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UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Series V,
Volume 1

The Origins of the National Security Agency 1940–1952 (U)

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CENTER FOR CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

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There also existed other pressures on the services. As a political reality, the Navy-Air Force decision to vote for merger was consistent with President Truman's desire for unification of the military COMINT organizations which, in turn, reflected the mood in Congress, as well as the tenor of the National Security Act. In later years, Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke, USA, a participant in the AFSA deliberations, commented about the political pressures existing at the time. Clarke, an official with many years of service in ASA and the office of the Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence, maintained that while Johnson pressed hard for merger, the real leverage for final service approval of the AFSA concept came from Truman and Congress.[30]

During the sessions of the Stone Board, the Navy made elaborate studies and charts of the major elements in both the majority and minority reports. As a result of this critical analysis, the Navy developed a unique grasp of the weaknesses and strengths of each report. Recognizing that the establishment of a consolidated agency was inevitable, and seeking to strengthen the operations of the new agency, the Navy sought at the eleventh hour to have some positive changes made to strengthen the new organization.

On behalf of the Navy organization, Stone conferred at length with General McNarney about the directive and proposed some substantive changes in the text. In particular, the Navy sought changes in the charter concerning the distinction existing between "fixed" and "mobile" collection sites. The draft directive stated that the fixed intercept installations would be "manned and administered by the service providing them, but will be operationally directed by AFSA." On the other hand, the mobile sites were to be excluded from any AFSA control and would be operationally controlled by the parent service. With unusual foresight, the Navy sought to eliminate this distinction, which it correctly predicted would be an issue of great difficulty for the new agency. McNarney, however, refused to make any substantive changes, insisting that his authority, as executive secretary of the War Council, extended only to editorial changes.[31]

With a unanimous vote now supporting the concept of merger, Johnson was ready to act. On 20 May 1949, Johnson ordered the issuance of JCS Directive 2010, establishing an Armed Forces Security Agency for the conduct of communications intelligence and communication security activities within the National Military Establishment. The new agency would be headed for a two-year term by a flag or general officer, to be chosen in turn from each service. The agency would function under the management control of the JCS, and would conduct its common activities "in not more than two major establishments." Johnson's directive established a date of 1 January 1950 for completion of the merger of the COMINT services.[32]

In taking this decisive action only two months after coming into office, Johnson ended the impasse that had existed for over a year. With the formation of AFSA, the military COMINT structure acquired a new identity and structure. While Johnson sought to recognize the unity of the COMINT mission and resources, he believed that a consolidation of the service COMINT efforts would be responsive at the same time to the public pressure for effecting greater economies in government.

Because of the concerns expressed earlier by the civilian agencies, Johnson also sent parallel letters to Dean Acheson, Secretary of State; Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence; and Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers,

executive secretary of the National Security Council.[33] He informed them of the formation, with the approval of the president, of a unified cryptologic establishment – the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) – and of the subordination and missions of the new structure. The tone of the letters was conciliatory as Johnson sought to assure each that the implementation of his new directive would not interfere with the functions of the USCIB. The final AFSA charter included no vestiges of a high-level Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Board, which had drawn such violent protests earlier from the CIA and the Department of State.

The JCS then reissued Johnson's directive as JCS 2010 on 20 May 1949. The JCS established a steering committee to assist in the planning of the many administrative, logistic, and operational actions necessary for physical merger of service resources. Its members were those representatives of the military departments then serving on USCIB. They were, for the Army, Major General S. Leroy Irwin and Colonel Carter W. Clarke; for the Navy, Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis and Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone; and for the Air Force, Major General Charles P. Cabell and Colonel Roy H. Lynn.[34]

In the selection process for the position of the director, AFSA, each service proposed one candidate. The nominees were Major General J.V. Matejka, USA, Chief Signal Officer, USEUCOM; Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, USN, Director of Naval Communications; and Major General Walter E. Todd, USAF, Joint Staff. On 15 June 1949, the JCS selected Stone.

The appointment of Stone, who had no experience in COMINT, was a sign to some that consolidation might be aborted. Stone, who represented the service most consistent in its desire for cryptologic autonomy, had signed the majority report opposing the creation of the agency he was now to head. Consolidation seemed in jeopardy.

As a result of AFSA's creation, the existing CJO (Admiral Wenger) and the director, AFSA, now had overlapping responsibilities. The CJO had been established earlier as USCIB's executive for the discharge of certain responsibilities, which the services, along with the civil agencies, had agreed should be vested in USCIB. Subsequently, with the establishment of AFSA and without prior concurrence of USCIB, these responsibilities were arbitrarily assigned to the director, AFSA. This situation presented a major dilemma for USCIB, particularly in the policy area of foreign liaison, a responsibility that NSCID No. 9 assigned to USCIB.

Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, first director of AFSA

At the 41st meeting of USCIB on 17 June 1949, the representatives of the Central

Intelligence Agency (Admiral Hillenkoetter) and the Department of State (W. Park Armstrong) cited the conflicts existing between the new AFSA Directive and the responsibilities of USCIB and the role of the CJO under NSCID No. 9. The military members of USCIB were unresponsive to the complaints of the CIA and State Department members, refusing essentially to go counter to a directive from the Secretary of Defense. The meeting ended with the agreement that the CIA and State Department should address a letter to Secretary Johnson expressing their views about the conflicts between the USCIB and AFSA charters.[35]

On 27 June 1949, Hillenkoetter sent such a letter to Johnson. Johnson, however, took no action. General McNarney, head of Johnson's management committee, met with USCIB to discuss the letter, but adamantly refused to pursue any changes to the AFSA Directive.[36] Hillenkoetter and Armstrong concluded that McNarney's views were inflexible and that further effort to change them was futile. They would have to wait for a new opportunity.

Although USCIB's nonmilitary members were unanimous in their opposition to the establishment of AFSA, they were unable to convince USCIB to take any stronger action protesting the establishment of AFSA. Because of charter limitations and the preponderance of military membership, USCIB would not challenge Johnson's plan. Recognizing that they could do nothing about the establishment or the structure of AFSA, the USCIB had no choice but to cooperate with the new agency during the interim period of its establishment. Further, lacking any response to Hillenkoetter's letter, the only solution for USCIB out of its jurisdictional dilemma was to appoint the director, AFSA, as the CJO.[37] In his capacity as CJO, the director of AFSA had a parallel responsibility to USCIB, which made the situation salvageable for USCIB. Consequently, USCIB agreed that the existing CJO (Admiral Wenger) should serve as the deputy CJO during the transition period, to assist primarily in the area of Second Party collaboration.

When Johnson established AFSA in May 1949, he simultaneously ordered the establishment of an advisory mechanism to exist within the AFSA structure. His directive defined the nature, role, and composition of the Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council (AFCIAC), designed to serve solely in the capacity of an advisory mechanism for AFSA and the JCS. Johnson's directive, however, indicated very clearly that AFSA, subject to the JCS, had the primary responsibility for formulating and implementing plans, policies, and doctrine relating to communications intelligence and communications security activities. AFSA, in effect, had the actual responsibility for running the COMINT and COMSEC operations, excluding only those responsibilities that were delegated individually to the Army, Navy, and Air Force.[38]

This dichotomy of organizational roles and division of labor did not last long. Within two months after the establishment of AFSA, the JCS proposed substantive changes to Johnson's directive. On 28 July 1949, JCS issued a new charter for AFCIAC, which not only changed the nature and role of the AFCIAC mechanism, but affected areas of authority of AFSA as well. After circulating the document to Johnson for information, the JCS approved the new AFCIAC charter on 1 September 1949.[39]

The changes in JCS 2010/6 tended to diminish the connotation of AFSA as representing a "unified" organization, while at the same time placing greater emphasis on "joint" operations. JCS accomplished this by transferring responsibilities to AFCIAC from the JCS,

as well as from the Director, AFSA. As noted above, AFSA initially had the authority to formulate and, after JCS approval, to implement plans, policies, and doctrine relating to communications intelligence and communications security activities. Under the new AFCIAC charter, however, AFSA no longer performed these basic tasks. Instead AFCIAC became the structure to "determine policies, operating plans and doctrines for the AFSA in its production of communications intelligence, and in its conduct of communications security activities." In addition to its originally assigned advisory functions, AFCIAC acquired considerable staff authority over AFSA. Thus, AFCIAC no longer functioned as an advisory mechanism within AFSA, but "became the agency of the JCS charged with the responsibility for ensuring the most effective operation of the AFSA." As the new policy authority and overseer of AFSA's operations, AFCIAC emerged as the real power in the COMINT structure.

In short, before the AFSA structure even became operational, the JCS had eroded much of AFSA's already limited authority. As happened during the period of the Joint Operating Plan, the military authorities turned once again to the use of a "committee" structure to run the COMINT organization. They also repeated the practice of excluding the civilian agencies from any participation in the committee process. These charter changes tended not only to destroy the separate identity of AFSA, but also to preserve the independent identity of the separate military COMINT services. The net result was an acceleration of the antagonism within the intelligence community over the control of the COMINT structure.

At the fourth meeting of AFCIAC, the council proposed to the JCS that its name be changed to Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC). Admiral Stone proposed the use of the word "security" because it was a generic term that embraced both the communications intelligence and communications security fields. Because of AFCIAC's jurisdiction over COMINT as well as COMSEC, the new title was considered to be more accurate. It also avoided the use of the term "communications intelligence" which at that time was considered to be classified. Following JCS approval of the change on 22 October 1949, the Secretary of Defense approved the change on 9 November 1949. After that, the Council was known as AFSAC.[40]

The Director, AFSA, chaired the AFSAC, which now became the mechanism through which AFSA reported to the JCS. AFSAC had ten members, including the chairman – three each from the three services, one from each of their communications, intelligence and cryptanalytic organizations. Consistent with the traditional practice in arrangements for joint operations, actions on substantive matters brought before AFSAC could be taken only by unanimous vote. Because of the diversity of the membership and their different interests, the requirement for unanimity made decision making difficult, if not impossible. This factor ultimately caused major problems for AFSA, as the services tended to vote along party lines whenever major issues arose. The hope that AFSA would develop a truly consolidated intelligence effort seemed remote.

Stone began his tour as Director, AFSA, and the CJO on 15 July 1949.[41] He was assisted by three deputy directors. Each deputy served as the liaison between AFSA and his parent service, and assumed specific functions within AFSA. Colonel Samuel P. Collins, the Army deputy director (AFSA-00A), was responsible for communications security, research and development, and communications. Captain Joseph N. Wenger became the Navy deputy director (AFSA-00B), and assumed control of COMINT. Wenger also received an additional

duty in a major policy area. When USCIB appointed Stone as the CJO, Wenger, who was CJO at the time, agreed to step down and to become the deputy CJO. As the deputy CJO, Wenger then assumed the responsibility for directing foreign liaison relationships on behalf of the dual interests of USCIB and AFSA. On the Air Force side, Colonel Roy H. Lynn of the Air Force (AFSA-00C) became responsible for staff and administrative functions.[42]

On the question of physical consolidation of facilities, neither the Army site (Arlington Hall Station) nor the Navy site (Naval Security Station) could accommodate all of AFSA's COMINT and COMSEC functions. One proposal was to make the split along COMINT-COMSEC lines; another placed all analysis on Soviet problems at Arlington Hall and all other cryptanalytic problems (ALLO) at the Navy site; a third left physical arrangements as they were, with a mixture of both COMINT and COMSEC remaining at the two installations.[43]

Stone opted for a division along the major functional lines of COMINT and COMSEC. He placed almost all of the COMINT operations and related research and development activities at Arlington Hall and all COMSEC operations, with related research and development aspects, at the Naval Security Station. Staff and other support functions were divided between the two sites depending on equipment and other logistical considerations. Stone established his new headquarters and administrative offices at the Naval Security Station.[44]

Stone also established four Monitor Groups – representing major functional areas – to direct the actual integration of the service elements into AFSA. The COMINT Monitor Group, headed by Captain Redfield Mason, was concerned with the merger of the largest of AFSA's operating units. This organization was to merge the Army Security Agency's Operations Division (AS-90) with the Processing Department (N-2) of the Navy's Communications Supplementary Activity, Washington (CSAW), as well as related units of both agencies. It also had the responsibility for the assimilation of two committee structures that operated under the aegis of the superseded Joint Operating Plan. This included the JPAG and the JICG of the JOP. The resulting structure became the Office of Operations, with Mason designated as its first chief.[45]

With the physical merger of the Army and Navy COMINT processing organizations into the AFSA structure, each service contributed many talented individuals with distinguished careers in cryptography. A number of these had achieved technical accomplishments of exceptional merit and possessed a combination of knowledge and experience that would become invaluable assets to the new agency. The Army's principal cryptologists were civilians, most of whom had acquired wartime commissions; the Navy's leading cryptologists were mostly career Navy officers.

Moving into the AFSA structure in 1949, William F. Friedman clearly stood out as the dean of Army cryptologists. During his career in the War Department and the Signal Intelligence Service, Friedman's contributions embraced not only cryptanalytic operations but research and development activities (both COMINT and COMSEC) and cryptologic education as well. While Friedman has received recognition for his abilities in the field of cryptanalysis, possibly his most lasting contribution may be in the area of training. Singularly gifted as both a teacher and a writer, Friedman left a legacy of training lectures and programs that have broad application even today. In April 1930, in his search for new talent for the newly established Signal Intelligence Service, Friedman personally

Captain Redfield Mason
Chief, COMINT Monitor Group

Dr. Solomon Kullback
Chief, Research and Development
Monitor Group

Dr. Abraham Sinkov
Chief, Communications Security
Monitor Group

Captain John S. Harper
Chief, Administration
Monitor Group

AFSA Monitor Group Chiefs

recruited three young mathematicians – Frank B. Rowlett, Abraham Sinkov, and Solomon Kullback – as junior cryptologists. As the Army continued its recruitment through the 1930s, the SIS gradually developed a small cadre of personnel who were highly trained in cryptology. During World War II, Rowlett, Sinkov, and Kullback, in particular, attained high personal accomplishments. They became representative of a new generation of cryptanalysts.

In contrast, the manpower of the Navy's COMINT organization in 1949 essentially represented a military cadre. The new Navy policy of the postwar period that moved in the direction of increased recruitment and use of civilian personnel had not been in effect long enough to have a significant impact on its overall structure. The Navy authorities, by

Frank B. Rowlett

encouraging professional careers in cryptology for its officers, had traditionally placed primary reliance on naval officers for the performance of COMINT duties. By the time AFSA was established, many Navy officers had acquired a broad background in communications intelligence matters, some dating back to the mid-1920s, including a number of

assignments as either producers or consumers of intelligence. During World War II, officers certified in the cryptologic field filled positions of major responsibility for the Navy in Washington and in field installations. Some of these field installations were Fleet Radio Unit, Pearl Harbor (FRUPAC) in Hawaii; Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne (FRUMEL) in Australia; Radio Analysis Group Forward Area (RAGFOR) on Guam; and a number of communications and intercept sites. Based on this broad depth of training and experience, AFSA acquired a talented and highly professional organization from the Navy. The list of officers assigned to AFSA with their initial assignments included Captain Joseph N. Wenger, deputy director, AFSA (for COMINT); Captain Laurance F. Safford, special assistant to the director; Captain Thomas A. Dyer, chief Plans and Policy; Captain Redfield Mason, chief, Office of Operations; and Captain Wesley A. Wright, chief of the Special Processing Division.

The other Monitor Groups were Research and Development, headed by Dr. Solomon Kullback; Communications Security, headed by Dr. Abraham Sinkov; and Administration, headed by Captain John S. Harper, USN. William F. Friedman became research consultant for the new AFSA. Frank B. Rowlett, a member of the Army team that broke the Japanese diplomatic system (Purple) during World War II, became AFSA's Technical Director. By the end of 1949, over [redacted] (military and civilian) were assigned to AFSA. Of this figure, [redacted][46]

Initially, Stone had two roles: one as Director, AFSA, and the other as the coordinator and executive agent for USCIB. As the director, Stone reported to Secretary of Defense Johnson through the JCS. He had the responsibility for all cryptologic activities in the Department of Defense. He was responsible for the furnishing of COMINT, not only to the military services, but also to other government departments. As director, he was also subject to the policies and rules of USCIB governing the production and dissemination of COMINT. However, once the COMINT was distributed to authorized intelligence recipients, Stone had no jurisdiction over its use or physical security. These became the responsibility of the user.[47] When acting as the coordinator and executive agent for USCIB, Stone worked under a different authority and in wider fields than he did as the Director, AFSA. As coordinator, Stone was responsible to the NSC through the USCIB. In this capacity, his authority extended to the use of COMINT by any U.S. agency. As director, AFSA, or as coordinator of USCIB, Stone was an ex officio member of USCIB, without a vote, and was ineligible to become chairman of USCIB (which was then held on a rotating basis among the membership).[48] Later, this lack of voting status in USCIB became a major obstacle for Stone and his successor as they were excluded from participation in the actual decision-making process of the Board.

During his first year, Stone constantly sought to clarify the nature and role of the AFSA structure and to accomplish all necessary consolidation actions. For the first seven months, his major objective was to develop administrative policies and procedures for the continuation of communications intelligence and communications security activities. He placed major emphasis on actions dealing with physical and administrative consolidation, and budget and financial factors. In his first progress report to AFSAC, Stone cited 15 July 1949 as the date of the formal activation of AFSA.[49] The report also noted the following as AFSA's milestones: On 1 October 1949, AFSA assumed operational control of its cryptologic

activities; and on 25 December 1949, AFSA assumed administrative control of all its allocated civilian personnel. The transfer and consolidation of facilities and personnel in a six-month period was a significant accomplishment. Merger seemed a reality.

The contrast between the earlier JOP and the new AFSA was readily apparent. Under the JOP, the Army and Navy processed the [redacted] The effort against the [redacted] targets was performed jointly by the CJO assisted by his small staff (committees) for intercept control, allocation of processing tasks, and foreign liaison. Under the JOP, the services worked together on a voluntary basis, operating essentially under a "management by committee" approach, with each service retaining its own independence – particularly when joint agreement could not be reached. AFSA differed from the JOP principally in that the COMINT processing activities of the Army and Navy in the United States were now physically merged at two locations. It performed both military and nonmilitary tasks. It was a major step toward consolidation.

With the merger of the Army and Navy COMINT processing organizations under AFSA, there no longer existed any need for the JICG or the JPAG, both of which were creations of the earlier Joint Operating Plan. The functions of the Joint Intercept Group and the Joint Processing Group were merged into a new AFSA Office of Operations. The duties of the JLG, however, required no realignment within the AFSA structure. The JLG, which dealt essentially with foreign liaison matters, continued to be a responsibility of the CJO under his USCIB hat. The responsibility for foreign COMINT liaison, administered by the JLG and its supporting staff, remained the responsibility of USCIB. This function remained under Stone as the Coordinator of Joint Operations.

Although the processing activities of the Army and Navy were now merged and the three services now functioned under AFSA as a joint agency of the JCS, the new agency faced some fundamental problems. The services generally took full advantage of the many loopholes existing in the AFSA charter in order to preserve their independence. For example, the AFSA charter withheld from AFSA any authority for the tasking of mobile collection sites.[50] This "exclusion" clause caused serious operational problems for AFSA from the outset. Initially, the Army and Navy reserved "mobile" or close-support facilities in the field for their exclusive control. According to the military services, this ensured that each satisfied the requirements of its own commanders for the production of COMINT for tactical purposes. This blanket delegation of authority to the services proved to be a major problem for AFSA, particularly in its relationships with the newly established Air Force Security Service.

By the simple act of declaring an intercept facility as mobile, a service could withhold any collection activity from Stone's control. The Air Force used this exclusion to the maximum by conveniently identifying all of its intercept facilities as mobile sites. Because of this situation, AFSA and the U.S. Air Force concluded an agreement on 18 September 1950 that essentially reflected a shared arrangement for AFSA/AFSS tasking of Air Force mobile collection sites.[51] The agreement concluded with the candid admission "that the agreement was made unilaterally between AFSA and the Air Force, in view of the fact that the latter is not providing any fixed intercept installation for operational direction of the Director, AFSA." This sharing of tasking reflected the best arrangement that AFSA was able to achieve with the AFSS. During the remainder of Stone's tour, as well

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(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

as his successor's, the Air Force continued to withhold the assignment of fixed stations from AFSA's control by continuing to identify all of its sites as mobile.[52]

Later these same difficulties over the question of fixed and mobile collection sites extended to relationships with the Army, but to a lesser degree. While the Army did not exclude AFSA from tasking its mobile sites, it did establish elaborate procedural channels for the relay of AFSA tasking instructions. Except in an emergency, AFSA could not task the sites directly, but had to go through intermediary channels, such as headquarters installations in the United States and in the field. The process was cumbersome and inefficient and worked against the timeliness of COMINT reporting.[53] The Navy was the only service that did not create problems in this area.

Another broad question that plagued AFSA officials was the division of responsibility between AFSA and the services. In its relationships with the services on processing and reporting matters, for example, AFSA once again found itself at odds with the AFSS. Neither the Army nor the Navy undertook to establish processing units within the United States. The Air Force, however, insisted on having its own processing unit within the United States.[54] AFSA considered this a major violation of its responsibilities. It asked the JCS to settle the dispute. Since the JCS failed to rule publicly in favor of either organization, the Air Force finally abandoned its plans for establishing a domestic processing unit.[55] The issue, however, did not go away. During the entire period of AFSA's existence, its relationships with the Air Force remained highly contentious over this issue, as well as over the question of mobile collection facilities.

