World War II to a series of scandals involving Soviet agents at the very top of the British Secret Service. This publicity is all the more amazing because, as Christopher Andrew notes, British politicians have traditionally considered intelligence too secret to be examined or even mentioned in Parliament.

The author has overcome this tradition of silence to produce a remarkably complete and readable history of the subject. In the process, he traces British Intelligence from its beginnings in the 18th and 19th centuries, when secret service funds were often used to corrupt domestic as well as foreign politicians, to the glory of British strategic intelligence during World War II. In an epilogue, he brings his subject up to present day, although secrecy has denied him many details concerning postwar operations. His description is an entertaining mix of the history of an institution with the eccentric personalities who created that institution.

The focus of Andrew's study is national-level intelligence and counter-intelligence, especially during and between the two World Wars. While paying token attention to the problems of tactical intelligence in the field, the book stresses the relationship between intelligence and politics at the highest echelons. For example, Andrew concludes that in 1924, conservative career intelligence officers were so concerned by the threat of communist subversion at home that they deliberately sabotaged the Labour government of Ramsey MacDonald by "leaking" evidence of Soviet involvement in domestic unrest on the eve of a national election. To avoid the same fate three years later, a Conservative British cabinet published signals intelligence to demonstrate Soviet espionage, thereby sacrificing a lucrative source of information when the Soviets changed their codes. It is this dangerous mixture of politics and

intelligence that leads the author to conclude that Britain should follow the American example, conducting systematic legislative review of intelligence agencies.

As already noted, this book will tell a soldier little about the practical procedures of tactical intelligence. It will, however, provide excellent reading for anyone concerned with interaction of strategic intelligence and national policy.

MAJ Jonathan M. House, USA,
24th Infantry Division (Mechanized),
Fort Stewart, Georgia

PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism. Edited by Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander 472 pages. D.C. Heath & Co., Lexington, MA 1987 \$22.95.

This anthology is the product of a conference which styles itself an "international task force." It is not as bad as this sounds, but could have been better. The group is truly international. A brief biography of the members shows a large number of nuclear scientists, a sprinkling of anti-nuclear activists, a few military men, the odd intelligence or terrorism specialist, and some lawyers. There are no members experienced in commando operations or physical security. For a book that spends three-quarters of its length on safeguarding nuclear materials, this is a major failing.

By calling on a broad spectrum of knowledge of nuclear issues, the book also becomes cluttered with minority reports. There is a valuable series of essays on the legal aspects of fighting terrorism. A firm grip on the law prevents the anti-terrorist from falling into official terrorism as occurred in Argentina.

The expertise of the task force shows in its examination of prospects for a terrorist bomb. Various technical reasons make it unlikely that terrorists will develop a nuclear bomb. The task force fails to recognize, however, that when the words "nuclear" and "terrorist" appear in the same headline, it is a terrorist victory. Incidents even without explosion or contamination degrade public security and increase belief in terrorist abilities. Aside from a burst of common-sense suggestions, the book is soft on security for nuclear reactors, fuel and waste.

Preventing Nuclear Terrorism is alternately alarming, reassuring and informative. It tends to wander into nonproliferation issues, an issue

beyond its scope. It is not the ultimate work on nuclear terrorism, but it is an adequate beginning.

Kevin L. Jamison, *Kansas City, Missouri*

KOREA: The First War We Lost by Bevin Alexander. 558 pages. Hippocrene Books, New York. 1986. \$24.95

Bevin Alexander's new historical work is a must for Korean War buffs. Using recently declassified information, he provides a truly interesting account of a war that the United States won against North Korean aggression, but then subsequently lost later when it tried to destroy the North Korea state along with its Chinese allies. This is an interesting conclusion that Alexander adequately supports through his scholarly research.

One of the real strengths of his book is the new look at the behind-the-scenes decisions and conflicts that existed before and during the war. For example, the President Truman and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) disputes (there were more than one) with General MacArthur that eventually led to his dismissal. South Korea's President Syngman Rhee's defiance of the early armistice proposals and the repatriation of POWs are also expertly presented.

