

The Roots of US Counterinsurgency Doctrine

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Counterinsurgency is currently much discussed following a period of neglect after the Vietnam era. Some people say that these types of actions for US forces began with US Marine Corps operations in Central America in the 1920s and 30s. This article, the winner of the Adler-Darby Military History Writing Program of the US Army Command and General Staff College, looks at an earlier successful US campaign in a counterinsurgency conflict.

IN 1901, US Army General J. Franklin Bell conducted a counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippine Islands notable for its diversity and effectiveness. As a military commander, he was afforded unusual power and authority. He engaged all the resources of his district in every sphere—political, economic, cultural and military—to isolate and defeat the enemy guerrilla force. His successful campaign empirically developed the counterinsurgency techniques that would form the basis of US low-intensity conflict doctrine.

The Philippine-American conflict holds a unique place in US history. The US Army had never before left the North American continent. Never before had it sought extrahemispheric colonies. Never before, or since, had the United States imposed sovereignty by force of arms over millions of aliens. It was the first campaign in a tropical climate and the first to quell an inspired and organized insurrection of a people fighting for independence. It was the first time Army officers were given absolute dictatorial control over US territory and its inhabitants. It was a new type of war that demanded innovation in tactics and an appreciation for the political as well as operational environment. It was a counterinsurgency war.¹

Background

To gain an appreciation for the social-political environment, it is necessary to examine the historical context and background events leading to Bell's campaign. Around the turn of the century, US patriotism and nationalism were at their zenith. It was a time of arrogance, power and an overstatement of national purpose. America had expanded across the broad continent and on to Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, and into the Pacific to Hawaii and Pago Pago. Concerned by Spain's abuses of the Cubans, Puerto Ricans and Filipinos and shocked by the sinking of the USS *Maine*, the United States de-

clared war on Spain on 25 April 1898.

One hundred days later, following essentially two naval victories, the war was over. The quick victory thrust the United States into prominence as a world power, further fueled the fires of patriotism and contributed to the decision to colonize the Philippines. Shortly afterwards the Philippines, led by General Emilio Aguinaldo, were in revolt. As 1899 drew to a close, Aguinaldo's army was defeated and ceased to exist as a regular fighting force. The US government settled into a policy of "benevolent pacification."

In actuality, the US leadership did not grasp the changing situation. They assumed the Filipino army had disintegrated with its defeat. In fact, Aguinaldo had decided to revert to guerrilla warfare.

The Filipinos recognized the futility of fighting with regular forces and, during the first half of 1900, prepared for a new guerrilla form of warfare. They dispersed their forces, divided the Philippines into districts, shed their uniforms and published operations manuals. They organized and recruited additional guerrilla forces, trained their forces on the new tactics, acquired arms and materiel caches and built a base of support within the Filipino populace. The nature and intensity of these activities would provide a unique challenge to US forces.

Aguinaldo's forces undertook an organized campaign to solidify their support base. They propagandized the people about US brutalities, used selected terrorism against collaborating Filipinos and conducted hit-and-run attacks on US troops and installations to demonstrate the weakness of US authority. These guerrilla tactics were complemented by the rugged terrain and dense tropical forests that provided a secure base of operations from which the forces could operate almost with impunity.

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"KILL EVERY ONE OVER TEN."

—GEN. JACOB H. SMITH

Illustrated by W. H. B. STANLEY



Editorial cartoon from William Randolph Hearst's New York Evening Journal. (Inset) General Emilio Aguinaldo who organized his guerrilla campaign with an eye towards influencing US public opinion.

Criminals Because They Were Born Ten Years Before We Took the Philippines.

Aguinaldo's intent was to tire the Americans and make their occupation as costly as possible. He was keenly aware of the anti-imperialist movement gaining support within the United States. He recognized the need to increase the guerrilla activity to influence the upcoming presidential election and the US press.

New York Public Library, (inset) National Archives

possible. He was keenly aware of the anti-imperialist movement gaining support within the United States. He recognized the need to increase the guerrilla activity to influence the upcoming presidential election and the US press. Although these were his near-term objectives, he and his forces were prepared to fight a protracted war. Thus, they were able to integrate guerrilla tactical operations into a politically oriented strategy. This approach to the operational environment was to become part of the classical revolutionary doctrine of Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap.

