

# Mao's War of Resistance: Framework for China's Grand Strategy

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Mao's war of resistance theory is a useful framework for understanding China's grand strategy. The self-described "active defense" strategy in its 2008 Defense White Paper does not have the full explanatory power that the "war of resistance" offers.<sup>1</sup> The war of resistance strategy is about China's pursuit of stability, modernity, and sovereignty as ends, using a geographical approach in a compound manner as the way of achieving these objectives, while using conventional and unconventional means simultaneously, over a protracted period. Executing the strategy in a global environment dominated by the United States ultimately reveals it is a defensive and nonassertive strategy in nature.

## ***China's Strategic Problem***

What are the strategic challenges that China's grand strategy should address? Most experts agree that China's primary objectives are economic growth and the maintenance of domestic political cohesiveness in an attempt to maintain the nation's internal stability and the Chinese Communist Party's control.<sup>2</sup> A RAND study succinctly summarizes China's objectives as modernity, stability, and sovereignty.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, China's diplomatic and military strategy, and actions domestically and in relationships with the outside world, must provide the ways and means to achieve these ends.

Suitable ways and means are derived first from conceptualizing an understanding of the world environment and making assumptions about the future. What are China's opportunities and challenges in the current environment? China greatly benefits from the international free-market system where it competes with its large pool of cheap labor. This factor alone permitted China in a short time to become the most competitive player facing the United States.<sup>4</sup> In some respects, China enjoys a free ride on the benefits of a stable system, one that the United States maintains at extraordinary diplomatic and economic cost. On the other hand, China does not enjoy the advantages that the United States garners in global domains such as international politics, global markets,

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space, and cyberspace. The World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, G-8 and now G-20, the dollar standard, the Internet, and the Global Positioning System are all US creations. The rules the United States emplaced to protect these systems, as well as the physical capabilities to protect lines of communication, permit America to influence world markets to its advantage. The United States is able to dictate to others and, in China's view, meddle in its domestic affairs, including human rights, political freedom, market reforms, Taiwan, and Tibet. Again, in the Chinese view, America has the privilege of using public diplomacy, sanctions, Most Favored Nation status, World Trade Organization membership, and military sales to Taiwan as part of its imperial impingement on China's sovereignty.<sup>5</sup>

Several assumptions regarding China's strategy for the future need to be analyzed. China's primary assumption is that the United States will remain as a global hegemonic power for the next several decades.<sup>6</sup> America will continue to play a leadership role, particularly in paying for security and stability throughout the world.<sup>7</sup> The United States will maintain a forceful diplomacy and a powerful military. Another Chinese assumption is China will be able to maintain its robust economic growth, something that will naturally cause the United States to fear its rise and denounce it for not meeting western standards in the realms of politics, economic activities, and human rights. At the same time, the United States will demand that China share the burden of costs in maintaining global stability and security.

The United States is China's grand strategic challenge. As both a benefactor of China's economic growth and an obstacle to China's greatness, the United States occupies a special place in the Chinese view of the world. China sees the United States as "the principal threat" and the essence of its grand strategy is based on how it measures and deals with the United States.<sup>8</sup> The researcher, David Lai, notes America was the only foreign nation singled out by name in China's 2008 Defense White Paper.<sup>9</sup> According to Zi Zongyun, "Apart from difficulties that are normal between any countries from a clash of interests, there are additional problems in the ideological aspect of Sino-US relations, bearing an emotional character that is rare with relationship between other foreign countries."<sup>10</sup>

Operating in an international system led by the United States, what are the means and ways for China to achieve its global aims? Ideally, the Chinese would take advantage of the system without adding undue costs, but America's competitive behavior and impositions on issues impacting Chinese sovereignty require a strategic response. Mao's "war of resistance" is the concept that underpins the strategy.