Although in principle the military cryptologic community was officially committed to making the merger work, this commitment was not reflected uniformly throughout the services. There still remained much open hostility and skepticism about the workability of the concept of consolidation. In addition, the nonmilitary members of USCIB continued to raise questions about AFSA's role and its relationships to USCIB. They complained about the lack of a civilian voice in this military hierarchy.[56]

By June 1950, AFSA had been operational for six months. It was still preoccupied with efforts to sort out its managerial role and its authority in the COMINT structure, as well as its relationships with the consumer community. The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, however, completely changed the focus of AFSA's activities. The war put new pressures on all U.S. intelligence sources. Both military and civilian intelligence authorities immediately pressed for an improvement in the quality and timeliness of COMINT reporting.[57] The war, however, quickly revealed the limitations of AFSA. Duplicate collection efforts, processing problems, service rivalries, and communication delays were prevalent. AFSA's limited ability to direct COMINT activities in support of national targets soon became evident to the entire intelligence community.

As the Korean War continued, the U.S. COMINT community achieved a mixed record of successes and failures. Because of the practice of counterpart coverage, each service concentrated on intercepting and processing the communications of its foreign counterpart. For example, the Army and Air Force intercepted the communications of the Korean military ground and air forces, respectively. The Navy handled the communications of Korean naval forces. Because of this reliance on counterpart coverage, the major COMINT successes took place in the area of tactical support. The Army and Air

Force, working independently on the low-grade communications of their counterpart targets, had the most success. The field exploitation of North Korean and Chinese Communist traffic, both voice and plain text, proved to be of significant value to the U.S. field commanders. [redacted]

By late 1951, because of the continued absence of COMINT from [redacted] enemy communications, the U.S. intelligence community, both military and civilian, became increasingly impatient with the quality and timeliness of AFSA's COMINT reporting. The military desired increased expenditures of effort and personnel on the [redacted] analytic problem. The civilian officials complained about the lack of channels for expressing their intelligence requirements and priorities to AFSA.[58] Pressure mounted on Stone and AFSA to improve the responsiveness of the COMINT structure.

As Stone's two-year tour was coming to a close, AFSAC convened in January 1951 to nominate a successor. According to the agreed procedures, the council would consider nominations made by the Army and the Air Force, but not the Navy, since the Navy had provided the first director. The Air Force, however, declined, and supported the Army's candidate, Major General Ralph J. Canine, USA.[59] On 15 February 1951, the Secretary of Defense approved the appointment of Canine as Director, AFSA.[60]

During World War II, Canine, an artillery officer, had served under General George Patton as Chief of Staff, XII Corps, 3rd Army. Other than having been a user of intelligence, Canine came to the AFSA job with no prior intelligence experience. However, prior to assumption of his AFSA duties, Canine had a unique opportunity to participate directly in a great number of matters involving AFSA's responsibilities and relationships.[61] As the Army's alternate member of AFSAC and USCIB, he participated in their meetings for a six-month period and learned firsthand about many of the issues confronting AFSA. This extended period of orientation gave him a valuable preview of the AFSA structure before his formal assumption of the position.

On 15 July 1951, Canine succeeded Stone as the second Director, AFSA. Canine's arrival heralded no immediate major changes in the AFSA structure, however. AFSA continued to operate under a multiple control arrangement, functioning under the guidance of USCIB and the JCS. USCIB provided limited guidance on policy matters, while the JCS provided the management and operational authority over AFSA. The Armed Forces Security Advisory Committee continued to oversee the operations of AFSA for the JCS, and at the same time exercised a heavy hand in the direction of AFSA activities. As noted earlier, AFSA did not have complete freedom of action in the policy and planning areas. A very early revision of the AFSA charter required that all major policy and planning actions by AFSA had to have prior approval of AFSAC. Concerning the very critical policy question of the division of responsibility between AFSA and the services, AFSAC consistently supported the service views rather than AFSA's. AFSAC also required unanimous approval by the members prior to taking action on an issue. This meant that it was very difficult, if not impossible, for AFSA to win a favorable decision on controversial issues.

Canine's arrival also brought no real changes in terms of AFSA's working relationships with the service COMINT organizations. If anything, a steady deterioration in these working relationships continued. After the establishment of AFSA, even the Army's initial

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support and enthusiasm for the centralized concept began to diminish and soon matched that of the other services in opposition to unification. In the Army's case, the change was due primarily to the reassignment of Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke, USA, Chief, Army Security Agency, who was considered to be the primary architect of the consolidation concept.[62] Clarke became Commanding General, Southwestern Command Japan, and remained temporarily out of the intelligence field until returning to Washington in late 1953.[63] With Clarke's departure, no one in authority in the Army wholeheartedly supported consolidation.

The services did agree on one major issue. They were united in their belief that the Director should have no authority over them. They viewed him solely in the role of "Coordinator," not "Director." Each of the first two Directors of AFSA, Stone and Canine, bitterly fought this concept. They believed this approach to be contrary to the spirit and intent of the AFSA charter. It inhibited them from doing their job properly. As a result of continuing pressure from Stone and Canine for changes, hostility continued to build between AFSA and the COMINT services.

Despite Stone and Canine's efforts, by December 1951 management and control issues remained unresolved. Critical to the successful functioning of AFSA were centralized processing; better communications, including courier forwarding of raw traffic as well as improvement of AFSA's own communications capability; and AFSA's control and direction of the services.

In summary, while logic seemed to argue for physical merger of the service COMINT activities, the actual establishment of the Armed Forces Security Agency did not occur without major opposition. Most authorities, both military and civilian, opposed its establishment.

With the exception of Defense Secretary Johnson and the initial support of the Army, the majority of the military authorities strongly opposed AFSA as conceptually unsound. The Navy and the Air Force felt that they would lose control of their resources as well as the ability to provide timely tactical support to their field commanders. Of the civilian authorities, the representatives of the Department of State and the CIA proved to be even more strident in their opposition to the establishment of AFSA. They viewed the AFSA concept as detrimental to national intelligence interests, and representative of still another effort by the military to control COMINT resources and intelligence priorities. From their perspective, the AFSA charter completely ignored the roles and authorities of USCIB as established by the NSC in July 1948.

Despite this opposition, Secretary Johnson almost singlehandedly accomplished the establishment of AFSA. Because of the new national interest in unification, as well as presidential support, Johnson pushed through the establishment of the Armed Forces Security Agency on 20 May 1949. In the process of establishing AFSA, Johnson overrode the objections of USCIB, the Navy, and the Air Force. General Canine described the situation best when he characterized the establishment of AFSA "as representing Johnson's shotgun wedding of the Army, Navy, and Air Force organizations."[64]

The original charter, as issued by Johnson, would have permitted a more autonomous role for the new agency. But an almost immediate modification of the AFSA charter by the JCS greatly diminished the authority of AFSA and effectively ruled out any real change of

direction for the COMINT structures. Because of the charter change, the Armed Forces Security Council, originally envisaged as an internal advisory mechanism for AFSA, became instead a military tribunal that directed the activities of AFSA – and left AFSA little authority of its own. The military authorities sought to dominate and control all COMINT assets and to prevent them from coming under the direction of the CIA and the Department of State. This proved to be a tactic that they would later regret.

During its three years of existence, AFSA was continually confronted with unresolved operational and jurisdictional problems, many of a critical nature. But AFSA did succeed in accomplishing the physical merger of the COMINT processing activities of the Army and Navy organizations. Organizationally at least, AFSA must be viewed as an important step, no matter how incomplete, in the movement toward the establishment of a national cryptologic effort. The AFSA concept and structure became another building block – and training ground – in the progression toward the centralization of a United States COMINT authority.

Chapter V

AFSA, the CONSIDO Plan, and the Korean War, 1949–1952

From its inception, AFSA faced pressures to restructure it, to weaken its authority, or to abolish it altogether. Almost immediately after AFSA was created, the Army proposed the creation of a new military intelligence agency to be known as the Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office (CONSIDO). It would control U.S. COMINT requirements and the dissemination of all COMINT. The draft proposal provided for exclusive military control over the U.S. COMINT effort. It quickly drew bitter opposition from the civilian agencies: CIA, the State Department, and the FBI. No sooner had the CONSIDO proposal been rejected than the Korean War broke out and AFSA again found itself in the middle of a major controversy. The war spotlighted AFSA activities and highlighted major weaknesses in the U.S. COMINT structure. Even before the war ended, AFSA became the center of a high-level investigation to reevaluate the role and placement of the U.S. COMINT organization in the overall U.S. intelligence structure.

When AFSA was established in 1949, Secretary Johnson considered a parallel Army proposal to create a Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office. The Army's plan, with support from the Navy and Air Force, sought to bring all consumers together in a central evaluation unit. The new office would be under military control, and would serve as an "intelligence" counterpart of the COMINT structure. CONSIDO would be charged with the responsibility for performing the requirements and dissemination functions related to the COMINT process for the entire intelligence community. Even more controversial than the original plans for the establishment of AFSA itself, the proposal had far-reaching implications and led to a new struggle between the military and civilian members of USCIB over the control of basic intelligence functions and relationships.[1]

The proposal itself was not new. Near the end of World War II, there had been extensive discussions by the Army and the Navy concerning the concept of a joint evaluation and dissemination center for COMINT product. However, when the services could not reach agreement on a proposal to merge their cryptologic activities, the concept was abandoned. The idea, however, remained alive within each service. Many military officials continued to believe that there should be an integrated COMINT structure charged with responsibility for performing intelligence functions such as the evaluation and dissemination of COMINT product. Three months before the establishment of AFSA, William F. Friedman, chief, Technical Division, ASA, played a major role in regenerating the plan. Working in conjunction with the Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, Friedman reworked the proposal, which the Army forwarded to Secretary Johnson a few days before the establishment of AFSA.[2]

The plan recommended the establishment of a new consolidated intelligence agency that would be composed of analysts from the various intelligence agencies, and would operate under the aegis of a military organization – either the director, AFSA, or some other military organization. The chief, CONSIDO, would exercise total control over the development of COMINT requirements, as well as the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of all intelligence based upon COMINT raw material. The proposal

envisioned the establishment of a CONSIDO office in Washington and the establishment of overseas branches.[3]

The stated fundamental objective of the CONSIDO consolidation plan was to improve Department of Defense intelligence and contribute to "efficiency and economy." With the establishment of CONSIDO, the COMINT exploitation units of all other departments were to be abolished. CONSIDO was to provide integrated intelligence estimates on all available COMINT and was to reflect the joint view of all intelligence agencies.[4] General Joseph T. McNarney, special assistant to the Secretary of Defense, became an enthusiastic supporter

William F. Friedman

of the plan, believing it would result in great savings. He directed that the proposal be coordinated with State, CIA, and the FBI in order to make it as acceptable as possible to them. McNarney, however, showed little real consideration for the civilian views. He remarked that he was "sure that it had been made clear to these agencies previously that the consolidation was a Department of Defense matter and would take place regardless of their opinions."[5]

Secretary Johnson did not immediately endorse the proposal, but instead referred it to the JCS for review.[6] During the next several months, various redrafts emerged throughout the intelligence community for establishing some form of "CONSIDO." The

main issues always focused on what organization would control the CONSIDO structure, and the role of CIA, State, and the FBI in a CONSIDO-type intelligence operation. Pentagon officials recommended that AFSAC, the same committee that directed the activities of AFSA, control CONSIDO. This, of course, would keep control of the organization in the hands of the military authorities. The three civilian elements adamantly opposed exclusive military control over CONSIDO or any organization that sought to administer the intelligence requirements process for the total U.S. COMINT effort and that sought to establish strictly military control over policies governing evaluation and dissemination of COMINT information.

The debate finally reached the USCIB, when Colonel James R. Lovell of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the JCS presented the CONSIDO proposal on 2 December 1949.[7] In the ensuing discussions, the USCIB representatives generally reaffirmed their organizational positions. State and CIA indicated they would not support the concept unless they were made jointly responsible with the Department of Defense for running CONSIDO. Both the State Department and the CIA supported the concept of a CONSIDO type operation, but they opposed the specific proposal because of its military orientation.[8]

W. Park Armstrong, speaking for State, insisted that "the civilian agencies retain their position of equality with regard to their authority and responsibilities in the COMINT field."[9] In a memorandum to the members of USCIB, Admiral Hillenkoetter, DCI, also stated his vehement objections to the CONSIDO proposal. He considered the plan to be in complete derogation of the COMINT roles of the DCI as assigned by the National Security Act of 1947 and USCIB as established by NSCID No. 9. He objected to placing intelligence functions, such as evaluation, correlation, and dissemination of AFSA product, under exclusive military control. Stating that intelligence requirements and priorities were a clear-cut legal responsibility of the CIA, Hillenkoetter further objected to the placement of these functions under the JCS. In short, Hillenkoetter stressed that many of the CONSIDO functions were national in nature and could not arbitrarily be assigned to a structure totally under military control.[10]

Within the new AFSA structure itself existed a wide divergence of opinion concerning CONSIDO. Many of the senior military officials felt that the CONSIDO proposal was conceptually sound. However, Admiral Stone, the director of AFSA, firmly opposed the CONSIDO concept. Because of possible infringements on AFSA's mission and function, Stone argued against the establishment of an additional agency outside the AFSA framework for the production of communications intelligence. Stone took the position that approval of CONSIDO would require a simultaneous revision of AFSA's charter. He stressed that AFSA must be responsive to the needs of the State Department and CIA as well as those of the military.[11]

Because of the objections raised by State and CIA (AFSA was not a voting member of USCIB), USCIB referred the issue to an ad hoc committee under the chairmanship of T. Achilles Polyzoides of the Department of State.[12] The committee continued to struggle for several more months to develop a compromise solution. Although all members of USCIB agreed that the six agencies represented on USCIB might integrate COMINT exploitation activities, they could not agree upon the best form of organization for that purpose. Two

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quite different proposals finally emerged from the ad hoc committee. One would establish a CONSIDO under the control of USCIB, the other would establish a CONSIDO under the control of the military.[13]

The end of the CONSIDO discussions took place at the 53rd meeting of USCIB on 14 July 1950. Under USCIB rules, a unanimous vote was required on all USCIB decisions. Since the members were sharply divided on the subordination of CONSIDO, "all the members agreed that CONSIDO should be removed from the agenda, subject to a possible restoration at a later date."[14] This action marked the conclusion of formal discussions over CONSIDO. It never reappeared on the USCIB agenda.

Although CONSIDO was dead, it left permanent scars within the intelligence community. It clearly illustrated the difference of opinion between the civilian agencies and the military establishment about the control of United States intelligence resources.[15] The distinction between "military" and "national" interests began to receive greater attention. The CONSIDO concept soon became the symbol of a new battle to acquire control over the entire intelligence process.

As AFSA struggled to establish itself, the North Koreans launched an attack against South Korea on 25 June 1950. AFSA and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community were caught unprepared.[16] The COMINT requirements in force in June 1950 (issued by the Intelligence Committee of USCIB) stressed primarily the need for information concerning the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union and Communist China. South Korea was considered to be outside the defensive perimeter of the United States. The list of countries and subjects "considered to be of greatest concern to U.S. policy or security" included no reference to Korea. One entry on the list did refer to "unusual activities of [redacted]" but the content of this requirement referred only to [redacted] Korea was included in the list of secondary requirements. This category was identified as being of "high importance" and as one that required "expeditious" handling to the extent possible. Korea was [redacted] as Item 15 in a list of 16 items. Item 15 read: "North Korean-Chinese Communist Relations," and "North Korean-South Korean Relations, including activities of armed units in border area."[17] This low priority statement of interest clearly did not reflect any great consumer interest – nor was it sufficient to justify broad COMINT coverage of North Korean communications prior to the invasion of South Korea.

Because of the absence of consumer intelligence requirements on Korea, AFSA had established no COMINT effort of any kind on North Korean communications.[18] There was no effort on the North Korean problem even on a "caretaker" basis. At the time of the invasion, the only intercept available to AFSA was a limited amount of unidentified traffic. The communications of North Korea first became known to AFSA in 1950 during the course of routine intercept searches for Soviet [redacted] links. The United States initially intercepted North Korean communications in May 1949 when a search position at an Army installation intercepted an unidentified radio net using Soviet communications procedures. On 21 April 1950, at the request of Army G-2, AFSA assigned an intercept position to the specific mission of searching for and developing information on North Korean communications.[19] As a result of these searches, 220 cipher messages were obtained.[20] For the purpose of identification, this traffic had passed back and forth between the group of AFSA analysts working the Soviet problem and the group working the [redacted].

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[redacted] problem. By the end of April, the Soviet analysts had concluded that the messages were "probably North Korean," but the two analytic groups could reach no agreement. It was not until after the war had started that the traffic was firmly identified as North Korean.[21]

The outbreak of the war severely strained the limited COMINT resources available to the United States and required considerable diversion of resources and tasking. Not only was the collection and reporting posture on Korean targets very weak in June 1950 but this situation extended to all supporting backup areas as well. There were no traffic analysts working on North Korean communications, no Korean linguists, no dictionaries of the Korean language, no books on the Korean language, no Korean typewriters – and an almost total absence of knowledge of North Korean [redacted] terminology.[22]

After the initial attack, AFSA made immediate and drastic adjustments in its COMINT posture, focusing on the now urgent North Korean tasks. Two weeks after the invasion, the intercept coverage of North Korean communications had been increased from [redacted][23] Drastic changes in other intercept coverage also took place. For example, the COMINT processing activities both in the United States and overseas, established 24-hour operations. At the same time, however, there was no compensating reduction in the priorities of other USCIB requirements.[24] As a result, AFSA continued its intercept and reporting of other targets. This coverage included priority reporting on the Soviet Union and [redacted] as well as on [redacted] The increasing number of priority targets and the limited intercept capabilities presented AFSA with serious problems in allocating its resources for intercept and processing activities. Lacking any unified direction from the consumers, AFSA generally became the tiebreaker in making decisions on conflicting priorities. In other cases it simply deferred to the decision of the military services based upon their intercept capability.[25]

Ironically, the outbreak of the Korean War proved to be beneficial to AFSA in one respect. By bringing national-level attention to the AFSA plight, the war helped to break the budgetary straitjacket that had hampered AFSA. In addition, the possibility that the war might expand to a global conflict led to the levying of a multitude of new requirements on AFSA, mainly for intelligence information about the USSR, [redacted] China, and North Korea. It quickly became evident that the struggling AFSA needed additional resources. This led to increases in AFSA's authorizations for manpower and facilities, as well as an expansion of the resources for the entire U.S. COMINT effort.[26]

The Korean War brought into focus another problem for AFSA that would require more than a simple expenditure of resources to fix. It was organizational and related to AFSA's position in the COMINT structure and its authority to direct the activities of the military services. With the Korean War, AFSA sought to establish itself as the central U.S. authority for COMINT matters. Unfortunately, the conflict between AFSA and the services could not be resolved and greatly impeded AFSA's efforts to fulfill its overall intelligence role. The difficulties stemmed from the inherent weakness of AFSA's charter with its ambivalence about the roles and authorities of the principal participants in the COMINT process.

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When Secretary Johnson established AFSA, he designated the new agency as the central defense authority for the communications intelligence activities of the United States, but with one significant exception. The charter excluded from AFSA's control those COMINT facilities and activities that served in direct support of the field commanders for the purpose of providing tactical intelligence.[27] The control and direction of these latter activities remained the responsibility of the military departments. This exclusion clause proved to be highly divisive. It resulted in a continuing and frequently bitter feud between AFSA and the services over who was actually in charge of COMINT. The Army and Air Force, in particular, took advantage of the clause and came into frequent conflict with AFSA over jurisdictional issues. The conflict usually involved tasking matters – questions primarily related to the exercise of operational and technical control over the military field installations. As a practical matter, during the Korean War the Army and Air Force directed their major emphasis toward the development of their own field collection and processing activities, primarily to meet the intelligence needs of their field commanders. In the judgment of the military COMINT services, they were tasked primarily by military authorities for the intercept of military counterpart traffic at the tactical level. Secondarily, they were tasked by AFSA to intercept those [redacted] of interest to the rest of the intelligence community. This latter category included the intercept of targets identified as being of joint interest, such as civil [redacted] This division of effort resulted in the issuance of separate and independent tasking from both the military intelligence officials and AFSA.[28] The unfortunate split in the exercise of control over the COMINT effort constituted a direct challenge to AFSA's dominant role in U.S. COMINT.

Admiral Stone, alarmed by the continuing feud, sought to clarify and resolve the conflict. Issuing AFSAC 60/26 on 13 September 1950, Stone proposed a more precise definition of the division of responsibility between AFSA and the services, as well as a greater role for AFSA in the tasking of field sites. Stone did not question the need for the services to conduct field processing activities in support of the field commanders, but he maintained that AFSA should be the primary organization to provide the centralized operational direction of field processing efforts. He proposed specific procedures for accomplishing a division of responsibility between AFSA and the services.[29]

In AFSAC 60/26, Stone stated plainly what he considered to be AFSA's role as the centralized COMINT authority in guiding the overall direction of the entire U.S. COMINT effort including those field operations that were delegated to the military departments for direct support purposes.[30] Stone's proposal, at least in the view of the Army and Air Force, was totally unacceptable. It reopened all the earlier arguments over the validity and fundamental purpose of the AFSA concept. The Army's official response, to Stone's amazement, totally rejected the idea of AFSA's exercising any operational direction and control over the Army's field processing effort. Stone noted on his copy of the Army's response that it was the most extraordinary example of a complete reversal of position that he had ever seen. In essence, the Army now claimed that AFSA did not have the responsibility for providing the Army's field commanders with combat COMINT. The Army maintained that it would reserve to itself the right of conducting all of its intelligence operations as it deemed necessary or desirable.[31] Similarly, the Air Force, stressing the

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need for having its own independent processing capability, rejected AFSAC 60/26, and insisted on controlling Air Force operations for the production of combat Air Intelligence.[32]

In a reversal of its earlier position, the Navy became the only service to support Stone's paper.[33] This switch was due in large part to Captain Joseph N. Wenger, USN, and his perception of the AFSA role. Wenger's participation in joint Army and Navy discussions extended from the late 1930s to the early 1950s. During the Stone Board deliberations, he provided staff support to the Navy member and was an articulate spokesman against the AFSA concept. Despite his personal feelings about the wisdom of the merger, Wenger, as a deputy director of the new AFSA, played a key role in implementing the merger actions. Motivated mainly by the realities of the situation, however, Wenger came to recognize that even greater centralization actions would be necessary in the future. He became a supporter of the AFSA concept and personally drafted the paper (AFSAC 60/26) that laid out a strong role for AFSA in directing the COMINT effort.[34] This now became the Navy position.

