

Citizen in Uniform: Democratic Germany and the Changing *Bundeswehr*

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The *Innere Fuehrung* with its corollary of “citizen in uniform” greatly contributed to the fact that the *Bundeswehr* became not only a self-evident part of our society but also a reliable instrument of German security policies.¹

—Dr. Franz Josef Jung, Former German Defense Minister

On 12 May 1949, Germany’s three Western Military Governors (United States, France and Great Britain) sent a letter to Dr. Conrad Adenauer, the President of the Parliamentary Council. With some reservations, this letter approved the Draft Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.² In less than two weeks, on 23 May 1949, the Constitution (or Basic Law) for the young democracy was confirmed by the Parliamentary Council in a public session.³ The unique preamble of the Basic Law committed the German nation to the promotion of peace and European unity. The Basic Law did not, however, include any articles regarding the establishment of armed forces.⁴ Even so, Germany and its occupying powers were determined not to repeat the militarism and fanaticism that had brought the nation and the world into two devastating wars in the first half of the century.

The ensuing deepening East-West conflict necessitated a German military contribution to defend Western freedom. This was especially evident following the 1950 communist North Korean invasion of South Korea.⁵ The United States urged its European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners to rearm Germany as a NATO member after the Pleven Plan for a European Defense Community was rejected by the French national assembly in 1954.⁶ But German citizens, who had suffered two major wars, remained skeptical regarding their nation’s rearmament.⁷ Nonetheless, Chancellor Adenauer managed to gain formal approval of rearmament, even though the majority of Germans opposed it.⁸ He envisioned this as a way to restore Germany’s sovereignty; a rearmed Germany would gain equal partnership within the western alliance of democracies.⁹ On 12 November 1955, the 200th birthday

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of General Scharnhorst, the founding father of conscription in Prussia,¹⁰ the first 101 volunteers joined the *Bundeswehr*.¹¹ Two years later the first 10,000 conscripts were drafted.¹²

A central issue was how to guarantee that the new force would be an integral part of the young democracy and not yield to antidemocratic tendencies in its ranks. This was especially important because much of its military leadership would come from the veterans of the *Wehrmacht* and *Reichswehr*. In October 1950, a Rearmament Commission established by Chancellor Adenauer issued its initial proposal for the formation of a new German army. A group of 15 hand-picked former *Wehrmacht* officers met at the “*Eifelkloster Himmerod*” under the lead of Adolf Heusinger¹³ and drafted the so-called “*Himmeroder Denkschrift*” (Himmerod Memorandum),¹⁴ which became the founding document for the new *Bundeswehr*. The group strongly advised that the preconditions for German rearmament should be totally different from those that led to the *Wehrmacht*. They insisted that Germany’s new army should be closely integrated with German society and subordinate to civilian leadership.¹⁵ German leaders did not want to create another “state within a state,”¹⁶ as happened with the *Reichswehr*. Nor did they want the military to be misused politically or to be subject to political indoctrinations, as was the *Wehrmacht*.¹⁷

The preamble of the Basic Law guided the new German national vision: “Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted this Basic Law.”¹⁸ The founding fathers of the *Bundeswehr* needed to ensure that the norms and values embodied in the Basic Law would be assured in the *Bundeswehr*.¹⁹ Therefore, Lieutenant General Graf von Baudissin²⁰ advocated that the *Bundeswehr* be built on the principle of *Innere Fuehrung* (leadership development and civic education), based on its corollary of “citizen in uniform” (*Staatsbuenger in Uniform*).²¹ Civil-military relations were established in accord with the Basic Law and in keeping with the principle of *Innere Fuehrung*. To ensure that the *Bundeswehr* conformed to the Basic Law, three pillars were established at its founding: the principle of *Innere Fuehrung*, the corollary of “citizen in uniform,” and conscription of German citizens for military service.

This article describes how *Innere Fuehrung*, with its corollary of “citizen in uniform,” assured that the norms and values of the German Basic Law were embedded in the *Bundeswehr*. It elaborates on this principle and shows how *Innere Fuehrung* shaped the civil-military relationship in Germany. The article then explains how the principle has remained intact through three paradigm changes of the *Bundeswehr*:

- Rearmament that included integration of former *Wehrmacht* and *Reichswehr* soldiers.
- Integration of former East German soldiers after reunification.
- Performance of new worldwide missions.

It then considers the implications of a recent fourth paradigm change—Germany’s transition to an all-volunteer force. Finally, the article offers some

recommendations to ensure that *Innere Fuehrung*, with its corollary of “citizen in uniform,” remains the guiding principle for the new all-volunteer *Bundeswehr*.

Innere Fuehrung (1st Pillar—Overarching Principle)

A simple definition or translation of *Innere Fuehrung* does not exist.²² Even the recent version of the *ZDv 10/1* (Joint Service Regulation—Leadership Development and Civic Education) offers more of an explanation than a definition of the concept.²³ On the *Bundeswehr* website of the Ministry of Defense, the concept is described as: “harmoniz[ing] the principles of a free and democratic constitutional state with the principles of order and operation required by the armed forces to fulfill their constitutional mission. Today [2011] *Innere Fuehrung* is more than ever a distinct hallmark of the German armed forces.”²⁴

Leadership and civic education are two parts of *Innere Fuehrung*. In German, “*Fuehrung*” means both.²⁵ Within the *Bundeswehr*, both leadership and civic education are essential to avoid the unquestioning and slavish obedience that characterized *Nazi-Wehrmacht* soldiers. *Innere Fuehrung* fosters moral courage and encourages soldiers to defend their own beliefs. The soldiers’ “law on obedience” ensures that the values and norms of the Basic Law are binding guidelines for soldiers in any situation.²⁶ As a mandatory part of leadership, civic education emphasizes *Bundeswehr* leaders’ duty to provide political education for the soldiers to “intensify their knowledge of the values and norms of the Basic Law.”²⁷

“Citizen in Uniform” (2nd Pillar—1st Vital Corollary to Innere Fuehrung)

The guiding corollary of “citizen in uniform” is the critical element of the *Innere Fuehrung* concept; it guarantees the army’s link to the state and society. In general, it guarantees soldiers the same rights as all other citizens while serving in the *Bundeswehr*. Some basic rights are explicitly confirmed by the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act (*Soldatengesetz* or *SG*).²⁸ A few citizen-soldiers’ rights are, however, restricted to avoid conflicts in loyalties between the military and the state and to balance personal freedom with obligations to the state.²⁹ The principle of *Innere Fuehrung* balances the need for an efficient, mission-ready military against the need to uphold society’s democratic values.

Conscription (3rd Pillar—2nd Vital Corollary to Innere Fuehrung)

The founding fathers of the *Bundeswehr* and the Parliament mandated a conscript army based on lessons learned from the past. Conscription was seen “as an organizational device to counteract anti-democratic political ambitions of the officer corps of the armed forces.”³⁰ In addition, every citizen has an obligation to serve his country and thereby gain an understanding of the role of the military in society and strengthen civil-military relations. Conscription ensures that the military reflects all elements of society. As President Heuss asserted, conscription slowly became the “legitimate child of democracy” in West Germany.³¹

Resting on these three pillars, *Innere Fuehrung* dynamically integrates the unchangeable core values espoused in the Basic Law into the *Bundeswehr*. It affirms the civil-military relation in Germany and it defines the self-image of the *Bundeswehr*. Through the corollary of “citizen in uniform,” the *Bundeswehr* became an integral part of the German state and society. It has enabled the nation’s military to adapt to major changes in society, in the state, and in the world.