### ***War of Resistance***

Mao's war of resistance theory is not as well known as his war of revolution concept. Logically, because the two types of conflict from which the theories are derived differ, though they have common aspects. A revolutionary war is a conflict to overthrow an existing government, e.g., the Red Army versus the

Chinese Republican government initially then against the Nationalists that followed into power afterwards. A war of resistance is a conflict against an invading external enemy, e.g., the Red Army cooperating with the Nationalist army to fight the Japanese Imperial Army. Both are “people’s wars,” but fighting an external enemy requires different approaches than fighting one’s own kind.

The finer points of the war of resistance are not readily understood because Mao himself added to the confusion. Mao initially used the term “revolutionary war” in his writings about the conflict against Japan. In a lecture he delivered at the Red Army College in 1936, Mao Tse-tung refers to the formation of the Communist Party, the Red Army, and the fight against the Chinese Nationalist Army, as a revolutionary war: a war to “bring about the defeat of the reactionary governments of their own countries.”<sup>11</sup> In later writings, however, he refers to it as the “War of Resistance” and clarifies it as a different form of fighting.<sup>12</sup> He delivered a lecture in 1938 titled, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan.”<sup>13</sup> Here guerrilla war is not a revolutionary war, but rather supplementary warfare in a “war of resistance” against an external enemy, an invading imperial army.<sup>14</sup> Two forms of warfare occur simultaneously in a resistance war, “regular warfare (that) is primary and guerilla warfare (that is) supplementary.” In other words, the Nationalist Army waged conventional warfare against the Japanese while the Red Army waged guerilla warfare.

According to Mao, resistance war is best fought in a protracted manner in three phases. The first phase consists of the enemy’s strategic offensive and one’s strategic defensive. One’s conventional army fights a defensive, positional battle while guerrilla forces fight a harassing war in the enemy’s rear area. The second phase is a stalemate, where conventional armies on both sides have stalled, and guerrilla warfare is used as the primary strategy against the invading force. The last phase is a strategic offense in which one’s conventional army fights offensive, mobile battles while guerrillas destroy the enemy’s logistical bases. During the second phase, where “our form of fighting will be primarily guerilla warfare,” Mao extensively describes how guerilla warfare should be waged to control the enemy’s rear area, including establishing bases (guerrilla-controlled areas) and turning enemy-controlled areas (enemy bases) into contested regions.<sup>15</sup> In contrast, the three stages of a revolutionary war are the agitation phase, (inciting the masses); the equilibrium phase (open violence with guerilla operations and establishment of bases); and lastly, open warfare between insurgents and government forces (particularly with formations of large, conventional units).<sup>16</sup>

A comparison of ends, ways, and means highlights the differences in the theories. The revolutionary war attempted to change the status quo and was offense-oriented in nature.<sup>17</sup> A war of resistance was fought to preserve the status quo by defending an existing order against an external enemy. The endstate for the revolutionary war was for the Communist Party to take over the leadership of China. The ends for the war of resistance were to maintain sovereignty and to resist domination by a superior Japan. The ways of a revolutionary war were the stages of escalation. The ways of a resistance war were compound

warfare, e.g., simultaneous defensive battles in territory considered a defensive zone and offensive battles in a contested zone, and the protracted manner to exhaust the stronger state that had to operate with an exterior line with longer lines of communication. In both cases the means are the conventional and unconventional capabilities derived from the people, hence the people's war.

### *Mao and the Evolution of China's Grand Strategies*

Do Mao's ideas still garner enough respect to prevail as China's grand strategy? An analysis of China's grand strategies from the 1960s to the present reveals that Mao's concepts remain ingrained. Even Deng Xia-ping noted the need to retain Mao's great thoughts as he expunged much of Mao's ideology.<sup>18</sup>

China's grand strategy in the 1960s was obviously influenced by Mao who desired to maintain the revolutionary fervor both domestically and globally.<sup>19</sup> For external relations, it was an assertive diplomatic and military strategy emphasizing the "people's war."<sup>20</sup> Mao actively supported revolutions to overturn the bipolar world of the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>21</sup>