After organizing and training, Aguinaldo's guerrilla forces began a concerted campaign. The fighting reached its

apex in November 1900. In response, the United States modified its policy of benevolence and began vigorous offensive operations continuing into early 1901.

On 23 March 1901, Aguinaldo was captured and the revolution appeared finished. General Arthur MacArthur declared victory, turned over complete control to the civilian Second Philippine Commission, headed by William Howard Taft, and the United States returned its policy of benevolent pacification.

"All of the evidence available at the end of 1901 showed that the campaign was a complete success. As far as the majority of provinces in the Philippines were concerned, pacification was at hand." Unfortunately,



Battalion
of Filipino
insurgents

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this assessment was far from accurate and would lead to disaster.

Company C, 9th Infantry Regiment, had been garrisoned in the town of Balangiga on the coast of Samar. Under its commander, Captain Thomas W. Connell, Company C had settled into a comfortable existence. It was early Sunday morning, 27 September, when the men began preparing for an 0800 eulogy for the recently assassinated President William McKinley. At the sound of the church bell, hundreds of bolomen suddenly rushed from concealment and began the infamous slaughter of the US soldiers. With improvised weapons and dogged determination, some men of Company C were able to fight their way to the harbor and escape by boat. Of the original 88 men, 59 were killed and 23 wounded. Only six members were

left unhurt.³

America had again misjudged the strength of the guerrilla movement. Following Aguinaldo's capture, the revolution had continued under the leadership of General Miguel Malvar on the island of Luzon and continued to gain support on Samar under the guerrilla leader, General Lukban. These two areas became strongholds of the revolutionary movement and the foundations for continued Philippine resistance.

"While the Americans had concentrated on the pacification of northern Luzon, understrength US forces in southern Luzon had been virtually besieged in their garrisons. US forces were so small and so widely dispersed that effective field operations were impossible."⁴

In retrospect, it is not surprising a major

disaster befell US forces because the reality of the actual threat far exceeded that estimated by the civil and military authorities. However, the incident on Samar was a surprise.

"It was, as so many editors claimed, the worst disaster for the United States Army

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since Custer's fate at Little Big Horn."⁵ It brought into focus the guerrilla threat and awoke the American public and solidified the will of the people behind the war. It shocked the US leadership into the realization that the war was not won and that aggressive measures were required to win. These measures included an additional commitment of forces and a harsh approach to pacification.

Reaction

Two US brigades were committed to the campaigns in the Batangas Province and Samar. General Jacob H. Smith would command the forces on Samar, and Bell would take over the reinforced units of the 2d District, Department of Southern Luzon (DSL). Together they would defeat the enemy forces and pacify the provinces. The strategy and tactics practiced by Bell would become an example of classic counterguerrilla operations. Those employed by Smith would result in his court-martial.

General Adna R. Chaffee, commander of the Philippines, was under extreme pressure from his superiors in Washington and Taft in the Philippines to end the war. This great desire "to bring the revolt to a quick end insured the final campaigns against the revolutionaries would be rigorous."⁶

This was the atmosphere when Bell assumed command of the 3d Separate Brigade (3dSB) in the 2d District, DSL, in late November 1901. He had come to the Philippines two and one-half years earlier as a major. He had performed numerous duties within the US Expeditionary Force to include personal liaison with Aguinaldo before the outbreak of hostilities and rose rapidly through the ranks. His most recent assignments were as the commander of the Pangasinan Province in northern Luzon and the difficult job of provost-marshal-general of Manila.

Bell was keenly aware of the revolutionary movement—its base of support, its tactical operations and the cultural background of its followers. He knew his enemy and what was required to achieve victory. The public outcry over the Balangiga massacre and the corresponding reaction of the senior leaders in Washington and the Philippines gave him the authority to design a campaign that would eliminate the guerrilla threat.

His campaign plan included a deliberate and comprehensive integration of social, political, economic and military actions. These actions were designed to isolate the guerrilla forces, eliminate their base of support and systematically destroy their will and means to resist. The foundation of his strategy was based on the philosophy that "a short and severe war creates, in the aggregate, less loss and suffering than a benevolent war indefinitely prolonged."⁷

The 3dSB had about 7,600 US soldiers and 680 native troops.⁸ It had responsibility for the 2d District, consisting of the three provinces of Batangas, Laguna and Tayabas

in the southwest portion of Luzon. The district had an area of about 2,800 square miles and a population of about 600,000. It was rich and the most populated in southern Luzon and had been one of the most Hispanicized areas in the Philippines. It had also been the birthplace of the Philippine revolutionary movement against Spain.