Paradigm Change 1: Rearmament and Integration of Former Wehrmacht and Reichswehr Soldiers

The *Reichswehr* provided the armed forces for the first democratic German state, the Weimar Republic (1919-1933). Its soldiers reflected the pre-democratic attitudes prevalent in the Wilhelmine era. Because its officer corps failed to accept parliamentary democracy, the *Reichswehr* essentially evolved into “a state within [a] state” that eventually undermined the Republic.³² Its successor, the *Wehrmacht*, developed characteristics of extreme German militarism committed to the ideals of National Socialism. Thus the *Wehrmacht* became a willing means to achieve the perverted ends of the Third Reich (1933–1945).³³ Consequently, the founders of the new *Bundeswehr* assiduously sought to avoid any repetition of the catastrophic consequences of these former military forces.

The Himmerod Memorandum (9 October 1950) conveyed initial views on how the new German armed forces should be designed. The memo asserted that these forces had to be fundamentally different. Accordingly, in a chapter entitled “*Das Innere Gefuege*” (inner structure), it recommended an innovative approach for the new force; “*Inneres Gefuege*” was further developed into the principle of *Innere Fuehrung* and its corollary of “citizen in uniform.”³⁴ At this time, public discussions of rearmament tended to be bitter and controversial. Following the Allied programs of denazification, demilitarization, and democratization, Germans were not ready to rearm.³⁵ *Innere Fuehrung* was designed to gain public trust. The new armed forces would be created completely in accord with the Constitution and the new military establishment would be an integral part of society.

To guarantee strong civil control,³⁶ command and control of the military would be exercised by a Ministry of Defense under robust political leadership. The principle “*divide et impera*” (divide and rule) within the *Bundeswehr* was established. According to the Basic Law, a separate administrative substructure was established beneath the military structure.³⁷

General Ulrich de Maizière, one of the founding members of the *Bundeswehr*, articulated four components of “*Das Innere Gefuege*.”³⁸ First, the armed forces would be integrated into an alliance that provided for a common defense of Europe. This accorded with the intent of the preamble and Article 24 of the German Basic Law. Second, Germany’s armed forces would structure and train for a defensive mission, in accord with Article 87a of the Basic Law.³⁹ Any kind of offensive action was strictly forbidden.⁴⁰ Third, Germany’s armed forces would organize jointly to reduce the independence of the separate military services. These services would fall under a single defense department

that controlled personnel, budget, and defense acquisitions. Fourth, the forces would observe the Basic Law and submit to the primacy of civilian authority. Thus, the Parliament controls the military in all matters.⁴¹

Given Germany's history, civilian control of the military had to be very strong and efficient. At the beginning, this requirement precipitated much discussion and frustration within the *Bundeswehr*.⁴² Its leaders were especially reluctant to yield direct civilian control of *Bundeswehr* soldiers.⁴³ But this political control was designed to ensure the linkage between the *Bundeswehr* and the German state and society. It would also foster a democratic mindset in the troops. *Innere Fuehrung* thus provided the means to gain and maintain public trust in and support of the nation's military.

Command over the *Bundeswehr* in peacetime was given to a civilian Minister of Defense, supported by state secretaries (parliamentary and public officials). Only in times of conflict (during actual or impending attacks) were the powers of command transferred to the Federal Chancellor.⁴⁴ The military thus had no central command and control of its own. Its *Generalinspekteur* (*GenInsp*), similar to a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), did not outrank the civilian chiefs.⁴⁵ In addition, as spelled out in the Basic Law, a Defense Committee (*Verteidigungsausschuss*) was established to represent the members of Parliament and to ensure parliamentary control over the executive and thus the armed forces. During the early years, the Defense Committee was instrumental in developing a legal framework for the young *Bundeswehr*.⁴⁶ Finally, as an additional means of civil control, an independent Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces was installed. This Commissioner oversaw the civil rights of the soldiers and ensured adherence to the principles of *Innere Fuehrung*.⁴⁷

In 1956, an independent Advisory Council on Questions of *Innere Fuehrung* (*Beirat fuer Fragen der Inneren Fuehrung*) was established to support the Minister of Defense in all matters pertaining to *Innere Fuehrung* and to provide independent expert judgment on civil-military issues.⁴⁸ In another 1956 democratic initiative, German soldiers were granted the right to elect a spokesperson. This individual mediated matters between soldiers and their military superiors.⁴⁹ Clearly, German leaders focused on building a legal framework and control system to ensure that the new armed forces would be an integral part of the new democratic Germany.⁵⁰

But the so-called Himmerod compromise weakened the original intent of reform.⁵¹ The traditionalist group tried to build an "*optimized Wehrmacht*"⁵² and thus preserve the strengths of the former organization. Even the US military raised some skeptical questions about the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* and "citizen in uniform." They feared these concepts would make the German contribution to the NATO alliance less effective.⁵³ Military sociologist Samuel Huntington argued that it could "reduce the fighting effectiveness of the new army"; he claimed "a democratic state is better defended by a professional force than a democratic force."⁵⁴

So fifteen years after its creation,⁵⁵ the *Bundeswehr* was mired in a deep crisis; the traditionalists seemed to dominate. The Chief of the Army, Lieutenant

General Schnez, supported by most of his top leadership, demanded that German society should adapt to serve the needs of the armed forces. Major General Helmut Grashey denounced *Innere Fuehrung* as a farce.⁵⁶ These traditionalists advocated a return to a strong warrior culture. The concept of *Innere Fuehrung* had obviously failed to permeate post-war Germany's military culture.⁵⁷ From its top leaders all the way down the ranks, *Bundeswehr* personnel regarded themselves as superior to society at large. *Innere Fuehrung* was at risk. The *Bundeswehr* appeared ready to separate itself from society.

The situation quickly changed when the Social Democrats (*SPD*) appointed their first Minister of Defense, Helmut Schmidt, on 19 October 1969.⁵⁸ Schmidt proposed a new image for the *Bundeswehr* and a new kind of soldier for the nation. He instituted military reform by changing the recruiting policy and the education system for officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Schmidt's education reform began with better-educated officers. He organized two *Bundeswehr* universities and mandated academic education for officers beyond their basic military training. Relying on Baudissin's ideal of "citizen in uniform," Schmidt's new recruiting policy for *Bundeswehr* personnel sought to build an army that reflected Germany's pluralistic society. Through these reforms, Schmidt broke the dominance of the old elites and diversified the officer corps.⁵⁹ In addition, Helmut Schmidt led the development of the first Joint Service Regulation *ZDv 10/1* (Assistance for *Innere Fuehrung*, classified: restricted).⁶⁰

This military reform revitalized the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* and affirmed the value of the "citizen in uniform." For the first time in German military history, a strong civil mindset displaced the formerly dominant military mindset. The conscript system ensured a place for the "citizen in uniform." It forced the *Bundeswehr's* elder generation to accept a new type of soldier envisioned by Helmut Schmidt.