China's strategy changed to passive defense in the 1970s and 1980s with general pragmatism and openness to the outside world.<sup>22</sup> Mentally, physically, and economically exhausted from the ideology and practices of the Cultural Revolution, Mao readily accepted a timely diplomatic opening by the United States to counter the mutual Soviet threat.<sup>23</sup> China's military strategy centered on the Soviet Union, mainly on a potential nuclear war, but in case of a ground war, China expected to fight a "people's war under modern conditions."<sup>24</sup>

When Deng Xia-ping came to power, he attempted to exorcise all revolutionary traces and concentrated on modernization.<sup>25</sup> By the end of the 1980s, commensurate with exposure to the outside world, the military strategy was overhauled to fight a "local, limited war" with other possible enemies on China's periphery.<sup>26</sup> Still, the passive defensive strategy reflected the Chinese elites' tradition of antihegemony, continuing Mao's belief that hegemony was the greatest threat to world stability.<sup>27</sup>

The end of the Cold War in 1989 brought a change in strategy from passive defense to active defense. The new strategy was initially less Maoist military thought and more Maoist political thought. One factor was a quantum leap in China's economic growth that fueled confidence and nationalism and matched the rise in wariness toward the United States, the sole remaining superpower. The quick victory by the United States in Operation Desert Storm shocked the Chinese. With a growing budget and in accordance with the philosophy of the Revolution in Military Affairs, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) looked to match America's advantage through technological advances. The military strategy and doctrine was changed to "local, limited wars under high-tech conditions."<sup>28</sup> The larger political challenge for China was an apparent hegemon that was willing to bomb the Chinese Embassy during the Kosovo crisis. Wu Xinbo notes that in the 1990s, Mao's thoughts reached new heights "because of his courage to stand firm against Western imperialism."<sup>29</sup>

The new century witnessed the inclusion of Maoist military thought in the national strategy. The United States was talking and behaving as “the new empire.”<sup>30</sup> China was often referenced as a diplomatic and military threat. President George W. Bush labeled China a “strategic competitor,” and America constructed a hedging “containment” strategy.<sup>31</sup> The collision of a US Navy reconnaissance plane with a Chinese fighter in April 2001 was more evidence of the empire’s aggressive intent in the minds of many Chinese. The United States’ military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with unilateral diplomatic endeavors, further elevated Chinese concerns. The continuing arms sales to Taiwan were perceived as meddling in China’s domestic affairs.<sup>32</sup> At the same time, successes that weaker, unconventional adversaries in Afghanistan and Iraq achieved against US forces may have influenced China to reconsider Mao’s asymmetric and protracted approaches. China’s strategic guidance in the 2008 White Paper deleted the term “limited” and substituted “high-tech conditions” with “conditions of informatization.”<sup>33</sup> With the confluence of a rise in Chinese nationalism, apparent US imperialism, and successful resistance by weaker adversaries to American initiatives, Mao’s ideas made a strong comeback.

### ***War of Resistance as a Contemporary Strategy***

Given the context above, the war of resistance seems to be the best framework with which to analyze China’s grand strategy. It is a strategic defense utilizing conventional and unconventional diplomatic and military means in a geographic orientation and protracted manner. China, using an overall defensive strategy, does not want to overturn the international order. It is not in its interest to do so because, as discussed earlier, China derives economic benefit from the current order that aids in its achieving national objectives. China will, however, defend any imposition or breach of what it considers its sovereignty or territorial rights. Diplomatically and militarily, it does not see itself as wanting to challenge or compete with the United States; it is, however, building capabilities to deter the United States in case of any action against its sovereignty of territory.<sup>34</sup> While defensive on the global scale and in overall intent, diplomatic and military elements can be offensive and at the different levels of war: theater strategic, operational, or tactical.

Just as in the original war of resistance, China’s area of interest can be geographically divided into two areas, a defensive zone and that of contested zones. The defensive zone is its nearby geographical sphere of influence: roughly the area surrounding the territorial boundary of China and the peripheral nations. The contested zones are characterized as everywhere else. The contested zones may be further divided into areas where China is able to establish a base of operations, and regions where it is unable to do so because the area is already part of a US-controlled zone or base of operation.