Alexander's book has real substance to it as it contains Korean war photos and battle sketches that relate extremely well to his narrative. His discussion on US versus Chinese tactics is very revealing in that he proposes it was not the Chinese mass attacks that made them so formidable, but rather their deception, surprise and stealthy infiltrations at night. They used these tactics throughout the war and were successful in keeping the United Nations' forces off balance, particularly when they found Chinese troops in their rear.

The reader also will obtain a clear understanding of the Pusan Perimeter battles as well as the subsequent Inchon landing. In following these major actions of the war, Alexander suggests very strongly that the Korean War should not have lasted so long nor have cost so much in human lives. He points out that China sent very clear signals about its pending entry into this war, if they had been heeded, the war could have ended sooner.

If you are interested in reading or writing about the Korean War, Alexander's book is a great start point. It is an excellent source to locate references on the Korean War, as his de-

tailed notes on each chapter are extremely well documented to include the listing of JCS message numbers. Once you start the book, you will have a difficult time putting it down.

COL Wayne C. Boyd, *USA, Saudi Arabia*

BROTHER ENEMY: The War After the War by Nayan Chanda. 410 pages. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York. 1986. \$24.95

Brother Enemy poses the question: "Was the Third Indochina War Inevitable?" Although Nayan Chanda does not answer this question directly, he does provide the reader with sufficient facts and insights to draw an informed conclusion.

In conceiving this book, the author determined to make sense out of the confusion of internecine feuds among fraternal communist parties, border disputes and traditional ethnic conflicts ongoing for more than 1,000 years, all of which have characterized the political scene on the Indochinese peninsula since the North Vietnamese victory in 1975. Perhaps more importantly for his American audience, Chanda has attempted to trace the reluctant reinvolvement of our government in the affairs of mainland Asia. Of particular interest are the events and policy disputes surrounding the decisions to play the China card and not to play the Vietnam card.

Chanda has succeeded admirably in his self-assigned task. *Brother Enemy* is an excellent example of contemporary history and is bound to take its place as a classic in Southeast Asia area studies. To tell his story, Chanda has skillfully woven primary and secondary sources together. He personally interviewed many of those involved from key policy makers, such as Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk and former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to the individual soldiers, diplomats and boat people who were affected by those policies. To fill in the numerous gaps in the story available to the public, Chanda has drawn on his considerable analytical skills born of years of newspaper reporting.

Let the casual reader beware. *Brother Enemy* is not bedtime reading. It is a serious, scholarly work written in frequently excruciating detail. The reader must be prepared to devote his entire attention to the task at hand. For this effort, however, he or she will be rewarded with the "story behind the headlines."

LTC Donald C. Snedeker, *USA,*
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC

THE FUTURE OF LAND WARFARE by Chris Bellamy. 326 pages. Croom Helm Ltd, London. 1987. \$37.50.

Chris Bellamy has produced a very thought-provoking treatise on a subject that should be near and dear to every officer in the US Army. In spite of recent emphasis on the Navy's maritime strategy, the Army will bear the brunt of fighting the next big war, and Bellamy's subject is "big war fighting over the next quarter century." Although there is considerable space devoted to land warfare in Europe, it by no means dominates the book. Bellamy concentrates on the major land powers that think big and, in his definition, big is conducting war at the operational level whether in Europe, Asia or the Middle East.

The chapter titled "The Operational Art of Major Land Powers" should put to rest the idea that operational art is simply something the US Army invented, as it is only one of nine armies discussed. The Army's AirLand Battle doctrine receives validation as Bellamy repeatedly cautions that future land warfare will continue to be integrated with air and space systems. He makes the point, in fact, that land warfare, as he uses the term, is synonymous with air-land warfare.

Bellamy specifically excludes low-intensity conflict from his analysis, and focuses on the operational level of war. He draws on recent and current conflicts from around the globe for clues to the nature of future battlefields. His definition of the future is 25 years, which allows him to base his conclusions on equipment and weapons systems currently in research and development.

The book includes separate chapters on nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, weapons and equipment; electronic warfare and directed energy weapons; and command, control, communications and intelligence. Each chapter assesses current and future capabilities of the major land powers based both on their doctrine and their research and development programs. Here Bellamy efficiently covers a great amount of material, although he necessarily deviates from the operational level of war in his coverage of the tactical details of emerging systems.