Paradigm Change 2: The Integration of Soldiers of the National People's Army

On 1 October 1990, the secession of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) triggered the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. On the same day, all generals, admirals, and soldiers older than 55 were retired from the GDR's National People's Army (NPA) (*Nationale Volksarmee* or *NVA*).⁶¹ Members of the political cadre and military justice system had been retired earlier.⁶² More than 2.5 million East Germans had served in the NPA between 1956 and 1990.⁶³ At midnight on 3 October 1990, the GDR national service flag was cased for the last time in all garrisons—the NPA no longer existed. On the same day, 1,200 officers and NCOs from the *Bundeswehr* occupied key positions in the former NPA.⁶⁴ They came as Germans to fellow Germans. Their mission was to win the hearts and minds of their former Warsaw Pact adversaries.⁶⁵

In this new security environment, the total German military force had to be reduced from 600,000 to 370,000. At the same time, former NPA soldiers were integrated into the *Bundeswehr*.⁶⁶ This was not an easy task. NPA

soldiers came from a nondemocratic society. The NPA was a political army and an instrument of dictatorship. The NPA had played an important role in socializing its young recruits into the GDR's communist society.⁶⁷ Their soldiers were indoctrinated to believe that *Innere Fuehrung* and "citizen in uniform" were an anti-democratic scheme "to create a human fighting machine, capable of independent, aggressive action and prepared to carry out criminal orders without scruples."⁶⁸ Indeed, they claimed that only the NPA within the communist regime could produce a "citizen in uniform."⁶⁹ In addition, these soldiers knew nothing of Western values, which were denigrated under the communist regime.

Whereas Wehrmacht veterans joined a newly established military force, these NPA veterans had to integrate into a 45-year-old organization with totally different values and mindset. Also, they would not be considered for high-level leadership positions, as *Wehrmacht* veterans were. Only 10,800⁷⁰ former NPA-soldiers were accepted "for a two-year probationary contract."⁷¹ Their *Innere Fuehrung* education began immediately at military schools and academies in West Germany. In addition to self-studies, they received practical training at *Bundeswehr* installations in the West. Mobile training teams supported their training, and former NPA soldiers were provided practical instruction at their new locations.⁷² To continue their service, they had to demonstrate total assimilation into the *Bundeswehr*.

Like these former NPA soldiers, new conscripts from East Germany had no democratic orientation.⁷³ They were integrated into the three-month basic training program with the West German conscripts and trained exclusively in West Germany.⁷⁴ This was an important step for building a German "army in unity" that joined together young people from different political systems on a regular basis.⁷⁵ These young soldiers were exposed to democratic norms and values before they returned to their garrisons and homes in the East. As of 2005, more than 600,000 East German youth had been conscripted into the *Bundeswehr*. The *Bundeswehrs'* commitment to the Basic Law helped to integrate these East Germans into a democratic society.⁷⁶ These soldiers were exposed to the principles of *Innere Fuehrung* during their time in the *Bundeswehr* and to the norms associated with civilian control of the military. Conscription was used to train soldiers in democracy and Basic Law. Indeed, as these young East Germans donned their *Bundeswehr* uniforms, they learned not only how to be "citizens in uniform" but also how to be democratic citizens.

Paradigm Change 3: Assignment of Worldwide Missions

According to the Basic Law, the *Bundeswehr* was authorized only to defend Germany within its borders. All German administrations up to 1990 accepted this mandate. Therefore, missions abroad only provided humanitarian support after a catastrophe. This concept changed with the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new international security environment.

The *Bundeswehr* did not provide ground forces for the Gulf War, but it did provide 11.8 billion Deutsche Mark (approximately \$6.9 billion)⁷⁷ to support the operation.⁷⁸ The *Bundeswehr's* participation in Cambodia with the United

Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992 was its first real deployment abroad.⁷⁹ This was followed by German soldiers' participation in AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) flights to monitor the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina (DENY-FLIGHT), the UNOSOM II (United Nations Operation in Somalia) mission in Somalia, and the naval blockade against Serbia and Montenegro (SHARP GUARD). These operations triggered legal complaints from two factional parliamentary parties. On 12 July 1994, the Supreme Court declared that missions abroad conformed with the Basic Law when authorized by Parliament.⁸⁰ An incremental approach was taken to adapt the *Bundeswehr* to its new missions and also to gain German society's acceptance of these changes.

Yet ten years after the *Bundeswehr* undertook its first mission, German society seemed reluctant to support these new tasks. When in 2002 former Minister of Defense Peter Struck declared that "Germany's security [was] also defended in the Hindu Kush,"⁸¹ this assertion triggered a lengthy and heated public debate. One year later, the 2003 defense policy designated worldwide missions as a primary task requiring further growth and reorganization of the *Bundeswehr*.⁸² Three years later, a White Paper specified the most probable tasks for the *Bundeswehr*: resolution of international conflicts, crisis management, and the war against international terrorism.⁸³ For the first time, official documents publically described *Bundeswehr's* operational reality. But these documents did not foster needed discussion related to security policy in German society.

Operations in Afghanistan marked the first time since World War II that German soldiers engaged in combat.⁸⁴ When the German people learned that their soldiers were being wounded and killed in Afghanistan, they were gravely concerned and surprised. Many believed that German soldiers stationed in Afghanistan were there to "help, protect, and secure" the Afghan people.⁸⁵ German society needed time to acclimate to the new roles their military was performing.⁸⁶

Consequently, a new *Bundeswehr* generation has emerged. German forces have been deployed on a regular basis and members of the force are suspicious of any colleagues and leaders who have not deployed. The 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines⁸⁷ declared that *Innere Fuehrung* would adapt to these new tasks. A 2006 White Paper stated "The tenets of '*Innere Fuehrung*'—leadership development and civic education—will remain the *Bundeswehr's* guiding principles."⁸⁸ Critics have argued, however, that the change of the *Bundeswehr* mission from defense to worldwide missions rendered *Innere Fuehrung* an anachronistic ideal—no longer a viable principle for current missions. At the same time, a group of mission-oriented, technocratic revisionist, senior officers replaced the traditionalists. Accompanying these officers has been a return to the "old" traditional thinking of the missions for the *Bundeswehr*. This group argues that efficiency in missions is more important than *Innere Fuehrung*. From their perspective, the peacetime concept of *Innere Fuehrung* does not address the realities of current missions. They espouse a position that *Innere Fuehrung* endangers soldiers when they participate in these missions.⁸⁹ Recent scandals in Coesfeld (2004) and in Afghanistan (2006) are reminiscent of actions that

first appeared when the *Bundeswehr* was first reestablished.⁹⁰ Again, a failure to think issues through and slavish obedience to authority, combined with a lack of human dignity, were evident in these scandals.

To address these issues, the latest version of the *ZDv 10/1* seeks to restore the value of *Innere Fuehrung* to a mission-oriented *Bundeswehr*.⁹¹ Nonetheless, the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* remains under stress. As the *Bundeswehr* transitions to an all-volunteer force, the 3rd pillar of conscription has been removed from Germany's military.

Paradigm Change 4: Transition to an All-Volunteer Force

On 1 July 2011, the *Bundeswehr* established the all-volunteer force following 54 years of conscription to adapt to the requirements for an expeditionary force with global reach. The conscript system had guaranteed a steady supply of young men for the *Bundeswehr* and a wide dissemination of the principles of *Innere Fuehrung*. More than eight million Germans have served in the *Bundeswehr*. These veterans have deeply embedded their beliefs and experiences in the *Bundeswehr* within the German state and society.⁹²

The all-volunteer force concept will be challenged to sustain the military's link to society. In fact, we may see the army's relationship with the German people dramatically weakened.⁹³ There is a belief that fewer young Germans will join the all-volunteer force, and there is a risk that those who do join may overrepresent specific segments of society. Wolffsohn, a historian at the *Bundeswehr* University Munich,⁹⁴ predicted that the "citizen in uniform" will be replaced by the "underclass in uniform."⁹⁵ Indeed, the integration of former NPA soldiers and a disproportionate number of East Germans in the *Bundeswehr* have already changed the character of the force. The *Bundeswehr* recruits one-third of its soldiers in the new *Bundeslaender*, where only one-fifth of the German population lives⁹⁶—and where democratic conditions and institutions have a short history. Without the third pillar of conscription,⁹⁷ civil-military relations will need to be buttressed by the remaining two pillars (*Innere Fuehrung* and "citizen in uniform") to ensure the *Bundeswehr* remains an integral part of society and the state.