### ***Conventional in the Defensive Zone***

For China's defensive zone, the emphasis is on a conventional approach. Diplomatically, China has developed a robust "good neighbor policy" with peripheral nations.<sup>35</sup> This includes developing diplomatic and economic ties through international organizations and bilateral and multilateral relationships to strengthen its regional interests.<sup>36</sup> One such means is through the membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, signed in April 1996, that includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.<sup>37</sup> At the same time, China is staking claims to major portions of the South China Sea and declaring the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as not just an economic zone recognized by the international community, but rather as a national security boundary.<sup>38</sup> In addition to security issues, China is taking an active role in the environment, transnational crime, and immigration with regional nations.<sup>39</sup>

Its military doctrine calls this area the "war zone," and the doctrine for a war zone campaign emphasizes a conventional defense capability that is adept at joint operations, "fighting local wars under conditions of informatization" and "access-denial."<sup>40</sup> Hence the increase in efforts to build conventional military capabilities such as antiship and cruise missiles, submarines, long-range bombers, advanced fighters, and amphibious forces that can fight not only a Taiwan scenario but also a regional defense scenario.<sup>41</sup> In conjunction with diplomatic efforts, there is emphasis on the defense of the periphery away from the continent, particularly in maritime territories and regions where conflict with the United States is likely.<sup>42</sup>

### ***Unconventional in the Contested Zone***

It is important to understand that China's grand strategy is a compound approach just like the war of resistance.<sup>43</sup> While the conventional approach is utilized in the defensive zone, unconventional means are applied simultaneously in the contested zone.<sup>44</sup> Diplomatically and militarily, the approach resembles an offensive vis-à-vis American leadership at the local scene just as the guerilla offensive in the original war of resistance. In its modern manifestation, the contested zones include those regions where the United States plays a leadership role, including North America, Europe, parts of Asia and the Middle East; to include areas where the United States is engaged in various activities but does not necessarily dominate, e.g., Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

Diplomatically, China began engaging the world in the 1990s with a transition to a multipolar system, emphasizing partnerships with various nations and regional blocs.<sup>45</sup> China now emphasizes the principle of sovereignty in relations within the international community, attempting to coalesce states in countering what it considers US interventionism. Realizing that multipolarity is not going to be achieved anytime soon, China cultivates economic and diplomatic relations with nations engendering doubt regarding the United States' leadership in world politics and economics.<sup>46</sup> In the contested zones, China often surpasses the United States in engagement efforts, in essence promoting

the Chinese philosophy that economic prosperity does not necessarily entail relinquishing political control. China serves as an example of successful state capitalism to many nations around the globe, including Venezuela, Iran, and Nigeria.<sup>47</sup> It can be argued that China has in fact been very successful in establishing political bases of operations in the contested zone, even in regions that may be traditionally considered US bases of operation, e.g., Australia, Japan, and Korea. The staunchest allies undoubtedly now have to balance their economic interests against traditional security interests.<sup>48</sup> Even European nations have to woo the Chinese with regard to purchasing European debt.<sup>49</sup> The United States is also influenced by China's public diplomacy targeting business and trade organizations.<sup>50</sup> The *People's Daily* ran a series of articles highlighting the effectiveness of Chinese lobbying efforts with the US Congress, a body that at one time accused the China Ocean Shipping Company of espionage, and now praises that company for providing jobs for Americans.<sup>51</sup> Many unconventional concepts were incorporated into the PLA's political doctrine in 2003 in an attempt to support the concept of three areas of conflict: psychological, public opinion, and legal.<sup>52</sup>

Unconventional military means are utilized in the contested zones. One approach is to develop capabilities that can directly impact US defenses by originating threats from mainland China through global commons. Such threats may include cyberwarfare, intercontinental ballistic missiles, antisatellite capabilities, and long-range submarines. Author Timothy Thomas notes that PLA officers writing on Internet strategies advocate a "people's war," inferring China is actively "at war" in cyberspace.<sup>53</sup> This is too literal an interpretation of "war," but it does portend the importance of cyberwarfare as a part of the unconventional capabilities China can exercise in war and peace. As for a space strategy, while still in its infancy, the author Dean Cheng notes the PLA is planning for military space operations that can provide not only an informational advantage but also the ability to attack terrestrial targets from space-based systems.<sup>54</sup>