The Future of Land Warfare should be read by anyone interested in the nature of tomorrow's battlefield. This includes such diverse professions as sociologists, engineers, war gamers, scientists, politicians and teachers, but most importantly, the officers charged with the responsibility to lead America's fighting men onto that battlefield.

LT Clayton R. Newell, USA,
US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY by Michael McGwire. 530 pages. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 1987. \$39.95 clothbound. \$18.95 paperbound.

This impressively researched book is part of a long line of books attempting to explain why the Soviet Union chooses to follow certain policies, with the main emphasis being on the military objectives in Soviet foreign policies. Western interpretation of Soviet foreign policy is strongly influenced by Soviet military developments, which are generally analyzed in terms of Western interests and vulnerabilities.

According to the book's foreword, this work represents a major departure from the standard approach. Rather than viewing the Soviet military posture from the perspective of the West, the author focuses on the Soviet viewpoint and way of thinking. He shows how the need to plan for the contingency of global war has shaped Soviet policy, resulting in a force structure perceived as far in excess of legitimate defense needs. The concept is sound, but hardly revolutionary; many other works have already appeared analyzing Soviet actions from the Soviet perspective.

According to the author, a doctrinal decision in late 1966 about the likely nature of a global war resulted in a basic change in Soviet strategic objectives. Corresponding changes occurred in operational concepts, the approach to arms control and policy in the Third World. The necessary restructuring of Soviet forces took place during the 1970s and 1980s. The book identifies the old and new hierarchies of strategic objectives, analyzes the implications of the shift and deduces the Soviet operational plan for waging global war, should it prove unavoidable.

The book is divided into four sections including appendixes. Part one covers in detail the genesis of Soviet strategic objectives; part two addresses the operational plan with discussions of the governing concepts, the Euro-Atlantic Region, the Asian-Pacific Region and the Indo-Arabian Region; part three discusses contemporary concerns with an overview and implications; and, part four contains four appendixes. The book has an extremely useful index.

One of the main themes is that the West has made some extremely unwise decisions regarding US defense policies. Based on an erroneous reading of Soviet intentions, we have relied too heavily on worst-case scenarios. The author concludes that NATO has no alternative to living with Soviet forces that are structured for operations against Western Europe, but the assertive-

ness of the threat will diminish as the Soviets think war less likely. He also concludes that the Soviets have good military reasons for negotiating reductions in their arsenal of strategic weapons and they have even stronger reasons for resisting or countering the deployment of weapons in space. For practical policies, the most important conclusion from his analysis is that ill-founded worst-case assumptions about the Soviet Union's broader intentions generate US policies whose results are the opposite of what the United States desires.

I recommend the book to those that have an interest in Soviet defense structure and Soviet foreign policy. It is not easy reading, and one needs some background in Soviet affairs to follow the author's arguments. The author tries to present the various sides of the main arguments while presenting stronger evidence for his viewpoint.

The author presents a persuasive case, but not a compelling one.

COL Robert F. Collins, USA, Retired

THE MYRIAD FACES OF WAR: Britain and the Great War of 1918 by Trevor Wilson 853 pages. Basil Blackwell, New York 1986. \$24.95

Some will find the sheer bulk of Trevor Wilson's work on Britain and the Great War daunting. Those who take it on will be rewarded by a lucid and captivating account of the British experience in World War I. Wilson delivers a panoramic view of war from the experience of the common soldier, to young women in explosives factories, to quiet towns in Sussex, to the deliberations of the war cabinet. His tools include a rich variety of sources, anecdotes, analysis and able

PASS IN REVIEW

THE NUCLEAR DILEMMA & THE JUST WAR TRADITION. Edited by William V. O'Brien and John Langan, S. J. 261 pages. Lexington Books, Lexington, MA 1986 \$25.00

This is one of an increasing number of books on the just war tradition—the lethality and consequences of a thermonuclear war negate the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The authors of the various essays admit that deterrence has worked so far, but that it depends on the willingness to use such weapons and is, therefore, *ipso facto*, immoral. In their view, an alternative must be found. As such, this book does not compel reading much below the senior service college level, but at that level, the subject matter has gained some notice over the past few years.—COL George M. Hall, USAR, Tucson, Arizona

THE GORBACHEV ERA. Edited by Alexander Dallin and Condoleezza Rice 185 pages. Stanford Alumni Association, Stanford, CA 1986 \$16.95 clothbound \$9.95 paperbound