In assessing the Army's strong disagreement with AFSAC 60/26, Wenger remarked about the ironies of the situation. He recalled that the Army had been the main proponent for the establishment of AFSA, whereas the Navy had opposed it, primarily for operational reasons. According to Wenger, the new Army position was completely counter to what was understood to have been the aim of AFSA and to what experience had shown to be the technical realities of COMINT operations. He also saw a real threat to the continued existence of AFSA if the Navy came to support the Army and Air Force position over the control of field resources. If this happened, Wenger speculated that the services would acquire complete independence in large sections of the COMINT problem, thereby depriving AFSA of its primary reason for existence as a military agency – the centralization and coordination of U.S. COMINT.[35] He recognized that the Army and Air Force dissents simply represented a reopening of the earlier controversy over the issues of centralization, but with one radical difference. The Army and the Navy, who had been the principal players during the Stone Board deliberations, were no longer speaking from positions of great operational strength. Each had lost its primary COMINT processing center to AFSA.

According to Wenger, when AFSA absorbed the COMINT processing activities of the Army and Navy, both services lost highly skilled organizations that took years to develop and would require many years to replace. Each organization had turned over a major portion of its COMINT-trained manpower, its COMINT machinery, and its COMINT facilities to AFSA in an effort to make that organization work. The Air Force, however, had lost nothing, as it possessed no major resources of its own at the time. In the Navy view, the magnitude of loss for the Army and Navy revolved around the particular needs of each for the production of combat intelligence – which the Navy believed differed greatly for each service. During the Stone Board discussions, the Navy repeatedly stressed this aspect. It asserted that much of the Army's combat intelligence program was targeted against low-level systems, which were exploitable in the field at the tactical level. In contrast, Wenger and other naval officials always maintained that the entire naval problem could be handled properly only in a full-scale technical center, as its complexity required exploitation at the highest analytical level.[36] Based on this rationale, the Navy consistently maintained that it had suffered a greater loss than the Army when AFSA absorbed the two processing centers in 1949.

Navy authorities now perceived AFSA to be a permanent organization and that the Army and Navy must rely on it for COMINT support. While the Navy authorities had earlier opposed the creation of AFSA, they now felt that it was too late to think in terms of restructuring or abolishing it, particularly during an ongoing war. Consequently, Navy officials, led by Stone and Wenger, supported AFSA and helped it to expand its technical resources and capabilities, including its professional talent and complex machine equipments. They believed that such an expansion of AFSA's technical capabilities would help AFSA meet the future intelligence needs of the three services as well as those of the other members of the intelligence community.[37] In taking this position, Navy authorities made it clear that they would oppose any effort by the Army and Air Force to undo the AFSA merger.

With only the support of his own service, however, Stone made little progress in his efforts to strengthen the concept of a centralized COMINT authority. Discouraged, Stone finally agreed to defer any further consideration of AFSAC 60/26 by the members of the Armed Forces Security Agency Council. Recognizing that he would not win support in the JCS for AFSA control of field relationships, Stone also chose not to submit AFSAC 60/26 to the JCS for decision. Instead he modified his initial broad approach and narrowed his argument to a single issue – Air Force processing of COMINT in the United States.[38]

In a memorandum to the JCS (AFSAC 60/42) of 24 November 1950, Stone took on a head-on challenge from the AFSS concerning the role and authorities of AFSA. AFSS insisted on establishing its own centralized processing activity at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas. Stone asserted that this plan was in direct conflict with the AFSA charter.[39] Although the JCS never took official action, the AFSS canceled its plan to develop Brooks as a centralized processing center. The Air Force, however, soon announced new plans (AFSAC 60/49) to establish [redacted][9] This action strongly reinforced the concept that the services were in charge of conducting tactical field operations.

With this sequence of actions involving AFSAC 60/26 and AFSAC 60/49, the Army and the Air Force prevailed over AFSA in their insistence that the services, not AFSA, should maintain the dominant role in controlling the activities of their field resources. The distance from Washington, as well as the need for timeliness in reporting the intelligence information, contributed to this victory. Moreover, this was an era when service collectors were tasked primarily with the intercept of the communications of their foreign counterpart service, and secondarily with the intercept of joint targets (i.e., civil and [redacted] Thus, for a combination of reasons, the military commanders in Korea would rely primarily on their respective military services for tactical intelligence rather than on AFSA. While AFSA officials continued to believe that AFSA should exercise operational and technical control over all COMINT activities, they did not have sufficient power and authority to impose their will on the military COMINT services.

As the Korean War continued, both the Army and the Air Force organizations expanded their field intercept capability and established their own field processing activities. Despite the continuing controversy, the operational elements of AFSA and the military services worked together in great harmony. In their day-to-day coordination on operational matters, they demonstrated a strong spirit of mutual cooperation and assistance. They freely exchanged information and technical details related to the

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collection and analytic processes, including such items as translations, cryptanalytic recoveries, and intercept data. There were also personnel exchanges between AFSA and the services over a broad range of operational functions. For example, AFSA sponsored continuing programs for AFSA personnel to perform temporary duty assignments in the field in order to assist the services – and for military personnel to participate in orientation and training programs at AFSA prior to their assignment to the field.[41] By the time the war ended, these field programs became major focal points for COMINT reporting and provided unique intelligence contributions to the field commanders.

From the beginning of the war, it was evident that U.S. combat forces in Korea would rely on the individual service processing units in the Far East for tactical COMINT support. Starting with only one intercept station [redacted] the Army COMINT organization ultimately acquired the largest contingent of field units in support of U.S. operations in Korea. The Army set up its field headquarters, the Army Security Agency, Pacific (ASAPAC), in [redacted] ASAPAC also served as a major processing center in the theater, directing Army fixed intercept sites located in [redacted] Hawaii, and Korea. In addition, ASAPAC established a number of advance detachments in Korea. By 1951, the 501st Communications Reconnaissance Group headed all Army COMINT units in Korea. Subordinate units were designated Communications Reconnaissance Battalions or Companies (CRB, CRC). ASAPAC exercised overall control of Army COMINT operations in Korea, including South Korean detachments.[42]

At the outbreak of war, the only Air Force unit in the Far East was the [redacted] with detachments scattered throughout [redacted] After the North Korean attack, the Air Force established a detachment of the [redacted] in Korea for intercept and reporting and for direction of a South Korean unit. In 1951, the Air Force began to deploy smaller teams to Korea for the production of tactical COMINT for the 5th Air Force. Eventually, the Air Force established the [redacted] an area headquarters, in [redacted] The [redacted] gradually assumed responsibility from ASAPAC for the intercept and processing of the ground communications of the North Korean Air Force.[43]

The reliance on counterpart coverage, coupled with the small number of North Korean or Chinese naval forces involved in the war, precluded any major role for U.S. naval COMINT units. In the course of the war, however, the Navy's radio facility, [redacted] did provide important assistance to the overall Far East COMINT effort. The [redacted] afloat also contributed unique intercept of Soviet [redacted] nets and Chinese [redacted] activities.[44]

At the Washington level, AFSA also attempted to improve its relations with consumers. Stone, in his dual role as AFSA Director and Executive Agent of USCIB in COMINT matters, attempted to keep the consumer community current on all AFSA actions. He not only encouraged the establishment of consumer liaison offices at Arlington Hall but also promoted an expansion of the direct dialogue between intelligence analysts and COMINT producers. Traditionally, the two performed their tasks with little interaction. This new dialogue took place in an era when the COMINT community was particularly sensitive to the release of "technical" information or "tech data" to consumers. The term "tech data" generally referred to the operational details of the intercept, analysis, and translation process. It included specifics related to collection sources, callsigns, identification of

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communications links, identification of cryptographic systems, and other details of the analytic process.[45] The issue over providing technical data to the consumers was never resolved. It continued to be a source of conflict between COMINT producers and consumers. Many consumers, especially CIA, demanded the data. The producers opposed providing it.

Initially, Stone's push for a freer interchange between producers and consumers caused considerable opposition within the COMINT family itself. Many AFSA personnel viewed the move toward closer dialogue as blurring the distinction that traditionally existed between the roles of the COMINT analyst and the intelligence analyst. The COMINT analyst was to provide only raw data. The intelligence analyst produced finished intelligence. Because of the war and its pressing priorities, however, such distinctions soon dissipated.[46]

Despite such problems, there existed major areas of cooperation among the intelligence producing agencies in Washington. Long before the establishment of AFSA, the Army G-2 and the Office of Naval Intelligence established collocated offices with their service counterparts at Arlington Hall Station and the Communications Supplementary Activity, Washington. Within each service, the consumer and producer elements developed harmonious working relationships and operated with a minimum of correspondence or formality. These consumer contacts extended not only to the COMINT processing elements but to the policy-making officers of the COMINT organizations as well.[47]

When AFSA was established, many of the Army and the Navy COMINT officials simply moved over to new positions of authority corresponding to their previous roles in their old agencies. In this manner, the liaison arrangements between the military producers and consumers operated smoothly during the transition period.

This liaison arrangement worked particularly well for the Army's Special Research Branch (SRB) during the Korean War. One of the most active consumers was G-2. Early in the war, SRB collocated personnel in AFSA's North Korean section, where they worked closely with the AFSA COMINT analysts in almost all phases of the exploitation process. Since the SRB representatives scanned all translations and traffic analysis reports prior to publication, they were able to develop a unique perspective of COMINT operations. In addition to this direct participation in COMINT activities, SRB served as a general channel for the dissemination of COMINT from AFSA to the Far East commands.[48]

In contrast to the long-standing working arrangements of the Army and Navy consumers with their military COMINT counterparts, the Air Force started from scratch. When the Air Force became a separate service in 1947, the Army continued to provide intelligence support to the new service on an interim basis. Within a year, the Air Force activated the AFSS, its own COMINT processing organization that began operations at Arlington Hall Station on 1 February 1949 and relocated to Brooks Air Force Base in Texas in May 1949.[49]

Responding to the demand for more timely COMINT product, the Air Force relocated a part of its Office of Intelligence (AFOIN-C/R), under Colonel Horace D. Neely, to Arlington Hall in 1950. The purpose of the move was to enable Air Force intelligence analysts to work more closely with AFSA, as well as with the Army (Special Research Branch) and Navy (OP-922Y1) intelligence organizations. The operations of the new AFOIN-C/R soon

paralleled that of other consumers, with its intelligence analysts consulting freely with processing personnel in AFSA's working areas.[50]

In time, however, the AFSS assumed administrative control of all Air Force COMINT activities in the Washington area. By February 1952, all of the Air Force units were combined into the Washington, D.C., Control-Collection Office (WDC/CCO) of AFSS headed by Colonel James L. Weeks. This organization represented the Air Force in a dual capacity, both as a producer and user of COMINT. As a COMINT producer, it worked with AFSA's Office of Operations in the development of intercept assignments and served in a general liaison capacity as AFSA's point of contact with the AFOIN-C/R and the AFSS. As a consumer, it produced finished intelligence and represented the Air Force on USCIB and AFSA boards and committees. By 1952, the Air Force was the largest consumer delegation resident at AFSA, with well over 100 people assigned to its control-collection office.[51]

Although the Department of State's active involvement in postwar COMINT dated back at least to 1945, when it joined with the Army and Navy organizations to form STANCIB, the establishment of a full-time State liaison officer at Arlington Hall did not come about until the Korean War.[52] It grew out of discussions of the USCIB on 14 July 1950 concerning mobilization and later discussions on the subject between Rear Admiral Stone and W. Park Armstrong, the State Department's representative on USCIB. When Armstrong suggested State's willingness to provide direct financial support to AFSA for increasing COMINT output, Admiral Stone countered by suggesting that the establishment of a State Department liaison group in AFSA might be more useful. Stone felt that State could assure fulfillment of its intelligence requirements by an "on-the-spot audit of the COMINT production program," and could also handle such working problems as determination of priorities and transmission of collateral.[53]

Armstrong accepted Stone's offer, but the State Department took no official action until a year later. On 15 July 1951, the department established a liaison unit at Arlington Hall consisting of John Crimmins and three assistants. The unit had no specific title at first, but was later designated the "Field Branch, Special Project Staff." The new Field Branch followed the pattern of operation of other liaison offices, but on a much smaller scale. It worked directly with AFSA 02, advising it of State Department COMINT requirements. It also worked directly with the analytic and collection elements of the AFSA Office of Operations in order to provide more detailed information about the requirements transmitted through the USCIB committee structure.[54]

AFSA's relationship with CIA underwent a greater change than with any other consumer group. Although initially uncertain of its charter and authorities, the new CIA gradually began to seek greater participation in COMINT activities. In response to a request from DCI Admiral Hillenkoetter, in 1948 USCIB authorized CIA direct access to COMINT activities. USCIB also authorized, under certain circumstances, the direct participation by consumers in actual COMINT production activities. It represented a major change in the consumer-producer relationship.[55]

Shortly after the physical merger of Army and Navy COMINT processing activities in 1949, CIA, with the concurrence of Admiral Stone, moved into its first official liaison office at Arlington Hall. Starting in late 1949, John S. Ward served part-time as the first CIA Liaison Officer. During this period, the main CIA interest was Soviet plain text. Based

upon the earlier USCIB decision, CIA arranged with AFSA for the assignment of some CIA personnel to the Russian Language Branch (AFSA 246) where they were integrated within the AFSA structure. With the support and guidance of AFSA personnel, CIA carried on its own research in the plaintext unit. In addition, CIA assigned a limited number of personnel to work in the collateral and COMINT files of the Central Records Office (AFSA 25).[56] With the onset of the Korean War, CIA merely expanded its cooperative effort with AFSA.

By 1951, the entire consumer community had liaison offices at Arlington Hall. Because of their well-established relationships with their military counterparts in COMINT, however, and because of AFSA's military orientation, the Army and the Navy representatives enjoyed a greater access to AFSA's operational offices than those from the Department of State and the CIA. AFSA, as a predominantly military organization, tended to be more responsive to the military when determining intercept priorities. Nevertheless, the representatives of the civilian agencies welcomed the establishment of a beachhead at Arlington Hall and the opportunity for direct and continuing dialogue between the producers and consumers on intelligence matters. While these measures contributed to a less confrontational attitude within the intelligence community, representatives of the civilian agencies still felt uncomfortable with the basic design of the U.S. COMINT structure and their lack of influence with AFSA. It was a continuation of the strong objections expressed by officials of the State Department and CIA when AFSA was first established as an autonomous intelligence arm of the Department of Defense.[57]

Despite problems, AFSA did succeed in making significant changes in its relationships with the consumers. Stone designed a new "open-door" policy for COMINT relationships with consumers, both military and civilian. He encouraged and facilitated the establishment of consumer offices at Arlington Hall in an effort to improve the dialogue between the producers and consumers. Both seemed to benefit. The consumers, by virtue of their physical presence at the COMINT center and by their participation in AFSA's priority mechanism, saw at first hand the inner workings of the AFSA structure – as well as the major problems confronting AFSA. In addition, the consumers began to display a greater appreciation of COMINT as a unique and valuable source of intelligence information. Although the concept of exercising "oversight" over the COMINT structure had not yet materialized, the intelligence community began to move in the direction of discussing more critically and more openly the quality, the utility, and the timeliness of COMINT reporting. Joint community actions and discussions of an evaluative nature now occurred more frequently. For example, the USCIB Intelligence Committee began publishing a monthly report listing the total number of COMINT messages published. It was broken down by country and series and indicated whether the messages were plaintext or encrypted. The report also showed the statistical improvements in volume over the previous month.[58] Despite the improving relationships, AFSA made no real progress in resolving the serious management and operational problems affecting its relationships with the military COMINT services by the summer of 1951.

The basic question of operational control of service intercept facilities remained unresolved. Stone, the first director of AFSA, in fact controlled fewer intercept positions than his predecessor, the Coordinator of Joint Operations under the earlier Joint Army-Navy Operating Plan. Under the Joint Operating Plan, the CJO had direct access to joint

intercept positions and a restricted access to all other intercept positions. But Stone, as AFSA director, did not have this same access. As noted earlier, a large number of the intercept facilities, namely the mobile collection sites, were removed totally from the control of AFSA. These sites were under the exclusive operational control of the services. Even in exercising AFSA's authorized control over the fixed intercept sites, Stone had to operate under a rigid set of arrangements and rules prescribed by each service.[59] The system was not designed to enhance timely reporting of COMINT information.

Another nagging problem for AFSA was the extent to which the services conducted their own autonomous processing activities in the field. While AFSA's protestations over the control of the field processing centers had abated somewhat with the Korean War, the problem remained. The services continued to dilute AFSA's role as a central authority. In particular, problems with the Air Force intensified as the AFSS persisted in its efforts to acquire primary control over the total air problem. Even more damaging to U.S. COMINT than the friction generated by this issue was the broader question of duplication and waste of resources both in the field and stateside processing centers.

For example, in early 1951 ASAPAC and AFSS both covered Chinese Communist and Soviet targets. [redacted] Concerned, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, G-2 of the General Headquarters, Far East Command (FECOM) requested that a high-level AFSA team visit the theater to assist G-2, FECOM, and ASAPAC in a consultative capacity.[60] On 12 March 1951, Stone sent two of his senior officials to the Far East Command to brief Willoughby and review the field operational problems. Benson K. Buffham, assistant chief, General Processing Division, and Herbert L. Conley, a senior manager and collection specialist, went to Korea. In their final report of 2 April 1951, Buffham and Conley cited the duplicative efforts of AFSA, ASAPAC, and the AFSS on the North Korean problem. Among their recommendations they proposed that ASAPAC and AFSS divide and coordinate their efforts, particularly on the Soviet and Chinese Communist [redacted] Despite the urgency of their recommendations, duplication continued until March 1952, when the AFSS assumed total responsibility for the Chinese Communist and Soviet [redacted].[61]

During 1951, AFSA confronted a number of operational problems as well. U.S. COMINT contributions to the war effort were far below the achievements of COMINT during World War II.[62] Suffering from a shortage of intercept facilities, short tours of duty by military personnel, and difficulty obtaining linguists, AFSA could not fully exploit COMINT possibilities during the war.[63]

Moreover, by the fall of 1951, the North Koreans introduced new and more sophisticated cryptographic systems, [redacted]

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(b)(3)-18 USC 798
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Benson K. Buffham

Herbert L. Conley

As the war dragged on, AFSA concentrated its efforts at increasing the flow of tactical COMINT from the services to the field commanders. The real COMINT success story of the Korean War proved to be in the area of tactical support. Because of the nature of the land war, coupled with the assignment of counterpart coverage to each service, the Army and Air Force controlled, almost totally, the intercept coverage and reporting on the Korean and Chinese targets. In providing direct support to the Eighth Army and the UN Forces, the Army and Air Force are generally acknowledged as having made the principal military contributions to the COMINT effort in Korea. An unpublished NSA review of COMINT in the Korean War written in 1953 emphasized this point:

> Perhaps the most interesting development of COMINT in a tactical support role was the successful expansion and utilization of low-level voice intercept. In August 1951, the effort was of the most rudimentary nature – but the nature of the intelligence provided was of such immediate tactical value to corps, division and regiment commanders that those commanders clamored for additional support. By the end of October 1951, seven low-level voice teams had been formed in support of the U.S. I and IX Corps. By June 1952, there were ten teams in action along the Eighth Army front.
>
> These teams were able to advise frontline unit commanders of imminent enemy artillery or infantry action and their advance warnings through the balance of the war were instrumental in the success of UN counter actions and the saving of many UN lives.[86]

The COMINT successes in the exploitation of [redacted] Korean and Chinese military and air force communications [redacted] To most intelligence consumers, however, the results still looked

extremely thin, especially with the lack of COMINT from [redacted] communications.[67] Many officials in the U.S. intelligence community, aware of the impressive contributions made by COMINT in World War II, complained about AFSA's [redacted][68]

While the military services were, in general, satisfied with AFSA's attention to their intelligence requirements, State Department and CIA officials were not. They felt that their intelligence requirements were not being met. They complained about their lack of input in establishing intelligence requirements and AFSA's lack of authority in translating these priorities to the collectors. AFSA officials made vague attempts to pacify the civilian complaints stating that "we will take care of it," that "of course, this is of interest to all of us," and "you can be sure that you will get your share." But this did not satisfy the State Department nor the CIA. In truth, the civilian agencies were correct. There was no existing mechanism whereby the rapidly growing CIA could express its needs for [redacted] and general intelligence information to the cryptologic community. Similarly, there existed no regularized channels open to the [redacted] with any degree of assurance that its needs would even be considered by AFSA.[69]

By 1951 the flaws of the AFSA experiment were clear. The division of responsibility between AFSA and the services prevented AFSA from undertaking any serious new initiatives to improve the total U.S. COMINT product. As a direct corollary of this, Stone's lack of authority over the services greatly diminished the quality and timeliness of COMINT reporting and resulted in duplication of COMINT coverage. Fractionalization prevented AFSA from operating as a centralized COMINT organization.