Another unconventional military approach is the utilization of military diplomacy through such activities as military sales, technical assistance, or peacekeeping operations. In the previous two decades, China significantly increased its military diplomacy not only to reinforce its defensive zone but also to build physical and relational bases of operations overseas.<sup>55</sup> The 2008 White Paper explicitly included a borrowed term from the US Army—Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)—to denote peacetime operations that are not conventional in nature.<sup>56</sup> China fields one of the largest peacekeeping forces in the world. As of December 2008, it had 2,146 peacekeepers serving in 11 UN missions in comparison to 296 peacekeepers from the United States.<sup>57</sup> The authors of the UN missions note the positive trend of China's responsible behavior related to global security issues. They also note, "Over time, it is possible China would aim to counterbalance Western influence gradually and take a more active role in shaping the norms and responses regarding UN peacekeeping operations in ways consistent with Chinese foreign policy principles and

national interests.”<sup>58</sup> As with the United States’ deployment of forces, Chinese military operations overseas enhance the security and effectiveness of China’s diplomatic and economic interests in a given region as well as providing familiarization with the area and bases for future operations.

### ***Protracted Approach***

Another characteristic of the war of resistance strategy is the extended timeframe required to execute it, “protracted” in Mao’s words. It is a strategy of exhaustion, the idea being that in the long-run the United States will tire before China. The United States, relying on a conventional approach, has more areas to defend and requires additional resources over extended lines of communication. China can conserve its resources, slowly build its capabilities, and bide its time until an opportunity develops to conventionally challenge the United States. As noted earlier, China has deleted the term “limited” in its concept of wars.

How long will the protracted strategy take and exactly what stage of the resistance is China currently experiencing? It is safe to say that the strategy is not yet at the third stage in execution, a point where China is ready to launch a conventional offense against the United States. Arguments can be made that China is currently at the first stage of the strategy where execution is largely defensive, both conventionally and unconventionally, a phase where the required conventional capabilities are being developed. Some may argue that the second stage of stalemate has already arrived with China’s ability to deny actions by the United States to come to the aid of Taiwan should a conflict occur. To add strength to this second stage view, one might say China is on an unconventional offensive by means of its diplomacy and military actions. If this view is accepted, one needs to realize the grand strategy took two decades to complete the first stage after China came to the world’s attention following the end of the Cold War. As a rough extrapolation, perhaps another two decades will be required if China wants to complete the second stage.<sup>59</sup> China will want to remain in the second stage as long as reasonably possible because the cost required to build conventional capabilities for the offensive is extraordinary, and counterproductive to China’s economic growth.

### ***Implications for the United States***

What then are the implications for the US in its relationship with a China that is executing a grand strategy of war based on resistance? First, the United States needs to recognize this is a defensive strategy and not designed to dethrone the United States in the international order. America needs to understand there are opportunities and incentives for cooperation in maintaining a strong international order. On the other hand, the United States should not mistake the defensiveness of China’s strategy as an unwillingness to confront the United States when required. China is building a substantial conventional force that can deny the United States access to the regions and go on the offense with significant unconventional, diplomatic, and military capabilities.

Second, Mao's concept for warfare is still alive in China's grand strategy. The "people's war" should not be discounted as an anachronism that cannot counter a modern strategy of war, one that relies on mobility, firepower, and speed. This method of warfare should not be confused with human wave attacks or guerilla tactics, but rather it should be understood as a sophisticated compound way of incorporating conventional and unconventional capabilities. Mao was well versed in the philosophies of Clausewitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu, and many of their ideas are incorporated in the war of resistance theory.