Opposing Bell was a well-organized, well-led guerrilla force possessing substantial support from the native elite. The insurgents were indistinguishable from the population and lived and worked with the natives. Their open and accepted use of terrorism, especially the public killing of collaborators, effectively prevented native cooperation with US forces. The guerrillas controlled the populace and the local politicians.⁹

Malvar commanded the guerrilla force of about 4,000 active insurgents equipped with around 3,000 rifles. Approximately 400 to 600 were regulars who operated in small bands in the mountains.¹⁰

Malvar exercised exceptional organizational ability and established firm insurgent policies and tactics. A successful landowner and a *principalia*,¹¹ he had demonstrated his abilities during the Philippine insurrection against Spain where he gained valuable experience in organizing guerrilla forces under Aguinaldo. As a result of his leadership and influence, he had attained the rank of general at 31. He was a charismatic leader, exceptional organizer and dedicated nationalist who pursued ruthless policies for the advancement of Philippine independence. He was probably the most capable general the United States would face in the war.¹²

Speech

Bell assembled his officers in a large room at his headquarters on 1 December 1901. Here he laid out the campaign plan for the pacification of the Batangas Province; a



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plan that would be elucidated in 38 telegraphic circulars (TCs), published in the next two months, that would implement his strategy.

Bell's speech shows a leader in touch with the social and political environment within which he must operate. Acutely aware of the cultural interpretation of his forces' actions and the impact those actions would have on the populace, his speech reflects a leader struggling with his own cultural biases to arrive at specific operational techniques that were personally repulsive, but nevertheless necessary. He describes the center of gravity of the guerrilla movement and outlines his strategy to destroy it. He explains to his subordinates the critical aspects of how to accomplish his objectives as well as the rationale for why he selected his techniques.

Bell opened his address with a statement of his mission: "I have been sent here with instructions to put an end to insurrection and re-establish peace in the shortest time practical."¹³ His speech considered several critical aspects of his intended campaign. He outlined his perceptions of the nature of the insurgency and the source of its support

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within the province. He then set forth a plan to "radically change the policy which has heretofore been pursued."¹⁴

Bell extolled the desirability of the current policy of benevolence, but concluded that it had proved inappropriate and ineffective, "the only argument the majority of either class can understand and appreciate is one of physical force."¹⁵ He directed his subordinate officers to act, speak and conduct themselves according to specific standards and to take measures to protect the populace, protect US soldiers and defeat the insurrection.

Bell recognized that the revolution was being supported primarily by the educated upper class. His reasoning was that "to successfully deal with the common people, the head men, the leaders, the *principales* are the ones we need to influence."¹⁶ He thus tried to develop an approach that attacked the guerrilla's base of support and power. In this case, the '*principalia* or rich citizens

bore the brunt of his policies, and he took an aggressive approach to winning them over. He typified the Filipino personality as being disposed towards distrust and intrigue, where benevolence and kindness were interpreted as weakness. "Without first whipping them and convincing them that we are able to accomplish our purposes by force if necessary, we can never gain their friendship; because otherwise we can never command their respect."¹⁷

Bell's major tool in influencing the *principalia* and insurgents was to imprison them. He directed that temporary prisons be constructed in all towns, authorized the imprisonment of any citizen based upon suspicion and allowed for the disciplining of inmates through solitary confinement in dark cells with rations of bread and water.

Although he found such measures personally disagreeable, "under such circumstances as surround us, it is unquestionably a military necessity. . . ."¹⁸ He stated that: ". . . we must pay particular attention to the attitude of *principales* who live in towns under our protection and are the eyes and ears and business agents of insurgents outside. These are the people we most need to investigate. We must get evidence of their complicity and keep them in prison until they are tired of helping to maintain the insurrection and ready to work for peace."¹⁹

Bell set, as an objective, the protection of the populace. "We owe the pacific people protection and must adopt some way of demonstrating our ability to give it."²⁰ He proposed constructing barriers and fences around towns to seal them from the insurgent-dominated countryside. This technique had proved effective in his previous campaign in the province of Pangasinan.