Because AFSAC invariably supported the service viewpoints rather than AFSA's on the issue of AFSA's authority, AFSAC was of no assistance to AFSA in resolving the serious jurisdictional disputes. The last avenue of appeal was to USCIB. However, USCIB was little more than a coordinating body with no real authority over the AFSA structure itself or its organizational role. Although USCIB had a vital interest in the intelligence produced by the military components, it could not resolve the jurisdictional issues between AFSA and the services.[70]

In summary, AFSA received persistent criticism from the time of its creation. The U.S. Army's CONSIDO proposal was an attempt by the U.S. military to establish a separate COMINT intelligence agency parallel to AFSA that would maintain strict military control over most U.S. COMINT sources. It met with bitter opposition from the civilian intelligence agencies such as CIA and the Department of State. Although the proposal was defeated, the deliberations concerning CONSIDO reinforced the generally hostile climate existing in intelligence matters, and the continuing concerns of CIA and State that their intelligence needs were not being met.

The Korean War proved to be a major turning point in the history of the U.S. COMINT structure. At the outbreak of the war, glaring weaknesses appeared in the AFSA structure. There were major problems with resources, intercept and reporting capabilities, and the cryptanalytic attack itself. Most importantly, the war illustrated AFSA's inability to control the COMINT organizations of the services and its inability to control and direct U.S. COMINT resources in an efficient, effective manner. Despite AFSA's attempts at increased

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coordination and some success with the exploitation of low-level technical communications, U.S. policymakers came to see AFSA as a basic failure. It did not or could not duplicate the COMINT successes of the Second World War. It thus became the centerpiece in a high-level investigation to reform and redirect the entire U.S. COMINT structure.

Chapter VI

The Brownell Committee and the Establishment of NSA, 4 November 1952

On 24 October 1952, President Truman issued an extraordinary directive that changed the organization and direction of the U.S. communications intelligence structure and laid the policy framework for the modern system. Truman stated that the communications intelligence function was a national responsibility rather than one of purely military orientation. This triggered actions that reorganized the U.S. military COMINT effort and strengthened the COMINT roles of the USCIB and the NSC and brought a wider role for the civilian agencies in U.S. COMINT operations. The president's memorandum also contained the first reference to a "National Security Agency," to be established in place of the Armed Forces Security Agency. Under Truman's directive, the Department of Defense became the executive agent of the government for the production of communications intelligence information, thereby removing the JCS as the controlling authority for the COMINT process.

Truman's directive stemmed from the recommendations of a presidential commission known as the Brownell Committee. Truman established the committee to conduct an investigation of the efficiency and organization of the entire U.S. communications intelligence effort. By December 1951, AFSA's disappointing wartime performance had been brought to the attention of the White House, and Truman responded by calling for a complete review of the COMINT structure. Setting up a mostly civilian committee, however, caused great alarm within the military, particularly in the JCS. In February 1952, the JCS complained that it had no part in the deliberations leading to the committee's establishment and that the U.S. military had been excluded from membership on the committee and its support staff.

The final Brownell Report emphasized the need for the establishment of one organization to manage the communications intelligence activities of the government. The report provided a strong indictment of service unification as it existed under AFSA as well as an indictment of the management and policy echelons existing above AFSA. The report recommended a complete reorganization of the U.S. COMINT effort, and provided a blueprint for the new structure. As its main theme, the Brownell Committee pressed for the elevation of the COMINT structure to a new status, requiring national-level attention and interest. It also spoke out against the almost total autonomy of the military in COMINT matters. This chapter details the history of the creation of the Brownell Committee, its report to the president, and subsequent acts that had a major impact on the U.S. intelligence community and led to the creation of the National Security Agency.

By 1951, the CIA and the Department of State representatives of USCIB felt vindicated in their original opposition to the establishment of AFSA. The problems associated with the operations of AFSA had grown considerably and now extended to a broad range of intelligence community relationships. Organizationally, the fundamental issue over the division of responsibility between AFSA and the military COMINT services appeared to be no

closer to a solution. The Korean War evoked new criticisms of the AFSA structure. A spirit of disunity and turmoil characterized the activities of the entire intelligence community.

The major players of the intelligence community were locked in a struggle over "who was in charge" and over the acquisition of expanded responsibilities and authorities. The military and civilian agencies continued to argue over basic jurisdictional and organizational relationships. These disputes greatly complicated the entire intelligence picture. The new CIA, seeking to expand its role, pushed for greater authority in the total intelligence process. While the Department of State had different intelligence interests than CIA, it generally aligned itself with CIA on most issues during the USCIB meetings and in the protests over the lack of civilian/military equality in the COMINT field.[1]

In particular, the vigorous and heated discussions over the establishment of AFSA, and later over the JCS proposal to establish a new military intelligence agency, CONSIDO, constituted head-on challenges, not only to the role of CIA in the intelligence field, but to the authority of the National Security Council as well. Although the CONSIDO proposal was dropped, CIA and State viewed it as an attempt to acquire a dominant and proprietary role for the military in such intelligence functions as estimates, evaluations, and dissemination of intelligence.[2] CIA and State perceived a constant erosion in their ability to get the COMINT structure to consider and satisfy their intelligence needs.[3]

The stage was set for reform. But what shape should the reform take? What were the avenues for resolution of the "AFSA problems" -- and the increasing tension within the community over the ownership and control of ancillary COMINT functions? AFSA by itself could not resolve the many managerial and operational conflicts. Nor did there appear to be any likelihood of a solution emanating from USCIB, which remained powerless because of its limited charter and military-dominated membership. Because of its membership majority, the military organizations were able to control the board in its working-level committees.[4]

Given the rigidity of the existing COMINT structure, CIA and State officials probably concluded that further dialogue would be fruitless. Taking direct action, they pressed for fundamental changes in the intelligence structure. It was an opportune time. The Truman administration was extremely budget conscious and was known to favor centralizing and consolidating intelligence responsibilities and functions.[5]

There was also a new DCI on the scene. General Walter Bedell Smith, USA, appointed by President Truman on 21 August 1950, succeeded Admiral Hillenkoetter as the fourth Director of Central Intelligence. The appointment of Smith represented a significant change of leadership for CIA and foretold a change in the CIA posture as well as in its approach to intelligence community relationships. Having served as chief of staff under General Dwight D. Eisenhower in the European Theater from 1942 to 1945, and as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1946 to 1949, Smith had gained the personal support and confidence of President Truman. Known to be an exceptionally strong and forceful executive, Smith was highly respected by Eisenhower and other top military and government officials, particularly for his organizational talents. During his three-year tour as DCI, Smith played a preeminent and rigorous role in the organizational evolution of the DCI and CIA roles. This, in turn, had a major impact on the entire intelligence community. Aggressive action became a keystone of Smith's new approach.[6]

General Walter Bedell Smith, DCI

With a view to reforming the COMINT structure, Smith brought the AFSA problem to the attention of the NSC on 10 December 1951 and recommended an overall survey of the COMINT structure. His recommendation for such a survey was based on a study by Kingman Douglass, who was then the CIA COMINT officer. The NSC, in turn, forwarded Smith's proposal to President Truman. Three days later, Truman directed Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, assisted by Director of Central Intelligence Smith, to review in depth the communications intelligence activities of the United States government.[7]

Acheson, Lovett, and Smith responded by creating a high-level committee to accomplish the survey. On 28 December 1951, they created the Brownell Committee, headed by George A. Brownell, a prominent New York City attorney. Brownell was assisted by Charles E. ("Chip") Bohlen, Counselor, State Department; William H. Jackson, Special Assistant to the DCI; and Brigadier General John Magruder, USA (Ret.), Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. The CIA and the Department of State provided the staff members of the committee: Lloyd N. Cutler and Harmon Duncombe, CIA; Grant C. Manson and Benjamin R. Shute, State. All of the staff members had served previously in the Special Intelligence Branches of the Army or the Navy. The Brownell Committee and its support staff took up residence at CIA and were administratively supported by CIA. The carefully tailored composition of the Brownell Committee and its supporting staff omitted one important group. The military authorities, who heretofore had dominated the U.S. COMINT structure, were not included at any level in the actual review process.[8]

Acheson, Lovett, and Smith directed the Brownell Committee to undertake a survey of the COMINT structure and to submit recommendations on two general subjects:

> (1) the needs of each governmental department and agency for the production of departmental intelligence, and of the Director of Central Intelligence for the production of national intelligence, and
>
> (2) the most effective allocation of responsibilities for COMINT activities, and the extent to which these activities should be performed by a single department or agency as a service of common concern – and to which department or agency such assignment should be made.[9]

In short, the committee was to look at centralization and placement of the entire U.S. COMINT effort in the U.S. intelligence community.

George A. Brownell

Meeting of the National Security Council, January 1951

Charles E. ("Chip") Bohlen

William H. Jackson

BGen John Magruder, USA, Ret.

The establishment of the Brownell Committee provoked immediate outcries within the U.S. military. Four weeks after the creation of the committee, the Joint Chiefs summoned the Director, AFSA, the three Service Directors of Intelligence, and the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, JCS, to a special meeting to discuss the Brownell Committee's investigation of COMINT activities.[10] On 4 February 1952, Major General Ralph J. Canine, USA, Rear Admiral Frank L. Johnson, USN, Major General Alexander R. Bolling, USA, Major General John A. Samford, USAF, and Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, USA, met with the Joint Chiefs. The message of the meeting was clear – the Joint Chiefs were alarmed over the activities of the Brownell Committee. The service chiefs complained that they had not been consulted about the investigation prior to its conception, that they had no representation on the board, and that the line of questioning indicated a possibility that the board would recommend transfer of AFSA from the control of the JCS. Despite their forebodings, however, the options open to the JCS remained limited, particularly in light of the fact that the committee was already in operation. Without the unanimous support of the NSC or the USCIB, the JCS was obviously in no position to risk a head-on challenge with the president or the secretary of defense.[11]

In trying to salvage something, the JCS had little choice but to settle for some rather pro forma actions. They asked General Omar Bradley, Chairman, JCS, to meet with Secretary Lovett and "again express the considerable concern of the JCS over the possible transfer of AFSA from their jurisdiction." They also decided that the JCS would make its own full-scale review of the AFSA problem – but at a later date – to determine whether more authority should be given to the director "so he could actually control in one organization the COMINT effort of the United States."[12] While this projected study was a tacit admission that all was not well within the COMINT structure, it reflected a glimmer of JCS optimism

that somehow the Brownell effort would wither and die without producing any tangible results. The JCS never got around to conducting its projected study. The Brownell Committee moved too swiftly.

The final Brownell Report, submitted to Acheson and Lovett on 13 June 1952, confirmed that JCS apprehensions about the loss of AFSA were well founded. The report completely demolished the concept of unification of the three services as it existed under AFSA. The committee concluded that the structure of COMINT activities did not reflect unification under single control, but rather a structure of four associated agencies – one of which, AFSA, performed limited functions in ways acceptable to those who controlled the other three. In short, it was a military organization controlled by the military.[13]

The report hammered out the theme that the director, AFSA, had insufficient authority or control over the COMINT activities of the three services. It noted, ". . . that for all practical purposes the AFSA charter made AFSAC (which is nothing except a committee made up of the three services) the boss of AFSA, which in turn is completely dependent upon the Service organizations for all its communications and practically all of its collection of COMINT."[14] In reviewing the management framework in which AFSA operated, the report noted that the director had to spend much of his time and energy on cajolery, negotiation, and compromise in an atmosphere of bitter interservice rivalry. According to the report, the director of AFSA had no real degree of control over the Service COMINT units – but rather was *under* their control by virtue of their representation on AFSAC. His only appeal was to the same three services.

The committee also had harsh words for other parts of the U.S. intelligence structure. It strongly criticized the management and policy structures existing above AFSA (USCIB, JCS, and AFSAC) for their total lack of effectiveness in providing guidance, direction, and management support to AFSA. Noting that "the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board (on which the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as the three services, are represented) has inadequate authority and has become an ineffective organization," the committee concluded that "the COMINT effort of today has too many of the aspects of a loose combination of the previous military organizations and too few of a true unification of the COMINT activities and interests of all the interested departments and agencies."[15]

In reaching its conclusions, the Brownell Committee stated that its basic thinking was influenced by "two controlling but somewhat conflicting factors."[16] As a first and fundamental premise, it believed that all of the interested services and agencies should have a voice in determining AFSA policies and giving it guidance. Second, as a counterbalance to this, and in order to strengthen the COMINT structure, the committee stressed that AFSA should be placed under a single governmental department for administrative purposes. This line of reasoning signaled, for the first time, the identification of COMINT resources as being national in nature. It signaled too the probable end of the era of exclusive military control of COMINT resources. Thus, in the view of the committee, the removal of the COMINT structure from JCS control was a necessity. Ideally, and in order to provide an effective COMINT response to the intelligence requirements of all consumers, the responsibility for the COMINT function should be centralized in a neutral governmental agency that would have some latitude in its operation.

The Brownell Report concluded that a point had been reached in the evolution of the United States intelligence community that now made it essential "to carry further the 1949 reorganization of the COMINT structure."[17] It proceeded to outline many actions that should be taken "to strengthen AFSA itself and to increase its authority over COMINT results." These recommendations, directed essentially toward a reorganization and unification of the COMINT structure, addressed a number of broad COMINT relationships, both within and outside the COMINT structure. The scope of the recommendations extended into the major operational and management phases of the COMINT business, including the production of COMINT, the centralization of COMINT authority, the management of COMINT resources, and policy oversight of COMINT resources.[18]

From the outset, the Brownell Committee recognized that complete unification would be impossible because of the dependence upon the military structures to man field stations. Consequently, Brownell concluded that the service units must retain their own authorities and responsibilities within their military departments. To ameliorate this and to assist AFSA in its mission of providing effective, unified organization and control of COMINT, the Brownell Report recommended that AFSA should have operational and technical control over all the COMINT collection and production resources of the military services. The Brownell Committee also supported the services' traditional position that they must control the close and direct intelligence support of the forces in the field. The committee fully recognized that it was creating a problem area between the new central authority and the services, but concluded that a solution could be found "with sincere and intelligent cooperation between the commanders involved."

Specifically, the committee proposed structural changes affecting the three levels of AFSA's organizational relationships: below AFSA (i.e., external service relationships); within AFSA; and above AFSA (i.e., USCIB and the Department of Defense). As to the first, the committee recommended that AFSA be established as the keystone of the COMINT organization – with its mission clearly defined by Presidential Memorandum. As outlined by the committee, the mission statement would give AFSA the responsibility and authority for providing a unified organization and control of the COMINT activities of most of the federal government.[19]

For those changes projected within AFSA itself, the committee concentrated principally on "people" considerations. It recommended that the director be a career military officer of at least three-star rank, with a tour of at least four years, rather than the two-year rotational tour established by the AFSA charter. The option of appointing a civilian director was left open if the particular circumstances warranted. The military director would have a career civilian as deputy – with the converse to apply in the event of a civilian director. In stressing the need for the development of a strong personnel program, the final report included a major discussion of a broad range of personnel considerations. The report concluded that the existence of a well-rounded personnel development program was essential to the future growth and success of AFSA. It stressed the dimensions of the "people" problems then existing at AFSA, including the exceedingly high rate of turnover among AFSA civilians and the lack of professional and managerial opportunities for the civilian workforce. The report strongly recommended that AFSA initiate greatly expanded efforts to develop career and professionalization programs for civilian and military personnel – at both the managerial and professional levels.[20]

In discussing projected organizational changes "above the AFSA level," the committee remarked that this category represented the single most difficult question it confronted. As the cornerstone of its recommendation in this area, however, the committee expressed no qualifications about the need for severing the relationship between the JCS and AFSA. It recommended the immediate termination of the 1949 "experiment" that had placed AFSA under the control of the JCS. As a corollary, the committee proposed the abolition of AFSAC. In place of JCS control, the Brownell Committee suggested that AFSA be directly subordinated to the Department of Defense as the executive agent of the government for COMINT activities.[31]

In much the same vein, the report recommended a revitalization and restructuring of USCIB. The report proposed sweeping membership changes including a significant decrease of military representation as well as the simultaneous elevation of AFSA to a position of full voting membership on the new USCIB. The report recommended that USCIB's membership consist of a representative of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the DCI, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the FBI, and the Director of AFSA. It further recommended that the DCI become the permanent chairman of USCIB. This would bring to an end the long-standing practice of selecting a new USCIB chairman annually, based upon a vote of the membership. The report also included a new procedural methodology to govern USCIB operations – with the objective of giving it a greater responsibility "for policy and coordination" in COMINT matters. It also proposed to establish a majority-rule principle when voting in USCIB on matters under the jurisdiction of AFSA. For those COMINT matters outside the jurisdiction of AFSA, however, it proposed retention of the rule requiring unanimous agreement of the members.[32]

Finally, in a related matter, the committee discussed the existing manpower levels and dollar expenditures of the entire U.S. COMINT effort in order to provide an indication of the cost to the government for the production of COMINT. It developed the data based upon figures received from AFSA and the three services. While acknowledging that its figures were possibly only little better than informed guesses, the committee cited these as representing a reasonable approximation of the resources spent in acquiring and processing communications intelligence information.[33]

In this investigation, the committee established that the combined manpower levels for AFSA and the three cryptologic services totaled [redacted] personnel in 1952. Of this figure, AFSA had a total of [redacted] military and [redacted] civilians. It estimated direct cost expenditures for the combined activities at [redacted] dollars annually – with AFSA's expenditures listed at [redacted] Because of security factors, the report noted that the cryptologic budgets were not subject to the usual checks and balances normally associated with the budget cycle process. Considering this as well as the magnitude of the expenditures for COMINT, the committee concluded that the fiscal process represented another compelling reason for establishing a strong and responsible AFSA – operating under the positive guidance of a policy board acting with real authority.[34]

On 23 June Secretary Lovett sent the Brownell Report to General Canine for his personal comments and recommendations. In a lengthy response, Canine enthusiastically supported the major conclusions and recommendations of the report. Canine did, however,

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Major General Ralph J. Canine

take issue with some aspects of the report. The committee had proposed an extension of the responsibilities of AFSA to include a communications security responsibility for the entire United States government rather than merely the Department of Defense, as was then the case. Canine agreed in principle with the proposal but pointed out that the committee had included very little on communications security in its report. He recommended that the proposed directive be confined to COMINT, with communications security to be made the subject of another study and to be addressed in a separate directive. Canine also argued strongly against retention of the rule of unanimity – even for COMINT matters outside the jurisdiction of AFSA. He pointed out that this would only serve to perpetuate one of the chief difficulties that had hampered USCIB in the past. He urged the acceptance of a majority-rule principle to govern all USCIB decisions. Lastly, Canine pointed out that the Brownell Report had omitted the generally accepted

identification of COMINT activities as being outside the framework of security rules governing other intelligence activities. Canine recommended that the same stringent security considerations then existing in NSCID No. 9 be carried over into the new directive.[25]

During the next four months, extended negotiations took place among the representatives of the Department of State, the CIA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and AFSA over the exact wording of the implementing Presidential Memorandum. Some of the issues discussed included the definitions of communications intelligence and finished intelligence; principles to govern the production of COMINT by the cryptologic structures; and a number of other policy considerations concerning relationships between producers and consumers in the production, evaluation, and dissemination of COMINT. The principals in these discussions and drafting sessions were W. Park Armstrong, State; Loftus E. Becker, CIA; General Magruder, Office of Secretary of Defense; Admiral Wenger, AFSA; and General Canine.[26]

Truman's directive, approved on 24 October 1952, affirmed that communications intelligence was a national responsibility. Truman directed the secretaries of State and Defense as a Special Committee of the NSC for COMINT, to establish, with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence, policies governing COMINT activities. He designated the Department of Defense as the executive agent of the government for the production of COMINT information. His memorandum also contained the first reference to the National Security Agency. In addition, Truman's memorandum provided the basis for a reconstitution of USCIB with broadened duties and responsibilities to correspond to those recommended by the Brownell Committee.[27]

On 24 October 1952, the National Security Council issued a parallel document, National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 9, Revised, entitled "Communications Intelligence." This directive established the new membership of USCIB, defined its duties and responsibilities, and prescribed the procedural methodology governing its participation in COMINT matters. The NSC directive implemented much of Truman's directive.[28]

The composition of the new USCIB differed only slightly from that proposed by the Brownell Committee. Under the NSC directive, the three armed services retained their membership, while the Joint Chiefs were not represented at all. The director, NSA, became a full voting member. The NSC directive also made the DCI the permanent chairman and provided that board decisions should be based upon majority vote. The NSC directive also stated that each member of the board "shall have one vote except the representatives of the Secretary of State and the Central Intelligence Agency who shall each have two votes."[29] The restructuring of USCIB meant that it became the new mechanism and forum for establishing and adjudicating problems associated with intelligence and processing priorities. With the new voting structure, this assured a more balanced participation by military and civilian representatives of USCIB in the decision-making process.