Third, the United States should understand that geography matters to China. While China may be strategically on the defensive, military technologies that expand operational areas permit the Chinese to extend the boundaries of its defensive zone. Maritime Asia is alarmed that China's conventional military capability may soon extend to the second chain of islands from China's coast.<sup>60</sup> At the same time, forward deployed US forces are becoming vulnerable to China's first-strike capabilities. The easy solution to this threat would be to redeploy forces, station them in the continental United States, and rely on a strategy of rapid deployment in times of crisis. This may seem reasonable in an operational context, but in the strategic context, it amounts to little more than letting China turn the United States' controlled zone into a contested zone, or worse, into a Chinese defensive zone. Instead, the United States should maintain a robust forward base of operations and pressure China into expending its resources. The United States cannot afford to cede areas such as Japan, Okinawa, or Korea. Once America abandons these regions, it will be almost impossible to reestablish its presence. The United States may have already inadvertently ceded the Philippines and Thailand, as China already considers them part of a contested zone.

Fourth, the United States cannot afford to relinquish its leadership in the protection of global commons. While it may seem appealing for economic reasons to share the costs with China, the United States will find it counterproductive once China has the capabilities that allow it to conduct security operations in the region where, previously, only the United States had that capability. China's attempt to launch a robust, blue-water navy capable of projecting several aircraft carrier groups could be extremely expensive for both nations. Such acts could very well result in an unintended arms competition, with the potential for misreading one another's intentions on the high seas.

Fifth, for some reasons, simply contesting for areas or regions may not be worth the costs of the competition for the United States. For example, specific regions in Africa and Latin America currently under contestation are not under the direct sphere of influence of either the United States or China. Unless the United States can define vital national interests in these areas, the policy choice should be to withdraw and allow China to engage. China has the capability to bring a level of development, military assistance, and peacekeeping to this part of the world, a region where the United States simply lacks sufficient resources. While some may support a competition for resources and moral leadership in these areas of the world, the counterargument is that resource extraction by China

adds to the global availability of resources. Additionally, Chinese assistance may improve the prospects of these developing countries. What is important is for the United States to understand China's intent for any contested areas.

Lastly, it is important to keep in mind that China is executing a long-term strategy. The United States cannot counter such a strategy with one that is shortsighted in terms of its national interests and objectives. This article has argued that, in the current environment, China's economic goal would be to discourage any strategic offensive or attempt to reorder the international system. The key issue, however, remains: China will ultimately want to reach for the third stage of such a strategy based on its interests.<sup>61</sup>

## **Conclusion**

From their own perspective, the United States and China see themselves as executing an "active defensive" strategy, one that aims to maintain the status quo. The real danger is the fact that it is easy to mistake the other's strategy as being assertive. US policymakers need to understand the "war of resistance" strategy, and be able to develop their own unified strategy, one that encourages China to benefit from a stable world order and encourages it to play a constructive role. Dismissing Mao's concepts because revolutionary war or people's war sounds anachronistic or is viewed as an inferior Eastern strategy is to misunderstand a potential adversary, a misunderstanding capable of leading to either overestimating or underestimating an opponent's intent.

Lastly, the war of resistance has implications not only at the grand strategy level, but also at the theater strategic, operational, and tactical levels as well. While this article dealt only with grand strategy, further research into implications of the concept at the operational and tactical levels may prove beneficial.

## **NOTES**

1. Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, China's National Defense in 2008, [http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20/content\\_1210227\\_4.htm](http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227_4.htm) (accessed February 22, 2011).

2. There are many variations along this line. Yufan Hao and Guocang Huan, eds., "Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition," *The Chinese View of the World* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), xi.

3. David M. Finklestein, "China's National Military Strategy" in *The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age*, eds. James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 103.

4. Avery Goldstein, *Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 148-149.

5. Ibid, 152; Andrew Scobell, *Chinese Army Building in the Era of Jiang Zemin* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2008), 20.

6. Goldstein, *Rising to the Challenge*, 24.

7. Ibid, 27.

8. Scobell, *Chinese Army Building*, 3, 20.

9. David Lai, "Introduction" in *The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military*, eds. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 19.