The 2011 Defense Policy Guidelines assert that *Innere Fuehrung* and its corollary of the "citizen in uniform" will remain unchanged. This policy envisions an expeditionary, combat-ready *Bundeswehr*, accepted within society and the state, with a strong reputation for spreading democratic values worldwide.⁹⁸ To achieve the proposed objectives of the Defense Policy Guidelines, much more than a simple transformation is necessary. Instead, a revolutionary and comprehensive approach,⁹⁹ led by Parliament, is required. Such a transformation needs to ensure adherence to the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* and the "citizen in uniform." The original intent for the founding of the *Bundeswehr* in accord with the Basic Law was to avoid creating a "state within a state." This intent must be preserved. German citizens now have an opportunity to be involved in a vital foreign and security policy discussion, led by Parliament and involving the nation's leadership. Widespread deliberation of this particular matter would

dispel German society's "polite disinterest," as former Federal President Horst Koehler described German citizens' disengagement from civic issues.¹⁰⁰

Even before the decision to suspend conscription in Germany, a number of political scientists offered recommendations for adapting *Innere Fuehrung* to these new missions and to an all-volunteer force. According to the political scientist Professor Elmar Wiesendahl,¹⁰¹ the core principles of *Innere Fuehrung* (primacy of civilian authority, respect of the Basic Law, and integration of the army and society) must remain unchanged. So long as other changes in the *Bundeswehr* do not violate *Innere Fuehrung*, these adaptations should proceed to make the *Bundeswehr* a viable 21st century armed force.¹⁰² A recent number of studies on the new missions and an all-volunteer force provide abundant material for a broad public discussion on the future of the *Bundeswehr*.¹⁰³

The Parliament, including the Chancellor, need to take the lead in assuring the *Innere Fuehrung* and the "citizen in uniform" retain their fundamental roles in the all-volunteer force; Parliament is the constitutional leader of the army. This adaptation is as critical as the post-war rearmament of Germany; it should attract the same level of scrutiny. The Defense Committee should be tasked to revive the subcommittee for "advancement of *Innere Fuehrung*." The subcommittee needs to work with *Bundeswehr* leaders and the ministerial department of *Innere Fuehrung* to devise ways to embed this principle in the new all-volunteer force.¹⁰⁴ The Parliamentary Commissioner and the independent Advisory Council on Questions of *Innere Fuehrung* have to be included in this deliberation. These four groups share responsibility for the future development of *Innere Fuehrung*. The *Bundeswehr* Association,¹⁰⁵ with its unlimited access to the public sector and direct access to the Minister of Defense, should also be a critical part of this process. The Parliamentary Commissioner would be responsible for implementing recommendations, as directed by law. These groups would be responsible for ensuring that the military recruiting and incentives programs¹⁰⁶ are financed in such a manner as to increase diversity, attract quality volunteers, and retain the best *Bundeswehr* soldiers.

Education also plays a critical role in this transition. In comparison to the former conscript *Bundeswehr*, new volunteers will require an extended education in ethics, history, and politics to compensate for any education shortfalls and to meet the higher standards associated with an expeditionary force. The formulative education of officers and NCOs needs to be aligned in an effort to assure the army's linkage to society and to facilitate reintegration of veterans into the civil sector. The *Bundeswehr* should establish exchange programs with industry and government agencies to support integration, linkage, and mutual understanding. To sustain relationships with society, *Bundeswehr* military careers need to parallel those of the US Army, which provides career officers abundant opportunities for education and internships with civilian universities, other agencies of government, and private businesses. Officers who pursue such opportunities should qualify for favorable promotion consideration. Likewise, *Bundeswehr* civilians need to study with the soldiers at the *Bundeswehr* Universities, ensuring networking and greater understanding.¹⁰⁷

As in Lieutenant General Graf von Baudissin's time, the *Innere Fuehrung* department should be posted directly under the *GenInsp* [CJCS] to signal its fundamental importance.¹⁰⁸ In addition, *GenInsp's* assistant for education and training should become a "Management Assistant for *Innere Fuehrung*" and report to the *GenInsp* and Defense Committee. The *Bundeswehr* Institute for Social Sciences should be tasked with conducting annual surveys on *Innere Fuehrung* with survey results presented directly to the Parliamentary Commissioner.¹⁰⁹ Finally, an information campaign needs to be undertaken at every level, designed and implemented for the purpose of gaining trust in the leadership's ability to successfully transform the all-volunteer armed forces.

Summary

With its 55 years of successful history, the *Bundeswehr* has already doubled the lifetime of the *Reichswehr* and *Wehrmacht* combined. *Innere Fuehrung*, with its vital corollary of "citizen in uniform," ensures that the *Bundeswehr* serves as a democratically structured and operated armed force that remains acceptable to the majority of the German people. This concept was initially challenged, but it has successfully adapted to the world's complex and uncertain strategic environment by adhering to its unchanging core values (consistent with the Basic Law). With the transition to an all-volunteer *Bundeswehr*, the pillar of conscription will no longer be available. Accordingly, *Innere Fuehrung's* other two pillars supporting civil-military relations need to be strengthened in an effort to compensate for that loss. Assuming that this will be a relatively simple transformation is not sufficient. A revolutionary process, like the one that originally launched the *Bundeswehr*, is required. This process has to be led by the Parliament, the ultimate master of the *Bundeswehr*. The process should also include societal stakeholders if we are to ensure the *Bundeswehr* remains an integrated and accepted part of German society.

NOTES

1. Dr. Franz Josef Jung, "Tagesbefehl des Bundesministers der Verteidigung (Order of the Day of the Minister of Defense)," Bonn, January 28, 2011: Own translation. The Order of the Day is available in the German version of *Innere Fuehrung* (Leadership Development and Civic Education), *Zentrale Dienstvorschrift 10/1, Innere Fuehrung*, (Joint Service Regulation), (Bonn: Joint Forces Staff (Fue S 1 4), January 28, 2008) only, http://www.innerefuehrung.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/zinfue!/ut/p/c4/JYvLCsIwEEX_aCaVatWdDwQV1J3WjSTtWGLSpMSJgvjxJngPnM3h4hUT-Tr50J117Jy1esG70XL3hadTto909EkjDkawiCJEao-AxEmKK5_xtCRrviLOZHOvkLkj2AQY-f2OYSQ0gFdlu1KNZLUYqJ-K_4VqvZfmeqyvH2sDni0PeLH0bIQeM!/ (accessed May 6, 2012); [German] Federal Ministry of Defense Home Page, "History of the Bundeswehr," February 28, 2012: "[The armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany] have officially been called the Bundeswehr since 1 April 1956." http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg!/ut/p/c4/FcwxDoAgDEDRG7W7m6dQ3AAbalRCKML1xfz15eOFK7GDg-1cxCY80Xje3ASXRwBIH61F4q61JO78gHv1Jp0UGwRSH5fohMc_SgENCdac9w8ftXfP/ (accessed May 10, 2012).