Simultaneously with the release of NSCID No. 9, Revised, President Truman issued a second directive that declared communications security to be a national responsibility to be discharged by a new United States Communications Security Board. He designated the secretaries of State and Defense as a Special Committee of the National Security Council

on COMSEC matters and directed them to develop policies and directives relating to the communications security function, including responsibilities, authorities, and procedures.[30]

There remained establishment of the "National Security Agency," as called for by Truman's directive. Secretary Lovett, as the executive agent of the government for communications intelligence, had the basic responsibility for starting the new agency. In the conversion of AFSA to NSA, Lovett had to deal with the issue of communications security. Since Truman's memorandum of 24 October 1952 had excluded communications security from the scope of the COMINT directive, Lovett had to define the extent of the new agency's role in communications security matters. Accordingly, Lovett issued two memoranda associated with the establishment of NSA.[31]

In a remarkably sparse announcement, Secretary Lovett accomplished the actual establishment of the new National Security Agency in his memorandum of 4 November 1952. In his memorandum to the service secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the director, National Security Agency, he described in general terms the basic institutional changes that now governed the cryptologic community. Lovett declared:

- The designation of the Armed Forces Security Agency was changed to the National Security Agency.
- The administrative arrangements for military and civilian personnel, funds, records, and other support categories previously authorized for AFSA were now available and in effect for NSA.
- All COMINT collection and production resources of the Department of Defense were placed under the operational and technical control of the director, NSA.
- Communications security activities previously assigned to AFSA were now assigned to the director, NSA.
- Addressees were directed to appoint a representative to a working group to be chaired by the director, NSA, to develop necessary directives for formal implementation of NSCID No. 9.[32]

With Lovett's memorandum, Canine acquired a new relationship with the military services and their COMINT activities. Theoretically, he now had control over all COMINT collection and production resources. Canine started a four-year term of office as the director of NSA on 4 November 1952. In accordance with its new charter, he received a third star. Each of the services assigned one or two two-star grade officers to the new agency. This change was consistent with Truman's decision to elevate the status of the unified agency. The reorganization of AFSA removed the COMINT structure from exclusive military control and theoretically gave all intelligence agencies, military and civilian, an equal voice in the COMINT processing and requirements process.

Robert Lovett, Secretary of Defense

The new directives, however, did include a "delegation of authority" provision that diluted to some degree the concept of central control. The drafters of the final directives, accepting the Brownell conclusion, supported the position that the services must retain control of the close and direct intelligence support of the forces in the field. Consequently, the final directives made provision for this broad exception by requiring the director to delegate responsibility to the services for direct support as may be required.

The shock waves of reorganization quickly hit the JCS. With the issuance of President Truman's directive and Lovett's follow-up memorandum, the dire predictions about the JCS loss of AFSA had come true. The director, NSA, was no longer under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff except, during a transition period, for COMSEC matters. By creating a new agency, Truman had shifted control of COMINT from the JCS to the Department of Defense and the new USCIB. The likelihood of bringing about any reversal of this policy appeared remote.

Three months after the establishment of NSA, Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell, USAF, Director, J-2, presented General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the JCS, with a lengthy appeal. In Cabell's view, the Brownell Committee had largely overlooked the progress achieved in the postwar evolution of AFSA.[33] Addressing the allegation of AFSA's failure to satisfy the intelligence requirements of State and CIA, Cabell maintained that a major part of the requirements problem had stemmed directly from the failure of State and CIA to seek adjustments in requirements through the existing mechanisms. They had sought a "revolution" instead. Making one final gesture to retain JCS control over the U.S. COMINT effort, Cabell proposed that the Secretary of Defense delegate responsibility for direction and oversight of the new NSA to the director of the Joint Staff of the JCS. Bradley forwarded the proposal to Lovett, who chose not to override the spirit of the earlier presidential guidance. Instead, Lovett opted to place within his own office the responsibility for exercising a supervisory role over the new NSA. Lovett delegated this responsibility to General Graves B. Erskine, USMC, (Ret.) as the newly established Special Representative of the Secretary's Office, who would function without organizational ties to the JCS. This sequence marked the end of JCS efforts to change the direction of the Brownell Report and its implementation.[34]

Established in the fall of 1952, NSA superseded AFSA. The Brownell Committee had succeeded in writing the organizational obituary of AFSA in less than six months. Its report was one of the most significant and far-reaching reviews ever prepared on the COMINT activities of the United States. The recommendations of the committee were accepted and put into effect almost in toto, resulting in a major restructuring of the COMINT community. The report became a kind of Magna Carta for U.S. COMINT activities and the new NSA. Within four months of its completion, a chain reaction of new national level issuances followed that affected the entire COMINT structure and produced a new COMINT agency.

In summary, there probably never existed a more propitious time for making fundamental changes in the U.S. COMINT structure than in 1951 when the Brownell Committee came into being. After a six-year postwar period of self-study and organizational experimentation, the COMINT community was still groping for answers to a number of major questions. There was also a strong new DCI, who was determined to strengthen the role and mission of his young agency and to establish its permanent niche

in the national intelligence structure. The Korean War, in highlighting the intelligence failures of the entire U.S. community, revealed that a great amount of discord and turmoil existed in the intelligence structure and provided an example for the voices that clamored for fundamental change.

The Brownell Committee, established to conduct an unprecedented wartime probe of the COMINT community, was well staged and well directed by officials from State and CIA. Within six months it produced an impressive report in support of centralization and unification. It radically altered the existing U.S. COMINT structure and permitted U.S. military officials little time to counter its major recommendations.

In the long struggle between the military and civilian agencies over the control of COMINT resources, the turning point came when DCI Smith orchestrated the founding of the Brownell Committee. With Truman's approval, it began its work without the foreknowledge or participation of the military community. Its primary committees and its supporting staff operated without representation from the military community. From the outset, the CIA and State Department dominated the Brownell Committee. There were old animosities to resolve, and CIA and State, while undoubtedly motivated by national security considerations, left nothing to chance in their efforts to realign the COMINT structure and ensure their greater participation in the intelligence process.

Operationally, the Brownell Committee went as far as it could in its proposals for the centralization of COMINT resources. Because of the almost total dependence upon the military installations for the intercept of traffic, the committee concluded that complete centralization of COMINT would not be possible. It recognized that the COMINT services would have to be incorporated into the new centralized structure. Despite this difficulty, the Brownell Report strongly recommended the establishment of a central authority to guide the activities of the military COMINT organizations.

As a result of the Brownell Report, a revised National Security Council Directive of 1952 defined the mission and authority of the new National Security Agency. NSA remained within the Department of Defense, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense. The director acquired new authorities and responsibilities to assist him in providing unified operational and technical control of COMINT. He acquired operational and technical control over all military COMINT collection and production resources of the United States He was authorized to issue instructions directly to operating units of military agencies engaged in the collection and production of COMINT. The directive did, however, contain one "exception" clause that weakened NSA authority. The directive required that the director make provision for delegation of operational control of COMINT activities to the military services for direct support purposes, as he deemed appropriate. This supported the traditional military position regarding tactical COMINT.

The committee recognized that this exception to the director's control authority would further weaken the concept of centralized control. But in creating a gray area between the services and the central authority, it somewhat optimistically concluded that a solution could be found by the development of greater cooperation between the director and the field commanders.[85]

The implementation of the Brownell Report clearly represented a strong positive move toward unification of the COMINT effort. Because of factors associated with the

organizational nature of the military structures, there remained the same number of agencies engaged in cryptologic activities. But NSA represented a vastly stronger structure than AFSA. With the acknowledgment by Brownell that direct support to field forces should be controlled by the Service Cryptologic Agencies rather than NSA, the services retained a significant degree of independence. This still presents problems today.

Chapter VII

Summary: The Struggle for Control Continues

World War II marked a key juncture in the growth and expansion of the U.S. Army and Navy COMINT operations. The war had a monumental and immediate impact on U.S. COMINT collection and reporting operations. Even more significantly, World War II marked the start of ten years of change and evolution for the military cryptologic services. After World War II, there was no returning to the era of total independence for the military COMINT organizations. Massive changes culminated with the establishment of the National Security Agency in 1952 and the strengthening of the United States Communication Intelligence Board. While the organizational origins of the new agency represent a fairly simple audit trail, the political struggles and cross-pressures that led to the establishment of NSA are far more complex. The expanding intelligence requirements of the federal government, the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, budgetary considerations, and bureaucratic in-fighting between the military and civilian agencies all were prominent factors in the effort to centralize the communications intelligence functions of the federal government into one agency.

By the summer of 1942, as a result of action by President Roosevelt, the Army and Navy cryptologic structures became the principal U.S. organizations devoting efforts to foreign communications intelligence activities. Their organizations had evolved along different lines, within different departments, and no one organization directly supervised their efforts. As a result of this dichotomy of origins and structure, a well-established pattern of independence – if not isolation – characterized Army-Navy relationships on COMINT matters. In June 1942, the services did reach an agreement on a division of cryptanalytic tasks, but there occurred no immediate change in their working relationships.

Until 1942, the Army and Navy resisted the introduction of any major changes to their relationships and sought to maintain their traditionally separate cryptanalytic roles. Each worked independently and exclusively on its assigned cryptanalytic tasks. The services not only continued to demonstrate little enthusiasm toward closer cooperation in COMINT matters, but maintained their traditional hostility toward proposals for merger, or even of opening up a new dialogue on operational problems. Consequently, cooperation on COMINT matters was minimal during the first two years of the war.

Nevertheless, out of the disaster at Pearl Harbor and the pressures of all-out war came persistent demands for the establishment of a truly centralized, permanent intelligence agency. As early as 1943 proposals for the establishment of a single United States Intelligence Agency routinely surfaced in the various intelligence forums of the JCS. At the same time, some military COMINT authorities foresaw their vulnerability to congressional criticism and future reductions in resources since they conducted their COMINT operations on a fractionated and sometimes duplicatory basis. Recognizing these threats to a continuation of their separate existence, the Army-Navy COMINT organizations took steps to establish closer technical cooperation.

(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

In 1944 some positive signs of the services moving toward an expansion of interservice cooperation occurred. That year saw the conclusion of a number of technical agreements between the services and the first exchange of liaison officers in Washington on the [redacted] problem. It also saw the establishment of ANCICC. While the dialogue was carefully prescribed and did not change the overall independent operations, it represented movement toward some form of consolidation.

Operating as separate COMINT organizations, both the Army and Navy experienced major successes during the war. Included were cryptanalytic breakthroughs against the communications of German submarines and the German and [redacted] armed forces, as well as the [redacted] countries, both in the European and Pacific theaters. These accomplishments heightened the sense of value and appreciation of intelligence among the military commanders and the leaders of the government. Communications intelligence generally came to be identified as the most important form of intelligence. Ironically, the magnitude of these intelligence successes later became the measuring rod for criticism of the postwar achievements of the military COMINT organizations.

As the war came to a conclusion, some Army and Navy officials realized that the loss of their primary targets (Germany and [redacted]) meant dire consequences for their organizations and budgets. Because of worsening Soviet-U.S. relations, however, the services began to explore the possibility of directing a major effort against Soviet targets. The services also anticipated major organizational changes in intelligence activities as the war wound down. The first of these changes occurred within a few months after V-J Day when President Truman ordered the establishment of new intelligence organizations, and authorized continuing relations with the British cryptologic organization. In January 1946, Truman created a National Intelligence Authority, a Central Intelligence Group, and a Director of Central Intelligence.

Eighteen months later, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, which reinforced and amplified the earlier Truman action concerning centralization of the U.S. intelligence effort. The act gave birth to a National Security Council, a Central Intelligence Agency, and a National Military Establishment, with three coequal departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. By 1948, a third military COMINT organization emerged, the Air Force Security Service. It began competing for scarce COMINT targets and resources.

Within a few months after the Truman Directive of 1946, the service COMINT organizations initiated their own reorganization effort. This effort marked the beginning of a six-year period of experimentation. Basically, the military authorities sought to centralize military control over COMINT activities and to develop an organization that would be responsive to military needs, especially with regard to the Soviet Union.

The first major change occurred in May 1946 when the services formed a joint working agreement, which became known as the Joint Operating Plan. The plan brought about a voluntary collocation of Army and Navy processing activities in the United States. Under the JOP, however, the services retained their separate identities and organizations. The plan also called for a radically new position, the Coordinator of Joint Operations. The position was literally that – a coordinator, not a director of operations.

Under the new JOP a new layer of committees subordinate to the CJO was also created. The CJO became a super-chairman for all the committees established under the JOP. Although he had a coordination role, he was powerless to direct the services, even on matters of joint tasks. This management weakness was compounded further when Army-Navy officials failed to reach agreement on what constituted joint tasks or the amount of their manpower contributions to joint tasks. Moreover, by this time, the civilian agencies had come to recognize that they had little or no voice in setting intelligence priorities for COMINT. Military interests simply dominated the process.

In late 1947, a major struggle developed between the military and civilian members of USCIB. Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, the third DCI, became the primary catalyst for the issuance of a new charter for USCIB. Hillenkoetter's general intent was to rewrite the charter to reflect the expanded membership of USCIB and to correlate the authorities of the Communications Intelligence Board with the National Security Act of 1947. Hillenkoetter wanted to give the civilian agencies a greater voice on policy matters relating to COMINT. He openly sought to bring U.S. COMINT under the direct control of the DCI.

After several months of negotiations, the members of USCIB (Army, Navy, Air Force, State, and CIA) could not agree on which organization should have the ultimate authority over the COMINT community. (The FBI retired from the board in 1947.) The board was deadlocked. The Armed Services took the position that USCIB should report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. State and CIA, however, believed that the board should report stalemated questions to the National Security Council instead.

On 1 July 1948, the National Security Council broke the deadlock by issuing National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9, "Communications Intelligence." The new directive, with the strong personal support of the Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, represented a major victory for the civilian members of USCIB. Under the provisions of the new NSCID No. 9, USCIB reported to the NSC as its parent body rather than to the individual military department heads. Also, for the first time, USCIB had an official charter issued at the national level. The rule of unanimity continued to govern USCIB's decision-making process, however, and hindered the effective functioning of the board.

Although Hillenkoetter achieved a major victory with the issuance of NSCID No. 9, he failed in his attempt to place the COMINT functions directly under the DCI. In the view of most military authorities, however, the outcome was still a catastrophe. The JCS clearly lost out in its counterproposal to be designated the "parent body" of USCIB for unresolved issues. Nevertheless, while NSCID No. 9 effectively dealt the JCS a blow in its efforts to control U.S. COMINT activities, it did not result in any immediate change in the day-to-day activities of USCIB and its subordinate committees. Since the military organizations had a majority on the board, they continued to dominate the discussions. The situation was clearly changing, however. As the major beneficiaries of the new directive, the State Department and CIA began to exert a much greater influence in all COMINT deliberations and decisions.

Within ten months of the issuance of the NSC directive, another major change took place in the intelligence structure. On 20 May 1949, Defense Secretary Louis Johnson directed a physical merger of the central processing activities of the three cryptologic services by establishing the Armed Forces Security Agency. He placed the cryptologic

functions under the exclusive control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. AFSA came about as a result of two interrelated political factors. On the one hand was the announced objective of Secretary Johnson to achieve "efficiency and economy" in the management of the cryptologic effort. On the other was the obvious strategy of the JCS to strengthen and to reestablish its hold on COMINT resources. The military was once again in a dominant position on COMINT matters.

From the perspective of the civilian agencies, the creation of AFSA meant the renewal of the military and civilian struggle over the control of COMINT resources. CIA and State Department representatives argued strongly against AFSA, which in their view existed in direct conflict with the new USCIB charter. They maintained further that AFSA was established without their participation and over their protests. Secretary Johnson, however, not only refused to discuss it directly with them, but refused as well to make any changes in the basic AFSA charter. Johnson did make one concession. He canceled the proposed Armed Forces Communication Intelligence Board, which would have become a policy board running parallel to USCIB.

Although the establishment of the Armed Forces Security Agency seemed to represent a consolidation of the U.S. COMINT effort and a more efficient approach to U.S. COMINT activities, AFSA was fundamentally unsound from both a conceptual and managerial viewpoint. Pentagon authorities, however, viewed AFSA as a reasonable and evolutionary step toward "service unification." Unification proved to be an ephemeral and elusive concept, however.

Although some military officials acquiesced in the *concept* of consolidation, it soon became clear that the bureaucracy in each service never seriously envisioned a true merger and the resulting diminution of its own responsibilities and authorities. AFSA was the creation of Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense. He sought to achieve a degree of unification of the services as well as "efficiency and economy" in the management of the cryptologic structure. While a form of merger took place, no fundamental changes were made in the way each service conducted its own operations.

In the actual implementation of the AFSA charter, the services took full advantage of loopholes in the charter to preserve their independent status. For example, the Air Force used the "exclusion clause" in AFSA's charter (which withheld from it any authority for the tasking of mobile collection sites) to exclude AFSA from any role in controlling Air Force collection sites. In fact, by 1952, AFSA had no authority over any Air Force collection sites. All had been conveniently identified by the Air Force as *mobile* facilities. In addition, two months after forming AFSA, the Joint Chiefs made substantive changes in the AFSA charter, and drastically diluted its basic authorities.

These problems, combined with a waning military support for the general AFSA concept foretold its ultimate demise. Of the three COMINT services, it was ironic that the Navy, which from the outset had strongly opposed even the AFSA concept of cooperation, ultimately provided the greatest support for AFSA. Although the Army, in the person of Colonel Carter W. Clarke, became identified as the originator of the AFSA concept, Army support for its offspring quickly diminished and could be characterized at best as "lukewarm." The Air Force, with its newly established AFSS, aggressively opposed AFSA,

seeking primarily to build its own structure and achieve total independence in COMINT matters.

From AFSA's first days, there was no way in which its first director, Admiral Earl Stone, could make it operate as a centralized unified structure. However, the full extent and impact of the weaknesses of the AFSA charter would not become widely known – or recognized – until the onset of the Korean War. By 1951, General Ralph Canine, the second director, AFSA, was encountering the same open opposition from the services to his efforts at centralization and consolidation as Stone had experienced.

The Korean War revealed the inherent weaknesses not only of the AFSA structure, but of the USCIB as well. During the Korean War, U.S. COMINT produced a mixed record. Its major successes took place in the area of tactical support, achieved primarily by the Army and Air Force. AFSA came under heavy criticism because of [redacted] its problems in attempting to control and direct the COMINT military services. The civilian members of USCIB now pointed to the lack of direction and unity in the COMINT effort. AFSA was not providing results.

The Army proposal to establish a new military agency to be known as the Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office (CONSIDO) shocked the civilian members of USCIB. The proposal drastically limited civilian input on COMINT matters. CONSIDO soon became the symbol of a new battle between the military and civilian members of USCIB for control of COMINT.

CIA and State officials completely understood the military rationale for the establishment of AFSA – although they thoroughly disagreed with it. The CONSIDO proposal, however, represented an even more encompassing threat to civilian input to the COMINT process. Not only was the control of COMINT and its dissemination at stake, but the control of all-source intelligence estimates and evaluation actions appeared to be at risk as well. The concept of a military CONSIDO controlling dissemination, estimates, and evaluative actions seemed to crystallize the major fears of the civilian agencies about their diminishing policy role in all intelligence matters. Because of this major opposition, the proposal died in USCIB in December 1950.

The long debate over CONSIDO left a lasting impression on CIA, State, and the FBI (reinstalled as a member of USCIB in 1950). They now believed that the military authorities would not relent in their pursuit of the CONSIDO-type concept, and would probably submit an amended version of CONSIDO at a later date.

By 1951, it was clear to the civilian agencies that the military organizations were incapable of jointly developing a structure that would meet, without bias, the needs of the growing United States intelligence community. After six years of experimentation and reorganization and two attempts to consolidate and centralize the communications intelligence activities of the United States, instability, disunity, and decentralization still existed. CIA and State were not totally altruistic in their opposition to military plans. They often appeared more concerned about the long-range overtones of military control of the intelligence role than about the actual level of COMINT support received during the Korean War, for example. They realistically concluded, however, that any fundamental reworking of the communications intelligence structure would come about only as a result

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of outside intervention. Any further joint military-civilian dialogue seemed useless. Working together, CIA and State officials proceeded to develop their own strategy for a "new look" at the organization of the COMINT structure. This time the civilians would have a major input.

The military authorities previously had set up AFSA without prior coordination with USCIB or the civilian members of the COMINT community. Now a complete reversal took place. The military authorities were completely left out of the deliberative and decision-making process leading to the termination of AFSA and the creation of a new centralized COMINT agency.

General Walter Bedell Smith, as the fourth DCI, became the catalyst for bringing about a new national-level review of the COMINT structure. In a memorandum to the National Security Council, dated 10 December 1951, Smith recommended an overall review of United States COMINT activities, based upon an earlier study by Kingman Douglass. The NSC, in turn, forwarded the proposal to President Truman. Three days later, on 13 December 1951, Truman directed Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson and Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, assisted by Director of Central Intelligence Smith, to review in depth the communications intelligence activities of the United States. The resulting review process was carefully orchestrated.

On 28 December 1951, in response to Truman's request, Acheson and Lovett established the Brownell Committee to study the existing structure and make recommendations. George A. Brownell, an eminent attorney in New York City, headed the committee. Brownell served as chairman, assisted by Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen, Counselor, State Department; William H. Jackson, special assistant to the DCI; and Brigadier General John Magruder, USA (Ret), special assistant to the Secretary of Defense. The CIA and the Department of State provided the four staff members for the committee, all of whom had served previously in the Special Intelligence branches of the Army or Navy. During the period of the survey, the Brownell Committee and its support staff resided at CIA and received administrative support from the CIA. The military organizations had no representation on the Brownell Committee or on its support staff.

Within six months, the Brownell Committee completed its report. It stressed the need for the unification of U.S. COMINT responsibilities and recommended a major overhaul of the existing COMINT organization as well as the USCIB structure. The final Brownell Report completely demolished the concept of "unification" as it existed under AFSA. During the next four months, extended negotiations took place among the representatives of CIA Departments of State and Defense and the director, Armed Forces Security Agency, over the exact wording of the implementing directives to be issued by the president. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were also excluded from these discussions. Ten months after the establishment of the Brownell Committee, Truman, accepting the report, issued two directives that led to the establishment of the National Security Agency with its dual responsibility for the communications intelligence and communications security activities of the government. There would be a centralized authority for U.S. COMINT activities, and the civilian authorities, by virtue of a major restructuring of USCIB, would play a major role in directing the scope of NSA's operations.