He also set about isolating the insurgent. "We must deprive the insurgent of supplies and prevent their getting more."²¹ He stopped payment to the local governments,

reasoning that the money was ending up in the guerrilla coffers. He authorized the burning of shelters that could be used by insurgents in the countryside and closed all seaports to incoming shipping. He directed that vigorous night operations be conducted to deprive the guerrillas freedom of movement in the darkness and to allow US forces to close with the insurgents before they could be warned and escape. He took extreme measures to eliminate the assassinations of Americans.

"We must adopt such measures as will make the life of an Americanista safer than that of any insurgent."²² Using General Order (GO) 100²³ as authority, Bell directed the execution of prisoners of war, without trial, in retaliation against assassinations of Americans. Additionally, he reasoned that since no assassination could be carried out without the knowledge of the *principales*, all *principales* in the town of an assassination were to be arrested for neglect of duty.²⁴

Finally, he set in motion policies designed to strengthen the US position. All informants would be guaranteed protection; all guerrillas surrendering with a gun were to be released; all guerrillas surrendering without a gun were to be jailed; detailed and formal records and files would be maintained on every person arrested or suspected; records of collaborators were to be kept to ensure they could not be discredited later; if the peasants would not perform required labor, the district *principales* would be arrested and confined or made to perform manual labor until the peasants complied.²⁵ These policies were indeed drastic and radical measures, especially when viewed from the safe borders of the United States.


Bell's plan reflects all the aspects of modern-day counterinsurgency doctrine. His program was designed not only to defeat the insurgent forces, but to destroy the infrastructure supporting the insurgency.

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Implementation

TC 2, 9 December 1901, gave immediate measures to protect the populace. Bell directed the establishment of protection zones²⁶ which the inhabitants of the countryside would be required to occupy. All these settlements would be garrisoned by US troops. More than 300,000 inhabitants were required to move their homes, possessions, food supplies, livestock and so forth, into these designated areas by 25 December 1901. "Property [found outside of said zone at said date] will become liable to confiscation or destruction."²⁷ He went on to add, "As soon as peaceful conditions have been established in the brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes and such assistance be rendered them as may be found practicable."²⁸

Bell complemented his comprehensive civil programs with aggressive military operations. Each sub-district was enjoined to take vigorous offensive operations against armed bands. TC 3 stated "Our troops should always assume the offensive and advance on and pursue them vigorously."²⁹ He reiterated his belief that the election of all town officials was "dictated by Malvar or other insurgent leaders."³⁰ He reminded his commanders of the necessity of forcing the officials to prove their loyalty by deeds not



Filipino volunteers on Luzon. By 1902 their numbers had grown to over 5,000.

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words. "Every inhabitant of this brigade should be active friends or be classed as an enemy."³¹ He directed that arrests of influential citizens be conducted, if only on suspicion. "Once confined, evidence is easily obtained."³²

TC 5, along with 3, was one of the most controversial. Bell outlined the general provisions of GO 100 and the corresponding violations committed by the Filipinos. He concluded that whenever a prisoner or an unarmed or defenseless American or friendly native was murdered or assassinated for political reasons, it was his purpose to "execute a prisoner of war under the authority contained in Sections 59 and 148."³³ He specified how the order would be carried out.

"This prisoner of war will be selected by lot from among the officers or prominent cit-

izens held as prisoners of war, and will be chosen when practicable from those who belong to the town where the murder or assassination occurred"³⁴ Not surprisingly, all assassinations within the brigade ceased.

Many of Bell's circulars concerned themselves with the administration and control of the protection zones. He continually increased the restrictions on the populace in areas the insurgency was active and gave privileged status to those areas free from the insurgency. To ensure the growing number of natives would not revolt against the relatively small garrison force, he directed that any town revolting "will be completely destroyed by fire as a measure of retaliation against such treachery."³⁵ He instituted a pass policy for all natives which effectively eliminated out-of-zone travel for able-

bodied men. Any male found outside the protected zone without a pass "will be arrested and confined, or shot if he runs away."³⁶