These 13 illuminating essays examine the general Soviet milieu inherited by Mikhail Gorbachev when he became general secretary of the Communist Party. Essayists purposely avoid predictions as they concentrate on the current state of Soviet affairs in a variety of areas. All of the essays offer intriguing glimpses at the issues facing the man whom one essayist labels a Soviet combination of John F. Kennedy and J. R. Ewing. For readers desiring a broad-brush look at the current state of Soviet affairs, this is a good place to start.—LTC Kenneth L. Privratsky, USA, 13th Support Command, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas

SECURING EUROPE'S FUTURE: A Research Volume from The Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. Edited by Stephen J. Flanagan and Fen Osler Hampson 334 pages. Auburn House Publishing Co., Dover, MA 1986 \$32.50

NATO faces a number of key issues as it approaches its 40th anniversary, but the real question is whether it will remain. This book attempts to answer that crucial question. The analyses are generally well done, but there is nothing all that new other than discussion of European reaction to the Strategic Defense Initiative. The conclusions (solutions) regarding military issues make a whole lot of sense as a means of continuing NATO's cohesion. However, beyond that, one should read this volume more for what is now occurring in NATO than for any comprehensive set of solutions to the alliance's perennial discord.—MAJ Albert J. Golly Jr., USA, Elmont, New York

writing. While Wilson tells us little that is new, his synthesis enables us to understand the rich and varied experience of Britain at war.

Wilson delivers on the promise of his title without lapsing into statistics or claiming much on the basis of limited samples. His account of the experience of common Britons in the work force, aboard ship and in the trenches is drawn from contemporary accounts and delivered in their context. That is, the attitudes of the British changed as the war wore on, apparently to no particular conclusion. For the British, the war was often enigmatic. Very little happened as anyone expected.

Britain's war aims and those of her citizens never became clear. Victory, when it came, seemed incomplete. What was clear was that very little survived of the Britain of 1914. We are left with the uneasy feeling that Britain's misad-

ventures in the Dardanelles, the apparent inability to destroy the German fleet at sea and the confusion in British policy at home and in its embassies are not irrelevant to our own experience.

Wilson's treatment of Kitchener's army, built on the bones of the old regular army, is excellent. The essence of the army raised in 1915 is its departure from the staid and insular army of the Empire officered by the elite and manned by the lower class. Kitchener's armies were national armies which drew, increasingly, from a cross section of society. The customs of the mess and instantaneous obedience without benefit of explanation died at the first battle of Ypres.

The citizen armies fought with courage but came to expect some leavening of the society in return. On the home front, changes in civil society paralleled those in the army. Britain entered the war as a society of classes based on deference.

DRAFTEE DIVISION: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II by John Sloan Brown. 225 pages. The University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, KY. 1986. \$25.00

Brown has written a thoughtful book on the mobilization, training and combat experiences of the 88th Infantry Division, the first draftee division to fight in World War II. The 88th was in the vanguard of the "rapid transformation" of draftees into combat-ready units by using small cadres of professionals as leaders. This is a challenging book that deserves wide circulation.—John W. Partin, *US Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida*

THE PERFECT WAR: Technowar in Vietnam by James William Gibson. 523 pages. Atlantic Monthly Press, New York. 1986. \$24.95.

This is an infuriating book. It purports to explain the US failure in Vietnam by claiming that the war was perceived by military leaders and civilian policymakers simply as a vast production system, a notion which Gibson calls "technowar." Such an interesting thesis merits careful examination, but instead of making a judicious examination of the available evidence, he contents himself with uncritically repeating a litany of the horrors of war—atrocities, indiscriminate use of firepower, fragging and so forth. His unfortunate manner of presentation will discredit the thesis in the eyes of those professionals who most need to examine the past for the good of the future.—William G. Robertson, *Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC*

MAN AND WAR by Plinio Prioreschi. 339 pages. Philosophical Library, New York. 1987. \$22.95

In this cranky, muddleheaded book, Prioreschi argues that a collective survival instinct is the cause of war. Nations rise while they are uncouth, then decline when affluence and education enfeeble them. He concludes that nuclear weapons secure the peace because the survival instinct now opposes war and hopes that all war may soon be eliminated. These arguments are all unfounded. If a collective survival instinct exists at all, it is not a major cause of war. Affluent and educated nations have generally been very effective combatants. In short, it is difficult to imagine arguments more at odds with experience than those used in this book.—MAJ Bruce R. Pimie, *USA, Center of Military History, Washington, DC*

During the war, much of that structure eroded at the hands of women in munitions plants, laborers in coal mines and the country's leadership who shaped their course and, thus, society as they believed the war required.