In conclusion, the directive establishing NSA clearly identified the national rather than the solely military character of U.S. COMINT activities. Within well-defined limits it strengthened the role and authorities of the director, NSA, over COMINT. It greatly expanded administrative and operational controls over all U.S. cryptologic activities. For the first time, the director acquired the authority to issue instructions directly to military units without going through military command channels. However, there remained some significant built-in limitations in the NSA charter. Although a nominal unification took place, efforts to unify and centralize COMINT authorities and responsibilities in one organization achieved only a partial and limited success.

From the outset, the designers of the NSA charter clearly recognized that complete unification would be impossible because of the dependence upon the military structures to man field stations. Consequently, although the service units were incorporated organizationally into the central organization, they retained their own authorities and responsibilities within their military departments. To ameliorate this, and to assist NSA in its mission of providing effective, unified organization and control of COMINT, the enabling directives provided that NSA would have operational and technical control over all the COMINT collection and production resources of the United States. Even this did not solve the problem.

There also existed a "delegation of authority" clause in the new charter that further diluted the concept of centralized control. The Brownell Committee, as well as the drafters of the implementing presidential directive, supported the services' traditional position that they must control the close and direct intelligence support of the forces in the field. Consequently, the final directive made provision for this broad exception by requiring the director to delegate responsibility to the services for direct support as may be necessary. The committee fully recognized that it was creating a problem area between the central authority and the services, but concluded that a solution could be found "with sincere and intelligent cooperation between the commanders involved."

Finally, despite the reorganization the same number of agencies remained engaged in cryptologic activities as before – namely, NSA, CIA, Army, Navy, and Air Force. NSA had in many respects simply replaced the defunct AFSA. The services retained a significant degree of independence. They retained their own separate organizations and identities, as well as administrative and logistic control of their field operations. The struggle over who would control U.S. COMINT resources would continue.

Abbreviations

AFCIAC – Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council (later redesignated as Armed Forces Security Agency Council)

AFCIB – Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Board

AFOIN – Air Force Office of Intelligence

AFSA – Armed Forces Security Agency

AFSAC – Armed Forces Security Agency Council

AFSG – Air Force Security Group

AFSS – Air Force Security Service

ANCIB – Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (joint policy board that later became State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board)

ANCICC – Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (working level committee of Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board)

ASA – Army Security Agency

ASAPAC – Army Security Agency Pacific

CAHA – Cryptologic Archival Holding Area

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

CIG – Central Intelligence Group

CJCS – Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJO – Coordinator of Joint Operations

CNO – Chief of Naval Operations

COI – Coordinator of Information

COMINCH – Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

COMINT – Communications Intelligence

COMMSUPDETS – Communications Supplementary Detachments

COMSEC – Communications Security

CONSIDO – Consolidated Information Dissemination Office

CRB – Communications Reconnaissance Battalion

CRC – Communications Reconnaissance Company

CRG – Communications Reconnaissance Group

CSAW – Communications Supplementary Annex, Washington (Navy facilities at Ward Circle, Washington, D.C.)

DCI – Director of Central Intelligence

DIA – Defense Intelligence Agency

DJO – Director of Joint Operations

DJS – Director, Joint Staff

DMC – Defense Management Committee

DoD – Department of Defense

DOE – Department of Energy

ELINT – Electronic Intelligence

E.O. – Executive Order

FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCC – Federal Communications Commission

FECOM – Far East Command

G.C. & C.S. – British Government Code and Cipher School

GCHQ – Government Communications Headquarters (U.K. SIGINT Organization)

G-2 – Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff

IAB – Intelligence Advisory Board

IAC – Intelligence Advisory Council

JIC – Joint Intelligence Committee (within the Joint Chiefs of Staff structure)

JICG – Joint Intercept Control Group

JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff

JLG – Joint Liaison Group

JN-25 – U.S. Navy designator for Japanese 5-digit code used by Japanese fleet

JOP – Joint Operating plan of Army and Navy, 1946–1949

JPAG – Joint Processing Allocation Group

LSIB – London Signals Intelligence Board

NIA – National Intelligence Authority

NME – National Military Establishment

NSA – National Security Agency

NSC – National Security Council

NSG – Naval Security Group

NSCID – National Security Council Intelligence Directive

NSS – Naval Security Station

ONI – Office of Naval Intelligence

OPNAV – Chief of Naval Operations

OSD – Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSS – Office of Strategic Services

RAF – Royal Air Force

RSM – Radio Squadron Mobile

SCA – Service Cryptologic Agency

SECNAV – Secretary of Navy

SIGINT – Signals Intelligence

SIS – Signal Intelligence Service (Army)

SMP – Special Committee on Merger Planning

SRB – Special Research Branch (Army Intelligence)

SSA – Signal Security Agency (Army)

STANCIB – State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (joint policy board that later became the United States Communications Intelligence Board)

STANCICC – State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (working level committee of State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board)

SUKLO – Senior U.K. Liaison Officer

SUSLO – Senior U.S. Liaison Officer

SWI – Special Weather Intelligence

SWNCC – State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

USA – U.S. Army

USAF – U.S. Air Force

USCIB – United States Communications Intelligence Board

USCICC – United States Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (working level committee of United States Communications Intelligence Board)

USEUCOM – U.S. European Command

USN – U.S. Navy

WC – War Council

WDC/CCO – Washington, D.C. Control-Collection Office (Air Force Security Service)

Notes

Chapter I

1. Admiral Joseph R. Redman, OP-20, memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy. "The Navy's Interest in the Processing of Intercepted Foreign, Nonmilitary Communications," 24 September 1945 Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, CBIB 38, NSA (TS). (Hereafter cited as Redman memorandum, 24 September 1945.)

2. *History of the Signal Security Agency in World War II*, "Organization, 1939–1945," (ASA, 1945), Vol. I, Part I, pp. 90–103, History Collection, NSA, Series IV (TS). (Hereafter cited as *History of the Signal Security Agency*, Vol. I, Part I.)

3. John W. McClaran, OP-20-G, memorandum for the Director, 12 April 1933, (Documents on Pre-1952 Cryptologic Organization and Policy – Vol. 1, (Pre-1942)), History Collection, NSA, Series VII (S).

4. The Navy had the primary responsibility for naval radio activities relating to all foreign powers, and for the diplomatic radio intelligence activities of the four major naval powers (England, France, Italy, and Japan). The Army had the primary responsibility for military radio traffic relating to all foreign powers, and for the diplomatic traffic of all foreign powers other than England, France, Italy, and Japan.

5. Laurance F. Safford, OP-20-G, memorandum for OP-20, "Coordination of Intercept and Decrypting Activities of the Army and Navy," 25 July 1940, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, CBIB 38, NSA (S). (Hereafter cited as Safford memorandum, 25 July 1940.)

6. Ibid.

7. Commander Laurance F. Safford and Colonel Spencer B. Akin, Directive to Joint Army-Navy Committee, 31 July 1940, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, CBIB 38, NSA (S).

8. Commander Laurance F. Safford, OP-20-G, memorandum for Admiral Leigh Noyes, 27 July 1940, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, CBIB 38, NSA (S).

9. Safford memorandum, 25 July 1940.

10. Ibid.

11. John R. Redman, OP-20-G, memorandum to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, "Cryptanalytical and Decryption Operations on Diplomatic Traffic," 25 June 1942, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, CBIB 38, NSA (S); and Laurance F. Safford, memorandum for OP-20-4, "Responsibility for Decoding and Translating Japanese Intercepts," 14 February 1946. History Collection, NSA, Special Series VII, Box 4. (Hereafter cited as Redman memorandum, 25 June 1942 and Safford memorandum, 14 February 1946.)

12. Ibid.

13. Colonel Spencer B. Akin and Commander Laurance F. Safford, memorandum for Chief Signal Officer and the Director of Naval Communication, "Traffic Division," 3 October 1940, History Collection, NSA (S).

14. Ibid.

15. Safford memorandum, 14 February 1946.

16. Redman memorandum, 24 September 1945.

17. Joseph N. Wenger, Vice Director, NSA, memorandum for Grant Manson, Staff Member, Brownell Committee, "Draft of Part I of the Brownell Committee Report," 27 March 1952, History Collection, NSA, Series VI.C (TSC); *History of the Signal Security Agency*, Part I, p. 90.

18. Frederick D. Parker, *A New View to Pearl Harbor: United States Navy Communication Intelligence, 1924–1941*, United States Cryptologic History Series, (NSA, 1988), Series IV, World War II. Vol. II, pp. 53–55, 1988 (S).

19. Captain John R. Redman, memorandum for Captain Joseph N. Wenger, (OP-20-G), "Army-Navy Agreement Concerning Allocation of Diplomatic Traffic," 9 February 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, CBIB 38, NSA (TS).

20. Ibid.

21. Redman memorandum, 25 June 1942.

22. Safford memorandum, 25 July 1940.

23. Ibid.

24. Redman memorandum, 25 June 1942; and Joseph N. Wenger, memorandum for OP-20-G, "Future Cooperation between Army and Navy," 1 June 1943, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, CBIB 38, NSA (S).

25. Redman memorandum, 25 June 1942.

26. Joseph N. Wenger, memorandum for OP-20-G, "Future Cooperation between Army and Navy," 1 June 1943, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, CBIB 38, NSA (S); and *History of Signal Security Agency, World War II*, p. 93.

27. Report of the Army-Navy-FBI Allocation Committee, "Report of Conference Appointed to Study Allocation of Cryptanalysis," 30 June 1942, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, CBIB 38, NSA (S). (Hereafter cited as Report of Allocation Committee, 30 June 1942.)

28. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, memorandum for the President, 6 July 1942, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4609, CBIB 38, NSA (S).

29. Franklin D. Roosevelt, memorandum for the Director of the Budget, 8 July 1942, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4609, CBIB 38, NSA (S).

30. Redman memorandum, 25 September 1945.

31. Report of Allocation Committee, 30 June 1942. A summary of the committee's allocation for cryptanalysis follows:

Diplomatic:	Army
Enemy Naval Operations:	Navy
Enemy Military Operations:	Army
Western Hemisphere Clandestine:	FBI-Navy
International Clandestine (other than Western Hemisphere):	Navy
Trade Codes:	(To be assigned by Committee)
Army Weather:	Army
Navy Weather:	Navy
Domestic Criminal:	FBI
Voice Broadcast:	FBI
Cover Text Communications:	FBI
Miscellaneous:	(To be assigned by Committee)

32. Report of Allocation Committee, 30 June 1942.

33. *History of Signal Security Agency*, Vol. I, Part 1, p. 121.

34. Ibid.

35. The NAVSECGRU Bulletin, Vol. III, Number 2, March–April 1969 History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H (U).

36. OP-20-G "Outline of the Collaboration in Cryptanalysis Between the Army and the Navy," 18 August 1944, p. 7, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4609, CBIB 38. (Hereafter cited as Outline of Collaboration by Army and Navy, August 1944.)

37. Outline of Collaboration by Army and Navy, August 1944, p. 8 (TS).

38. George C. Marshall and Ernest J. King, "Joint Army-Navy Agreement for the Exchange of Communications Intelligence," 4 February 1944, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2465, CBIB 14, NSA (S). (Hereafter cited as Joint Army-Navy Agreement, 4 February 1944.)

39. SRH-200, OP-20-G File on Army-Navy Collaboration, 1931–1945, Part 2, p. 7, Special Research History (SRH) 200; Record Group 457, National Archives. (Hereafter cited as RG-457, NSA.)

40. Briefing by Brigadier General Woodbury M. Burgess, USA, Assistant Director for Production, February 1957, File: Robertson Committee Background, History Collection NSA, Series VI.C (S).

41. History of the Signal Security Agency, "The Japanese Army Problems – Cryptanalysis," 13 May 1947, Vol. 3, p. 24.

42. Henry F. Schorreck. "The Role of COMINT in the Battle of Midway," SRH 230, RG-457.

43. Brownell Committee, Report to the Secretary of State and the SecDef, 13 June 1952, pp. 22–29. History Collection, NSA, Series V.F (TSC).

44. Admiral Joseph R. Redman, OP-20, memorandum for Admiral Edwards, "Formalization of Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ANCICC) – Need for," 18 January 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2463, CBIB 14, NSA (TS). (Hereafter cited as Formalization of ANCICC, 18 January 1945.)

45. Joseph N. Wenger, OP-20-G, memorandum for OP-20 via FRC, [redacted] Liaison," 16 July 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 7779, CBQM 36, NSA (U).

46. Dennis DeBrandt, "Structuring Intelligence For War," CIA Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 32, No. 1, Spring 1988, pp. 43–56 (U).

47. James S. Lay, CIA, draft manuscript, undated, entitled "History of USCIB," Vol. 1, p. 3, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 47 (S). (Hereafter cited as Lay Report.)

48. Ibid.

49. During this period, intelligence requirements were generally handled on a service-to-service basis. For example, the military consumers would originate their intelligence requirements and forward them to the respective COMINT organizations for satisfaction. Following the establishment of USCIB, and the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, minor procedural changes in the process started to take place in the postwar years. The first major effort to change the requirements process occurred in the mid-1960s with the establishment of the Intelligence guidance for COMINT Programming (IGCP). Further changes took place in the mid-1970s when the intelligence community established a National SIGINT Requirements System (NSRS) that superseded the IGCP.

50. Lay Report, Vol. 1, p. 5.

51. In 1941, New York lawyer William J. Donovan was appointed Coordinator of Information (COI) by President Roosevelt. In 1942 this organization was redesignated the Office of Strategic Services and transferred to the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its mission was to collect and analyze strategic information as required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct special operations not assigned to other agencies. *United States Government Organization Manual*, Summer 1944, p. 162. See also John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1986).

52. Formalization of ANCICC, 18 January 1945.

53. Ibid.

54. Joseph N. Wenger, memorandum for the Chairman, USCIB, "Report on the Status and Authority of USCIB, USCICC, its members and the Coordinator of Joint Operations," 7 February 1947, Appendix A, p. 1, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 5061, CBIB 23, NSA (TS). (Hereafter cited as Wenger Report to USCIB, 7 February 1947.)

55. Minutes of 3rd meeting of Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 19 June 1944, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2154, CBPC 28, NSA (TSC).

56. General George C. Marshall, memorandum for Admiral Ernest King, "Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board – Establishment of," 9 March 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2463, CBIB 14, NSA (TS).

57. Wenger Report to USCIB, 7 February 1947, Annex C-1.

58. Wenger Report to USCIB, 7 February 1947, Annex C-2.

59. Formalization of ANCICC, 18 January 1945.

60. Ibid.

61. ANCIB was primarily structured to serve as a coordinating mechanism for handling the joint plans and operations of the Army and Navy COMINT organizations, and such other issues as could be resolved amicably. From the outset, however, ANCIB was intended to function only as a brokering or coordinating organization, and not as an authoritarian voice. While the COMINT services accepted ANCIB as a coordinating and negotiating

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mechanism, they never viewed ANCIB's charter as giving it sufficient authority to cut across the command channels of the Army and Navy whenever disagreements arose. The heads of the Army Security Agency and the Navy Supplementary Activity continued to be directly responsible to their respective military commanders.

62. Dean Acheson, Henry L. Stimson, and James V. Forrestal, joint memorandum for President Truman, "Collaboration with the British in the Communication Intelligence Field, Continuation and Extension of," undated, History Collection, NSA, Series V.A (TSC). (Hereafter cited as Acheson, Stimson, and Forrestal memorandum.)

63. Richard Hough, *The Greatest Crusade – Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Naval Wars*, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1986) pp. 26–27.

64. *History of the Signal Security Agency*, Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 144.

65. Lieutenant Commander Alwin D. Kramer, memorandum for OP-20-G, "Cryptanalysis: FBI Activities and Liaison with the British," 8 June 1942, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box No. 47 (S).

66. Franklin D. Roosevelt, memorandum for General Marshall, dated 9 July 1942. Text of memorandum is quoted in *History of the Signal Security Agency in World War II*, Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 118.

67. Ibid.

68. Major General George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, memorandum for Chief of Staff, 9 July 1942. Text of memorandum is quoted in *History of the Signal Security Agency*, Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 110.

69. Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, memorandum for the Chief of Staff, "Agreement between British Government Code and Cipher School, and U.S. War Department in regard to certain Special Intelligence," 10 June 1943, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2401, CBTJ 66, NSA (S).

70. Outline of Collaboration by Army and Navy, August 1944, pp. 44–48.

71. Formalization of ANCICC, 18 January 1945.

72. Ibid.

73. Minutes of 27th meeting of the State-Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 13 February 1946, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H, Box 37 (TS).

74. Background notes prepared by Admiral Joseph Wenger, Deputy Director, AFSA, for General Ralph Canine, Director, AFSA, in connection with the activities of the Brownell Committee in 1951, p. 5, History Collection, NSA, Series VI.C (S-CCO).

75. Ibid.

76. Rear Admiral Hewlett Thebaud, Chairman, ANCIB, memorandum for General Clayton Bissell, Admiral John R. Redman, and General W. Preston Corderman, "British Reply to U.S. Proposal Regarding [redacted] 15 August 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 7779, CBQM 36, NSA (TSC). (Hereafter cited as British Reply on [redacted]

77. U.S. Navy Serial OP-20-3-G-10/at, "Proposed Plan for the Coordination of U.S. Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Effort on the [redacted] Project," 13 June 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2463, CBIB 14, NSA (TS).

78. John F. Callahan and Wason G. Campbell, Secretariat of STANCIB/STANCICC, memorandum for members of STANCICC, "Establishment of a U.S. Combined Intelligence Liaison Center in Great Britain," 3 May 1946, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2156, CBPC 27, NSA (S).

79. Ibid.

80. Acheson, Stimson, and Forrestal memorandum.

81. Harry S. Truman, memorandum for Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 12 September 1945, History Collection, NSA, Series V.A (TS).

82. Minutes of the 22nd meeting of Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 16 October 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2154, CBPC 26, NSA (TSC).

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83. Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Senior Member, ANCIB, memorandum for General Eisenhower and Admiral King, 13 December 1945, "State Department Representation on ANCIB-ANCICC," Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 5061, CBIS 23, Annex 0-2, p. 1, NSA (TSC).

84. Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Senior Member, ANCIB, memorandum for Alfred McCormack, "State Department Representation on ANCIB-ANCICC," 11 December 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 5061, CBIS 23, Annex 0-2, p. 2, NSA (TS). Alfred McCormack entered the War Department as Special Assistant to Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, in 1942. He was appointed Deputy Chief Special Branch, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff on 17 June 1942. In 1944, he became Director of Intelligence, Military Service, in charge of providing intelligence for the Operations and Planning Division and for the commands in all theaters of war. On 1 October 1945, McCormack became Special Assistant to James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, with the task of organizing an intelligence unit in that department. He resigned from State in April 1946.

Chapter II

1. J.N. Wenger, USN, OP-20-G 1, memorandum for OP-20-G, "Future Cooperation between Army and Navy," 1 June 1943, Accession No. 4614, CBIS 38, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (S). See also General Marshall's letter as Army Chief of Staff, for Admiral King, concerning Signal Intelligence, 18 August 1945. Same Accession No. Paragraph two of Marshall's letter made it clear that the Army sought to retain the total responsibility for [redacted] traffic following the termination of hostilities.

2. The Navy provided posthumous recognition of Admiral Wenger on 7 July 1976, with the dedication of the Rear Admiral Joseph N. Wenger Naval Cryptologic Museum. In the dedication ceremony, special note was made of his "helping to establish the Armed Forces Security Agency and later serving as Vice Director of its successor, the National Security Agency."

3. Minutes of the 14th meeting of Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 9 May 1945, Section III (Army Proposal Regarding Army-Navy Collaboration), pp. 7–8, Accession No. 2154, CBPC, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). Captain J.N. Wenger, OP-20-G, memorandum for Captain W.R. Smedberg, III (F-20), "Policy regarding collaboration between the Army and the Navy in the Communication Intelligence Field," 30 May 1945, Accession No. 5061 N, CBIS 23, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (S).

4. Minutes of 8th meeting of Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 8 November 1944, Section I (Joint American-British Postwar Agreement), pp. 6–8, Accession No. 2154, CBPC 26, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

5. OP-20-G staff study, "Outline of the Collaboration in Cryptanalysis between the Army and Navy," 18 August 1944, Part VII (Discussions prior to 1944) pp. 56–69, Accession No. 2468, CBIS 15, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

6. Ibid., p. 58.

7. George C. Marshall, memorandum to Admiral King, "Signal Intelligence," 18 August 1945, Accession No. 5061N, CBIS 23, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC).

8. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, memorandum for General George C. Marshall, "Signal Intelligence," 20 August 1945, Enclosure B to ANCIB minutes, 21 August 1945, Accession No. 2155, CBPC 27, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

9. John V. Connorton and Robert F. Packard, Secretariat, ANCICC, memorandum for the Subcommittee on Merger Planning (SMP), 30 August 1945, Accession No. 2468, CBIS 15, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

10. John V. Connorton and Robert F. Packard, Secretariat, ANCICC, memorandum to members of ANCICC, "Recommendations of SMP concerning a location for the merged Army-Navy C.I. Organization," 7 September 1945, Accession No. 2468, CBIS 15, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

11. Ibid.

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12. Brigadier General W. Preston Corderman, USA, Acting Chairman, ANCICC, memorandum for ANCIB, "Merging of Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Activities," 26 September 1945, Accession No. 2468, CBIB 15, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

13. Ibid.

14. See Documentary Appendix to Part I, *History of AFSA/NSA* (Hereafter referred to as Documentary Appendix for AFSA/NSA) (Enclosure A), History Collection, NSA, Series V.A (TS). Copies of all of the letters in the Eisenhower and Nimitz exchange of 1945 concerning merger are included in this file.

15. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, "The Navy's Interest in the Processing of Intercepted Foreign [redacted] Communication," 14 October 1945, Accession No. 2468, CBIB 15, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

16. See Documentary Appendix A for AFSA/NSA, Item 11.

17. See Documentary Appendix A for AFSA/NSA, Item 12.

18. Memorandum, STANCICC to STANCIB, "Coordination of the Army and Navy Communication Intelligence Activities," 15 February 1946 (Incl. A of minutes of STANCIB-STANCICC joint meeting, 15 February 1946), History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 36 (TSC).

19. Ibid.

20. Joseph N. Wenger, OP-20-G, memorandum for Captain W.R. Smedberg, III, (P-20), "Policy regarding collaboration between the Army and Navy in the Communication Intelligence Field," 30 May 1945, Accession No. 5061N, CBIB 23, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

21. Minutes of 27th meeting of the State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 13 February 1946, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H, Box 37 (TS).

22. Minutes of joint meeting of the State-Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board and the State-Army-Navy Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 15 February 1946, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 36. (TSC).

23. Ibid.

24. British-United States Communication Intelligence Agreement, 5 March 1946, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 47 (TSC).

25. See Wenger Collection in Cryptologic Archival Holding Area for information and chronology concerning the development of the separate appendices to the BRUSA Agreement. See Accession Nos. 9090 and 9091, CBIB 24.

26. Colonel W. Preston Corderman, and Captain Joseph N. Wenger, memorandum for STANCIB, "Coordination of Army and Navy Communication Intelligence Activities," 5 April 1946, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2468, CBIB 15, NSA (TS). (Hereafter referred to as Corderman-Wenger Agreement.) The data for approval, 22 April 1946, is that given in Captain Wenger's memorandum to Chairman, USCIB, "Report on the status and authority of USCIB-USCICC, its members and the Coordinator of Joint Operations," 7 February 1947. (Annex A, Item 19). See Accession No. 5061 N, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

27. Corderman-Wenger Agreement.

28. Ibid.

29. See Dr. George F. Howe's *Narrative History of AFSA/NSA*, Part I, pp. 28-30, History Collection, NSA, Series V.A (TSC). (Hereafter cited as Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*).

30. Minutes of joint STANCIB/STANCICC meeting, 15 February 1946 (Item 3), History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 36 (TS).

31. Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, pp. 28-30.

32. E.M. Huddleson, Jr., Director, Special Projects Staff, Department of State, memoranda for the Coordinator of Joint Operations, "Communications Intelligence Priorities," 24 June and 19 November 1946, Accession No. 1984, CBPC 27, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC).

33. Corderman-Wenger Agreement.

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34. Memorandum for CJO, Subject: Report of Joint Intercept Control Group for the period 1 April 1946 to 28 February 1947, 6 March 1947, from Lieutenant Colonel Morton A. Robin, USA, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 1379, CBPS 57, NSA (TS).

35. See enclosure to Corderman-Wenger Agreement of 5 April 1946, entitled "Coordination of the Army and Navy Communication Intelligence Activities, 15 February 1946," Accession No. 2468, CBSC 15, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (S).

36. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chairman, STANCIB, 14 February 1946, included as Annex Q to memorandum for members of USCICC, 25 August 1945, Accession No. 5061 N, CBSS 23, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (Restricted).

37. Copy of memorandum from Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USA, Chairman, STANCIB, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, "FBI Representation on STANCIB," 4 June 1946, included as Annex S to memorandum for members of USCICC, 25 August 1945, Accession No. 5061, CBSS 23, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (Restricted).

38. Major General S.J. Chamberlin, Senior Member, USCIB, memorandum for Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, DCI, "Central Intelligence Group Representation on USCIB," 3 July 1946. For text of memorandum see J.N. Wenger memorandum for the Chairman, USCIB, "Report on Status and Authority of USCIB-USCICC," 7 February 1947, Annex U, Accession No. 5061, CBSS 23, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

39. See Accession Nos. 1984 and 1377, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA, for a great variety of correspondence concerning the intelligence requirements of the civilian members of USCIB. These requirements are originated by the Department of State, CIA, and the FBI, and are addressed to the intelligence and priorities committees of USCIB and the CJO.

40. J.N. Wenger, memorandum for CJO, "Priority Problems," 24 October 1946, Accession No. 1984, CBSC 27, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). See also minutes of 34th meeting of USCICC (Item 3), 9 October 1946, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 37 (TSC).

41. Grant Manson, State Department Member of USCIB Intelligence Committee, "State Department Proposals for Modification of Requirements Expression," 25 February 1949, Accession No. 7674, CBSC 72, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

42. George F. Howe as [b](3)-P.L. 86-36 Historical Study of COMINT under the Joint Operating Plan, 1946–1949, pp. 164–65, History Collection, NSA, Series V.E (TSC).

43. Ibid.

44. Minutes of 30th meeting of USCIB, 27 April 1948, with enclosure (USCIB: 5/36, 9 April 1948), History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 37 (TSC).

45. Historical Study, Joint Operating Plan, p. 165.

46. Ibid., p. 164.

Chapter III

1. One year later, further changes took place at the national level, which primarily involved the military services and the defense establishment. Congress, in August 1949, amended the National Security Act converting the National Military Establishment into the Department of Defense, and making it a cabinet-level agency. By this time, there was a new Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson. The new act made the three military services subordinate departments within the new Department of Defense structure. At the same time, Johnson acquired unqualified authority and control over the entire organization and became the "principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense." Steven L. Rearden, *The History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years, 1947–1950*, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the SecDef, 1984), pp. 53–55. (Hereafter cited as Rearden, *The Formative Years*.)

2. United States Communications Intelligence Board, Organizational Bulletin No. II, 31 July 1946, p. 8, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 34 (TS). (Hereafter cited as USCIB Organizational Bulletin.)

3. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. On 10 March 1945, General George C. Marshall, and Admiral Ernest J. King co-signed a Joint Memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2) and the Commanding General, Signal Security Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval Communications, which formally established the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board. For the text of memorandum see the USCIB Organizational Bulletin, pp. 2–3.

7. The term ULTRA is generally used to refer to the British exploitation of German messages encrypted on the Enigma machine. The term MAGIC refers broadly to the work of the United States in reading high-level diplomatic communications of the Japanese in the Pacific Theater, primarily on the Purple machine.

8. See Rearden, *The Formative Years*, p. 141.

9. Lay Report.

10. Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1981), pp. 305–40. (Hereafter cited as Troy, *History of CIA*.)

11. See Troy, *History of CIA*, p. 464, for the text of Truman memorandum to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.

12. Ibid., p. 351.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. See Rearden, *The Formative Years*, pp. 23–27.

16. Ibid., pp. 24–27.

17. Ibid.

18. For the text of Truman memorandum establishing the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), see Troy, *History of CIA*, p. 464.

19. Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, Part I, p. 143.

20. Minutes of the 21st and 22nd meetings of USCIB, 4 and 19 November 1947, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 36 (TS).

21. See minutes of 25th and 27th meetings of the United States Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee (USCICC), 17 February 1946 and 23 October 1946, pp. 4–5 and pp. 3–6, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 36 (TS).

22. Starting with its 21st meeting on 4 November 1947, USCIB discussed the question of "control" authorities over USCIB during many meetings. (Hereafter cited as minutes of 21st Meeting of USCIB.) In particular, see minutes for the 25th meeting of USCIB, 19 December 1947, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 36 (TSC).

23. See miontes of 21st meeting of USCIB.

24. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary for Research and Intelligence, memorandum to all the members of USCIB. "Amended Draft of NSCID Establishing USCIB," 7 June 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 34 (C). (Hereafter cited as Armstrong memorandum, 7 June 1948).

25. Minutes of 26th, 27th, and 28th meetings of USCIB, 6, 20 January 1948 and 3 February 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38 (TS).

26. Lay Report, pp. 32–34. See also minutes of 28th meeting of USCIB, 3 February 1948.

27. See minutes of 26th meeting of USCIB, 6 January 1948.

28. Ibid.

29. See minutes of 28th meeting of USCIB, 3 February 1948.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Forrestal memorandum for Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force, 13 February 1948, Spint File, CIA Archives, Langley, USCIB Charter (TS).

33. Grant Manson, State Department Liaison Officer, memorandum to Park Armstrong, Special Assistant, State Department, 3 March 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 47 (S)

34. Ibid.

35. Grant Manson, State Department Liaison Officer, memorandum for the record, "Current Developments on the Charter," 23 March 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 47 (TS).

36. R. H. Hillenkoetter, DCI, memorandum to Lieutenant General S.J. Chamberlin, Chairman, USCIB, 22 March 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 47 (S).

37. Lay Report, pp. 34–35.

38. Lay Report, pp. 34–36.

39. See minutes of 31st meeting of USCIB, 13 May 1948.

40. See Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA* for an excellent account of this entire sequence concerning the USCIB charter. In particular, see pp. 122–29.

41. See Armstrong memorandum, 7 June 1948. The enclosure to the basic memorandum summarizes the major issues between CIA and other members of USCIB concerning the charter controversy.

42. Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, pp. 126–28.

43. Grant Manson, memorandum, "Various Views Concerning Developments on the Charter," 25 March 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 47 (TS).

44. See Armstrong memorandum of 7 June 1948.

45. C.T.R. Adams and J.E. Fitzpatrick, Ad Hoc Secretariat, memorandum for the DCI, "Action agreed upon at the time of the Ad Hoc meeting of the IAC held at 1410 on 11 June 1948," History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 34 (C). Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, DCI, memorandum for the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, "Proposed NSC Intelligence Directive, Communication Intelligence," 11 June 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 34 (S).

46. NSCID No. 9, "Communications Intelligence," 1 July 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series V.A. (C).

Chapter IV

1. Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, Part I, pp. 1–26.

2. Joseph N. Wenger, USN, memorandum for Director, AFSA, "Consolidation of CSA and ASA," 12 July 1949, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 3791, CBPI 48, NSA (TS).

3. Interview of Stuart MacClintock, 25 February 1986, by Robert D. Farley, OH-05-86, Center for Cryptologic History, NSA (S).

4. Joseph N. Wenger, OP-20-G, memorandum for Civil Service Board, Staff and OINC NEGAT, "Authority of Civil Service Appointees," 24 April 1946, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 3791, CBPI 48, NSA (TS).

5. Joseph N. Wenger, memorandum for OP-20, "Civil Service," 18 December 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 3791, CBPI 48, NSA (TS).

6. Woodbury M. Burgess, USAF, "Briefing of Robertson Committee," 1957, History Collection, NSA, Series VI.C.

7. Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army, memorandum for James V. Forrestal, "United Armed Forces Security Agency," 24 July 1948. Accession No. 2459, CBPI 14, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (U).

8. Report of the Joint Committee of the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, U.S. Congress, 1946, p. 253, NSA Cryptologic Collection, NSA (U).

9. Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, Part I, pp. 144–46.

10. Rearden, *The Formative Years* pp. 53–55.

11. James V. Forrestal, memorandum to Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, "Terms of Reference for the Committee on the Creation of a Unified Armed Forces Security Agency," 19 August 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series VII. Box 4 (S). (Hereafter cited as Forrestal Letter.)

12. Ibid.

13. Minutes of the 1st meeting of the Committee on the Creation of a Unified Armed Forces Security Agency, 7 September 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series V.F (TS).

14. Forrestal Letter.

15. Earl E. Stone, memorandum for SecDef, "Committee on the Creation of a Unified Armed Forces Security Agency – Report of," 30 December 1948, Historical Collection, NSA, Series V.F (TS). (Hereafter cited as Stone Board Report).

16. Ibid., (Tab D – Army View).

17. Ibid., p. 6.

18. Ibid., p. 5.

19. Ibid., p. 5.

20. Ibid., (Part A), p. 9.

21. Minutes of 41st meeting of USCIB, 17 June 1949 (USCIB 25/1), "Establishment of Armed Forces Security Agency," History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 37 (TSC). (Hereafter cited as 41st meeting of USCIB.)

22. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, DCI, memorandum for SecDef, "Report of the Committee on the Creation of a Unified Armed Forces Security Agency," 14 January 1949, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38 (TSC).

23. 41st meeting of USCIB, and Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, p. 155.

24. Brownell Committee, Report to the Secretary of State and SecDef, 13 June 1952, p. 21, History Collection, NSA, Series V.F (TSC). (Hereafter cited as Brownell Report.)

25. Minutes of 13th meeting of AFSAC, 28 April 1950, (AFSAC 25/74), pp. 14–15, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.A (TS).

26. George F. Howe, "The Early History of NSA," *Cryptologic Spectrum*, (Spring 1974), pp. 11–17.

27. Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, pp. 158–59.

28. Rearden, *The Formative Years*, pp. 410–22.

29. Captain Paul R. Schratz, USN (Ret.), "The Admiral's Revolt," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, (February 1986).

30. Interview of Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke, 3 May 1983, by Robert D. Farley, OH-06-83, History Collection, NSA. (Hereafter cited as Carter Clarke interview.)

31. Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, p. 159.

32. Louis Johnson, memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Organization of Cryptologic Activities within the National Military Establishment," 20 May 1949, Accession No. 1404, CBDD 11, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area (TS). (Hereafter cited as Johnson Directive Establishing AFSA.)

33. Louis Johnson, letter to Secretary of State, 20 May 1949, Accession No. 6490, CBDD 44, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

34. Johnson Directive establishing AFSA.

35. 41st meeting of USCIB.

36. Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, pp. 165–66.

37. Minutes of 41st meeting of USCIB.

38. Johnson Directive establishing AFSA.

39. JCS 2010/6, Charter for Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council, 28 July 1949, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 1404, CBDD 11, NSA (TS). (Hereafter cited as JCS 2010/6.)

40. JCS 2010/12, Change in title of "Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council," Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 1404, CBDD 11, NSA (TS).

41. While Stone reported as Director on 15 July 1949, the earlier date of Johnson's Directive, 20 May 1949, is generally cited as the date for the establishment of AFSA.

42. Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, Part II, pp. 3–6.

43. Ibid.

44. AFSAC 25/29, Progress Report as of 30 January 1950 by Director, AFSA, to AFSAC, 27 January 1950, Accession No. 5253, CBSS 71, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS) and Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, Part II, pp. 15–39.

45. Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, Part II, p. 15.

46. Ibid. Part II, p. 40.

47. Travis M. Hetherington, Chief Plans and Policy Divisions, memorandum for General Canine, "Establishment of a USCIB Coordinator's Group," 13 May 1952, with enclosure, pp. 3–4 of enclosure, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2960, CBSS 33, NSA (TS).

48. Ibid.

49. Earl Stone, memorandum for members of AFSAC, "Progress Report as of 30 January 1950," 27 January 1950, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 5253, NSA (TS).

50. Johnson Directive establishing AFSA.

51. AFSA/Air Force Agreement on Task Assignments to AFSS Mobile Intercept Sites, 22 September 1950 (AFSAC: 60/24), Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4820, CBSS 57, NSA (TS).

52. Joseph N. Wenger, memorandum to George F. Howe, NSA Historian, "Comments on Historical Study," 25 May 1960, Part II, XII, History Collection, NSA, Series VI.D (TS). (Hereafter cited as Wenger, comments on *AFSA/NSA History*.)

53. Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, pp. 78–80, 92–94.

54. JCS 2010/23, "Division of Responsibility between Armed Forces Security Agency and the Military Services," 18 November 1950, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 1404, CBDD 11, NSA (TS).

55. Ibid.

56. During 1949 and 1950, CIA and State continually stressed the issue of their lack of an authoritarian role in USCIB activities. In particular, see minutes of 41st meeting of USCIB, 17 June 1949, pp. 2–8, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 34 (TS).

57. Louis W. Tordella, "Presentation to Eachus Study Group," 10 September 1968, p. 12, History Collection, NSA, Series VI.D (TSC).

58. Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, Director, AFSA, memorandum for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Director of Naval Intelligence, Director of Intelligence, USAF, "Formulation of Special Intelligence Requirements," 18 August 1950, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 39058, NSA (TS).

59. JCS 2010/28, "Succession of Directors, Armed Forces Security Agency," 17 February 1951, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 1404, CBDD 11, NSA (TS).

60. Ibid., and Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, Part II, p. 137.

61. Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, Part II, pp. 137–38.

62. Interview of Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, 9 February 1983, by Robert D. Farley, OH-03-83, Center for Cryptologic History, NSA and Wenger, comments on *AFSA/NSA History*, Center for Cryptologic History, NSA.

63. Carter Clarke interview.

64. Major General Ralph J. Canine, Director, NSA, Presentation to Agency seniors at Arlington Hall Station, 25 November 1952, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4918, CBNS 61, NSA (TS).

Chapter V

1. See minutes for 48th meeting of USCIB, concerning CONSIDO, 13 January 1950. Accession No. 6490 (Folder #2), Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC).

2. Howe's *History of AFSA/NSA*, Part II, pp. 126-29.

3. Louis Johnson, memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Maximum Exploitation of COMINT," 19 May 1949, with enclosure, Accession No. 6491, CBNS 45, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC). (Hereafter cited as Johnson Memorandum, 19 May 1949, concerning CONSIDO.)

4. Ibid.

5. Major General S. Leroy Irwin, USA, Director of Intelligence, memorandum for Joint Intelligence Committee, "Conference with General McNarney on Draft CONSIDO Paper," 20 October 1949, Accession No. 6491, CBNS 45, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

6. Johnson memorandum, 19 May 1949, concerning CONSIDO.

7. USCIB 26/1, Item 7 of the Agenda for 47th meeting of USCIB, 2 December 1949, "Presentation of Draft CONSIDO Paper," Accession No. 6490 (Folder #2), CBNS 45, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

8. USCIB 26/4 Item 2, Section I, of the Agenda for the 48th meeting of USCIB, held 13 January 1950, "Draft Proposal on the Establishment of CONSIDO," Accession No. 6490 (Folder #1), CBNS 44, History Collection, NSA (TSC). (Hereafter cited as USCIB 26/4, 13 January 1950.)

9. USCIB 26/4, 13 January 1950.

10. Rear Admiral R.H. Hillenkoetter, USN, DCI, memorandum for USCIB Members, 12 January 1950, Accession No. 6491, CBNS 45, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC).

11. USCIB 26/4, 13 January 1950.

12. Ibid.

13. USCIB 26/7, Item 2 of the Agenda for the 49th meeting of USCIB, held on 16 March 1950, "Draft Proposal on Establishment of CONSIDO," History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38.1 (TSC).

14. USCIB 26/13, Item 2 of the Agenda for the 53rd meeting of USCIB, held on 14 July 1950, "Draft Proposal on Establishment of CONSIDO," History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38.1 (TS.)

15. See minutes of 30th meeting of USCIB, 27 April 1948, pp. 2-7, w/encl (memorandum for Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, Director, Central Intelligence, for Lieutenant General S.J. Chamberlin, Rear Admiral T.B. Inglis, and Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, dated 21 April 1948, concerning [redacted] History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38.1 (TSC).

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 at. p. 33. (b)(1)
FOIA(b)3 - 50 USC 403-3(c)(6) National Security Act of
FOIA(b)3 - 50 USC 403g Section 6 of the CIA Act of 1948

17. Charles P. Collins, CIA, Chairm
Operations, "Recurrent Intelligence
Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC).

18. Ibid.

19. Captain Mason, Chief of Office Operations, teletype message for Captain Wenger, V/DIR, undated, but apparently originated soon after the start of the Korean War. During this period, there existed a teletype circuit (known as "pony" circuit) between the Office of Operations at Arlington Hall Station and the AFSA Directorate at Naval Security Station. The circuit was used primarily for exchange of operational communications between

AFSA officials. Copy of message is in Wenger Collection. See Accession No. 9139, CBIB 26, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC). (Hereafter cited as Mason to Wenger Message.)

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 *he U.S. COMINT Effort During the Korean Conflict, June 1950 – August 1953*, (unpublished manuscript, 6 January 1954), pp. 1–2, History Collection, NSA, Series V.M (TSC). (Hereafter (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 Korea.)

21. Ibid., p. 2.

22. Ibid., p. 3.

23. Mason to Wenger Message.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 Korea, pp. 2–3.

25. Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, Director, AFSA, memorandum for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Director of Naval Intelligence, Director of Intelligence, USAF, "Formulation of Special Intelligence Requirements," 16 August 1950, Accession No. 39058A, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). See also responses from Army, Navy, and Air Force as promulgated by AFSAC 60/25, Accession No. 39058A, NSA (TS).

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 *ist*, pp. 33–34, 57–58.

27. Louis Johnson, memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Organization of Cryptologic Activities within the National Military Establishment," 20 May 1949, Accession No. 1404, CBDD 11, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

28. Brigadier General W.N. Gilmore, Chief, ASA, memorandum for Major General Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, "Korean Intercept Effort Prior to the Outbreak of Korean Hostilities," 5 October 1950, Accession No. 9139, CBIB 26, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC).