With the populace under control and confined to specific areas, Bell began an organized campaign to find and defeat the insurgent forces. On 26 December 1901, Bell reported to his next higher commander, "I am now assembling in the neighborhood of 2,500 men, who will be used in columns of fifty each. I expect to accompany the command. . . . I take so large a command for the purpose of thoroughly searching each ravine, valley, and mountain peak for insurgents and for food, expecting to destroy everything I find outside of town. All able-bodied men will be killed or captured."³⁷

In subsequent orders, Bell continued to emphasize control and selected intimidation of the insurgent supporters. TC 18 directed that commanding officers of all garrisoned towns "arrest all native municipal officials"³⁸ who have not actively aided US forces. He went on to make several exceptions to this order, however the impact was obvious. In one final step, he directed that presidents or heads of barrios must inform the Americans when insurgents entered their jurisdiction. Failure to do so would result in the official being "marched on foot daily at the head of columns or detachments until they have had a drastic lesson."³⁹

After Bell's major campaign, the Army continued to operate in small units throughout the mountains. They destroyed food supplies, harried the guerrillas and kept up constant pressure on the insurgents. The US forces were joined by more Filipinos who were anxious to bring the war to a close and demonstrate their loyalty. These operations were supported increasingly by the prominent and leading citizens who rejected their relationship with the guerrillas and submitted to Bell's overwhelming pressure.

The concentration of the civilian populace

would, according to Mao Tse-tung's philosophy, effectively remove the ocean in which the insurgent fish swam. Additionally, the active and aggressive military operations forced the guerrillas into smaller and smaller pockets. By mid-March, Malvar's forces were harried, dispersed, hungry and facing pressure from both the army and their own populace.⁴⁰

The Philippine-American conflict ended on 16 April 1902. "Without escort, without arms and without guides, Malvar surrendered."⁴¹ He issued his last statement on 6 May 1902: "I proclaim and make known by means of this edict to all concerned that the war carried on against the authority of the United States by the Filipino people has ended."⁴²

Bell's victory was impressive. The insurrection had originated in the Tagalogs (provinces of 3dSB) and had spread like a

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conflagration. "The fire had been quenched everywhere else. General Bell had now stamped out the embers in the Tagalog Provinces."⁴³ He had accomplished this feat in only six months. In his last TC 38, 16 May 1902, he revoked his previous restrictions: "In view of the fact that all insurgents have now surrendered in Batangas and Laguna, it is desired to put a complete end to every war measure heretofore authorized and enforced and to re-establish a feeling of secu-

rity and tranquility among the people as rapidly as possible."⁴⁴

The curtain was not drawn on Bell's campaign. Although receiving praise from his superiors and even the president, he received abject criticism from some members of Congress. The reconcentration of the civilian populace into the protection zones

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was a source of concern and embarrassment. It was Spain's own use of these methods in Cuba and the Philippines which had precipitated US criticism and helped justify the Spanish-American War.

An investigation of Bell's and Smith's campaigns resulted. In the end, Bell was vindicated, but Smith did not fare as well. He was court-martialed, found guilty and forced to retire. However, the controversy surrounding Bell did not end. New evidence of inhumane treatment and harsh living conditions surfaced. These were gradually drowned out by the success of the operations and the disinterest in the subject by a desensitized public and Congress. Thus, the campaign passed into the annals of history to be considered and debated by historians thenceforth.

Bell's campaign in Batangas was unquestionably effective. According to John Gates, it served as the foundation for military doctrine which guided US interventions in Cuba, the Caribbean and, later, in the occupation of Veracruz. The counterinsurgency opera-

tions practiced by Bell contributed to the development of the doctrine subsequently employed by General John J. Pershing in his campaign against the Moros on Mindanao in 1908. "In the final analysis, ironically perhaps, the greatest significance of the American Army's Philippine experience might still be as an example of a successful pacification campaign."⁴⁵

In retrospect, Bell's campaign reflects the tenets of current US counterinsurgency doctrine. He was successful in isolating the insurgent from the population, both physically and psychologically, thereby denying him personnel, materiel and tactical intelligence. He developed a strategy for neutralizing the insurgent leadership and organization. He made stringent provisions for securing and protecting the populace from the insurgent and ensuring a political and government infrastructure free from insurgent terrorism. He successfully mobilized all elements—political, social, economic and military—to neutralize the insurgent and motivate the populace in support of the government. Finally, he decentralized tactical operations and conducted aggressive campaigns which seized the tactical initiative and ultimately led to the guerrilla defeat.