Because Wilson does not impose himself on the flow of his work, the incremental changes in social, political and economic policy are revealed as the British saw them. Thus, the myriad faces of the war do not seem 70 years old. More ominously, the bureaucratic muddling, military miscalculation, diplomatic impotence and social change for good or ill that occurred in Britain all those years ago seem very familiar.

MAJ Gregory Fontenot, USA,
1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas

GEORGE C. MARSHALL: STATESMAN, 1945-1959
by Forrest C. Pogue 603 pages Viking Press, New York
1987. \$29.95

This is the fourth and final volume of what will surely be the definitive biography of the greatest American soldier of the 20th century. It is writing worthy of its subject—strong praise indeed.

In the post-World War II period, Marshall no longer wore the Army uniform. Nonetheless, he remained concerned with national security—as President Truman's special envoy to China during its civil war, then secretary of state in the early years of the Cold War and, finally, secretary of defense during the war of Korea. Yet in none of these assignments was Marshall concerned primarily with "military" issues at tactical, operational or administrative levels. At least up to 1950, he tended to think that in most cases military force was not the most effective way to contain communism. Hence, to Nationalist China he advised social and political reforms. To Western Europe he emphasized economic rehabilitation and gave it grants-in-aid through the Marshall Plan. This being the case, what can practicing soldiers learn from this particular volume?

Most of all they can learn about Marshall: about how a great man deals with more abuse than any man should ever have to stomach. Unfortunately, this experience might be more than an academic issue for contemporary soldiers. Low-intensity conflict is their most likely contingency, and traditionally in America, this has provoked suspicion and criticism of the armed services.

Criticism, however, was something Marshall

learned stoically to live with. The Communists called Marshall, sincerely trying to mediate an end to the Chinese Civil War, a stooge for Chiang Kai-shek. Later, Joe McCarthy and his "lunatic fringe" in the US Senate called him a stooge for Mao Tse-tung.

Congress wanted Marshall "to get tough with the Russians" but appropriated funds for barely two divisions. It also wanted "victory" in Korea until victory, inevitably, brought in the Chinese. Then it wanted to pull off the peninsula completely.

Finally, there was the Truman White House. Whenever it wanted to remove uncooperative men from sensitive positions, it called on Marshall, a non-partisan figure able to help a Democratic administration deal with a Republican Congress. Although in poor health and longing to retire to his garden of tomatoes, Marshall replaced James Byrnes in the State Department and then, Louis Johnson at Defense. Grateful, I guess, political operatives still condemned Marshall's "righteous goddamned Baptist tone" when his opposition to military aid for Israel threatened to cost the Democrats New York State in the 1948 presidential election.

Republicans proved no better. In the 1952 election, Marshall's old protégé, Dwight Eisenhower, decided not to defend his mentor, whom he revered like a father, lest it impair his own relationship to the McCarthy wing of his political party.

Throughout all this, the imperturbable Marshall remained imperturbable. One might have wished him to exclaim: "You can take this job and shove it." Then, at least, the republic might have learned the price it must pay for abusing its finest public servants. But Marshall was simply too great a soldier to expect persistent gratitude. He deserved it, of course, and so does his masterful biographer.

Michael D. Pearlman, *Combined Arms Center Historian,*
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

PRESIDENTS' SECRET WARS: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II by John Prados
480 pages William Morrow & Co., Inc., New York.
1986 \$22.95

John Prados is one of the nation's leading experts on US intelligence agencies and functions. In *The Soviet Estimate* (1982), he detailed the intelligence community's analysis of the Soviets' strategic nuclear forces, demonstrating that its

estimates were often inaccurate and misinterpreted. Now, he has tackled another brand of intelligence activity, US presidents' conduct of "secret wars," a phrase he broadly defines to include various clandestine, special and paramilitary operations. Some involved only advice and arms to native fighters, but others included active participation by covert agents and regular military personnel.