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3. Deutscher Bundestag, “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,” October 2010, trans. Professor Christian Tomuschat and Professor David P. Currie, trans. revised by Professor Christian Tomuschat and Professor Donald P. Kommers in cooperation with the Language Service of the German Bundestag, 11, <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf> (accessed May 3, 2012); Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 41.

4. For an English translation of the original version, see Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe (CVCE), “The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG),” May 23, 1949, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/The_Basic_Law_of_the_FRG_23_May_1949-en-7fa618bb-604e-4980-b667-76bf0cd0dd9b.html (accessed May 10, 2012).

5. Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 43: “Two months after the outbreak of the war in Korea, Winston Churchill demanded a West German contribution to the European defense.”

6. Ibid., 64-65; Markus Reinhardt, “Civil-Military Relations in the European Union and ‘Innere Fuehrung,’” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 5-6.

7. Anja-Dalgaard Nielsen, *Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2006), 27.

8. Steven J. Brady, *Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance under Pressure, 1953–1960 (The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series)* (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2010), 107; Mark S. Milosch, *Modernizing Bavaria: The Politics of Franz Josef Strauss and the CSU, 1949–1969 (Monographs in German History)* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 29: “the great majority of Germans opposed rearmament.”

9. Klaus-Juergen Bremm, Hans-Hubertus Mack, and Martin Rink, *Entschieden fuer den Frieden: 50 Jahre Bundeswehr, 1955 bis 2005* (Freiburg i.Br./Berlin: Rombach, 2005), 3.

10. Georg Heinrich Klippel, *Das Leben des Generals von Scharnhorst, Dritter Theil, Fuenftes und sechstes Buch, 1801–1813* (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1871), 294.

11. [German] Federal Ministry of Defense Home Page, “History of the Bundeswehr,” February 28, 2012: “three months later, the volunteer army became a conscript army;” Ute Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscriptation and Civil Society* (Oxford, UK: Berg, 2004), 19.

12. Ibid., 267; Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, *The Rebirth of the West: The Americanization of the Democratic World, 1945–1958* (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), 386.

13. *Jewish Virtual Library Home Page*, A Division of the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Heusinger.html> (accessed May 8, 2012).

14. Das Bundesarchiv Home Page, “Das deutsche Militaerwesen - Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1990,” April 21, 2010, 16:46, 3-11, http://www.bundesarchiv.de/oefentlichkeitsarbeit/bilder_dokumente/01725/index-2.html.de (accessed April 28, 2012); Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 53-63; for background on the Himmerod Memorandum, see David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 97-103; and especially Professor Dr. Holger H. Herwig, “Aggression Contained? The Federal Republic of Germany and International Security,” NATO Research Fellowship (Calgary, Canada: The University of Calgary), 3-34, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/herwig.pdf> (accessed February 29, 2012); Prof. Dr. Holger H. Herwig, e-mail message to author, March 4, 2012. Professor Herwig could not recall the date of publication of his paper. He stated that the paper “was only printed electronically.”

15. Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 56-67; James Sperling, *Germany at Fifty-Five: Berlin ist nicht Bonn? (Issues in German Politics)* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004), 332.

16. Berthold Meyer, *The Concept of “Innere Fuehrung” and its Translation Into the Agenda of Socialisation of German Soldiers, PRIF-Research Paper, no. II/3-2008* (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Hessische Stiftung Friedens-und Konfliktforschung, 2008), 7-8.

17. The [German] Federal Minister of Defense, *Innere Fuehrung: Leadership Development and Civic Education, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1* (Bonn: Joint Forces Staff Fue S), January 28, 2008), no. 201-205, 9, <http://www.innerefuehrung.bundeswehr.de/resource/resource/zEzNTM->

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18. Deutscher Bundestag, "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," 13.

19. Matthias Molt, *Von der Wehrmacht zur Bundeswehr: Personelle Kontinuität und Diskontinuität beim Aufbau der Deutschen Streitkräfte 1955–1966*, Dissertation (Heidelberg: Philosophische Fakultät der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität, 2007), 31: The founding fathers are Lieutenant General (Retired) Wolf Graf Baudissin, General (Retired) Johann Adolf Graf Kielmansegg and General (Retired) Ulrich de Maizièrè.

20. Korvettenkapitän Carsten Pust, *The German Leadership Philosophy in the Information Age* (Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Forces College / College des Forces Canadiennes, May 6, 2003), 8, <http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/289/287/pust.pdf> (accessed May 4, 2012).

21. Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 59-60.

22. Donald Abenheim, *The Citizen in Uniform: Reform and its Critics in the Bundeswehr, Final Report* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, February 1988), 2-6; Petra McGregor, "The Role of 'Innere Führung' in German Civil-Military Relations," *Strategic Insights* 5, no. 4 (April 2006).

23. Michael G. Lux, *Innere Führung: A Superior Concept of Leadership* (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008), 50-60; The [German] Federal Minister of Defense, *Innere Führung, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1* (2008), Preliminary remarks.

24. [German] Federal Ministry of Defense Home Page, "Innere Führung (Leadership and Civic Education) and the Citizen in Uniform," February 2, 2012, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Fcw5EoAgDEDRG5HeziO4NA5gDBkhMKzXF-dXr_1wwkx0Z9KVo2gPOxyW-FzOUCZ1UYeswO-RaUvRc-VWmyY1loMuKRTDj9bSJJgTbf_MEBwqkENYPn9-ejA!!/ (accessed May 3, 2012).

25. Meyer, *The Concept of "Innere Führung,"* 8.

26. The [German] Federal Minister of Defense, *Innere Führung, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1* (2008), no. 308, annex 2/2: Section 11 of *Soldatengesetz (SG) (Legal Status of Military Personnel Act)* describes the significance and limits of obedience; Sabine Manitz, "Redefining Soldierly Role Models in Germany," *Armed Forces & Society*, September 27, 2011, originally published online August 5, 2011, 686, in ProQuest (accessed November 11, 2011).

27. Ibid., no. 625, 22, Chapter 6-II and 6-III.

28. Ibid., no. 308, annex 2/1; Ulrich de Maizièrè, "Was war neu an der Bundeswehr? Betrachtungen eines Zeitzeugen," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 14: The additional duties were compensated by the legal rights for complaint, election of spokespersons, the abandonment of military courts and the institution of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces.

29. Deutscher Bundestag, "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," 24-25.

30. Wilfried von Bredow, "Conscription, Conscientious Objection, and Civic Service: The Military Institutions and Political Culture of Germany, 1945 to the present," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 20, no. 2 (Winter 1992): 291.

31. Ibid., 292; Stephan Pfaffenzeller, "Conscription and Democracy: The Mythology of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society*, March 18, 2010, originally published online November 13, 2009, 485, <http://afs.sagepub.com/content/36/3/481> (accessed April 26, 2012).

32. Eberhard Kolb, *The Weimar Republic*, trans. P.S. Falla and R.J. Park (London: Routledge, 2005), 172; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 109-113.

33. Wolfram Wette, *The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality*, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 2-3.

34. Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 59-62: Abenheim translates "Inneres Gefuege" as "inner structure"; de Maizièrè, "Was war neu an der Bundeswehr?" 11.

35. Jared Donnelly, *Public Opinion of Conscription in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1954-1956* (master's thesis, University of North Texas, May 2009), 10, in ProQuest (accessed November 12, 2011); Donald Abenheim, *Soldiers and Politics Transformed: German-American Reflections on Civil-Military Relations in a New Strategic Environment* (Berlin: Carola Hartman Miles, 2007), 84.

36. Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 80: “The Adenauer government agreed that the future soldier should be subordinate to civilian control as never before in German history,” and 81: “by subordinating the new armed forces to parliamentary control, finally fulfilling the liberal hopes for the soldiers and the state in German history.”

37. Dieter Wellershoff, “Das ganze vor seinen Teilen sehen,” in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 22-23; Deutscher Bundestag, “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,” 73-74; for dates of amendments see: <http://www.constitution.org/cons/germany.txt> (accessed May 10, 2012).

38. de Maizière, “Was war neu an der Bundeswehr?” 11-15.

39. Deutscher Bundestag, “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,” 30: Article 24 (2); *Ibid.*, 73: Article 87a Armed Forces was added March 19, 1956.

40. *Ibid.*, 30: “Article 26;” Donald Abenheim, *German Soldier and German Unity: Political Foundations of the German Armed Forces, Final Report* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, January 1991), 12.

41. de Maizière, “Was war neu an der Bundeswehr?” 12-14: In addition, the military territorial tasks and the civil administration were joint down to the garrison. The same applies for the areas of security policy, military reconnaissance, military law, and *Innere Fuehrung*; Uwe Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung: Erfolge und Defizite der Fuehrungsphilosophie der Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles, 2007), 31-34. Accordingly, the German military is often described as a “parliamentary armed force.”

42. Detlef Bald, “Militärreform und Grundgesetz: Zum Konzept der ‘Inneren Führung’,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (APuZ 21/2005). Own translation: “It is significant, that even in September 1955 Heusinger [the first Joint Chiefs of Staff] and Speidel [the first Commander of Allied Ground Forces in Central Europe] announced their skepticism on the primacy of the civilian in the Bundeswehr to the chancellor.” http://www.bpb.de/popup/popup_druckversion.html?guid=FQNO6C&page=0 (accessed May 6, 2012)

43. Hans-Juergen Rautenberg, “Streitkraefte und Spitzengliederung – zum Verhaeltnis von ziviler und bewaffneter Macht bis 1990,” in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 113-114: The term “civil control,” adopted from US constitutional theory, was intentionally mistranslated to allow the civil authorities to directly control all military activities and to assure the constitutional superiority of political over military leaders.

44. Deutscher Bundestag, “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,” 108: “Article 115b.”

45. Bald, “Militärreform und Grundgesetz;” Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 168.

46. *Deutscher Bundestag Home Page*, “Defence Committee,” http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a12/index.html (accessed April 12, 2012).

47. Rudolf Schlaffer, “Der Wehrbeauftragte – Kontrolleur der inneren Entwicklung der Bundeswehr,” in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 398. The Swedish ‘Militie-Ombudsman’ was taken as an example for this institution. Some parliamentarian feared that this institution would undermine the confidence between superiors and subordinates; *Deutscher Bundestag Home Page*, “Armed Forces Commissioner,” http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/commissioner/index.html (accessed April 12, 2011); Deutscher Bundestag, “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,” 40-41, Article 45b.

48. The [German] Federal Minister of Defense, *Innere Fuehrung, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1* (2008), 4; For a description of the history of the Council and a comparison to the RAND Corporation, see Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 94.

49. Andreas Gromius, “Die Beteiligungsrechte der Vertrauensperson in der Bundeswehr: Erlaeterungen zum Soldatenbeteiligungsgesetz,” ed. Oberstleutnant Martin Berg (Walhalla Fachverlag), 15. This recalled a Weimar Republic tradition within the Reichswehr. <http://www.walhalla.de/static/leseprobe/6244600.pdf> (accessed April 6, 2011)

50. Abenheim explains four major features of the Bundeswehr to ensure integration, see Abenheim, *German Soldier and German Unity*, 10-15; Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 83. According to Huntington’s theory of civil-military relations, the Germans chose “Subjective Civilian Control” to achieve “its ends by civilizing the [Bundeswehr], making them the mirror of the state.”

Objective Civilian Control on the other hand “achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state;” Bredow, “Conscription, Conscientious:” 291.

51. For more details of the use of former Wehrmacht officers in the Bundeswehr, see Jens-Olaf Koltermann, “*Citizen in Uniform:*” 9-11.

52. Jürgen Rose, “Demokratisierung der Bundeswehr als Schritt auf dem Weg zum Frieden: Anmerkungen zu den Zivilisierungsperspektiven einer autoritären Institution,” (Marburg: Center for Conflict Studies Working Papers, 2011), 10, <http://www.uni-marburg.de/konfliktforschung/publikationen/wp14.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2012).

53. Abenheim, *Soldiers and Politics Transformed*, 211.

54. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 123.

55. Rudolf J. Schlaffer, Wolfgang Schmidt, Wolf Graf von Baudissin, *1907-1993: Modernisierer zwischen totalitärer Herrschaft und freiheitlicher Ordnung* (Muenchen: R. Oldenbourg, 2007), 237: That was after the retirement of Baudissin who retired December 31, 1967.

56. Detlef Bald, “Die Militaerreform in der ‘Aera Brandt’ – zur Integration von Militaer und Gesellschaft,” in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 341-342; Donald Abenheim, “Image of the Wehrmacht in Federal German Society and in the Tradition of the Bundeswehr” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Civil-Military Relations, August 1999), 24.

57. Frank Naegler, “Innere Fuehrung: Zum Entstehungszusammenhang einer Fuehrungsphilosophie fuer die Bundeswehr,” in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 332-333.

58. Angelika Doerfler-Dierken, “Die Bedeutung des Jahres 1968 fuer die Innere Fuehrung,” in *Zurueckgestutzt, sinmentleert, unverstanden: Die Innere Fuehrung der Bundeswehr*; ed. Detlef Bald, Hans-Guenther Froehling, Juergen Gross, Claus Freiherr von Rosen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 71.

59. Bald, “Die Militaerreform in der ‘Aera Brandt’,” 343-346, 349: As a result, the demographics of the officers changed in 1975 as follows: public servants from 42% (1967) to 26% (1975), white-collar employees from 26% to 41%, blue-collar workers from 4% to 17%, self-employed, farmers and craftsman from 26% to 15%. Most important the percentage of aristocratic lieutenants fell from 15% to only 1%.

60. Doerfler-Dierken, “Die Bedeutung des Jahres 1968,” 74.

61. Abenheim, *Soldiers and Politics Transformed*, 28: “In its head and limbs in 1990, the NVA remained a Germanized version of the Soviet Army.”

62. Werner von Scheven, “Die Bundeswehr und der Aufbau Ost,” in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 442. Own translation: “and all female officer candidates, except those in medical service;” Andre Bickford, “Soldiers, Citizens, and the State: East German Army Officers in Post-Unification Germany,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51, no. 2 (2009): 260-261, in ProQuest (accessed January 6, 2012).

63. Gunnar Digutsch, “Die NVA und die Armee der Einheit” in *Die Bundeswehr 1955–2005, Rueckblenden – Einsichten – Perspektiven*, ed. Frank Naegler (Muenchen: R. Oldenbourg, 2007), 451.

64. Ibid.; 467; Corps and division-level units were taken over by generals and their teams from the Bundeswehr. On the regiment and battalion level, Bundeswehr officers took the lead. In cases where NVA officers were in the lead, a training and support group from the Bundeswehr was attached; Scheven, “Die Bundeswehr und der Aufbau Ost,” 442-443

65. Joseph Fitchett, “Success Story for the Bundeswehr / 10% of Its 30,000 Officers Come From the East: German Army Smoothly Makes Room in the Ranks for Former Foes,” *The New York Times*, February 11, 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/11/news/11iht-bundes.2.t.html?...all> (accessed April 17, 2012).