It is not so much the specific counterinsurgency techniques practiced by Bell from which we should draw lessons—many of these would be as, or more, unacceptable now as they were then. Rather we should learn from the process by which he determined his objectives and the environmental factors he had to consider to arrive at an integrated strategy.

However, it was his absolute authority over all spheres of Filipino life that enabled Bell to develop the strategy that brought a rapid end to the insurrection. This strategy allowed a unity of command and central focus for economic, political and military action designed to achieve well-defined goals. His realization of the cultural differ-

ences between his forces and the Filipinos was also critical to his strategy and ultimately to his success.

Finally, it was Bell's personal struggle with employing the harsh techniques of pacification that may be illustrative of our difficulties in conducting counterinsurgency operations. Could Bell have accomplished his mission without resorting to the aggressive techniques employed? Was the reaction of the press and public outcry over the conduct of his campaign indicative of our own cultural biases and standards of conduct? Even

now many historians are quick to judge Bell based solely on the means that he employed to achieve victory.

This raises some higher issues: Will the constraints inherent with US social and cultural morality preclude effective low-intensity operations in specific operational environments? Who will be able to determine that we cannot achieve the ends given our constraints on the means? Will our country ask our military leaders to try anyway? These are crucial questions that transcend this historical example. \square

NOTES

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2 John Morgan Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Inc., 1973), 243.

3 Stuart Creighton Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903* (Westford, MA: Murray Printing Co., 1982), 699-707.

4 Gates, 267.

5 Miller, 204.

6 Gates, 205.

7 BGJ Franklin Bell, *Telegraphic Circular (TC) 3, 9 December 1901: Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders, Regulating Campaign Against Insurgent and Proclamations and Circular Letters, Relating to Reconstruction after Close of War in the Provinces of Batangas, Laguna and Mindoro Philippine Islands* (1 December 1901 to 1 December 1902) comp. M. F. Davis (Batangas, 1 December 1902), AGO 415839.

8 Brian McAllister Linn, *The Warm Luzon: U.S. Army Regional Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1900-1902* (unpublished dissertation, 1985), 312.

9 *Ibid.*, 311.

10 *Ibid.*, 310.

11 Glenn A. May, "Filipino Resistance to American Occupation: Batangas, 1899-1902," *Pacific Historical Review* vol. 4 (November 1979). The principal, about 3 percent of the adult Filipino males, were at the top of the socioeconomic ladder. This elite was well educated and many had achieved political power during the Spanish period.

12 Linn, 248.

13 Bell address *Telegraphic Circulars* (1 December 1901), 1.

14 *Ibid.*, 1.

15 *Ibid.*

16 *Ibid.*

17 *Ibid.*, V.

18 *Ibid.*, IV.

19 *Ibid.*

20 *Ibid.*

21 *Ibid.*, VII.

22 *Ibid.*, VIII.

23 Gates, 191. General Orders 100, Adjutant-General's Office, 1863 (signed by President Lincoln) officially recognized the right of rebellion, and the classification of those who rise up in arms against an occupying or conquering army as "war rebels" who were not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war.

24 Bell address VIII.

25 *Ibid.*, IV-IX.

26 The established protection zones were in actuality concentration camps. The word "reconcentration" became associated with the sinister Spanish General Weyler's camps in Cuba where inhumane treatment and human suffering were rampant.

27 Bell TC 2-2.

28 *Ibid.*

29 Bell, TC 3-3.

30 *Ibid.*, 4.

31 *Ibid.*

32 *Ibid.*, 5.

33 Bell, TC 5, 8.

34 *Ibid.*

35 Bell, TC 13, 13.

36 Bell, TC 14, 14.

37 James H. Blount, *The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1902* (New York and London: The Knickerbocker Press, 1912), 381.

38 Bell, TC 16, 16.

39 Bell, TC 20, 19.

40 Linn, 306-10.

41 Russell Roth, *Muddy Glory: America's Indian Wars in the Philippines 1899 to 1935* (Hanover, MA: Christopher Publishing House, 1981), 81.

42 *Ibid.*

43 Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1930), 224.

44 Bell, TC 38, 32.

45 Gates, 289.

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