10. Zi Zhongyun, "The Clash of Ideas: Ideology and Sino-U.S. Relations" in *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior*, ed. Suisheng Zhao (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004), 241.
11. Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 77-146, 270.
12. *Ibid.*, 89, 271. Writing in 1936, in comparison to later writing in 1938, Mao reverts to categorizing war of resistance as a specific form of a revolutionary war as if to defend against an accusation that fighting the Japanese fell outside of the realm of a revolution.
13. *Ibid.*, 77-146 and 153-183.
14. *Ibid.*, 153.
15. *Ibid.*, 212-219.
16. Andrew Krepvinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 7-8. Mao does not quite put it in these terms, but Krepvinevich developed these stages from various writings of Giap and Mao.
17. Mao, *Selected Military Writings*, 102. "The proposition that a revolution or a revolutionary war is an offensive is of course correct."
18. 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 2007: Planning China's Next 5 Years, 1980: Deng Xiaoping Comments on Mao Zedong Thought, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229773.htm> (accessed February 26, 2011).
19. Joseph Y. S. Cheng and Zhang Wankun, "Patterns and Dynamics of Chinese International Strategic Behavior," in *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior*, ed. Suisheng Zhao (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004). Cheng and Zhang attribute this characteristic from 1960-1972.
20. Mao, *Selected Military Writings*, 102, 103-106; Chas W. Freeman, *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 72-73. Paul H.B. Goodwin, "The PLA Face the Twenty-First Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations" in *China's Military Faces the Future*, eds. James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999), 41-42. Freeman notes that diplomatic strategies can be assertive, passive defensive, or active defensive. These terms are similar to, if not the same as, Mao's terminology of revolutionary, passive defense, and active defense, revolutionary being equated to offensive. The similarity is understandable given Freeman's preeminent expertise on China.
21. Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 277-278.
22. *Ibid.*; Cheng and Zhang, "Patterns and Dynamics," 179.
23. Cheng and Zhang, "Patterns and Dynamics" 179. Cheng and Zhang attribute this as a period of pseudo-alliance with the United States against the Soviet Union from 1972 to 1982.
24. Goodwin, "The PLA Face the Twenty-First Century," 43, 46-48.
25. Lau Siu-kai, "Pragmatic Calculations of National Interest" in *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior*, ed. Suisheng Zhao (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004), 98.
26. Goodwin, "The PLA Face the Twenty-First Century," 43, 48-49.
27. Cheng and Zhang, "Patterns and Dynamics," 183.
28. Goodwin, "The PLA Face the Twenty-First Century," 43, 54-55.
29. Wu Xinbo, "Four Contradictions in Constraining China's Foreign Policy Behavior" in *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior*, ed. Suisheng Zhao (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004), 69.
30. There are numerous books on the new American empire published in the early 2000s. An example is Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of American Empire* (New York: Penguin Press 2004).
31. Goldstein, *Rising to the Challenge*, 157.
32. Goodwin discusses the U.S. Navy EP-3 collision and the military sales to Taiwan. Paul H.B. Goodwin, "The People's Liberation Army and the Changing Global Security Landscape" in *The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military*, eds.

Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 56-57.

33. Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, China's National Defense in 2008, [http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20/content\\_1210227\\_4.htm](http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227_4.htm) (accessed February 22, 2011).

34. Dean Cheng, "Chinese Views on Deterrence," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 60 (1st Quarter 2011): 92-94.

35. Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, "Chapter I. The Security Situation," in China's National Defense in 2008, [http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20/content\\_1210227\\_3.htm](http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227_3.htm) (accessed February 22, 2011).

36. Suisheng Zhao, "The Making of Chinese Periphery Policy" in *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior*, ed. Suisheng Zhao (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004), 256-259.