Under this expansive definition, "secret wars" have spanned the globe and the Cold War, from the Baltic States and Albania in the immediate post-World War II era to Grenada and Nicaragua during the Reagan administration. In between, came foreign adventures in Manchuria, Yunnan, North Korea, Iran, Guatemala, Syria, Indonesia, Tibet, Cuba, the Congo, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Kurdistan, Angola, Chile and Afghanistan, and domestic spying within the United States. Some of these covert operations are well known, others are not. Prados surveys them

all and shows how they frequently interrelate.

Interspersed within the narrative are discussions of significant issues. What types of covert operations are appropriate for a democratic nation to undertake? How have presidents tried to solve the problem of exercising control over the "secret warriors" while still maintaining security and plausible deniability? How and why have so many operations occurred even though the CIA's own general counsel has argued that the agency has, at best, a flimsy legal basis for conducting secret warfare? And finally, how effective have covert operatives been? Merely listing these questions is to emphasize the importance of Prados's study.

The book is maddeningly discursive in places and is not definitive, since many relevant documents remain classified. Yet, anyone interested in national security affairs will profit greatly from reading it and pondering its implications.

Peter Maslowski, *University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska*

BOOKS RECEIVED

This list of recently published professional books is for your information.
These books are not for sale through the *Military Review*.

AIRCRAFT VERSUS AIRCRAFT: The Illustrated Story of Fighter Pilot Combat Since 1914 by Norman Franks 192 pages. Macmillan & Co., New York. 1986 \$19.95.

"AIR FORCE SPOKEN HERE": General Ira Eaker and the Command of the Air by James Panton 558 pages Adler & Adler Publishers, Bethesda, MD 1986 \$24.95

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR by Timothy H. Donovan Jr., Roy K. Flint, Arthur V. Grant Jr. and Gerald P. Stadler Edited by Thomas E. Gress 250 pages Avery Publishing Group, Wayne, NJ 1987 \$18.00

ASYMMETRIES IN U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS: Implications for Near-Term American Deployment Options by William A. Davis Jr 76 pages Pergamon Press, Elmsford, NY 1986 \$9.95

ATLAS FOR THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, Edited by Thomas E. Gress 58 pages Avery Publishing Group, Wayne, NJ 1986 \$20.00

BEHIND JAPANESE LINES: An American Guerrilla in the Philippines by Ray C. Hunt and Bernard Norring 258 pages University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 1986 \$20.00

THE BRITISH EMPIRE AS A SUPERPOWER, 1919-39 by Anthony Clayton 545 pages University of Georgia Press, Athens, GA 1986 \$30.00

CITIZEN SUMMITRY: Keeping the Pace When It Matters Too Much to be Left to Politicians, Edited by Don Carlson and Craig Comstock 396 pages St. Martin's Press, New York 1986 \$11.95

CITIZENS AS SOLDIERS: A History of the North Dakota National Guard by Jerry Cooper with Glenn Smith 464 pages, North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies, North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND. 1986 \$9.95

CONFRONTATION: The Strategic Geography of NATO and the Warsaw Pact by Hugh Farnington. 354 pages Routledge & Kegan Paul, New York 1986 \$59.95

CRISIS OF THE RAJ. The Revolt of 1857 through British Lieutenant's Eyes by Wayne G. Broehl Jr 347 pages University Press of New England, Hanover, NH 1986 \$19.95

DEADLY ILLUSIONS: Army Policy for the Nuclear Battlefield by John J. Midgley Jr 220 pages Westview Press, Boulder, CO 1986 \$23.50

EMERGING POWERS: Defense and Security in the Third World, Edited by Rodney W. Jones and Steven A. Hildreth 441 pages Praeger Publishers, N.Y. 1986 \$45.00.

FLEET TACTICS: Theory and Practice by Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr., USN, Retired. 316 pages Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD 1986 \$21.95

GERMANY'S VISION OF EMPIRE IN VENEZUELA 1871-1914 by Holger H. Herwig. 287 pages Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 1986 \$38.00

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A Bibliography by Amos Lakos 481 pages Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1986 \$37.50.

INTO LAOS: The Story of Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719; Vietnam 1971 by Keith William Nolan 388 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, CA 1986 \$18.95