66. Abenheim, *Soldiers and Politics Transformed*, 20; Digutsch, “Die NVA und die Armee der Einheit,” 470.

67. Abenheim, *German Soldier and German Unity*, 16-19: “fully 98% of the officer corps joined the SED [Socialist Unity Party];” Digutsch has slightly different and more detailed figures, see Digutsch, “Die NVA und die Armee der Einheit,” 451-453: Members of the SED, end of 1988: officers: 96%, officer cadets: 94% and NCOs: 60%; Bickford, “Soldiers, Citizens, and the State,” 263-264, 279, 283.

68. Abenheim, *Soldiers and Politics Transformed*, 25-26.

69. Ibid., 26; Ruediger Wenske, "Zur Sicht der NVA auf die "Innere Fuehrung" in der Bundeswehr" in Wolf Graf von Baudissin *1907-1993: Modernisierer zwischen totalitaerer Herrschaft und freiheitlicher Ordnung*, ed. Rudolf J. Schlaffer, Wolfgang Schmidt (Muenchen: R. Oldenbourg, 2007), 195; for background on the different views on Innere Fuehrung, see Abenheim, *German Soldier and German Unity*, 22-25.

70. *Bundeswehr Home Page*, "Hintergrundinformationen zur Eingliederung von Soldaten der NVA in die Bundeswehr (Background information on integration of Soldiers of the National Peoples Army into the Bundeswehr)," January 18, 2012, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/NYzBD0IwEES_hR_o0gNlvGGMxouejOKttGtpKC1ZFrn48bYHZ5K5vMmDF6QG9XFWsYt-BeXhCp92-30S_GRQLEzoeSeGbUVhag_HKYhAWFz04PTDCIzvSV8eAnJcxSEtrSXEkMUdin8lKllhwBrpSHg9yV_4jv_X53tZNVcnL9XTLQm-hMwjzNDVbWxQ_swOnBw!!/ (accessed April 7, 2012).

71. Abenheim, *Soldiers and Politics Transformed*, 34; Nina Leonhard, "Die Soldaten der NVA und die 'Armee der Einheit'," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 461. Approximately 500 officers and 900 NCOs were dismissed from the Bundeswehr because they failed to report their Stasi (the East German secret police) backgrounds.

72. Leonhard, "Die Soldaten der NVA und die 'Armee der Einheit,'" 462-463.

73. Meyer, *The Concept of "Innere Fuehrung,"* 10-11.

74. Scheven, "Die Bundeswehr und der Aufbau Ost," 449.

75. Christian Hacke, "Die Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 275; Steele named it "army of unity," see Charles A. Steele, *Brothers in Arms: Case Studies of Officer and NCO Integration in the New States of the Federal Republic of Germany* (dissertation, West Virginia University, 2000), 8, in ProQuest (accessed December 7, 2011).

76. Karl Johann, "EinTeilderBundeswehrwiedieStreitkraefte:50JahreBundeswehrverwaltung," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 207.

77. Harold Marcuse, *Historical Dollar-to-Marks Currency Conversion Page*, March 29, 2012, <http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/projects/currency.htm> (accessed May 22, 2012).

78. Deutscher Bundestag, "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," 73: "Article 87a [Armed Forces];" Peter Dreist, "Die Auslandseinsaetze der Bundeswehr zwischen Politik und Verfassungsrecht," in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 508-509; Karen Carstens, "The Week in Germany," *German Missions in the United States Home Page*, February 17, 2012, http://www.germany.info/Vertretung/usa/en/newsletter/The_Week_in_Germany/TWIG_120217.html (accessed May 2, 2012).

79. Kerry Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force: The evolution of German security policy 1990-2003* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), 59-60; *Die Bundesregierung Home Page*, "Chronologie der Einsaetze (Chronolgy of Bundeswehr missions)," August 28, 2008, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/Auslandseinsaetze/ChronologieEinsaetze/2008-04-24-Chronologie%20der%20Eins%C3%A4tze.html> (accessed April 3, 2012).

80. Dreist, "Die Auslandseinsaetze der Bundeswehr zwischen Politik und Verfassungsrecht," 509, 511-517; Ulrike Liebert, "Europeanizing the Military: The ECJ and the Transformation of the Bundeswehr," *CEuS Working Paper 2002/7* (Bremen: University of Bremen, 2002), 3-4. In addition, on January 11, 2000, the European Court of Justice declared that women should be admitted to all military services. The Bundeswehr was at that time not properly prepared for such a step, <http://www.monnet-centre.uni-bremen.de/pdf/wp/2002-7-Liebert.pdf> (accessed April 16, 2012).

81. Stefanie Fletcher, "On a new mission: The foreign missions of the Bundeswehr and German security policy," *Compass 2020: Germany in International relations. Aims, instruments, prospects* (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2007), 10, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/05162.pdf> (accessed April 27, 2012).

82. Dr. Peter Struck, *Defense Policy Guidelines* (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung ([German] Federal Ministry of Defense), May 21, 2003), 11-12, http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Germany_English2003.pdf (accessed April 27, 2012).

83. [German] Federal Ministry of Defense, *White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2006), 9, http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/germany_white_paper_2006.pdf (accessed April 27, 2012).

84. Tom Dyson, "Managing Convergence: German Military Doctrine and Capabilities in the 21st Century," *Defense Studies* 11, no 2 (June 2011): 253-254.

85. Niels Klabunde, "Cultural Diplomacy as "Soft Power" and the Need for Cultural Knowledge in Germany's Mission in Afghanistan," 7, <http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/pdf/case-studies/cd-as-a-softpower.pdf> (accessed April 27, 2012); "Bundeswehr: Neue Aera," *Der Spiegel*, December 28, 1992, 30-31. The 1992 created slogan "helping, protecting and securing" of the former Minister of Defense, Volker Ruehe, was still deeply ingrained in German society, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13855395.html> (accessed April 9, 2012)

86. Dyson, "Managing Convergence," 252: "The cult of the warrior was weak or absent within the Bundeswehr," *Spiegel Online International Home Page*, "Army's Composition 'Still Reflects Spirit of Cold War'," June 14, 2010, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,700511,00.html> (accessed April 27, 2012); James D. Bindenagel, "Afghanistan: The German Factor," *Prism* 1, no. 4 (September 2010): 96: "German politicians have been slowly urging the German public to be more involved militarily and to accept a military-combat role in NATO operations;" *Ibid.*, 106: "The Kunduz attack has changed the debate; Germans in Afghanistan are at war and war is [still] rejected by a significant majority of Germans at home."

87. Dr. Peter Struck, *Defense Policy Guidelines* (2003), 19.

88. [German] Federal Ministry of Defense, *White Paper 2006*, 10.

89. Berthold Meyer, "Innere Fuehrung und Auslandseinsatze: Was wird aus dem Markenzeichen der Bundeswehr?" *HFSK-Report, Nr. 02/2009*, 23-24: Both the traditionalists and the reformers of the founding generation retired from the Bundeswehr in the mid-1980s.

90. DW-Staff (jen), "18 Soldiers Indicted in Hazing Case," *Deutsche Welle Home Page*, June 21, 2005; Coesfeld incident 2004: "Eighteen German soldiers were indicted Monday in the wake of a scandal surrounding the alleged abuse of more than 160 military recruits, using electrical shocks and beatings," <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1623143,00.html> (accessed April 1, 2012); *Spiegel Online International Home Page*, "Afghanistan Scandal: Skull Images Shock Germany," October 26, 2006; Afghanistan incident 2006: "German soldiers desecrating a skull in Afghanistan have triggered a full blown image crisis for Germany. Those who behave like that have no place in the Bundeswehr," intoned German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung on Wednesday. Chancellor Angela Merkel weighed in Wednesday, calling the photos "shocking and repugnant," <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,444879,00.html> (accessed April 1, 2011).