29. AFSAC 60/26: Report by the Director, AFSA, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, via the Armed Forces Security Agency Council, "Division of Responsibility Between AFSA and the Services," 18 September 1950, Accession No. 5864 (Folder #3), CBIB, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

30. Ibid. See also Joint memorandum from Rear Admiral Felix Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral John R. Redman, Director of Naval Communications, and Captain L.S. Howeth, Head Security Branch, Naval Communications, for Chairman, Armed Forces Security Agency Council, "Comments on AFSAC 60/26," 27 October 1950, Accession No. 5864 (Folder #2), CBIB 31, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

31. Stone wrote these informal remarks on the Army's response to AFSAC 60/30, 19 October 1950, Accession No. 9092, CBIB 24, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

32. AFSAC 60/30, 19 October 1950: Major General C.P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence, USA, memorandum for Chairman, AFSAC, "Report by DIRAFSA, AFSAC 60/26," Accession No. 5864 (Folder #3), CBIB 31, Wenger Collection, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

33. AFSAC 60/33, 24 October 1950: Major General Alexander R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, memorandum for Chairman, AFSAC, "Comments on AFSAC 60/26," Accession No. 9092, CBIB 24, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

34. Memorandum for the Record by Captain Joseph N. Wenger, Deputy Director, AFSA, "Comments on AFSAC 60/26," November 1950, Accession No. 5864, (Folder #3) CBIB 31, Wenger Collection, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

35. Captain Joseph N. Wenger, USN, Deputy Director, AFSA, memorandum for Director, AFSA, "Army Comments on AFSAC 60/26," 26 October 1950, Accession No. 5864, CBIB 31, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). (Hereafter cited as Wenger memorandum, 26 October 1950).

36. Wenger memorandum, 26 October 1950. See also memorandum from Captain Rufus L. Taylor, OP-322Y1, for OP-32, "Comments on JCS 2010/24," 15 January 1951, Accession No. 5864, CBIB 31, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

37. Wenger memorandum, 26 October 1950.

38. Admiral Earl E. Stone, Director, AFSA, memorandum for Major General Alexander R. Bolling, USA, "AFSAC 60/26," 1 November 1950, Accession No. 9092, CBIB 31, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

39. AFSAC 60/42: Admiral Earl E. Stone, Director, AFSA, memorandum for Members of AFSAC, "Division of Responsibility Between AFSA and the Military Services," 24 November 1950, Accession No. 5864, CBIS 31, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

40. AFSAC 60/49, 12 July 1951: Brigadier General Roy H. Lynn, Commander, USAFSS, memorandum for Director, AFSA, "Establishment of Group Headquarters [redacted] 18 June 1951, Accession Nos. 4820, 2422, and 3756N, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 *st*, pp. 37–39.

42. Ibid., pp. 35–43.

43. Ibid., p. 36, 39–40.

44. Ibid., p. 35.

45. Minutes of 53rd meeting of USCIB, 14 July 1950, pp. 6–11 (USCIB 77/4: Selective Intelligence Mobilization) History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 35.1 (TS).

46. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 *onsumer Liaison Units, 1949–1957*, April 1957, pp. 7–10, Accession No. 10684, CBIS 52, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC). (Hereafter c(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 *mer Liaison*.)

47. Ibid., pp. 2–11.

48. Ibid., pp. 3-11.

49. Colonel Roy H. Lynn, memorandum for Coordinator of Joint Operations, "Scheduling of USCIB Committee Meetings," 2 May 1949, Accession No. 1426, CBPS 63, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (S). Colonel David Wade, USAF, Vice Commander, memorandum for CIO, "Transmission of Classified Material to this Headquarters," 9 May 1949, Accession No. 1426, CBPS 63, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (S).

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 *mer Liaison*, pp. 19–23.

51. Ibid.

52. Within the State Department, the Special Projects Staff (SPS) became responsible for the receipt and dissemination of COMINT. In May 1947, Robert F. Packard served as the first COMINT liaison officer for the SPS, which was then located at the Pentago (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 *mer Liaison*, pp. 33–34.

53. Minutes of 53rd meeting of USCIB, 14 July 1950, pp. 6–11, (USCIB 77/4: Selective Mobilization), History Collection, NSA, Series XII H, Box 38.1 (TS).

54. T. Achilles Polyzoides, Director, Special Projects Staff, Department of State, memorandum for Director, AFSA, "Establishment of a Department of State (Special Projects Staff) Liaison Unit at AFSA 02," 25 June 1951, History Collection, NSA, Series XII H (TS). Admiral Stone, Director, AFSA, memorandum for the Special Assistant, Department of State, "Establishment of a Department of State (Special Projects Staff) Liaison Unit at AFSA 02," 5 July 1951, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H (TS).

55. See minutes of 30th meeting of USCIB, 27 April 1948, pp. 2–7, w/encl (memorandum for Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, Director, Central Intelligence, for Lieutenant General S.J. Chamberlin, Rear Admiral T.B. Inglis, and Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, dated 21 April 1948, concerning [redacted] History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38 (TSC).

(b) (1)
56. Ibid. FOIA(b)3 - 50 USC 403-3(c)(6) National Security Act of 1947, Subsection 102(d)(3), a

57. Minut FOIA(b)3 - 50 USC 403g Section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949 nt of Armed Forces Security Agency," History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38.1 (TSC).

[redacted]

59. AFSA/Air Force Agreement on Task Assignments to AFSS Mobile Intercept Sites, 22 September 1950 (AFSAC 60/24), Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4820, CBSS 57, NSA (TS). Wenger, "Comments on Historical Study."

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 *st*, pp. 45–46.

61. Major General Charles A. Willoughby, G-2, Far East Command, message dated 12/1908Z March 1951, addressed to ACSI, Washington, Accession No. 9139, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). Captain J.S. Holtwick, USN, Chief, Office of Operations, memorandum for B.K. Buffham and H. Conley, "Visit to FEC," 12 March 1951, Accession No. 9139, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (S). Major General Charles A. Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Far East Command, memorandum for Herbert Conley and Benson K. Buffham, 15 March 1951, Accession No. 9139, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC). Report of Tour of Far East Command, by B.K. Buffham and H.L. Conley, 4 April 1951, Accession No. 9139, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC).

62. Brownell Committee, Report to the Secretary of State and SecDef, 13 June 1952, p. 62, History Collection, NSA, Series V.F. (TSC). (Hereafter cited as Brownell Report.)

63. Ibid. See also Captain Redfield Mason, Chief, AFSA 02, memorandum for Commanding General, ASA, "Korean Linguists for ASAPAC," 1 August 1950, Accession No. 9139, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC).

64. These improvements are generally attributed to the intervention of Soviet advisors who became alarmed over the communications procedures of the North Koreans. See Richard Chun, "A Bit on the Korean COMINT Effort," (unpublished manuscript, 1971), p. 3, History Collection, NSA, Series V.M.1 (SC).

65. Ibid.

66. Robert E. Drake, "The COMINT Role in the Korean War," (unpublished manuscript, Circa 1954), p. 6, History Collection, NSA, Series V.M (TSC).

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 est, pp. 78–81, 116–18.

68. Brownell Report, pp. 22–28.

69. Louis W. Tordella, "Presentation to Rachus Study Group," 10 September 1968, p. 12, History Collection, NSA, Series VI.D (TSC).

70. The minutes of the USCIB meetings from 1949–1950 provide evidence of the beginning of a gradual change in the attitude of the CIA representatives. DCI Hillenkoetter, who served as the third DCI from 1 May 1947–7 October 1950, became more assertive in his efforts to carve out a greater role for CIA in the national intelligence process. In particular, see USCIB 26/4, 13 January 1950. See also the minutes of the 41st meeting of USCIB, concerning the establishment of AFSA, 17 June 1949, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38.1 (TSC). (Hereafter cited as minutes of 41st meeting of USCIB, 17 June 1949.)

Chapter VI

1. During the USCIB meetings of 1949 and 1950, CIA and State continually raised the issue of their lack of an authoritarian voice in guiding the activities of AFSA. In particular, see the minutes of the 41st meeting of USCIB, 17 June 1949, pp. 2–8, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H (TS). (Hereafter cited as minutes of 41st meeting of USCIB, 17 June 1949.)

2. In later years, a portion of the CONSIDO concept was resurrected anew and implemented by the SIGINT Policy Board. Twenty-five years after the disapproval of the CONSIDO proposal, the National Foreign Intelligence Board established the National SIGINT Requirements System (NSRS) as a community requirements mechanism in 1975.

3. Minutes of 41st meeting of USCIB, 17 June 1949.

4. The standing requirement for a unanimous vote on major decisions had prevailed in USCIB for a number of years. Consequently, it became very difficult for the representatives of CIA and State to win support for a favorable decision in USCIB on controversial issues, particularly when they sought to acquire an enhanced role in influencing the AFSA intelligence process. See NSCID No. 9, "Communications Intelligence," 1 July 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series V.A (TS).

5. John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA*: New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1986, pp. 102–11 and Rearden, *The Formative Years*, pp. 20–27.

6. Lawrence K. White on the Directors, Oral History Interview by Dino Brugioni and Urban Linehan, *Studies in Intelligence* (CIA), Winter 1987, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 1–6.

7. Walter B. Smith, DCI, memorandum for Executive Secretary, National Security Council, "Proposed Survey of Communications Intelligence Activities," 10 December 1951 (CIA Archives) (TSC).

8. Robert A. Lovett and Dean G. Acheson, letter to Brownell, Bohlen, Magruder and Jackson, 28 December 1951 (Exhibit A in Brownell Report), History Collection, NSA, Series V.F (TSC).

9. Ibid.

10. Lieutenant General Ralph J. Canine, "Memorandum for the Record," 7 February 1952, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 6009, CBSD 75, NSA (S).

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Brownell Report, p. 62.

14. Ibid., p. 50.

15. Ibid., p. 6.

16. Ibid., p. 134.

17. Ibid., p. 6, pp. 121–24.

18. Ibid., pp. 121–28.

19. Ibid., p. 7 of cover letter.

20. Ibid., pp. 124–28.

21. Ibid., pp. 129–34.

22. Ibid., pp. 131–34.

23. Ibid., pp. 53–56.

24. Ibid.

25. Ralph J. Canine, Director, AFSA, memorandum for SecDef, "Brownell Committee Report," 8 July 1952, Cryptologic Archive Holding Area, Accession No. 5741 N, CBSC 33, NSA (TS).

26. Memorandum for the Record by Rear Admiral J.N. Wenger, Deputy Director for Intelligence, AFSA, "Draft of Proposed Presidential Directive for Organizing the COMINT Activities of the U.S.," 14 October 1952, Accession No. 5741 N, CBSC 33, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

27. Harry S. Truman, memorandum for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, 24 October 1952, History Collection, NSA, Series V.A (TS).

28. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9, Revised, Communications Intelligence, 24 October 1952, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession Number 14842, CBSD 76, NSA (TS).

29. Ibid.

30. Harry S. Truman, memorandum for the Secretary of State and the SecDef, "Communications Security (COMSEC) Matters, History Collection, NSA, Series V.A (TS).

31. Robert A. Lovett, SecDef, memorandum, for the Service Secretaries, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Director, National Security Agency, "Interim Implementation of NSCID No. 9, Revised, 4 November 1952, History Collection, NSA, Series V.A (TS).

32. Ibid.

33. Lieutenant General C.D. Cabell, Director Joint Staff, memorandum for General Bradley, General Vandenberg, General Collins, and Admiral Fechteler, "National Security Agency," 9 February 1953, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2466, CBIB 15, NSA (S).

34. Ibid.

35. Almost four decades later, the national directives unequivocally identify NSA as the central authority in the field of U.S. cryptology. NSCID No. 6, issued in February 1972, charges the Director with "full control" over all SIGINT collection and processing activities, which now includes COMINT and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) processing activities. But, as in 1952, there still exist a number of grey areas between NSA and the services, mainly because of charter limitations and exceptions to the authority of NSA. Moreover, national directives also provide for the delegation of SIGINT authorities, as necessary, to the military services for conducting a number of direct support activities, including tactical ELINT operations. While considerable progress has been made in pulling together U.S. SIGINT activities into the semblance of a single system, divided control still exists.

Notes on Sources

Most of the documents used in the preparation of this history are in the holdings of the Office of Archives and Repository Services and the Center for Cryptologic History. A diverse number of sources originated these holdings, which reflect a broad range of departmental, national, and operational relationships extending over this period of cryptologic history. The Office of Archives and Repository Services (T54) holds three basic groups of resource materials: the stored records that are held for a temporary period pending a disposition review by the owning organization; the retired records that are undergoing an appraisal to determine their archival value; and the accessioned records that are filed as permanent Agency records in the Cryptologic Archival Holding Area (CAHA), or Archives. The Agency's Center for Cryptologic History (D9) maintains its own research collections.

Among Agency records, two separately organized collections deserve special mention. These are the accessioned records of the Archives and the special collections maintained by the Center for Cryptologic History. For the researcher, there is very little distinction between the kind of records in the Archives and those maintained in the Center for Cryptologic History. There are major distinctions, however, in the method of organization and arrangement of the documents for retrieval purposes – and in the continuity accorded historical themes. These differences in organization stem mainly from basic differences in the approach to records keeping as well as factors associated with the organizational evolution of each organization. In the course of developing into today's structures, each organization underwent a different sequence of growth, and each developed its own operating concepts and methodology.

Starting with the AFSA period and extending into the NSA years, the Office of the Adjutant General (AG) served as the first administrator of cryptologic records. During the early 1950s, the AG established the beginnings of the Agency's records management program and directed the creation of a Records Repository for the retention of vital records. These early rudimentary actions safeguarded from destruction massive holdings acquired from the World War II era as well as other essential records associated with the establishment of AFSA and NSA. However, as NSA directed its primary energies toward its operational missions and as organizational changes occurred, the position of Agency officials concerning the priority of non-operational tasks of this nature became clear. The resource allocation officials consistently demonstrated little enthusiasm for the program and generally provided only token support in terms of resources and priorities.

In responding to its new national role, NSA commenced a pattern of frequent organizational change that extended from 1952 until the late 1970s. This pattern of recurring institutional change impacted unfavorably on the direction and emphasis accorded its records management function. During this period of approximately twenty-five years, the management responsibility for the task rotated among at least six Key Components: Office of the Adjutant General, Office of Administrative Services, Comptroller, Office of Policy, Office of Management Services, and Office of Telecommunications. Despite this cycle of change and the continuance of the strictures on resources, the records management program achieved some progress over the years. But

overall, these circumstances clearly affected the quality and scope of the program and impeded its implementation. They also encouraged the creation of special collections of historians and history-minded technicians.

As the Agency expanded, the lack of storage facilities emerged as another major problem in the conduct of the Agency's records management program. Until the late 1970s, the Agency resorted to storing its record holdings at several different locations within the Agency as well as a number of locations outside NSA's control. These external locations included facilities at Crane, Indiana; Arlington Hall Station; Vint Hill Farms; Torpedo Station, Alexandria, Virginia; and Fort Holabird, Baltimore. The dispersal of records represented an inefficient method of operation and impacted negatively on the various steps in the review and disposition cycle. As a practical matter, however, perhaps the greatest damage occurred in the retrieval process. The dispersal of stored, retired, and permanent records not only affected the quality and timeliness of service provided to operational elements, but it also impeded the retrieval efforts of researchers and historians.

All of these factors contributed to a lack of direction and stability for the entire records program. The big push for change did not come until 1977, when the Agency established the Cryptologic Archival Holding Area (CAHA) – or Archives, as it is commonly called. The establishment of an Archives stemmed from action by President Carter directing the mandatory declassification of intelligence documents that were thirty years old or older. In complying with Executive Order 12065, Admiral Inman ordered that a new urgency be placed on declassification matters and on the records management program of NSA. As an integral part of this action, Inman directed the immediate establishment of a new archival office to assume archival responsibility for all elements of the Agency and to function under the control of the Director's Policy Staff. By 1980, with the physical relocation of all of the stored, retired, and accessioned records in the Office of Archives and Repository Services, the Agency concluded its first serious attempt to establish an archival program.

Of the records processed thus far by the archives since its establishment in 1977, the accessioned records generally start with the World War I era and extend to 1960. The accessioned records yielded significant information for this study. These records are arranged and filed under a nine-letter code group, called a Cryptologic Record Group (CRG), which identifies the file location as well as the "origin, geographic pertinence, and subject content" of the record. The most useful part of this immense collection is its subject correspondence file of letters, memoranda, reports, and other correspondence between the Army and Navy cryptologic organizations and between the military services and officials in the defense establishment, the National Security Council, the White House, and other executive departments. There are also a number of Special Collections within these holdings, such as the Wenger Collection, personal papers, and various project files, that proved to be extremely valuable.

The Center for Cryptologic History traces its origins to the AFSA era when a history office was established as a very small element within the training division (AFSA 14). But shortly after the establishment of NSA in 1952, the history function received new attention and emphasis at the Directorate level. This change occurred mainly because of the interest of General Canine, who wanted the events associated with the establishment of NSA to be documented from an historical viewpoint. He supported the recruitment of three

professional historians and created a new history element, which functioned as a part of his Plans and Policy Staff. Following the appointment of Dr. George F. Howe as the first professional historian, the history program enjoyed some degree of high-level support and recognition which lasted for several years. Within a few years, however, following the retirement of General Canine, the political situation began to change for the history element. By the mid-1950s, as the growing Agency became increasingly preoccupied with more pressing operational considerations, the position of the history group began to deteriorate. Lacking any sponsorship at the Directorate level, the group encountered great difficulty in obtaining support and resources for conducting even a modest history effort.

Like the early Records Office, the History Office became a casualty of frequent reorganization actions, as well as periodic resubordinations within the Agency. By 1989, the History Office had been placed organizationally in at least seven different Key Components. These Key Components included the Training Office, Plans and Policy, the Central Reference Organization in the Office of Operations, the Policy Staff, the Management Organization, the National Cryptologic School, and the Office of Telecommunications.

Vice Admiral Studeman's 17 September 1989 memorandum announced the decision to establish the Center for Cryptologic History as an element of the Director's Staff (D9) and marked a new departure for the Agency's history program. Personnel were transferred from T54 the following month to constitute the core of the new organization, with Henry F. Schorreck retaining his position as NSA historian. Components of the Center include the oral history program, the NSA museum collection, and the publishing arm (which also publishes *Cryptologic Quarterly*, the Agency's professional journal) as well as the research collections and historians.

During the years of austerity, the NSA Historian of necessity performed only limited research activities and concentrated on the development of historical records relating to the evolution of the cryptologic structure of the United States. Today, the Center for Cryptologic History, by virtue of its History Collection, is a major holder and authority on early U.S. cryptologic records. The collection is designed to assist in meeting the needs of Agency researchers and in providing information support services to Agency officials.

The records in the History Collection begin with the American Revolution and extend into the present. These holdings are divided into Series, generally on a chronological basis, with further subdivisions made topically. The History Collection contains published and unpublished manuscripts, a broad range of policy and operational correspondence, personal collections, crisis files, historical studies, and transcripts of oral history interviews. Another important collection of historical records exists as a totally separate entity within the Center. The "Cryptologic Collection" became a part of the History Collection in 1987. Originally a part of the Technical Documents Section of the NSA Library, the Cryptologic Collection is slanted heavily toward technical matters. It contains a wealth of material on cryptographic systems from the World War II period and earlier, descriptions of cryptanalytic solutions and techniques, and extremely useful information concerning cryptologic organizations.

Among the records acquired from the three services for this early period, the holdings contributed by the Army are noteworthy and are the most prolific of the three military services'. During the early 1980s, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) welcomed NSA personnel in their screening of INSCOM holdings from World War I to the post-World War II period. As a result of this cooperation, the Archives now holds an immense collection of Army cryptologic records for the early years of cryptology.

The archival holdings acquired from the Navy and Air Force vary considerably. With particular reference to the Navy, the Archives does hold a collection of Army-Navy records that devolved to NSA following the organizational realignments occurring during the postwar years. Initially this sequence began with the Joint Army-Navy Operating Agreement of 1946, which forced each service to move toward closer cooperation on cryptologic matters. The Agreement resulted in a first-time consolidation of a broad range of Army-Navy operating documents and correspondence, including the records of the various Joint Committees. As a part of this process, the Navy also intermixed with its contemporary holdings some earlier naval records dating to the immediate pre-war period. As further organizational changes occurred, this collection of joint Army-Navy holdings passed to the custody of each successor structure. The cycle of institutional change, extending over a six-year period, included the establishment of AFSA in 1949 and ended with the creation of NSA in 1952. Today this legacy of Army-Navy records is invaluable, not only for research, but also as a source of accurate perspective on the nature and problems of these early joint operations.

Because of its later arrival as a third cryptologic service, the Air Force records for this early period do not start until after World War II. The Air Force created the Air Force Security Service (AFSS) as a separate command in Texas in 1949, five months before the establishment of the Armed Forces Security Agency. During a transition period, the initial AFSS structure relied on the Army Security Agency for administrative and operational support. By the time of the Korean War, however, the AFSS started to function as an independent service and acquired its own facilities and targets. Still, even for this latter period, there is a paucity of internal Air Force documentation at NSA concerning the inner workings of the new cryptologic service. This may have been due, in part, to the remote location of AFSS Headquarters in Texas. Today the Air Force Unit Histories appear to constitute the bulk of the Air Force cryptologic records in the archives. But for the purposes of this report, these Unit Histories proved to be of minimal value.

The combined holdings of the Archives and the Center for Cryptologic History contain significant documentation issued not only by the military services (both the cryptologic and intelligence organizations), but also by the evolving United States Communication Intelligence Board (ANCIB – STANCIB – USCIB) and the civilian consumer agencies. In particular, the correspondence, agendas, and minutes of the initial policy boards (ANCIB – STANCIB – USCIB) provided exceptional perspective about the nature of the conflicts and power struggles taking place within the intelligence structure during the postwar period from 1945 to 1952. The internal correspondence from some consumer agencies gave special insights into the unity reflected by the representatives of CIA and State in their joint opposition to the exclusive military control of the COMINT effort. This block of records also provided enlightening perspective, once again from the point of view of the non-military consumer, about the AFSA structure and the activities of the Brownell Committee.

Oral interviews, conducted mainly by Robert D. Farley, the NSA Oral Historian, and selected Special Research Histories (SRH), resulting from declassification, helped fill out the documentary record.

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