37. Zhao, "The Making of Chinese Periphery Policy," 263.

38. Goodwin, "The PLA Face the Twenty-First Century," 48-50.

39. Zhao, "The Making of Chinese Periphery Policy," 257.

40. Nan Li, "The PLA's Evolving Campaign Doctrine and Strategy" in *The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age*, eds. James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 146; Goodwin, "The PLA Face the Twenty-First Century," 46; Michael Flaherty, "Red Wings Ascendant: The Chinese Air Force Contribution to Antiaccess," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 60 (1st Quarter 2011): 95.

41. Mark Cozad, "China's Regional Power Projection: Prospects for Future Mission in the South and East China Seas," in *Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other than Taiwan*, eds. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 289-290.

42. Goodwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century," 48-50.

43. The latest fad is to call it "hybrid warfare," which is supposed to denote all forms of warfare used simultaneously. This paper will use "compound warfare." Thomas M. Huber, ed., *Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 2002).

44. Another current fad term is "asymmetric warfare," which is used to denote what is termed as unconventional warfare in this article. It is meant to denote it as a weaker organization's way of war against a stronger entity. "Unrestricted" is another term since the writing of two Chinese military writers, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare: Assumptions on War and Tactics in the Age of Globalization* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999).

45. Cheng and Zheng, "Patterns and Dynamics," 179-180.

46. Stefan Halper, *The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

47. Ibid, Chapter 4.

48. John Frewen, *Harmonious Ocean: Chinese Aircraft Carriers and Australia's U.S. Alliance*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 10, 2010).

49. Anthony Fiaola, "Chinese Clout Felt in Europe," *Washington Post*, January 10, 2010.

50. Steve Mufenson and Peter Whoriskey, "China Agrees to Buy Hummer," *Washington Post*, October 10, 2009; John Pompre, "China's Lobbying Efforts Yield New Influence, Openness on Capitol Hill," *Washington Post*, January 9, 2010.

51. "Congress Feels Chinese Influence," People's Daily Online, January 11, 2010, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6864713.html> (accessed February 5, 2011).

52. Dean Cheng, "China's Active Defense Strategy and Its Regional Impact," Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 26, 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/2011/01/Chinas-Active-Defense-Strategy-and-Its-Regional-Impact> (accessed February 15, 2011).

53. Timothy L. Thomas, "Google Confronts China's 'Three Warfares,'" *Parameters* 40, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 109.

54. Dean Cheng, "Prospects for China's Military Space Efforts," in *Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other than Taiwan*, eds. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 231.

55. Heidi Holz and Kenneth Allen, "Military Exchanges with Chinese Characteristics: The People's Liberation Army Experience with Military Relations" in *Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other than Taiwan*, eds. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 429.

56. Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, "Chapter II. National Defense Policy," in China's National Defense in 2008, [http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20/content\\_1210227\\_4.htm](http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227_4.htm) (accessed February 22, 2011).

57. Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang, "China's Expanding Presence in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Implications for the United States" in *Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other than Taiwan*, eds. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 104.

58. *Ibid.*, 115,117.

59. There is no great basis for comparison, but in cases of the Korean War and the Vietnam War where war of resistance strategies were utilized, first and second stages were of equal period: 2-3 years in the case of Korea and 5-7 years for Vietnam before the full-scale conventional offensive.

60. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010, [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010\\_CMPR\\_Final.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf) (accessed February 1, 2011), 22-23.

61. David Lai has an interesting metaphor for the Chinese way of strategy that supports the war of resistance concept. He claims that the Chinese game of *go* explains China's strategy better than chess. First, there is the difference of the geometry, or the territorial aspects, to the game of *go* versus the force orientation objective in the game of chess. The war of resistance is very much about geography and territory, e.g., the defensive zone. Then there are ordinary and extraordinary moves akin to conventional and unconventional approaches. Additionally, the players engage in multiple theaters whereas chess is largely one contiguous front that is conventional. Chess relies on decisive maneuvers whereas *go* is a game of patience and endurance. *Go* rarely goes to completion as in chess where one side dominates and entire forces are annihilated or the King is "checkmated." It is a prolonged game that ends when the parties have committed all their resources and no more moves can be made. David Lai, *Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China's Strategic Concept* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2004).