91. The [German] Federal Minister of Defense, *Innere Fuehrung, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1* (2008). Mission and mission-related issues are mentioned in the regulation in several places: Mission: no. 105, 501, 504, 609, 620, 628, 636, 663, 672, 675; Mission readiness: no. 612, 624, 654, 675; Mission ability: no 644.

92. [German] Federal Ministry of Defence Home Page, "Compulsory and voluntary military service," February 28, 2012, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg!/ut/p/c4/FcxLDoAgDADRG7V7d55CccengUYohCJcX80kbzl44ZfYydEOrmIznmg8b26BKzOCsk_UE_HQVjMPvsE9EkgXpQ4_gU104PGPckRDgq2U_QXOHYjX/ (accessed April 10, 2012).

93. For possible consequences of an all-volunteer force which deploys soldiers on combat tours regularly, see Mark Thompson, "An Army Apart: 45,000 troops are coming home to a country that doesn't know them," *Time*, November 21, 2011, 35. The U.S. example cannot be translated into German society 100%, but some of the consequences may become reality for the all-volunteer Bundeswehr in the future.

94. *Prof. Dr. M. Wolffsohn Home Page*: Professor Dr. Michael Wolffsohn (17 May 1947-) is an Israeli-born German historian who is working at the Bundeswehr University Munich as a historian, <http://www.wolffsohn.de/> (accessed January 6, 2012).

95. Michael Wolffsohn, "Die Unterschicht übernimmt die Landesverteidigung," *Welt Online*, January 16, 2011, <http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article12186329/Die-Unterschicht->

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96. Wenke Apt, "Demographischer Wandel als Rekrutierungsproblem? Regionale Ungleichheit und unerschlossene Potentiale bei der Nachwuchsgewinnung der Bundeswehr," *SWP-Aktuell* 41 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), May 2010), 2, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2010A41_apw_ks.pdf (accessed April 16, 2012); for German population by area, see *Statistisches Bundesamt Home Page*, Population by area, 2012, <https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/LongTermSeries/Population/lrbev03.html> (accessed May 2, 2012).

97. Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung*, 35. The consensus in German society is that conscription has facilitated the integration of the Bundeswehr into society.

98. German Ministry of Defense—The Minister, *Defense Policy Guidelines: Safeguarding National Interests – Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together* (Berlin: May 27, 2011), 9-10, 13-14, 16-17, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg!/ut/p/c4/LYsxEOAgDATf4gdIB-cv1MYBzcQbMDgQ8ftSONtssUsrddQ3iDdk9YImWnaM4XXhauIq9pPLybB65wRdDf6FQzZ2R-47PxdqtcTHGAXIU_q72byv9tgQFK91xGj6tRgx1/ (accessed April 27, 2011).

99. Uwe Hartmann, "Baudissin und die Weiterentwicklung der Inneren Fuehrung" in *Zur Aktualitaet des Denkens von Wolf Graf von Baudissin*, ed. Michael Staack (WIFIS-aktuell, Wissenschaftliches Forum fuer internationale Sicherheit e.V. (Leverkusen Opladen: Budrich, November 2011), 43.

100. Dr. Horst Koehler, "Rede von Bundespraesident Horst Koehler beim Festakt zum 50-jaebrigen Bestehen der Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr am 14. September 2007 in Hamburg: 'Maessstaeb der Fuhrungsauslese,'" *FueAk-Reflexionen, Zeitschrift der Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr* (Newspaper of Command and Staff College of the Bundeswehr), no. 8 (September 2007), 7: Own translation. http://www.fueakbw.de/share/1/05_Publikationen/07_FueAk_Reflexionen/Jahrgang_2007/FueAk_Reflexionen_Nr8_09_2007.pdf (accessed March 1, 2012)

101. *Home Page of Professor Dr. Elmar Wiesendahl*. Wiesendahl is head of the department of social science at the Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr (Command and Staff College of the Bundeswehr), <http://www.elmarwiesendahl.de/> (accessed April 9, 2012).

102. Elmar Wiesendahl, "Zur Aktualitaet der Inneren Fuehrung von Baudissin fuer das 21. Jahrhundert: Ein analytischer Bezugsrahmen" in *Innere Fuehrung fuer das 21. Jahrhundert: Die Bundeswehr und das Erbe Baudissins*, ed. Elmar Wiesendahl (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoeningh, 2007), 161-162.

103. *Ibid.*, 13-16; Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung*, 264-266; Berthold Meyer, "Innere Fuehrung ist keine Schoenwetter-Dienstvorschrift" in *Bundeswehr im Krieg: wie kann die Innere Fuehrung ueberleben?*, ed. Detlef Bald, Hans-Guenter Froehling, Juergen Gross, Hamburger Beitraege zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, Heft 153 (Hamburg: Dezember 2009), 42-44; Doerfler-Dierken, "Die Bedeutung des Jahres 1968," 96-105; Detlef Bald, "Die Reform der Bundeswehr und eine zeitgemaesse Innere Fuehrung," in *Zurueckgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden*, 96-105; Juergen Rose, "Vision 'Zivilisierung des Militaers,'" in *Zurueckgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden*, 143-151, 153.

104. Meyer, "Innere Fuehrung und Auslandseinsaetze:" 25-27: Meyer describes how the sub-committee of the Defense Committee did not properly cooperate with the Bundeswehr and the consequences of this lack of cooperation.

105. *Deutscher BundeswehrVerband Homepage, The Bundeswehr Association Home Page*, https://www.dbwv.de/C12574E8003E04C8/Docname/INTERN_HomeDE (accessed April 16, 2012); Manitz, "Redefining Soldierly Role Models in Germany," 685: "This organization is [a kind of] a union."

106. *[German] Federal Ministry of Defense Home Page*, "Accompanying Programme for the Reform," October 18, 2011, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg!/ut/p/c4/RYYxDolwFEW_xR_og-

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107. Meyer, The Concept of “Innere Fuehrung,” 6-7; “it is principally possible for civil students to study at a Bundeswehr-university, this has never happened in reality;” *Zivile Karriere Bundeswehr Home Page*; instead, the Bundeswehr civilians study at public universities, https://ziv.bundeswehr-karriere.de/portal/a/zivkarriere!/ut/p/c4/PYqxDYQwDABnYQG7_-63ADonOMTCn7wcHCSmhwKha06nwxlvCnVZaZdaSHHEKconHHBK38hM2Bhe6dWC6OJlhUQx5xpzi9nVWBjDuBNrtbb7Iv4D8vbcjYKSJ_xv3-ECWwv73A!!/ (accessed April 27, 2012); The [German] Federal Minister of Defense, *Innere Fuehrung*, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 (2008), No. 502, 16.

108. Juergen Gross, “Einfuehrung,” in *Zurueckgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden*, 13-16. Gross describes how Innere Fuehrung lost its significance in the Bundeswehr over time.

109. *Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr Home Page, The Bundeswehr Institute for Social Sciences Home Page*, http://www.sowi.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/swinstbw!/ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK94uyk-OLyzLziEiCnNCm1KL40r1i_INtREQDvuaV8 (accessed May 10, 2012); Meyer, “Innere Fuehrung und Auslandseinsatze:” 33.